Seeing things differently: contrasting narratives of British and German photographic intelligence during the Second World War

This study examines Anglo-American narratives of British and German photographic intelligence (PI) in Europe during the Second World War. According to these narratives, Germany relegated PI to tactical and operational applications; by contrast, Britain performed these same functions but also made strategic use of the discipline. This paper reevaluates how British and German PI actually differed. It further examines whether each side’s successes and failures were within the ‘agency of agencies’ – how much did PI successes and failures directly result from intelligence organizations’ choices and actions? Finally, this paper identifies implications of these narratives for comparative intelligence studies and historiography.     

Swedish intelligence in the Second World War

Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment (New York: Crown Books, 1992). Pp.485. $25.00.     

History of the British Inter-Services Security Board and the Allocation of Code-Names in the Second World War

During the Second World War there was an increasingly developed system for controlling the code-names used for operations where different Allied forces were involved. This paper follows the development of this system – based on the British Inter-Services Security Board – that spread to overseas theatres on the British side and to American forces world-wide. The selection of code-names was not without controversy; with Winston Churchill getting personally involved and his intervention is highlighted. A critique of the system is attempted, although the final judge is ultimately the success of the security of the activities disguised by the code-names.     

British Intelligence and the Mandate of Palestine: Threats to British National Security Immediately After the Second World War

Recently declassified Security Service (MI5) records reveal, for the first time, the full extent of the threat that Zionist terrorism posed to British national security immediately after the Second World War. It is well established within the historical literature that after 1945 Britain faced violent campaigns by Jewish terrorist groups in the Mandate of Palestine. Hitherto unacknowledged in the historiography, however, is the fact that the threat of Zionist terrorism extended from Palestine to Britain itself. This article studies the nature of the threat posed by Zionist terrorism within Britain after 1945, and explores the counter-terrorist measures that MI5 devised to meet it. Overall, as this article shows, MI5's concerns with Zionist terrorism after 1945 offer a striking new interpretation of the history of the early Cold War.     

The impact of the Second World War on postwar social spending

The huge quantitative literature on postwar social spending almost entirely neglected war as a possible explanatory factor of social spending dynamics. Given the mass carnage and the enormous social needs caused by the Second World War, this is quite astonishing. This article examines for the first time, whether, and in what ways, the Second World War affected cross‐national differences in public social spending of 18 Western welfare states over the course of the Golden Age. Using panel regressions, it is found that the war strongly affected social spending until the late 1960s. The evidence demonstrates that the Second World War is not simply a temporal watershed structuring different phases of welfare state development, but rather a crucial factor for understanding cross‐national differences in welfare efforts and social expenditure dynamics in the postwar period.     

Spying on the rock: an assessment of Abwehr clandestine operations against Gibraltar during the Second World War

This article will offer an assessment on the effectiveness of clandestine operations conducted by the German military intelligence service, the Abwehr, against the British colony of Gibraltar during the Second World War. This assessment is based on declassified British archival records, and this paper will argue that while the Abwehr had complex networks which attempted operations against the British at Gibraltar the Germans actually achieved little meaningful success. This article will reason that the inability to achieve any significant results was due to ineffective leadership and direction from Abwehr officers who also oversaw inadequate agent recruitment and training which impaired Abwehr clandestine operations.     

The Foreign Research and Press Service: Britain's Primary Source of Intelligence from the German-occupied Baltic States during the Second World War

The article investigates how the Foreign Research and Press Service succeeded in overcoming internal government prejudice to become His Majesty's Government primary supplier of intelligence from the German-occupied Baltic states during the Second World War. As the Foreign Office had banned the covert intelligence agencies from operating within the Soviet sphere, which included the Baltic states, the non-covert Foreign Research and Press Service Baltic States Section could operate without offending the USSR. The article charts how the Foreign Research and Press Service supplied crucial information from the enemy press that helped to form British war and post-war policy towards the USSR.     

Covert Operations and Official Collaboration: British Intelligence's Dual Approach to Ireland during World War II

Neutral Ireland posed a unique challenge to the wartime British intelligence community and the latter responded by adopting a dual approach. On the one hand, it carried out covert intelligence operations in Irish territory, involving the Service intelligence branches, the Ministry of Information, and, most importantly, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). On the other hand, unprecedented cooperation developed between military, police and intelligence agencies from Britain and Ireland, and in particular between MI5 and Irish military intelligence (G2). For most of the war British intelligence pursued this joint strategy of covert activity and official collaboration, and MI5 and SIS shared responsibility for Ireland. However, there was a gradual shift of emphasis towards cooperation and it was eventually concluded that the MI5-G2 link could serve all Britain's security needs. This article charts this evolution and places it within the context of Anglo-Irish wartime political relations.     

Special documentation systems at the Government Code and Cypher School,Bletchley park,during the Second World War

The work of GCCS at BP has received much attention in recent years. Concentration, however, has been on the capture of Sigint by the interception services and the problems of decryption of messages in Enigma. Less attention has been placed on the documentation of the decrypts and the intelligence held by the factual indexes maintained by the Air, Military and Naval Sections. Lying behind these were the highly specialized devices which facilitated the translation and analysis of decrypted messages by providing the expansions of abbreviations common in all Sigint and the ‘equivalents’ of German and other terms. This paper describes the work of two specialist units, serving Hut 3 (Air and Military intelligence) and Hut 4 (Naval intelligence), engaged in the creation and maintenance of such devices.     

Les Occidentaux: Western Europe and the United States since the Second World War

In his recent book, Les Occidentaux, Alfred Grosser describes and analyses the complex conundrum of relations between the countries of Western Europe and the United States since 1945. In the late 1970s, this story is of course still incomplete, because there has been no ‘end of an era’ in transatlantic relations, in spite of the deep economic crisis which has affected all the countries involved. His study focuses not only on the facts, but also on how these facts were perceived by those involved; in so doing it poses, answers and provokes many questions. In the following edited and translated extract from the Conclusion of his book, Professor Grosser briefly re‐examines some of the more significant problems he has considered and takes another look at his solutions and their implications.