Axis prisoners of war as sources for British military intelligence, 1939–42

It was during the Second World War that the Allies developed a sophisticated intelligence system to harness information garnered from the hundreds of thousands of Axis captives taken during hostilities. Indeed, prior to 1942, many Allied field commanders displayed a healthy scepticism towards intelligence obtained from this source. Such suspicions were eventually overcome. This article examines British efforts during the formative period 1939–42 when an integrated infrastructure was painstakingly established to extract, collate and assess material obtained from Axis POWs. It not only examines the intelligence organisations which were established by each of the British armed services, but also analyses the variety of military and political information obtained and how it was interpreted and disseminated.     

‘Lacking intelligence’: Some reflections on recent approaches to British counter‐insurgency, 1900–1960

David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds), Policing and Decolonisation: Nationalism, Politics and the Police, 1917–65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). Pp.227. £35.00. ISBN 0–7190–3033–1.

Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky (eds), Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935–39 (London: Macmillan, 1992). Pp.231. £40.00. ISBN 0–333–53514–6.

Peter Heehs, The Bomb in Bengal: The Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism in India 1900–1910 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994). Pp.324, £17.50. ISBN 0–19–563350–4.

Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople (London: John Murray, 1994). Pp.431. £19.99. ISBN 9780719–55017–1.

Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919–60 (London: Macmillan, 1990). Pp.210. £40.00. ISBN 0–333–51131‐X.     

‘In the way’: intelligence,Eden, and British foreign policy towards Italy, 1937–38*

In 1937–1938 a divide emerged over Italian appeasement between Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden. Chamberlain wanted to appease Mussolini with de jure recognition of his Ethiopian conquest. Eden disagreed and even resigned over the matter. Historians have struggled to define clearly Eden’s resistance. The intelligence archive allows for a reassessment of British policy towards Italy and Eden’s resignation. It shows that secret intelligence was central to Eden’s decisions and demonstrates the importance of intelligence in diplomatic history. It shows that Eden, almost alone, correctly read ambiguous intelligence on Mussolini and recognized him as an enemy of Britain.     

International Cooperation and Bureaucratic In-fighting: American and British Economic Intelligence Sharing and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1939–41

The pursuit of intelligence on the German economy by the United States Army Air Corps prior to 1942 revealed great gaps in US knowledge of the German economy. This encouraged joint efforts with British Intelligence. The Air Corps exploited sources creatively to find German industrial targets. Its specialized needs persuaded it to try to establish an Air Corps intelligence gathering section. The Air Corps clashed with the Army over access to economic data. Its need for economic intelligence merged with its political goal of making strategic bombing its primary mission. Intelligence gathering efforts ultimately translated into the creation of air warfare strategy.     

‘Toys’ and ‘Whispers’ in ‘16‐land’: SOE and Ireland, 1940–1942

This article explores SOE plans to organise stay behind parties in neutral Ireland in cooperation with Irish army officers, in anticipation of a successful German invasion, as well as efforts to prepare for sabotage operations and to plant rumours through its agent Roddy Keith, and later through the British press attache John Betjeman. SOE's ambitions were opposed both by MI5 and SIS. MI5 wished to protect its own links with Irish intelligence, while SIS feared for the security of its covert Irish networks (which in fact were already penetrated). The consequent rows drew in C, Sir Frank Nelson, and other senior figures. They were resolved by Churchill, who felt that to provide the Irish with war material would only encourage them in their neutrality policy. His verdict was taken as an instruction to SOE to quit Ireland.     

Libra rising: Hitler,astrology and British intelligence, 1940–43 1

During the Second World War Nazi Germany presented British intelligence with two intellectual challenges: to acquire its tactical‘secrets’ and to comprehend the strategic ‘mysteries’ of its commanding elite. The former were hidden, but knowable through the miracles of Ultra. The latter – Hitler's strategic intentions – were by contrast virtually impenetrable. Consequently, between 1940 and 1943 British intelligence used the talents of an astrologer, Louis de Wohl, who claimed – wrongly – that Hitler's strategic plans were astrologically inspired. However, as de Wohl's star began to wane he was talent-spotted by the Special Operations Executive (SOE), which employed him to disseminate black propaganda. He consequently travelled to the United States where, in tandem with British Security Co-ordination, he undermined American confidence in the invincibility of Hitler through astrological prognostications. This article aims to demonstrate that although Britain had unprecedented access to Germany's tactical ‘secrets’, the ‘mysteries’ of Hitler's strategic mind-set remained just that.     

British intelligence and counter‐insurgency in the era of decolonisation: The example of Malaya

This article uses two approaches to show the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) and intelligence were reaching a turning point before the 1952 appointment of a single commander; and to show the reason for this success was a counter‐insurgency technique which placed population control at its core. First, the article outlines the development of intelligence, in order to identify when and why it became effective. Second, it re‐examines intelligence on the Malayan Communist Party's (MCP) so‐called ‘October’ 1951 Directives. It argues these confirm the MCP was virtually forced to change its tactics by late 1951. Together, these approaches challenge existing historiography, which makes Sir Gerald Templer's era of 1952–54, when he was both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, the turning point.     

