The logic of anti-Zionism: Soviet elites in the aftermath of the Six-Day War

Despite the opening of Soviet archives, and the surge in scholarly interest in anti-Zionism, scholars have not used declassified archive documents to shed new light on Soviet anti-Zionism in the wake of the Six-Day War. Based on such documents, Gjerde’s article challenges a view of post-1967 Soviet anti-Zionism that has been prevalent since it emerged during the Cold War: that it represented a ‘disguised’ form of antisemitism that Soviet leaders used as a political tool. To the contrary, Gjerde argues, the archive documents suggest Soviet anti-Zionism was more than a propaganda invention. Within higher Soviet echelons, a particular logic existed that fostered a view of ‘Zionism’ as an immense, conspiratorial threat to the Soviet Union. In one sense, this logic grew out of a more general tendency to view nonconformity as conspiracy: the Soviets had established extremely narrow boundaries for what constituted acceptable Jewish identity; and, when some Soviet Jews began to voice nationalist sentiments after the Six-Day War, Soviet leaders saw this expression of nonconformity as essentially a hostile act, warranting severe counter-measures. This is not to say Soviet anti-Zionism was not antisemitic but rather that to explain it merely as a propaganda tool is to ignore much of the complexity of its emergence.     

Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq

The concept of ‘politicization’ of the US intelligence services, and in particular the CIA, has been debated by scholars for many years. However, it has also been easily dismissed by those investigating recent US foreign policy, as in the Robb-Silberman Commission's assurance over the 2003 Iraq War that ‘the Intelligence Community needs to be pushed’. This essay seeks an extension of the critique of politicization by considering the historical context since the formation of the CIA. It seeks an application of that critique by putting forth, when evaluating the policy and operations of the George W. Bush administration, the notion of an ‘alternative network’ within the government. The argument is that politicization must be linked to a conception of ‘Executive power’, both within the American bureaucracy and in the projection and rationalization of US aims overseas.     

Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet War Scare: The Untold Story

Abstract

During the Soviet war scare of the 1980s, British intelligence shared vital information from KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky with its American partners. The US intelligence community, however, was suspicious of the message and the messenger, dismissing Soviet ‘war talk’ as disinformation. Some officials even believed that the British had tweaked their reports to influence US policy. President Ronald Reagan, however, on the advice of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, listened to Gordievsky rather than his intelligence advisors. The war scare had a profound influence on Reagan's thinking about nuclear war, Kremlin fears, and Soviet–American relations that led him to seek a new détente with Moscow and the end of the Cold War through diplomacy rather than confrontation.?Subsequent events and post-Cold War revelations vindicated Gordievsky. Reagan sought his advice on the eve of his first summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and later expressed his gratitude during a private meeting in the Oval Office.     

Mind games: cognitive bias,US intelligence and the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia

This article examines the impact of cognitive bias on the analytic output of the United States intelligence community during the Prague Spring. Utilising a range of primary sources, including declassified documents, oral history and contemporary accounts, this article argues that as a result of heuristic biases, analysts formed the mindset that the Soviet Union would not invade Czechoslovakia, and did not alter that assumption in the face of increasing evidence to the contrary. Consequently analysts possessed a distorted understanding of both Soviet intentions and the prevailing political environment and did not accurately convey the likelihood of military action to consumers.     

A Constructive Quality: The Press,The CIA,and Covert Intervention in the 1950s

This article examines the relationships between the CIA and the US domestic press during the 1950s through the lens of CIA covert interventions in Guatemala and Indonesia. It disputes interpretations of the press/CIA relationship that argue for significant control exercised by the CIA, and contends that there were several types of press/CIA relationship, ranging from cooperation to hostility. The most common relationship was one of friendly confluence, rooted in Cold War considerations; even well-disposed reporters, though, tended to be careful about preserving their independence. This article concludes that while the CIA/press relationships generally resulted in reporting favorable to the CIA, there were counter-trends in the 1950s that laid the groundwork for the later collapse of the CIA's public image.     

