Voice of America and Iran, 1949–1953: US liberal developmentalism,propaganda and the Cold War

The administration of President Harry S. Truman used Voice of America radio to promote Iranian ‘liberal developmentalism’. Radio propaganda joined economic assistance, military aid, and other information programs to promote Western‐style capitalism and to repel Communist appeals in Iran. But President Dwight D. Eisenhower abandoned Truman's gradualist Iran policy in favor of covert action, a seemingly more expedient solution to perceived Iranian political instability. The US‐British engineered coup in 1953 to overthrow the nationalistic Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq revealed the shallowness of US commitments to liberal reform in Iran and highlighted Americans' willingness to undermine Iranian sovereignty in order to preserve US security interests in the Middle East.     

Sabotage! The Origins,Development and Impact of the IRA's Infrastructural Bombing Campaigns 1939–1997

At various moments in the twentieth century the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in its various incarnations have used the tactic of infrastructural bombing, notably in their 1939 attacks in England on electricity pylons and in the summer of 1971 in Northern Ireland on its electrical distribution network. In 1996 the British Security Service (MI5) foiled an attack by the IRA aimed at causing a total electrical blackout of the greater London area, a plan that would have seen major disruption in the capital for many weeks or months. Using recently declassified material this paper seeks to re-evaluate the impact of these IRA infrastructural sabotage campaigns that have until now either been ignored or judged to have been derisory or incongruous failures. This paper demonstrates the historical development of this tactic from both the IRA's perspective, and that of those who were tasked with hindering it, highlighting the devastating potential of such tactics in the future.     

Surveillance and intelligence under the Vichy regime: The service du controle technique, 1939–45

F. Lafitte, The Internment of Aliens (London: Libris, new edition, 1990). Pp. 266. £9.00.

A. W. Brian Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Pp. 453. £35.00.     

The Making of Bletchley Park and Signals Intelligence 1939–42

The article argues that signals intelligence was an organizational accomplishment in the sense of requiring a) the establishment of an independent organization and b) that this organization combine cryptanalysis with intelligence analysis, traffic analysis and interception. This was not pre-ordained but the outcome of specific conflicts and decisions at Bletchley Park during the first three years of the Second World War which transformed the Government Code and Cypher School from a cryptanalytical bureau to a fully-fledged signals intelligence agency. Detailed archival evidence is presented in support of this claim.     

The Royal Navy,Intelligence and the Spanish Civil War: Lessons in Air Power, 1936–39

This article discusses the Royal Navy (RN)—Royal Air Force (RAF) feud concerning the use of air power in the round through an investigation of each service's appreciations of the lessons being learned about air power during the Spanish Civil War. It reveals that despite such bodies as the Joint Intelligence Committee existing, for the processing of operational and strategic intelligence, there was very little that was joint about the way air power lessons were being used to inform RN and RAF interwar preparations for future conflict. Not only were the RN and RAF rivals, which dragged out the process and skewed the results so that they became useless for planning, but in that non-joint age each service could use the results for its own separate purposes and avoid any synergy among the services for operational and strategic effectiveness.     

‘Consistent with an Intention’: The Far East Combined Bureau and the Outbreak of the Pacific War, 1940–41

Abstract

From 1934, Britain expanded its military and naval intelligence agencies against Japan. At the outbreak of war in Europe, they, and most of their personnel, were moved from Hong Kong to Singapore, and joined into an interservice organization, the Far East Combined Bureau. Much of the evidence about the Far East Combined Bureau is lost, but the surviving record illustrates what intelligence was available to decision-makers in Singapore during 1940–41, thus illuminating every debate about this disaster. Even more: it enables a reconceptualization of the relationship between intelligence and the outbreak of the Pacific War as a whole.     

Bitten by the Russia bug: Britons and Russia, 1894–1939

Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Pp.xv + 408, maps, biblio., index. ISBN 0–19820–47–0.

Michael Hughes, Inside the Enigma: British Officials in Russia, 1900–39 (London: The Hambledon Press, 1998). Pp.xi + 336, biblio., index. £35. ISBN 1–85285–160–0.

