Preparing for Armageddon: Jic 1 (Final) and the Soviet Attack on Canada

From 1945 to 1947 Canada shifted from a dependency on Great Britain for wartime operational intelligence to a junior partnership with the United States in the production of strategic threat assessments of the Soviet Union. Working through the Military Cooperation Committee the primary objective of Canadian and American officials was to update the wartime Defence Plan (ABC-22), with a Basic Security Plan for the post-war defence of North America. Each country was to produce a detailed 'Implementation' based on an intelligence 'Appreciation' of the threats facing North America in the 'air-atomic age'. Towards this end, the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee prepared JIC 1 (Final), a report on when, where, and in what capacity the Soviet Union would strike Canada in the event of the next major war. The basic problem facing the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee was to incorporate American sources in the assessment of Soviet capabilities without simply producing a carbon copy version of the assessment of their continental ally. Moreover, the Canadians were particularly concerned that they produce a 'made in Canada' assessment of Soviet intentions. The report was completed and approved by Canadian and American defence officials in 1947 and updated versions became the basis for continental defence planning until the signing of the 1957 Norad agreement.     

Regulation,the Regulatory State and European Politics

For the past 15 years or so, the claim of a rise of the regulatory state in Europe has been a dominant theme in public policy research. This paper critically reflects on this claim and the associated scholarship by considering four key questions. First, what is the significance of the supposed rise of the regulatory state for the state in Europe and how can this trend be explained? Second, what insights have been gained from the study of phenomena associated with the regulatory state, both in terms of EU and national levels of government as well as in terms of process and organisational understandings of policy analysis? Third, does the regulatory state represent a stable arrangement or does it suffer from its own peculiar dilemmas that fundamentally affect the nature of European states? Fourth, and finally, this article develops three scenarios – those of withering away, plodding along, and rejuvenation – for the future of the (study of the) regulatory state in Europe.     

The Soviet Union,the Middle East,and the evolving world energy situation

Surveying and summarizing the basic issues confronting Soviet decisionmakers in the next ten years as reflected in energy and international political terms, this analysis treats the capacity and constraints mediating Soviet influence in the resolution of the future world energy balance. A scenario highlighting a “Soviet-Preferred Future World” is developed that focuses on three classes of likely energy outcomes: (1) a gradual erosion of the Western commercial position in Middle East oil, (2) repeated shortages in oil-consumer states leading to a diversion of attention away from international matters and increased preoccupation with “domestic” energy woes, and (3) a deterioration of the terms of trade for energy importers vis à vis Soviet and noncommunist trading partners. The discussion concludes with an assessment of several of the key choices confronting the major oil-importing nations and requiring resolution.     

Why is there no Radical Right Party in Ireland?

The rise of the radical or extreme right parties in Europe – parties usually noted for strong, sometimes racist anti-immigrant ideologies – has attracted a great deal of attention in political science. Ireland, despite having some conditions favourable to the growth of such a party has no radical right party. This paper argues that that this is because the ‘space’ usually occupied by such parties – for young, poor people disaffected by economic change – is taken up by Sinn Féin, which though it has similarities to radical right parties, differs markedly in its attitudes to immigrants. It goes on to explain the special circumstances that prevent nationalist parties in Ireland from presenting overtly anti-immigrant platforms. The focus on anti-immigration and liberal economic policies for such parties may mean that other parties with strong resemblances are excluded from studies they might usefully be included.     

Harry Howe Ransom and American intelligence studies

In this interview Harry Howe Ransom, a leading American scholar of intelligence studies over the past 50 years, discusses how he entered the field and his views regarding some key intelligence topics. Foremost on his research agenda has been the study of whether in democratic societies secret agencies can operate side-by-side with an otherwise open government without violating basic civil liberties – the difficult balancing act between the need for security, on the one hand, and the cherished value of liberty, on the other. He has also been a leading critic of intelligence politicization, noting in this interview that there is a tendency for intelligence systems to provide information they think their top bosses want to hear, and for the top bosses – more often than not – to do what they wish in spite of intelligence to the contrary. Professor Ransom began his research into intelligence as a young political scientist at Harvard University and continued this work throughout his subsequent distinguished career at Vanderbilt University and into his retirement years.     

