Intelligence collection versus investigation: how the ethos of law enforcement impedes development of a US informational advantage

There is an inherent tension between a law enforcement–driven approach and a requirementsdriven approach to intelligence collection. The US experience, with the development of the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), as the primary intelligence service within the domestic environment, suggests that the tension is nearly insurmountable if an organization starts from a reactive, threat-focused posture. As a law-enforcement agency, which US government decision-makers expect to fulfill an intelligence function, the FBI is triply handicapped by the external strictures of the Department of Justice (DoJ); the Bureau’s own policies – which respond to the DoJ parameters; and the FBI’s organizational culture.     

The Threat Review and Prioritization trap: how the FBI’s new Threat Review and Prioritization process compounds the Bureau’s oldest problems

Abstract

In the nearly 15 years since the events of 11 September 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has undertaken a succession of efforts to become an agency capable of fulfilling the intelligence functions with which it has been entrusted. However, historically, the FBI’s experience with intelligence has been reactive due to a law enforcement culture that closed cases rather than identified ways to keep opportunities for collection open, as well as bureaucratic wariness due to the differing expectations from one Presidential administration to the next. The Threat Review and Prioritization (TRP) process is the most recent iteration of the Bureau’s attempt to organize as an intelligence service. However, TRP is informed not by a mission of developing intelligence that will help to disrupt emerging threats or exploit opportunities at both the strategic (policymaking) and tactical (arrests), but instead reactively focuses on the threats which have become fully manifest within the FBI’s own domain. TRP leaves the US at a disadvantage vis-à-vis state and non-state adversaries and competitors. Organizationally, it institutionalizes the shortcomings of reactivity and insularity that were the unfortunate characteristics of the pre-9/11 FBI.     

Hunters not Gatherers: Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century

Because of its origins in a sort of anti-Elizabethan paranoia against centralised government, the United States is poorly set up institutionally to cope with the major danger to itself in the twenty-first century: the threat posed by Islamist terrorism. The Director of Central Intelligence is neither central nor fully directing. A large part of the intelligence community, especially in terms of budgets and supervision, is outside his direct control. There is a 'waters edge' separation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CIA. Essentially the CIA collects foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence overseas. The FBI, primarily a crime-oriented organisation, has had only a secondary function of domestic counter-intelligence. It is a case-oriented agency focused on establishing past facts in order to bring suspects to justice. It is psychologically ill-adapted to conceptualising threats that lie upstream, that is, in the future. In this context, September 11 can be most properly described as a failure of imagination. Remedies being proposed range from creating an internal security service à la Britain's MI5 to establishing a semi-autonomous domestic counter-intelligence agency within the FBI. In the field of covert action, intelligence in the twenty-first century likely will be characterised by what could be termed an offensive hunt strategy. Put in another way, intelligence operatives in the twenty-first century will become hunters, not gatherers. They will not simply sit back and gather information that comes in, analyse it, and then decide what to do about it. Rather they will have to go and hunt out intelligence that will enable them to track down or kill terrorists. This will involve sending operatives into countries with which we are not at war, indeed in some cases countries with which we have correct relations. In many circumstances, however, terrorist leaders will be hunted down with the help of host country elements. The likelihood is that this new strategy will be implemented primarily in terms of Special Forces operations aided by CIA elements. Modalities will have to be worked out between the Department of Defense and the CIA as to how such offensive hunt operations are to be carried out and how congressional oversight will be exercised.     

The Trump–Russia connection

The ongoing congressional and FBI investigations of possible coordination between President Donald Trump's campaign team and Russia to influence the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election threaten, at a minimum, to undermine Trump’s policy priorities. If even some of the accusations prove true, they will produce the biggest White House scandal since the Iran-Contra affair in 1985–87 in an inexperienced administration already beset by infighting.     

Corrupt political jurisdictions and voter participation

An FBI investigation of county purchasing activities in the mid 1980s resulted in the conviction of 55 of Mississippi's 410 county supervisors. Analyzing data from the state's 1987 county supervisor elections and hypothesizing that candidates' demands for votes increase as the gains from holding public office increase, we predict larger voter turnouts in the 26 of the state's 82 counties where supervisor corruption was exposed. Holding constant average voter turnout in the preceding U.S. presidential election and controlling for the competitiveness of supervisor races, we find that more Mississippians indeed voted in corrupt than in non-corrupt counties.     