G. W. Morrell, Britain Confronts the Stalin Revolution: Anglo‐Soviet Relations and the Metro‐Vickers Crisis (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1995). Pp.ix + 204, appendices, biblio., index, edn $34.95. ISBN 0–88920–250–8.     

Shield of collaboration: The Wang Jingwei regime's security service, 1939–1945

This article studies the role of the security service in the Wang Jingwei collaborationist regime (1940–45), and argues that it not only contributed to the regime's coercive muscle but that it was also involved with the regime's broader socio-political policies. The central position within the Wang Jingwei government enjoyed by the security service enabled its head, Li Shiqun, to wield enormous influence within the regime. However the Wang Jingwei government had to share control over its security service with the Japanese intelligence agencies. This dual control made the security service a less tractable instrument of regime control than it should have been. This dual authority provided a clear example of the limits on the power of a collaborationist regime like the Wang Jingwei government, even in the crucial area of regime security.     

Out of Africa? The Gallimberti Affair and Anglo-Italian Relations, 1949–1950

Abstract

The Peace Treaty of 1947 required Italy to renounce sovereignty over its former colonies. Italy and Britain, although NATO allies, bitterly disputed the disposition of Tripolitania and Eritrea. The Italian government sent agents to Tripoli and Asmara to influence local populations in favour of its policy of independence for both regions. The agents ran espionage operations: developing networks of agents, purloining documents, bribing officials, and channeling illegal funds to local political parties. Dr Matteo Gallimberti, the Italian agent in Tripoli, faced accusations that he was embezzling funds. After he committed suicide in January 1950, local British military authorities discovered the full range of his illegal activities. Rather than publicly embarrass the Italian government, British Foreign Office officials coerced concessions from the Italian government in exchange for keeping the potential scandal concealed. The affair demonstrates the fractious nature of Anglo-Italian relations within the framework of the NATO alliance and the respective foreign policy-making elites' differing and self-interested approaches to development and security issues in Africa.     

History,Geography and the French National Space: The Question of Alsace‐Lorraine, 1914‐18

The restoration of French authority in Alsace and Lorraine, the regions ceded to the new German Empire following the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, was a major preoccupation of France's political leadership before 1914 and was the principal French war aim during World War I. This paper examines how French politicians and intellectuals sought to reinforce this territorial claim between 1914 and 1918. In the early years of the war, the propaganda campaign was dominated by conservative politicians, business élites and senior figures in the army whose preoccupations were mainly economic and strategic and whose proposals were often unrealistic. Later in the war, moderate and less obviously self-interested geopolitical arguments were developed by leading French academics, particularly the historians and the geographers, with the active support of their government. This campaign emphasised cultural, historical and political questions, drew on the ideas of earlier French theorists of the nation-state, notably Ernest Renan, and had a significant impact on the subsequent development of France's renowned interwar tradition of geo-historical research.     

The ‘Sarcee War’: Fragmented Citizenship and the City

In 1880, the Tsuu T'ina Nation (then the Sarcee band) staged a small, armed protest known as the ‘Sarcee War’, in Calgary, Alberta, to demand food and a separate reserve from the Siksika, with whom they had been assigned land. This paper argues that this protest reveals the material and political roots of Aboriginal citizenship: a fragmented and differentiated political body, unified through contingent agreements. The Tsuu T'ina actions, the choice of location and their specific demands reveal an assertion of rights that differ from the ‘standard’ idea of Canadian citizenship (then and now) and articulate a complex process of ‘othering’ and belonging.     

International Cooperation and Bureaucratic In-fighting: American and British Economic Intelligence Sharing and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1939–41

The pursuit of intelligence on the German economy by the United States Army Air Corps prior to 1942 revealed great gaps in US knowledge of the German economy. This encouraged joint efforts with British Intelligence. The Air Corps exploited sources creatively to find German industrial targets. Its specialized needs persuaded it to try to establish an Air Corps intelligence gathering section. The Air Corps clashed with the Army over access to economic data. Its need for economic intelligence merged with its political goal of making strategic bombing its primary mission. Intelligence gathering efforts ultimately translated into the creation of air warfare strategy.