Three Philosophical Lessons for the Analysis of Criminal and Military Intelligence

It has recently been suggested that philosophy – in particular, epistemology – has a contribution to make to the analysis of criminal and military intelligence. The present article pursues this suggestion, taking three phenomena that have recently been studied by philosophers, and showing that they have important implications for the gathering and sharing of intelligence, and for the use of intelligence in the determining ofstrategy. The phenomena discussed are: (1) Simpson's Paradox, (2) the distinction between resiliency and reliability of data, and (3) the Causal Markov Condition.     

Seeing Red: U.S. Air Force Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1945-1949

In the immediate postwar period Army Air Force A-2 cultivated a unique intelligence culture that focussed on the air-atomic threat posed by the Soviet Union and the use of the most advanced technologies to monitor countries behind the 'Iron Curtain'. Although most intelligence reports presented a detailed analysis of Russian air power capabilities, consideration was also given to an assessment of intentions. Based on a literal interpretation of Marxist texts and an unambiguous reading of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, A-2 more than any other agency was convinced of the Soviet willingness to wage war. As for a reading of capabilities, the fact that the Soviets were developing a long-range air force was in itself evidence of intentions. A-2 was, however, left out of the national security decision-making loop until after the successful test of the Soviet A-bomb, which was accurately predicted by the Air Force in the summer of 1949. Until that time most officials in the Truman administration believed in the likelihood of the slow incremental expansion of Soviet power rather than the launching of an 'atomic Pearl harbor' against the Western bloc.     

The Political Foundations of the Eurocracy

This article explores the politics behind the design of EU regulatory institutions. The EU has established an extensive ‘Eurocracy’ outside of the Commission hierarchy, including over 30 European agencies and a number of networks of national regulatory authorities (NRAs). The article examines the politics of institutional choice in the EU, explaining why EU policy-makers create agencies in some policy areas, while opting for looser regulatory networks in others. It shows that the design of EU regulatory institutions – ‘the Eurocracy’ – is driven not by functional imperatives but by political considerations related to distributional conflict and the influence of supranational actors.     

Australia and the China Threat: managing ambiguity

A China Threat – the fear of being taken over by China and the Chinese – has been an ever present in the politics of Australia since even before there was a Commonwealth of Australia. It was both a major cause of Federation in 1901 and a determinant of Australia's foreign policy thereafter. In the last 20 years, concerns about China have come to focus less on migration and more on economic integration and China's political influence. There are as always distinct paradoxes in the China Threat. It may be a useful vehicle for making a political point at election time but China has a place in the Australian economy that has led Australia's leaders to at least modify their resistance once in office.     

What Sort of Semi-presidentialism do Finns Want? An Intra-systemic Comparative Analysis

Against the backdrop of moves by the political establishment, endorsed by political scientists, to shift towards a purely ceremonial presidency, this paper uses recent survey data to assess levels of popular support – and the socio-demographic structure of support – for two different types of semi-presidentialism in Finland. It represents an exercise in intra-country comparison – comparing public support for a return to the significant powers the head of state possessed under the 1919 constitution (Duverger-style semi-presidentialism) with backing for the more limited presidential prerogatives enshrined in the 2000 constitution (status quo semi-presidentialism). Correlation and multiple regression analysis of complementary data-sets led to two main findings. The vast majority of Finns seem content with the current limited powers of the president – status quo presidentialism – whilst among the minority that would apparently prefer a return to Duverger-style semi-presidentialism, there is a disproportionate number of persons with relatively low levels of formal education, low social status and predominantly left-wing party political persuasion.     