Information Technology (IT) woes and intelligence agency failures: the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s troubled IT evolution as a microcosm of a dysfunctional corporate culture

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has experienced a number of high-profile failures – across nearly four decades – in developing its Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. Repeated missteps are indications of problems with the Bureau’s broader culture that degrade its effectiveness across missions. A significant factor contributing to this dysfunctional culture is the diversification of the FBI’s responsibilities, to the point of losing a corporate identity. Reform will require an assessment of the Bureau’s purpose, the elements which it should retain in furtherance of this vision, and the steps to align its workforce with the competencies necessary to pursue this mission.     

9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure

Public discussion about the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks has focused on the human causes of tragedy – on individual mistakes, failures of leadership, and the power plays between intelligence officers in the field and policymakers in Washington. But closer examination of the FBI suggests that organizational weaknesses are the root cause of poor agency performance. Longstanding deficiencies in the FBI's organizational structure, culture, and incentive systems proved crippling in the 1990s, when the Cold War ended and the terrorist threat emerged. These lingering weaknesses ultimately prevented the bureau from capitalizing on 12 separate opportunities that might have disrupted the 9/11 plot.     

DNA fingerprints and rape: A feminist assessment

Can the use of DNA fingerprinting reduce the frequency of rape? Feminist technology assessment is used here to evaluate this new forensic technique, which distinguishes between persons by differences in DNA sequences in variable regions of their chromosomes. Although everyone's DNA pattern is unique, the statistical degrees of difference among sub-populations within ethnic and racial groups are not fully known. The technique is beset by laboratory errors, difficulties in interpretation, and lack of quality control. Policy analysts may also be troubled by the politics behind the harassment of expert witnesses, the rejection by journals of critical articles, the influence of the FBI on federal assessment reports, and the inequitable distribution of costs and benefits. The cases of British rapist-murderer Colin Pitchfork, San Diego rape victim Alicia Wade, and eight exonerated convicts demonstrate how the technique can clear probably innocent rape suspects, but they illustrate little rape-prevention capacity. If DNA testing accurately exonerates a suspect, then the police may continue searching; yet, a test with greater power to exonerate may let criminals escape and may lower the credibility of rape victims' eyewitness testimony. Furthermore, any accurate DNA typing might foster behavior to avoid apprehension or the reduction of sentences through plea-bargaining, thus having a negative effect on deterrence. Despite clear benefit to individual women in specific circumstances, this technique is likely, overall, to be disadvantageous to women. The rape victim identifies her assailant in a police line-up again before the jury in court. He is convicted and put behind bars. Some years later he hears about DNA testing and convinces his lawyer to get tests on the semen that was fund on the victim's clothes. when results show that he could not have been the rapist, he is released from prison. Yet the victim remains convinced that he was the man who attacked her and lives in fear that will find her and rape her again.¹     

JFK,FBI, and CIA: playing hardball over an intelligence leak to the New York Times

On 26 July 1962, the New York Times published a front-page story by reporter Hanson Baldwin which, among many things, showed the vulnerability of Soviet land-based missiles, in the event of a first strike by the US. Drawing at least indirectly from a National Intelligence Estimate, it also showed how US intelligence had obtained that information. The story infuriated President John F. Kennedy, who believed it harmed the security of the United States. This article details an aggressive FBI investigation of who had leaked to Baldwin, as well as an initiative at the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct its own future leak investigations inside the US, both authorized by President Kennedy.     

