The road to Bletchley Park: the British experience with signals intelligence, 1892–1945

This essay examines the evidence and the literature on British signals intelligence between 1892 and 1945. It assesses the relative significance of the documents on signals intelligence released since the Waldegrave Initiative. It criticizes many conventional assumptions in the literature and argues that signals intelligence has been a normal practice of the British government throughout the twentieth century. The text sketches an alternative history of British signals intelligence during 1892–1945 and analyses its value for the British state in various aspects of the two world wars and diplomacy during the inter-war period.     

International Cooperation and Bureaucratic In-fighting: American and British Economic Intelligence Sharing and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1939–41

The pursuit of intelligence on the German economy by the United States Army Air Corps prior to 1942 revealed great gaps in US knowledge of the German economy. This encouraged joint efforts with British Intelligence. The Air Corps exploited sources creatively to find German industrial targets. Its specialized needs persuaded it to try to establish an Air Corps intelligence gathering section. The Air Corps clashed with the Army over access to economic data. Its need for economic intelligence merged with its political goal of making strategic bombing its primary mission. Intelligence gathering efforts ultimately translated into the creation of air warfare strategy.     

De Gaulle,Colonel Passy and British Intelligence, 1940–42

De Gaulle's relationship with his secret intelligence and subversive services, the Bureau central de renseignements et d'action (BCRA) headed by Colonel Passy, as well as with British intelligence is examined in the light of the now declassified archives of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the BCRA. These archives reveal that de Gaulle failed to interest himself seriously in secret intelligence or subversion before the arrival of Jean Moulin in London in October 1941. De Gaulle's subsequent relationship with the BCRA and British intelligence was defined by an obsessive need for political control, which only served to compromise the BCRA's otherwise successful collaboration with British intelligence.     

Intelligence and diplomatic signalling during crises: The British experiences of 1877–78, 1922 and 1938

The roles of intelligence, communications and signals in crisis decision-making routinely are mentioned in passing but rarely assessed in detail. This study examines these issues in three international crises: the great eastern question, 1877–78, Chanak, 1922 and Munich, 1938, and briefly compares these findings to two others, July 1914 and Cuba, 1962. It demonstrates that intelligence, communications and signals are more problematical in crises than is generally believed. This study challenges the conventional view that crises are essentially something to manage. Instead, it argues, crises are explosive, unpredictable and high in risk, dominated by emotion, factionalization, communication failures, missed signals and unintended consequences.     

Spying on Nasser: British Signals Intelligence in Middle East Crises and Conflicts, 1956–67

This article examines British signals intelligence on Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1958 Middle East Crisis and the Egyptian intervention in the Yemen. It explains the production of signals intelligence and reviews the evidence that GCHQ could read Egyptian and other Arab communications. It then identifies some of the intelligence provided by GCHQ and considers its influence on British policy.     

Intelligence in Occupied Belgium: The Business of Anglo-Belgian Espionage and Intelligence Cooperation during the Two World Wars (1914–1918, 1940–1944)

During both World Wars, one of the most powerful weapons Belgian citizens possessed in resisting German occupation of their country was the gathering of intelligence on the enemy for the allied armies. But Belgian's first and second secret wars were different in several respects, one of the most important being the relationship between the Belgian secret services in exile and their British counterparts. If the First World War was essentially a story of bitter concurrency between them, the Second was mostly a tale of ‘jealous’ partnership. The relations with the intelligence networks in occupied Belgium formed a delicate but crucial issue, where money played an important role. This article explores these dynamics and how they affected the main mission of gathering intelligence on the Germans.     

Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of Europol

Abstract

This article analyses the gap between government ambitions and actual outcomes in the case of European counter terrorism intelligence cooperation. Specifically, it investigates why Europol has not managed to live up to its tasks despite outspoken government support. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, the study suggests why bureaucrats might be motivated to resist calls for international cooperation. By examining the process by which Europol has developed as an actor in the counter terrorism field, this article shows how development in the field of intelligence cooperation is not exclusively the reflection of government preferences. It concludes by suggesting that scholars could gain greater insight from a less state centric approach to the study of intelligence. In addition, the article suggests that policy makers cultivate a greater familiarity with bureaucratic factors and that they continually work with those factors in mind.     

Sabotage! The Origins,Development and Impact of the IRA's Infrastructural Bombing Campaigns 1939–1997

At various moments in the twentieth century the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in its various incarnations have used the tactic of infrastructural bombing, notably in their 1939 attacks in England on electricity pylons and in the summer of 1971 in Northern Ireland on its electrical distribution network. In 1996 the British Security Service (MI5) foiled an attack by the IRA aimed at causing a total electrical blackout of the greater London area, a plan that would have seen major disruption in the capital for many weeks or months. Using recently declassified material this paper seeks to re-evaluate the impact of these IRA infrastructural sabotage campaigns that have until now either been ignored or judged to have been derisory or incongruous failures. This paper demonstrates the historical development of this tactic from both the IRA's perspective, and that of those who were tasked with hindering it, highlighting the devastating potential of such tactics in the future.     

