British Intelligence in the Middle East, 1898–1906

This article examines British intelligence efforts in Turkish Arabia at the turn of the twentieth century. It argues that intelligence collection was really three separate efforts, carried out by the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Government of India, and it reflected concerns about British decline, the problems experienced during the Boer War, as well as an effort to penetrate the ‘information order’ of India's sub-empire. Although intelligence efforts suffered from bureaucratic disharmony in Whitehall, and between London and the Government of India, valuable contributions were nevertheless made to Britain's knowledge of Turkish Arabia.     

British Intelligence and the Jewish Resistance Movement in the Palestine Mandate, 1945–46

At the end of the Second World War, British and Zionist interests came into conflict over the issue of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which raised the broader issue of what sort of National Home could exist within the British Mandate. As a result, in 1945–46, the three Jewish armed groups in the Mandate, the Haganah, Etzel and Lehi, started a loosely coordinated armed struggle against British rule. Even the moderates in the Jewish Agency rejected their former partner against Hitler, Britain, and used force against it in order to achieve their political goals. This article assesses British intelligence on these developments, and demonstrates that it failed to anticipate or even to understand the threat until the destruction of the King David Hotel. The article demonstrates that these mistakes occurred because British intelligence relied heavily on the intelligence organs of the Jewish Agency itself for intelligence about political threats within Palestine. The article assesses this intelligence failure, and its heavy costs. However, it denies that bad intelligence caused British failures in the Mandate. On the contrary, that failure stemmed from deeper problems of policy.     

British codebreaking and American diplomatic telegrams, 1914–1915

During the First World War, British intelligence solved the United States' diplomatic codes and were reading its diplomatic telegrams transmitted between Washington and US diplomatic outposts throughout Europe. Controversy has emerged over when the British succeeded in solving these codes, with two historians relatively recently having claimed that British intelligence succeeded in doing so from the beginning of the war or soon after. Through a thorough consideration of the available documentation, this piece aims to correct these mistaken claims and to date the completion of the British solving of American codebooks to the middle phase of the war, to between October 1915 and January 1916. It seeks to lay reliable foundations for further work by showing that research into the wartime impact of British signals’ intelligence on Anglo-American relations is necessarily limited to only the middle and later phases of the war.     

International Cooperation and Bureaucratic In-fighting: American and British Economic Intelligence Sharing and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1939–41

The pursuit of intelligence on the German economy by the United States Army Air Corps prior to 1942 revealed great gaps in US knowledge of the German economy. This encouraged joint efforts with British Intelligence. The Air Corps exploited sources creatively to find German industrial targets. Its specialized needs persuaded it to try to establish an Air Corps intelligence gathering section. The Air Corps clashed with the Army over access to economic data. Its need for economic intelligence merged with its political goal of making strategic bombing its primary mission. Intelligence gathering efforts ultimately translated into the creation of air warfare strategy.     

De Gaulle,Colonel Passy and British Intelligence, 1940–42

De Gaulle's relationship with his secret intelligence and subversive services, the Bureau central de renseignements et d'action (BCRA) headed by Colonel Passy, as well as with British intelligence is examined in the light of the now declassified archives of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the BCRA. These archives reveal that de Gaulle failed to interest himself seriously in secret intelligence or subversion before the arrival of Jean Moulin in London in October 1941. De Gaulle's subsequent relationship with the BCRA and British intelligence was defined by an obsessive need for political control, which only served to compromise the BCRA's otherwise successful collaboration with British intelligence.     

British technical intelligence and the Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile threat, 1952–60

This article looks at the shifting intricacies of British assessments of the Soviet IRBM threat to the United Kingdom during the 1950s. Based on JIC, Cabinet and Air Ministry records of the period, as well as political memoirs, it looks at the assessments in parallel with the development of the British Blue Streak nuclear ballistic missile programme. This land‐based weapon was eventually cancelled in April 1960 on strategic not cost grounds, too early in this author's opinion.     

Veterans interests and the transition to government growth: 1870–1915

Civil War veterans were the first interest group to use their political power to obtain substantial monetary transfers from the U.S. Treasury. Veterans supported the Republican party, and in exchange Republicans provided increasingly generous veterans benefits, placing a strain on the Treasury that led toward a demand for increased taxes. Veterans also established a precedent that other groups could follow to petition the goverment for economic benefits, shaping the transformation of American government in the Progressive era which led to the substantial growth of the federal government in the 20th century.     

Intelligence in Occupied Belgium: The Business of Anglo-Belgian Espionage and Intelligence Cooperation during the Two World Wars (1914–1918, 1940–1944)

During both World Wars, one of the most powerful weapons Belgian citizens possessed in resisting German occupation of their country was the gathering of intelligence on the enemy for the allied armies. But Belgian's first and second secret wars were different in several respects, one of the most important being the relationship between the Belgian secret services in exile and their British counterparts. If the First World War was essentially a story of bitter concurrency between them, the Second was mostly a tale of ‘jealous’ partnership. The relations with the intelligence networks in occupied Belgium formed a delicate but crucial issue, where money played an important role. This article explores these dynamics and how they affected the main mission of gathering intelligence on the Germans.     