If I only had a brain: Yip Harburg,J. Edgar Hoover,and the failures of FBI intelligence work

E. Y. Harburg, the lyricist behind The Wizard of Oz, remains one of the most important songwriters blacklisted during the Cold War. His removal from Hollywood features in the 1950s denied moviegoers a distinct American voice whose lyrics mixed humor and entertainment to champion liberal causes. From 1944–1972, Director J. Edgar Hoover and the Bureau’s major field offices investigated Harburg. His declassified FBI file shows institutionalized incompetence in the way the Bureau went about writing reports, evaluating evidence, making conclusions, and conducting counter-intelligence work. Harburg’s story illuminates the battle between the left and right to shape popular culture during the Cold War. Hoover and Harburg held opposing views on politics, religion, economics, and race. Yet both men shared a fervent faith in popular culture’s capacity to transform America. Together they vied to remake the nation according to their own distinct visions – Hoover’s fear of declension stood in contrast to Harburg’s hope for radical progress.     

Domestic terrorism: Notes on the state system of oppression∗

Abstract

Twenty‐five years after the Watergate affair culminated in the resignation of Richard Nixon, the country continues to be animated by the spirit of scandal—even if the alleged offenses against William Jefferson Clinton involved sexual misconduct rather than illegal bombings, break‐ins, and other non‐"crimes and misdemeanors.” In this article, Noam Chomsky discusses a more basic threat to the Constitution than Watergate found in the pattern of FBI break‐ins and illegal actions first revealed to the public in 1973. (Illegal actions by the national police are known to have continued in the 1980s as a tactic used against activists in the Central America solidarity movement.) Not only does Chomsky locate a pattern in the FBI's actions since the founding of the Bureau, he discusses historical antecedents in the Alien and Sedition Acts, the judicial murder of the Haymarket anarchists, and the Palmer raids. For Chomsky, the real meaning of these actions is that the system routinely works to stifle dissent using means far more problematic than those employed by the Watergate burglars. In Chomsky's view, the purpose of these criminal actions is to frustrate preliminary stages of organization before more advanced forms of “revolutionary radicalism” can develop.     

Transforming the FBI: A Challenge of Culture, Resources, and Mission

A recent review of restructuring efforts at the Federal Bureau of Investigation published by the National Academy of Public Administration examines several studies that precipitated the reorganization and discusses the current state of counterterrorism, intelligence, and internal security functions within the agency. However, the report fails to seriously engage the benefits of restructuring federal agencies to separate criminal investigation from antiterrorism or to address the financial implications of the current reorganization. Although it provides a useful overview of current changes within the FBI, it lacks theoretical linkages.     

Max weber and China’s transition under the new leadership

Some scholars have applied Max Weber’s three ideal types of authority (traditional charismatic and rational-legal) and general transition theory to China. This paper argues that the application of these Weberian concepts is faulty. Weber’s understanding of rationality is specific, a narrow reference to modern Western capitalist rationalization of action. When Weber’s account is forced upon the issues of Chinese political leadership, it simplifies the complexity of historical phenomena, and falls prey to the difficulties of universalism and dualism. Chinese political ideas and practices have developed in a distinctive cultural tradition and may not be able to be fully understood in Western terms and categories. This paper proposes an alternative tongbian interpretation of Chinese politics. His research interests focus on comparative Western and Chinese political philosophy. He has published a number of articles in English and Chinese. He has taught American Politics, International Relations, Western Political Philosophy and Theory, and team-taught ASIAN Nations: China. He is currently teaching Advanced Chinese Language at the Japan American Institute of Management Science (JAIMS) and is a Liaison of Exchange Programs with China at the Center for Chinese Studies, University of Hawai’i at Manoa.     

Remembering JPAM's first editor,Raymond Vernon

Raymond Vernon, the founding editor of the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, died on August 26, 1999, at the age of 85. He was Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs Emeritus at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government at the time of his death, having served on the faculties of various schools at Harvard since 1959. He will be remembered for his contributions to a number of public policy areas. For example, in the late 1950s he led a research team that produced a study of the future of the New York metropolitan area, regarded as a landmark in the field of urban planning. In the last two decades he wrote extensively on the phenomenon of multinational corporations. His last book appeared in 1998 and was awarded a prize in 1999 by the Academy of International Business.     

‘Strangers in their own land’: Powellism’s policy impact

ABSTRACT

In this paper, Solomos provides an account of the impact of Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech on policy agendas about race relations and immigration. He argues that Powell’s intervention helped to shape policy frames around race and immigration in its immediate aftermath and beyond. By exploring the impact of the speech on the policy climate, his paper argues that perhaps the most important aspect of the speech is the way it helped to shape the policy agendas of both the Conservative and Labour parties, even as Powell himself was marginalized from mainstream politics. He concludes by suggesting that Powell’s intervention links up with contemporary debates and preoccupations about race and immigration.     