Axis prisoners of war as sources for British military intelligence, 1939–42

It was during the Second World War that the Allies developed a sophisticated intelligence system to harness information garnered from the hundreds of thousands of Axis captives taken during hostilities. Indeed, prior to 1942, many Allied field commanders displayed a healthy scepticism towards intelligence obtained from this source. Such suspicions were eventually overcome. This article examines British efforts during the formative period 1939–42 when an integrated infrastructure was painstakingly established to extract, collate and assess material obtained from Axis POWs. It not only examines the intelligence organisations which were established by each of the British armed services, but also analyses the variety of military and political information obtained and how it was interpreted and disseminated.     

The Future of Civil–Military Intelligence Cooperation Based on Lessons Learned in Iraq

As part of the infrastructure for monitoring the movements of Private Security Companies (PSCs) in Iraq, a unique intelligence interface has been constructed to enhance cooperation between the military and PSCs. Using a wide range of existing intelligence-sharing agreements and guidelines for handling classified information, PSC contractors working with the US military have been able to provide unclassified intelligence products to the wider PSC community. Using lessons learned in Iraq as a contractor building this interface, the author explains how institutional difficulties were overcome and argues that the US military should be better prepared to share intelligence with the wide range of organizations it can expect to work with in future unconventional warfare or nation-building operations. Some of the lessons learned in Iraq can also be applied to the US Department of Homeland Security's Regional Fusion Centers, where many of the same difficulties with intelligence-sharing and integration with commercial organizations are being encountered.     

What's the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection

Abstract

As the professional practice of intelligence collection adapts to the changing environment and new threats of the twenty-first century, many academic experts and intelligence professionals call for a coherent ethical framework that outlines exactly when, by what means and to what ends intelligence is justified. Reports of abuse at detention centres such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, the ever increasing use of technological surveillance, and the increased attention on the use of torture for intelligence collection purposes have all highlighted a need to make an explicit statement about what is and what is not permissible intelligence practice. In this article an ethical framework will be established which will outline under what circumstances the use of different intelligence collection activities would be permissible. This ethical framework will first underline what it is about intelligence collection that is ‘harmful’ and, therefore, should be prohibited under normal circumstances. The ethical framework then outlines a set of ‘just intelligence principles’, based on the just war tradition, which delineate when the harm caused can be justified. As a result, this article outlines a systemic ethical framework that makes it possible to understand when intelligence collection is prohibited and when it is permissible.     

Shield of collaboration: The Wang Jingwei regime's security service, 1939–1945

This article studies the role of the security service in the Wang Jingwei collaborationist regime (1940–45), and argues that it not only contributed to the regime's coercive muscle but that it was also involved with the regime's broader socio-political policies. The central position within the Wang Jingwei government enjoyed by the security service enabled its head, Li Shiqun, to wield enormous influence within the regime. However the Wang Jingwei government had to share control over its security service with the Japanese intelligence agencies. This dual control made the security service a less tractable instrument of regime control than it should have been. This dual authority provided a clear example of the limits on the power of a collaborationist regime like the Wang Jingwei government, even in the crucial area of regime security.     

Intelligence reform commissions and the producer–consumer relationship

Since 1949 intelligence reform efforts have resulted in extensive studies on every aspect of the intelligence community. One common aspect of commission comment has been how policy-makers interact with the intelligence products, commonly known as the producer–consumer relationship. Decades of successive commissions identify the same or similar problems with the relationship and recommend organizational changes aimed at improving the analyst – policy maker interaction. Eventually, the same issues arise because most structural reforms are incapable of addressing critical aspects of this relationship. Future efforts should first consider previous commission results as well as understand what reforms can and cannot impact this relationship.     

Intelligence and the ‘Mindset’: The German invasion of Norway in 1940

‘Weserübung’, the German invasion of Norway and Denmark on 9 April 1940, was a brilliantly successful surprise attack, both strategically and tactically. Strategic surprise was obtained because the idea that Germany was about to launch a major invasion of Norway was remote from any of the preconceived scenarios about Germany's next move. Germany's achievement of tactical surprise was also aided by bad weather in the North Sea. The main reason for the failure of both Norwegian and British policy-makers to comprehend what the Germans were up to lies in the importance of the ‘mindset’. On both sides of the North Sea the conventional wisdom was that Germany would not attempt an invasion of Norway against the supremacy of British sea power. Hence all incoming information was interpreted in Oslo in the light of the next mindset, namely that only a determined British attempt to take control of the Norwegian coast could trigger an armed German retaliation. In London, incoming intelligence was interpreted so as to conform to the Admiralty's preconceived scenario of a German naval breakout into the North Atlantic.     

MI(R), G(R) and British covert operations, 1939–42

The Military Intelligence (Research) department of the British War Office was tasked in 1940 with encouraging and supporting armed resistance in occupied Europe and the Axis-controlled Middle East. The major contention of this paper is that, in doing so, MI(R) performed a key role in British strategy in 1940–42 and in the development of what are now known as covert operations. MI(R) developed an organic, but coherent doctrine for such activity which was influential upon the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its own sub-branch, G(R), which applied this doctrine in practice in East Africa and the Middle East in 1940–41. It was also here that a number of key figures in the development of covert operations and special forces first cut their teeth, the most notable being Major Generals Colin Gubbins and Orde Wingate.