The Sino–Japanese territorial dispute and threat perception in power transition

A territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has gained a high profile in Sino–Japanese relations. Since the 2012 escalation of the territorial dispute, there is no sign of any de-escalation despite economic interdependence, which previously helped ease the tension. Drawing on the constructivist understanding of threat perception and power transition theory, this article analyzes the way in which the deepening of threat perceptions associated with a perceived regional power transition prevents Japan and China from working beyond their subjective conceptions of justice associated with boarders and history. Since 2012, the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute has increasingly fitted into a larger picture of power-political conflict taking place in a power transition in which both Japan and China aim to return to ‘normality’ by propagating their territorial claims, strengthening their military capabilities, and strategic realignment. To that end, this article first introduces a theoretical framework on the centrality of threat perceptions in power transition. Second, it traces the ways in which Japan and China have developed a threat perception of each other since 1972. The third section deals with the escalation of the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute since 2010 and highlights the deepening of mutual suspicion and threat perception exemplified at the bilateral and multilateral levels. I conclude that the Sino–Japanese territorial debate entered a new stage of normative and power-political competition in earning international support for territorial claims in the East China Sea.     

Colin Davidson's British Indian Intelligence Operations in Japan 1915–23 and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Colin Davidson was the British consular official in Japan during and after World War I delegated to run intelligence operations in the country on behalf of the British Indian security authorities. Davidson's original target, Indian revolutionaries based in Japan, soon expanded to include their clandestine links to powerful Japanese political patrons, violating the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–23). Davidson's expertise on Japan, combined with intelligence on Japanese ultranationalist support of Indian independence, proved crucial for confirming suspicions about secret Japanese intent against the British Empire, contributing to the decision not to renew the Alliance.     

Intelligence and diplomatic signalling during crises: The British experiences of 1877–78, 1922 and 1938

The roles of intelligence, communications and signals in crisis decision-making routinely are mentioned in passing but rarely assessed in detail. This study examines these issues in three international crises: the great eastern question, 1877–78, Chanak, 1922 and Munich, 1938, and briefly compares these findings to two others, July 1914 and Cuba, 1962. It demonstrates that intelligence, communications and signals are more problematical in crises than is generally believed. This study challenges the conventional view that crises are essentially something to manage. Instead, it argues, crises are explosive, unpredictable and high in risk, dominated by emotion, factionalization, communication failures, missed signals and unintended consequences.     

Intelligence reform commissions and the producer–consumer relationship

Since 1949 intelligence reform efforts have resulted in extensive studies on every aspect of the intelligence community. One common aspect of commission comment has been how policy-makers interact with the intelligence products, commonly known as the producer–consumer relationship. Decades of successive commissions identify the same or similar problems with the relationship and recommend organizational changes aimed at improving the analyst – policy maker interaction. Eventually, the same issues arise because most structural reforms are incapable of addressing critical aspects of this relationship. Future efforts should first consider previous commission results as well as understand what reforms can and cannot impact this relationship.     

British Intelligence and the ‘Fifth’ Occupying Power: The Secret Struggle to Prevent Jewish Illegal Immigration to Palestine

At the end of the Second World War, British intelligence struggled to enforce strict limits imposed on Jewish immigration to Palestine. Holocaust survivors and Jews wishing to escape communism in Eastern Europe flooded the western Zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, while the Zionist movement worked to bring them to Palestine. Illegal immigration to Palestine was the key policy dispute between Britain and the Zionist movement, and a focus for British intelligence. Britain sought both overt and covert means to prevent the boarding of ships at European ports which were destined for Palestine, and even to prevent the entry of Jewish refugees into the American zones. This article highlights Britain's secret intelligence-gathering efforts as well as its covert action aimed to prevent this movement. It highlights a peculiar episode in the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States, during which cooperation and partnership was lacking. British intelligence promoted a rumour that Soviet agents were using Jewish escape lines to penetrate Western Europe and the Middle East in order to persuade American authorities to prevent the movement of Jewish refugees. Instead, this article argues, American intelligence secretly cooperated with the Zionist organizers of the escape routes so to expose Soviet agents. Britain's attempt at deception backfired, and provided effective cover for the movement of hundreds of thousands of Jews during a critical period. Meanwhile its intelligence had dramatically improved, but policymakers failed to reassess Britain's ability to sustain immigration restrictions and the indefinite detention of tens of thousands of illegal migrants.     

Spying on Nasser: British Signals Intelligence in Middle East Crises and Conflicts, 1956–67

This article examines British signals intelligence on Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1958 Middle East Crisis and the Egyptian intervention in the Yemen. It explains the production of signals intelligence and reviews the evidence that GCHQ could read Egyptian and other Arab communications. It then identifies some of the intelligence provided by GCHQ and considers its influence on British policy.