The Queer Jew: Gender,Sexuality and Jean-Paul Sartre's Anti-Antisemitism

In an attempt to understand the mechanisms that enable the perpetuation of racism, Judaken examines how antisemitic stereotypes can be reiterated in the discourse of those individuals most committed to the eradication of antisemitism. He argues that typologies - mythic images of collective identity - depend upon an associative logic. These associations are engendered in the construction of the Self (both individual and collective), by demarcating it-self from the Other(s), generally through tropes of gender, pathology and race. Judaken focuses on Jean-Paul Sartre's Anti-Semite and Jew,a text which Sartre called 'a declaration of war against antisemitic motifs', and argues that this unintended effect is the result of how Sartre conceptualizes both consciousness and the relation between the Self and Other in Being and Nothingness. This work of existential phenomenology, that sought radically to critique the western metaphysical tradition, nevertheless reinscribes dominant assumptions within western culture about gender and sexuality. Judaken shows how Sartre's re-citation of these assumptions fundamentally determines how he conceives of the relation between the antisemite and 'the Jew'. He concludes, however, by suggesting that imminent to Sartre's own position, there is an-other way of conceiving of the relation between Self and Other that might offer hope beyond the impasses of the western tradition's failures in embracing difference, singularity and particularity.     

Iraq’s Political Turmoil

Motivated by the government's patronage and corruption, massive political protests in Iraq have mobilised the majority Shia population and weakened Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. He is caught between an intensely disgruntled population and an equally stubborn ruling elite. In a heavily armed population with a recent history of civil war, there is a salient risk that popular demands will be pursued through violence.     

Congressional Supervision of America's Secret Agencies: The Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee

In 1947, the United States created a modern intelligence community to guard against another surprise attack like the one at Pearl Harbor. This community consists of 13 major agencies, among them the CIA and the FBI. Concealed from public view, they pose a significant challenge to the concept of government accountability in a democratic society. This article examines the failure of congressional lawmakers to hold the secret agencies accountable during the Cold War. Contrary to recent theoretical research on legislative oversight, which suggests reasons that accountability has been strong in the United States, this study finds that a weak system of legislative review has permitted a dangerous erosion of civil liberties. The study also explores the efforts of the Church Committee in 1975 to fashion new safeguards that would reduce the probability of further abuse of power by the intelligence community.     

Human Rights in the United States: The Unfinished Story of Political Prisoners and Cointelpro

For many years, black nationalists have tried to reopen the investigation into the FBI's COINTELPRO (COunter-INTELligence PROgram), which served to disrupt and destroy the black liberation movement and other progressive movements in the US. On September 14, 2000 in Washington, DC, Congressional Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-Georgia) convened a "brain trust" on this subject as part of the Congressional Black Caucus' Legislative Conference, a yearly series of forums and panel discussions on issues of importance to the communities represented by the Caucus. The title of the McKinney panel was "Human Rights in the United States: The Unfinished Story of Political Prisoners/Victims of COINTELPRO." Six panelists presented information on the history of COINTELPRO and its relevance to the cases of the approximately 100 + political prisoners in US custody at this moment. Some of these prisoners have served 30 or more years; all have exceedingly long sentences. While the US government denies that it holds any political prisoners, the facts of the cases—and the connection of many cases to COINTELPRO operations—indicate otherwise. Several current and past political prisoners, most notably Jalil Muntaqim (Anthony Bottom) and Dr. Mutulu Shakur, along with released political prisoner Herman Ferguson, have consistently urged that the illegalities committed under COINTELPRO be examined further, and that compensation be made to the victims of these acts. The panel presentations excerpted below all point to the necessity of such an examination—and of releasing all of the US-held political prisoners in order to redress the crimes committed against progressive political movements under the aegis of COINTELPRO and other FBI counterintelligence programs. The significance of this issue to the community was illustrated by the tremendous crowd that gathered and participated in the discussion following the panel.