The Response of Chinese Intellectuals to the US War on Terror

Studying the Chinese intellectual response to the US War on Terror, and how the battle between the Chinese liberals and nonliberals fitted into the above debate, the article focuses on two cases, 9-11 and the war in Iraq. Each will be divided into the expressive response (i.e., how the intellectuals reacted physically); the ideological response (i.e., how they interpreted the incidents in ideologically); and the strategic response (i.e., how they proposed the right strategies for the party-state to manage global affairs). After studying the cases, we should discover how the Chinese intellectuals used nationalist rhetoric to disguise their real disagreements, i.e., their views on domestic politics as well as to advance their own national importance. Simon Shen is Research Assistant Professor in the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK). Dr. Shen is author or editor of Redefining Nationalism in Modern China: Sino–American Relations and the Emergence of Chinese Public Opinions in the 21st Century, Chinese Response to Anti-terrorism, Non-state Actors and Foreign Affairs of the Greater China Region (with Joseph Cheng). His articles have appeared in the East Asia, Journal of Comparative Asian Development, Pacific Review, Politics, Asian Perspective, and Journal of East Asian History. Research for this article was partially funded by a grant from the South China Program, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. The author thanks Dr. Rana Mitter of the University of Oxford and anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on the earlier drafts of this article.     

Dictator,Loyal, and Opportunistic Agents: The Soviet Archives on Creating the Soviet Economic System

Studies of the mature Soviet economy focus on the structuralweaknesses of rent seeking and corruption. Such an economy ispresumed to perform better in its adolescent phase under astrong stationary-bandit dictator, dedicated to growth andable to control rent-seekers. We use the recently openedSoviet state and party archives to show the process that beganin the 1930s of transforming the inner circle of the Sovietstationary bandit into a rent-seeking bureaucracy lackinglong-term goals.     

Comparing US and UK Intelligence Assessment in the Early Cold War: NSC-68, April 1950

US and British intelligence assessments regarding the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold War contained substantial differences despite the remarkable level of cooperation and information sharing that existed between the respective services in the period. Using NSC-68 as a "pivot", this article examines these discrepancies as well as those similarities that did exist, considering their significance and evolution in an effort to understand what factors drove and shaped intelligence analysis on both sides of the Atlantic.     

Debating War and Peace: US Congress and the Domestic Legitimization of Military Interventions

This article investigates how members of US Congress legitimized their votes in four cases of military interventions after the Cold War (Iraq 1991, 2002–2009; Somalia 1993; Libya 2011). Using an original dataset on congressional rhetoric, the qualitative content analysis highlights that the domestic legitimization of military interventions hinges on members of Congress’s perception of external threats and national interests. So far, international relations research focused on the executive and the war powers literature offered mainly quantitative accounts on voting patterns within the legislative branch―especially for the US case. The relevance of national interest arguments within congressional debates confirms the expectations of neoclassical realism while contradicting previous studies about a dominant discourse in US society, which legitimizes interventions with universal values, such as democracy promotion or human rights.     

The CIA in Western Europe and the abuse of human rights

Covert action by the CIA and other intelligence services is designed to remain secret. Academics and the public at large therefore to this very day face great difficulties in answering two specific questions: What covert action has the CIA carried out in Europe during its almost 60 years of existence? Did CIA covert action violate human rights in Europe? Some operations, however, have become known and are now in the public research domain. Among them are the clandestine anti-communist stay-behind networks set up by the CIA in case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. As the details of the operation emerge only gradually some sources suggest that the stay-behind network was linked to terrorist groups, adding further interest to this largely unknown research subject at a time when the so called ‘war on terrorism’ has forced academics to examine present and historical terrorism data once again.     

Interrogating 24: Making Sense of US Counter-terrorism in the Global War on Terrorism

As an increasing number of scholars have argued, the fiction of popular culture and the reality of politics are inseparable. Fact and fiction, rather than remaining distinct, are mutually constitutive and interact to produce new meaning. A critical reading of Fox Television's intensely popular series 24 suggests that the series (re)produces key elements of the global war on terrorism discourse and is therefore a particularly useful case for under standing the importance of intertextuality for the production of meaning. Though the packaging of 24 may be new and exciting, the underlying messages remain the same, in the process rendering commonsensical the US global war on terrorism and the way that it has been waged.