Eagle's-eye View: An American Assessment of the 1973 Yom Kippur War

The United States displayed a keen interest in the nature, progress and results of the Yom Kippur War, because the fighting was thought to reflect how non-nuclear hostilities between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact (WP) would unfold on the plains of central Europe in case war broke out there. In contrast to many observers of the war, who concluded that the losses suffered by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) at the hands of Egyptian and Syrian anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons had rendered the aircraft and the tank largely impotent, thereby revolutionizing how wars would be waged in the future, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts and United States Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Command officers, based upon an in-depth review of the nature, progress and results of the fighting, re-affirmed the centrality of these weapons systems on the modern battlefield. Rather than focus obsessively on technological developments, they concluded that training, leadership and tactics were ultimately the decisive elements in the Yom Kippur War.     

Early warning versus concept: the case of the Yom Kippur War 1973

This article begins with a definition of the terms ‘early warning’ and ‘surprise’, and examines whether the failure of Israeli Intelligence to warn Israeli decision-makers in 1973 conforms to these definitions. After examining the conventions of Israeli military intelligence regarding anticipating a surprise, and the conceptions on which these were based, the article demonstrates how events in late 1973 indicated a possible Arab attack on Israel, but also the manner in which the Concept used to measure these warnings proved more resilient than the warnings. Discussions in the few days preceding war, when information was accumulating, are subjected to particular attention. The development of a sub-conception, with the original framework allowed and changed the forecast from ‘no war’ to ‘low probability' of war. The persistence of the Concept is attributed to both strategic intelligence and also to the doctrine of deterrence. Like deterrence, intelligence success is hard to measure. One can never be sure that a surprise attack has been prevented as a result of early warning.     

Comparative Research in the Nordic Countries: Overcoming Ethnocentrism?1

In the beginning of the 1970s comparative politics was still a neglected genre in Nordic political science. During that decade, however, comparative research started to make headway. An examination of articles published in five leading Nordic political science journals during the 1980s indicates that more than one-tenth of the content was devoted to comparative research. The examination suggests that the Nordic approach to the small-N problem in comparative research is variegated: binary comparisons constitute just over one-quarter of the volume, whereas the share of studies exploiting three to five cases is slightly larger, and the share of studies discussing more than five cases is slightly larger still. However, in the selection of cases for study, a more clear-cut strategy and pattern is revealed. It is clear from the journal data that Nordic comparativists escape ethnocentrism by turning to another ethnocentrism - i. e. they are predominantly preoceupied with the Nordic countries. While this emphasis on Nordic comparisons certainly can be defended on methodological grounds, doubts can be raised about the overall methodological justification of the Nordic orientation. The risks involved are not always recognized. What is known as Galton's problem merits special attention in a Nordic context. The nature of the problem is that empirical relationships may be the result of learning, which means that the cases studied lack independence. Since it is evident that a lot of diffusion occurs in the Nordic countries, the challenges posed by Galton's problem should receive much more attention in Nordic research than is presently the case.     

The Egyptian public sector: The control structure and efficiency considerations

The Egyptian public sector is labouring under a mass of legal controls which are proving an obstacle to its efficient running. A variety of government agencies, as well as the Board of Directors and the General Assembly, are burdening each company with regulations and demands for information. The little latitude thus allowed company managers in deciding upon such essential problems as finance, the size of the labour force and the price of output has had severe effects in decreasing the efficiency of each company and of the sector as a whole. Some dynamic company managers are trying to find a way around the system, but this is having negative efficiency and welfare effects. Examples of the negative effects of the mass of controls on problems such as finance and pricing are given in the article. Attempts at forming joint ventures, in order to escape the oppression of belonging to the state, have been made by some companies, but these have met with union opposition in some cases although the state seems to encourage the reduction in investment outlay which this policy might have. The article develops the analysis of the politico administrative framework of economic activity presented by Ayubi (1982).     

The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the Iraq War

The moral and political reverberations of the Iraq War of 2003 are still being felt all over the world. In the belligerent democracies of the West, official inquiries of all kinds and conditions have probed and exposed the nature of government, the reflexes of the national security state, and, most extraordinarily, the sensitive relations between rulers and intelligencers. For all parties the consequences have been severe. Focusing on Britain, and especially on the inquiries led by Lord Hutton and Lord Butler - an odd couple but a revelatory combination - this article takes stock of the reckoning.     

Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet War Scare: The Untold Story

Abstract

During the Soviet war scare of the 1980s, British intelligence shared vital information from KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky with its American partners. The US intelligence community, however, was suspicious of the message and the messenger, dismissing Soviet ‘war talk’ as disinformation. Some officials even believed that the British had tweaked their reports to influence US policy. President Ronald Reagan, however, on the advice of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, listened to Gordievsky rather than his intelligence advisors. The war scare had a profound influence on Reagan's thinking about nuclear war, Kremlin fears, and Soviet–American relations that led him to seek a new détente with Moscow and the end of the Cold War through diplomacy rather than confrontation.?Subsequent events and post-Cold War revelations vindicated Gordievsky. Reagan sought his advice on the eve of his first summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and later expressed his gratitude during a private meeting in the Oval Office.     

Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and Prospects

Abstract

In 2011 intelligence reform became a timely and pertinent topic in Egypt with the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak by mass demonstrations. Yet two outstanding questions persist: can Egyptian intelligence be reformed? What would intelligence reform entail in the Egyptian context? An examination of historical Egyptian intelligence reforms suggests that ‘reform’ in the Egyptian context usually means greater efficiency and centralization at the expense of public oversight and accountability. Prospects for fundamental intelligence reform are further hampered by Egypt's authoritarian traditions, its relatively weak legislature and judiciary, lack of an empowered civil society, censorship and an apparent official addiction to secrecy.     

公共事物治理的困境及其克服

对公共事物的治理已越来越成为人们关注的焦点 ,本文首先分析了市场派在公共事物治理中面临的三种困境 :公地悲剧、囚徒困境、集体行动的逻辑困境 ,接着对政府派在公共事物治理中所面临的困境进行了分析 ,最后提出了克服公共事物治理困境的五条有效途径 :建立多中心治理结构、建立自主治理结构、提升政府能力、广泛的公众动员及培育公共精神