The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953–61

Assessments of the CIA's role in Latin America during the 1950s have tended to focus predominantly on the twin case studies of Guatemala and Cuba. Consequently, the Agency's role – and, more broadly, that of its head Allen Dulles – has come to be seen as one obsessed with covert action and relatively unimportant in terms of policy discussions. Dulles, in fact, has been portrayed as an unwilling and disinterested participant in policy discussions. The present article will challenge those assertions by suggesting that, by examining Dulles's role in the Eisenhower administration's discussions on Latin America, a different picture emerges – one that paints Dulles as an active and rational participant, and which raises important questions for our understanding of the CIA's role during the Eisenhower era.     

Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 1956–61

During the Algerian war of independence (1954–62), Federal Germany became the theatre of a series of unexplained bombings and shootings that targeted Algerian nationalists and German arms dealers. At the time, these crimes were attributed to the Red Hand, a counter-terrorist organization or parallel secret service with a mission to defeat the enemies of l’Algérie française. This article argues that the attacks on West German territory were executed neither by vigilantes nor by renegade agents. Instead, they were carried out by the French foreign intelligence service SDECE with the full approval of the highest political authorities in Paris. Using the case of Federal Germany as an example, this article seeks to reveal how and why covert action – including state-sanctioned murder – became an integral and important part of the Algerian war, particularly of France's campaign to undermine the Algerian rebels' efforts to procure military and non-military supplies. The article will show that the Red Hand served merely as a cover to detract from the state's resort to such violent and criminal means.     

Objective intelligence or plausible denial: An open source review of intelligence method and process since 9/11

Since 9/11 there have been a series of reports criticizing the American Intelligence Community for its lack of foresight and inaccurate intelligence prior to the Iraq invasion of 2003. It is argued here that this is not a new phenomenon, but a replay of other periods of self-doubt and introspection within the Intelligence Community. The criticism of organizational structures and individuals – however relevant that may be – does not address the real, and enduring, problem with US intelligence-gathering bodies. The very process of intelligence theory, definition and practice needs to be fundamentally reviewed. Eschewing the dogmatism that has hindered intelligence reform, this article suggests three methods as a starting point for a new approach.     

Palestine,Israel and Egypt: New scholarship on the Middle Eastern conflicts

A. Ilan, The Origins of the Arab‐Israeli Arms Race (London: Macmillan 1996). Pp.287. ISBN £36. 0–333–63240–0.

Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandier (eds.), Middle Eastern Security: Prospects for an Arms Control Regime, a BESA study in Mideast Security (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass 1995). Pp.199. £25/$19.50 (cloth); £16/$19.50 (paper). ISBN 0–7146–4644‐X and 4168–5.

Saul Zadka, Blood in Zion. How the Jewish Guerillas drove the British out of Palestine (London: Brassey's 1995). Pp.227, biblio., index. £19.95. ISBN 1–85753–136–1.

Joseph Heller, The Stern Gang. Ideology, Politics and Terror 1940–1949 (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass 1995). Pp.358. £37.50/$47.50 (cloth); £18/$25 (paper). ISBN 0–7146–4106–5.

W. Scott Lucas, Britain and Suez. The Lion's Last Roar (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1996). Pp.139, biblio., index. £35. ISBN 0–7190–4579–7.

Ram Ginat, The Soviet Union and Egypt 1945–1955 (London: Frank Cass 1993). Pp.269. £35/$45. ISBN 0–7146–3486–7.     

The British experience with intelligence accountability

This article assesses the British experience with intelligence accountability through an analysis of the principal mechanism that exists to provide for it – the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee. It discusses the context within which oversight proposals emerged, the debate surrounding the nature of the new oversight body, and assesses the performance of the Committee over the first decade of its existence. It concludes that while the Committee has secured some important advances with regard to the accountability of the intelligence and security services, there are nevertheless significant limitations and weaknesses, many of which were evident in the Committee's 2003 investigation and report into pre-war intelligence on Iraqi WMD. In this context, the debate as to whether the oversight body should have select committee status, discussed at length in the article, remains highly relevant.     

