Explaining the First Contested Senate Confirmation of a Director of Central Intelligence: John McCone,the Kennedy White House,the CIA and the Senate, 1962

This article explores the first nomination for Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that was seriously contested in the US Senate. Unlike three previous DCIs who headed the Central Intelligence Agency, John A. McCone faced harsh criticism from some in the news media and 12 negative votes in the US Senate after he was nominated for the position by President John F. Kennedy. The article considers factors, including McCone's personal attributes and recent years' controversies about the CIA, as reasons that provoked some opposition to his confirmation as DCI.     

Revealing the parameters of opinion: an interview with Frances Stonor Saunders

In 1999 Frances Stonor Saunders published Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: Granta) (American title: The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters). The book received much attention from the media and from academics, and triggered a renewed assessment of this important aspect of Cold War history. W. Scott Lucas interviewed Frances Saunders about the methods of the CIA, the role of the intellectuals in the political and cultural battles of the Cold War, the question of their autonomy, the need for financial support of cultural activities, and the debate about the principles of intellectuals.     

Intelligence Contracting: On the Motivations,Interests, and Capabilities of Core Personnel Contractors in the US Intelligence Community

In the debate on intelligence contracting, intelligence officers are grouped into two personnel categories characterized by opposing sets of motivations and interests. Government employees are assumed to be motivated by a higher goal related to national security, while intelligence contractors are said to be motivated primarily by pecuniary interests and loyal first and foremost to their shareholders. Contemporary research on human motivation, however, suggests that the two personnel categories are not all that different in that both appear to be intrinsically motivated and loyal primarily to the mission at hand, namely national security. Moreover, comparative research on public organizations and private corporations suggests that there are more similarities between the two than there are differences. This must lead us to re-examine the recent criticism fielded against the practice of intelligence contracting.     

US Atomic Energy Intelligence Against the Soviet Target, 1945-1970

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and its allies mounted a massive atomic energy intelligence effort against the Soviet Union. Long-range, standoff technical systems provided the most data and allowed for successful tracking of many aspects of the Soviet nuclear program. Because of the closed nature of Soviet society and Soviet security and counter-intelligence measures, exploitation of open sources and traditional espionage operations, although important, were less productive. The relative lack of human intelligence made it difficult to understand important developments inside the Soviet nuclear complex and resulted in significant intelligence gaps.     

Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence Governance in East Central Europe and the Balkans

This article discusses the reform of intelligence governance in two sub-regional groupings of former communist states: East Central Europe and the Balkans. These two sub-regions are delineated according to the pace and nature of transformations that they have undergone since the collapse of communist rule and their relations with respect to the European Union, the key political and economic organization in Europe. A number of lessons are drawn from comparing experiences in the two sub-regions relating to democratic reform of the security apparatus, and in particular the intelligence sector. Significant factors in the consolidation of democratic governance of intelligence include the nature of precursor communist-era regimes and the legacies they created, whether armed conflict has occurred during the transition, the extent and character of external (especially EU) assistance, and the strength of media and civil society. These factors appear to have influenced how transitional regimes have sought to introduce institutional reforms to constrain the powers of those services and their susceptibility to arbitrary use. They also have influenced measures taken to redress abuses by intelligence services under the preceding communist regime and the legitimation of the post-authoritarian state.     

Intelligence collection versus investigation: how the ethos of law enforcement impedes development of a US informational advantage

There is an inherent tension between a law enforcement–driven approach and a requirementsdriven approach to intelligence collection. The US experience, with the development of the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), as the primary intelligence service within the domestic environment, suggests that the tension is nearly insurmountable if an organization starts from a reactive, threat-focused posture. As a law-enforcement agency, which US government decision-makers expect to fulfill an intelligence function, the FBI is triply handicapped by the external strictures of the Department of Justice (DoJ); the Bureau’s own policies – which respond to the DoJ parameters; and the FBI’s organizational culture.     

Interdisciplinary,cross-sector collaboration in the US Intelligence Community: lessons learned from past and present efforts

ABSTRACT

How does one design and sustain interdisciplinary, cross-sector collaboration to improve intelligence results for twenty-first century security threats? This paper will analyse five past and present initiatives designed to create interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral collaboration within different agencies of the US Intelligence Community (IC). We will discuss key features of each effort, their successes and challenges, identify common themes and, propose which collaborative model might be most advantageous for a particular type of project based on project constraints. In so doing, we provide direction for IC leaders seeking to improve academia–industry–intelligence partnerships for future planning on intelligence-funded collaborations.     

Comparing US and UK Intelligence Assessment in the Early Cold War: NSC-68, April 1950

US and British intelligence assessments regarding the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold War contained substantial differences despite the remarkable level of cooperation and information sharing that existed between the respective services in the period. Using NSC-68 as a "pivot", this article examines these discrepancies as well as those similarities that did exist, considering their significance and evolution in an effort to understand what factors drove and shaped intelligence analysis on both sides of the Atlantic.     

What's wrong with the Intelligence Cycle

In the modern era, almost all intelligence professionals will study the Intelligence Cycle as a kind of gospel of how intelligence functions. Yet it is not a particularly good model, since the cyclical pattern does not describe what really happens. Policy officials rarely give collection guidance. Collection and analysis, which are supposed to work in tandem, in fact work more properly in parallel. Finally, the idea that decision makers wait for the delivery of intelligence before making policy decisions is equally incorrect. In the modern era, policy officials seem to want intelligence to support policy rather than to inform it. The Intelligence Cycle also fails to consider either counter-intelligence or covert action. Taken as a whole, the cycle concept is a flawed model, but nevertheless continues to be taught in the US and around the world.