The dispositions of ‘Good’ citizenship: Character,symbolic power and disinterest

Abstract

The problems of determining citizenly competence and finding an appropriate balance between public and private life have increasingly organized intellectual debate in civil society. Although civic republicans and liberals give different answers to these problems, they both claim that ‘character’ should be a necessary foundation for good citizenship. This article identifies a tension between character's analytical status as a category of explanation and its normative status as a moral category. Although most civic republicans and liberals recognize that the concept of character is socially constructed, the concept typically appears as a pre-political good whose social origins are hypostatized or forgotten. This article uses the sociological insights of Pierre Bourdieu in order to explain how character simultaneously appears as a social construct and as a moral good by exploring how the concept is mobilized by civic republicans and liberals as a solution to the problem of ‘good’ citizenship. The goal of the article is three-fold: first, to use Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, field and symbolic power to clarify the analytical and normative aspects of the concept of character and its relation to citizenship and civil society; second, to demonstrate how power shapes and conditions character formation in civil society; and third, to offer an account of the practical means by which character is promoted by civic republicans and liberals as a solution to the challenges facing civil society.     

The price of alliance: Anglo-American intelligence cooperation and Imperial Japan’s criminal biological warfare programme, 1944–1947

From 1932 to 1945, Imperial Japan secretly developed the largest state biological warfare (BW) programme of its time, which was unique in its use of biological weapons in warfare and in its inhumane experiments on captive Chinese civilians. After Japan’s surrender, US military intelligence teams searched for any evidence of BW activities, whilst sharing all it could find with its close partner, the UK. Despite the UK offering little intelligence material in return, it secured detailed US intelligence reports on Japanese BW war crimes, and colluded with the United States to keep these Japanese war crimes a secret.     

‘The importance of being honest’: Switzerland,neutrality and the problems of intelligence collection and liaison

This paper seeks to contribute to a number of debates that have attracted scholarly attention over the last few years. Firstly, by examining the experiences of the Swiss foreign intelligence service, the paper takes issue with what one scholar has dubbed ‘intelligence history snobbery’; a process that has privileged the study of the major powers and overlooked the contribution made to the secret world by the intelligence agencies of small states. Secondly, the paper explores the extent to which a state's engagement in the secret world is affected by its preconceived ideas over its place and standing in the international community. It asks whether the behaviour of a neutral foreign intelligence service is likely to differ from that of any other ‘small’ state, and whether neutrals can be both honest brokers in international affairs, and earnest players in the field of secret intelligence. The final section of the paper looks at the impact of the end of the Cold War and the emerging ‘global war on terror’ on the shape of the Swiss intelligence community.     

‘Playing for fascism’: sportsmanship,antisemitism and the British Union of Fascists

Taking recent developments in the study of fascism as a cultural system as a starting point, Spurr examines the interrelationship between notions of race, sportsmanship and Britishness in the subculture of the British Union of Fascists (BUF). More specifically, by focusing on the BUF’s understandings of Britishness and sportsmanship, he highlights the self-reflexive qualities of the movement’s subculture in which a fascist world-view shaped not only explicitly political programmes but also the ways in which this variant of European fascism mirrored particularly English modes of defining national identity and cultural difference in the rhetoric of sportsmanship. In addition, Spurr outlines one of the many ways that this fascist culture shaped social practice in the fascist community, so reflecting an assumption that fascism was as much a lived experience as it was a world of ideas and political philosophy. In so doing, he examines the implications of the BUF’s distinctly English notion of sportsmanship for its followers’ self-definition as Britons, and how this understanding functioned in the construction of the counter-image of the Sporting Jew. As a metaphor, while seemingly rather innocuous, this characterization of the Jew enabled Mosleyites to express a multilayered critique of Jews in a manner that encapsulated their wider ideological concerns and in an idiom readily recognized in the wider context of British inter-war culture. In adopting this approach, Spurr rejects suggestions that the BUF mimicked Nazi models of antisemitism and moves beyond revisionist historiography’s concern with origins and forms to explore the cultural functions of racism in the movement’s subculture.     

‘The clash of races’ and ‘the Jewish intelligence’: a specifically French form of social antisemitism

The phenomenon of ‘social antisemitism’ is well known. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, an idiosyncratic variant had emerged in France. Where, elsewhere, social antisemitism tended to be ingrained and unthinking, this French variant was (typically) more theoretical, and its practitioners tended to be among the most prominent authors and thinkers. It stressed the essential cultural differences between the ‘French’ and the ‘Israelites’, and the ‘separateness’ of the Jews within France, and also developed a series of facile generalizations about the essentially inferior nature of the Jewish intellect. Griffiths examines this phenomenon, both for its characteristics and for its widespread existence in French intellectual circles, by taking a specific subject: the reception of Lacretelle’s 1922 novel Silbermann. A wide range of writers and critics—a number of whom had in other circumstances a reputation for liberal values and attitudes, and had been among those who had deplored the excesses of the antisemitic mob during the Dreyfus affair—are found to echo the views put forward by Lacretelle in that novel, and even to elaborate on them. Many of these writers were to adopt a completely different attitude towards the Jews after the Second World War; when the position of the Jews was fully realized, their earlier ‘social antisemitism’ proved less powerful than their human sympathies. But this is not to devalue the importance of the danger posed by social antisemitism, which could provide the basis for far more virulent forms of racism to flourish.