Intelligence to counter terror: The importance of all-source fusion

The modern digital environment has made terrorism and other transnational crimes vastly easier to coordinate on a worldwide scale than was possible before World War II. It has also exacerbated a most serious challenge: governments attempting to stop terrorists – particularly democracies – are expected to do so without undermining the laws, representative principles and informal confidences upon which a culture of democracy depends. The purpose of this article is to examine the modern intelligence requirements for countering terror in order to appreciate this challenge in greater depth and to develop a reasoned basis for balancing counterintelligence capabilities with civil liberties. It begins by considering the nature of the terrorists we face and the requirements for good intelligence operations against them. Historical examples illustrate those lessons that can be learned from the defeat of similar threats in the past, including the recurring ways in which challenges to civil liberties arise as democracies optimize intelligence in the name of security. In discussing the special opportunities and challenges modern technology poses in this contest, the analysis suggests an essential next step for democracies threatened by terrorists in their midst.     

Eberstadt,Dulles and NSC 50: The Impetus for CIA Evolution through 1953

Despite outward appearances, the CIA's evolution between 1945 and 1953 was influenced by two objective investigations – the Eberstadt Task Force and Dulles Commission – and was accelerated, but not instigated, by the shock of the Korean War. The role of these two investigations, which ultimately resulted in NSC 50 and the establishment of the CIA as a viable member of the US intelligence community, has been overlooked in recent literature. While these panels played a critical role in shaping the CIA's organization during this period, the Truman administration never achieved its goal of establishing a truly ‘central’ intelligence organization. This article examines the formation of the CIA, discusses both reports, national policy changes enacted in response, and relevance to the US intelligence community's current operations.     

Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance

After major intelligence failures it is often asked why intelligence and security officials failed to heed the many ‘wake-up calls’ that had been provided by earlier failures and surprises. This article addresses this question by examining intelligence failures as ‘focusing events’, which is a concept used in the literature on government policy making to explain how disasters and crises can stimulate policy change and help organizations and decision-makers learn. It argues that in order for an intelligence failure such as a major terrorist attack to inspire improved intelligence performance – to be a true wake-up call – that failure must not only act as a focusing event to bring more attention to the threat, but it must also lead to increased intelligence collection and greater receptivity toward intelligence on the part of decision-makers.     

Jewish resistance in Poland's eastern borderlands during the second world war, 1939–41

After the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland in September 1939, a network of Jewish underground organizations and active conspiratorial groups was established. Its objective was to resist the violent imposition of the Soviet system, to preserve Jewish culture and religion and, for those with a Zionist orientation, to work for the establishment of a Jewish homeland. The Zionist parties and organizations among them were particularly active, especially the youth groups. The fate of the Jewish population of Eastern Europe under the Soviet occupation of 1939–41 remains understandingly overshadowed by the tragic events of the Holocaust. As a result, the activities of this Jewish underground are not widely known and have received little attention from scholars. Only in recent years have historians researching the history of Jews in eastern Poland begun to look more closely at Jewish resistance and especially at Zionist activity under Soviet occupation. These scholars have, however, relied exclusively on the eyewitness accounts of the few survivors. At the same time, Polish and Russian historians conducting intensive research on the war-time Soviet occupation of eastern Poland have published contemporary Soviet documents that confirm the existence of this Jewish underground. The material currently available shows that the Jewish underground was more widespread than previously thought, and that the Soviet authorities viewed Jewish resistance groups, and indeed any clandestine activity, as a serious threat to their rule.     

Political Mobilisation,Political Participation and the Power of the Vote

This article proposes a framework to recast our thinking about political participation. The approach adopted insists on the role of collective actors and their agents – the political elites – in the democratic process and, by implication, in determining the amount and forms of individual political participation. The proposed framework builds on a simple model of representative government and introduces some major changes in the political context which have become ever more conspicuous in the course of the last 30 years, and which are substantially modifying the conditions for conventional (electoral) and unconventional political participation. Prominent among these changes are the increasing role of the media in politics, and the decline of party control over the voters. These changes tend to enhance both electoral and non-electoral forms of participation. Another set of contemporary institutional changes reduces the electoral accountability of political decision-makers, with expected consequences that are more ambiguous for both electoral and non-electoral participation.