Surprise party

Alesina’s (Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 651–678, 1987) influential model of presidential elections with ideologically motivated parties attributes higher growth and lower unemployment under Democratic presidents to the surprise inflation a Democratic victory entails. In contrast to the published literature, we test this hypothesis using calculations of presidential election surprises consistent with the assumption of rational economic actors. We confront the econometric complications attending a time-series approach taking into account economic growth dynamics. We ultimately fail to confirm the hypothesis that the level of uncertainty associated with presidential election results has an effect on economic outcomes.     

Denunciatory technology: forging publics through populism and secrecy

This paper theorizes contemporary institutionalized forms of denunciation, or what I call ‘denunciatory technologies’. Denunciatory technologies are mechanisms that allow citizens to report one another to the state for a wide range of wrongdoing, such as welfare fraud. The scarce literature on such initiatives relies heavily on concepts of neoliberalism to explain their emergence and operation. I first argue that a focus on neoliberalism fails to recognize these technologies as a sophisticated type of statecraft that promotes public sensibilities. I then offer a more robust account of denunciatory technologies. Rather than relying on an analysis of neoliberalism, I argue that these technologies fuse the policing of political criminals like the ‘welfare cheat’ to the very notion of ‘public good’, and refract vertical populist energies back onto the population. I conclude that, through such technologies, publics become an integral tool in their own governance.     

Political secrecy in Europe: crisis management and crisis exploitation

Abstract

This article theorises the relationship of crisis and political secrecy in European public policy. Combining the literatures on crisis management and securitisation, it introduces two distinct types of crisis-related secrecy. (1) Reactive secrecy denotes the deliberate concealment of information from the public with the aim of reducing immediate negative crisis consequences. It presents itself as a functional necessity of crisis management. (2) Active secrecy is about substantive or procedural secrecy employed by authority-holders to implement their interests with fewer restraints. Here, secrecy is an instrument of crisis exploitation, reducing obstacles to extraordinary measures. This distinction is based on an understanding of authority-holders as simultaneous legitimacy- and discretion-seekers whose secrecy politics depend on the constraints and opportunities presented by crises. In order to illustrate active and reactive secrecy, the article uses examples from the euro crisis (Eurogroup summitry, ECB sovereign bond purchases) and the security crisis after 9/11 (terror lists).     

Contestation and co-optation: why secrecy in EU external relations varies

Abstract

The question posed in this article is how to explain that the governance of secrecy in EU external relations varies. While the Common Foreign and Security Policy appears to retain its secretive character, the EU’s external trade policy has recently seen a shift towards more transparency. This article argues that to understand this variation, one has to take into account the institutional power of the European Parliament as well as the extent to which the rules and practices of secrecy are perceived as legitimate. The empowerment of the Parliament in trade means that it has had recent success in pushing back secrecy in this area. However, a general finding is that the majority of parliamentarians seem only rarely to question the executive’s governance of secrecy in external relations. The analysis shows that perceptions of legitimacy are crucial to account for different secrecy regimes – a finding that is likely to be relevant for the understanding of secrecy in foreign policy beyond the EU.     

Why states have no right to privacy,but may be entitled to secrecy: a non-consequentialist defense of state secrecy

ABSTRACT

Despite an increase in initiatives aimed at enhancing political transparency, democratic states claim the right to withhold information from citizens: classified intelligence and military programs, diplomatic discretion, closed-door political bargaining, and bureaucratic opacity are examples. Can the state’s claim to restrict access to information be justified? In the first part of the essay, I focus on the arguments that defend the state’s claim to restrict access in terms of the state’s right to privacy where the state privacy is presented as a species of group privacy. While I concede that group privacy may be defended, I argue that governments and parliaments are not the kind of groups that may exercise privacy against citizens because of the relation of accountability in which they stand to citizens. In the second part of the essay, I propose an alternative argument to the effect that the scope of openness required in democratic governance is less extensive than traditionally assumed. I focus on the concept of democratic authority and argue that we can understand the practices of classification as an exercise of a special right to secrecy that is implied in the democratic state’s right to rule in a content-independent way.     

Institutional shrinkage: The deviant case of Swiss banking secrecy

Using the Mahoney–Thelen causal model one would expect “layering” to be the dominant kind of institutional change affecting Swiss banking secrecy. Our research into governance in Swiss banking shows that it does not fit this theoretical model. Applying deviant case analysis we have refined our understanding of institutional change. We argue that the removal of rules and the momentum of pressure should be acknowledged when explaining variations of institutional change and we suggest that the processes of shrinkage should not be ignored.     

Ambient accountability: intelligence services in Europe and the decline of state secrecy

Abstract

In the 1990s, judgments in the European Court of Human Rights concerning state surveillance forced many West European countries to introduce new parliamentary bodies and formal systems for accountability. Promising both greater transparency and lawful intelligence, these frameworks were then energetically rolled out to Central and Eastern Europe. Although officials boasted about their effectiveness, these formal accountability mechanisms have failed to identify serious abuses over the last decade. Moreover, the security regime in much of Central Europe still remains largely unreconstructed. The article argues that a robust culture of accountability cannot be conjured into existence merely by introducing new laws and regulations, or indeed by the increasing tide of media revelations about intelligence. However, it suggests that we are now seeing the rise of a more complex pattern of ‘ambient accountability’ which is at last challenging the secret state across Europe.     

Queer pleasures: Some thoughts

Queer praxis is often conceptualized as a creative construction of alternative ways of being; a strategic practice of self‐(trans)formation. The practice of queer pleasures constitutes one such mode of possibility. Within this model, queer pleasures represent the threshold of a politics that promises a radical confrontation with inhibiting normalities. Yet by applying political priorities to pleasure, and by incessantly equating pleasure with the sexual, there is a risk of re‐establishing hierarchies and conventions, and, moreover, of reinforcing a notion of the subject as self‐transparent, autonomous and intentionally motivated. This paper explores some of the dimensions of pleasure that this politics tends to ignore—the trivial, quotidian, accidental, embarrassing, boring, insignificant, mediocre—and asks whether this overlooking is accidental or a structural inevitability. I will explore queer's investment in the politics of pleasure, and speculate about alternatives     

Shared secrecy in a digital age and a transnational world

ABSTRACT

This article examines the notion of shared secrets and the procedures by which secrecy is not the opposite of exchange of information, but the restriction of it to a certain ‘circle’ of people and the maintenance of others in ignorance. It creates corridors depending on the objectives of secret information, the persons having access, and the knowledge of this access by other people. Shared secrecy has been considered as an exception to common practice, but it has changed in scale with digitization and transnationalization of information, especially when suspicion is becoming used in statistical terms for prevention purposes.     

Courts and the politics of secrecy: national security,human rights and the importance of supranational oversight

Abstract

The article examines the use of state secrecy in court litigation concerning alleged gross human rights violations committed in the struggle against terrorism, focusing specifically on cases of extraordinary rendition and comparing the performance of courts in the United States, in Italy and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The article explains that national courts have validated the assertion by national governments of the state secret privilege in litigation involving cases of extraordinary rendition, ensuring de facto immunity to individuals involved in gross human rights abuses. On the contrary, it underlines that the ECtHR has pierced the veil covering these ‘deep secrets’, undertaking a strict scrutiny of acts of extraordinary rendition to torture committed by governments in the name of national security. As the article argues, the success of the ECtHR can be explained by a number of reasons, including distance, time and institutional design. In conclusion, the case law of the ECtHR on secrecy and national security confirms the continuing importance of supranational courts as instruments of external oversight on the human rights practice of European states.