Modernization without the market? The case of the ‘Soviet East’

This paper examines the contradictory nature of the ‘modernizing’ encounter between the former Soviet state and Cnetral Asian societies with a view to exploring more fully a path that purported to be transformative in the absence of a market economy. This encounter was evaluated by some as a radical break with the past and by others as an instance of cultural stasis and continuity. This apparent paradox is explained with reference to the specific features of the command economy and Soviet nationalities policy and their interplay with local forms of social organization. The main argument is that what appeared to some commentators as ‘traditionalism’ was as much a response to and creation of the system itself as a feature of local communities.     

Collision in Manchuria: rescue,intelligence, and the Cold War in Asia,August–September 1945

The Japanese decision to surrender on 15 August 1945 created an extraordinary and unique situation in the Chinese province of Manchuria. Within hours of the Japanese surrender, a number of special American intelligence teams parachuted into Manchuria to gain information on the POW’s and Soviet intentions for postwar Asia. This paper will examine on what occurred when Soviet and American military personnel met in Manchuria. Both sides had very different goals and aims for the end of war. For the small American force assigned to locate and identify Allied POW’s, their mission exemplified the already strained relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. For nearly every instance of cordial and joyous meetings between the two sides there were equally difficult confrontations and misunderstandings. These encounters offered a preview into the coming Cold War in Asia.     

New ways of thinking: The intelligence function and strategic calculations in the admiralty, 1882–1889

Intelligence analysis is often viewed as a distant relative of the policy deliberations within military and naval organisations. This is especially apparent in contemporary settings, where policymaking is rigid and highly compartmentalised by the firewalls that exist between intelligence producers and consumers. The purpose of this article is to examine an overlooked case from intelligence history, when the creation of an intelligence function within the Admiralty had a profound impact upon the formulation and conduct of British naval policy in the 1880s. This inevitably encouraged new ways of thinking about how the Admiralty organised and prepared for war.     

‘Consistent with an Intention’: The Far East Combined Bureau and the Outbreak of the Pacific War, 1940–41

Abstract

From 1934, Britain expanded its military and naval intelligence agencies against Japan. At the outbreak of war in Europe, they, and most of their personnel, were moved from Hong Kong to Singapore, and joined into an interservice organization, the Far East Combined Bureau. Much of the evidence about the Far East Combined Bureau is lost, but the surviving record illustrates what intelligence was available to decision-makers in Singapore during 1940–41, thus illuminating every debate about this disaster. Even more: it enables a reconceptualization of the relationship between intelligence and the outbreak of the Pacific War as a whole.     

Soviet industrial espionage against American military technology and the US response, 1930–1945

Between 1930 and 1945, the Soviet Union played a significant role in American domestic affairs. Although its agents’ infiltration of social movements and government agencies is well known, their parallel and highly successful practice of espionage against American industrial and military technology is less familiar. Washington officials were aware of Soviet spying, but mired in the Depression and then preoccupied with war, they mounted only a limited response, reflecting a political culture that did not emphasize active counterintelligence efforts. As a result, early Cold War revelations of unmistakable Soviet espionage shocked Americans, polarizing the Soviet‐American relationship and introducing a zealous domestic security apparatus.     

Air power and intelligence in the western desert campaign, 1940–43

During the fighting in the Western Desert of North Africa, the Royal Air Force conducted a land‐based interdiction campaign against Axis motorized transport supply columns which was guided by intelligence. It was this campaign, and not the Ultra‐driven sea interdiction campaign, which was responsible for the destruction of the bulk of Axis supply. The impact of land‐based interdiction totally destroyed the morale and fighting ability of the Axis forces at El Alamein in late 1942, and set a pattern for operations which was replayed with success throughout the remainder of the war.     

The UK–US intelligence alliance in 1975: Economies,evaluations and explanations

Intelligence and defence are often cited as central to the fabric of Anglo-American relations after 1945. However, we still know relatively little about how the Anglo-American intelligence relationship changed during the latter part of the twentieth century. During the 1960s and 1970s the UK continued its long retreat from its world role, driven by recurrent economic crises at home and anti-colonial nationalism abroad. This essay examines UK intelligence in the mid-1970s in the light of recent archival releases pertaining to the Roy Mason Defence Review. This material sheds interesting light on tensions between the military and diplomats in Whitehall over defence intelligence. More importantly, it appears to show that, partly because of the contraction of defence dispositions, UK intelligence activities were called upon to compensate and therefore became relatively more important as a substantive contribution to the alliance.     

The impact of ‘Tempest’ on Anglo-American communications security and intelligence, 1943–1970

ABSTRACT

This article examines the impact of the discovery by Britain and the United States in the late 1940s/early 1950s that cipher machines produced compromising emissions, a phenomenon which became known as Tempest. The British and Americans were forced to develop security measures to protect their encrypted communications but the Soviet Union was still able to exploit Tempest emissions from cipher machines in Western embassies in Moscow and read their diplomatic traffic. At the same time, Tempest became an important new way for the NSA and GCHQ to gather communications intelligence, particularly from developing world states and NATO allies.     

Ideas,identity, and institution‐building: From the ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia‐Pacific way'?

Abstract

This article examines the extent to which the development of multilateral institutions in the Asia‐Pacific region may be viewed as an exercise in identity‐building. It argues that institution‐building in this region is more of a ‘process‐orientated’ phenomenon, rather than simply being an outcome of structural changes in the international system (such as the decline of American hegemony). The process combines universal principles of multilateralism with some of the relatively distinct modes of socialization prevailing in the region. Crucial to the process have been the adaptation of four ideas: ‘cooperative security’, ‘open regionalism’, ‘soft regionalism’, and ‘flexible consensus’. The construction of a regional identity, which may be termed the ‘Asia‐Pacific Way’ has also been facilitated by the avoidance of institutional grand designs and the adoption of a consensual and cautious approach extrapolated from the ‘ASEAN Way’. The final section of the article examines the limitations and dangers of the Asia‐Pacific Way. It concludes with the assertion that while the Asia‐Pacific Way is an over‐generalised, instrumental, and pragmatic approach to regional cooperation, and there remain significant barriers to the development of a collective regional identity that is constitutive of the interests of the actors, it has helped introduce the concept and practice of multilateralism into a previously sceptical region and might have ‘bought’ enough time and space for regional actors to adapt to the demands of multilateralism.     

Eyes of the underground: Jewish insurgent intelligence in Palestine, 1945–47

This article represents an attempt to fill in some gaps in the historiography of Israeli ingelligence. It describes the origins and development of Jewish insurgent intelligence organizations and their operations against the British in Palestine, 1945–47. The essay presents a picture of rudimentary but effective intelligence serivces that made a significant, if not decisive, contribution to the armed struggle against the Briitsh. It examines critically some mysteries and myths surrounding Jewish intelligence in that conflict. By examining insurgent intelligence from the ‘bottom up’ ‐ against a government ‐ the article suggests there is a whole new ‘missing dimension’ of intelligence studies that bears scholarly attention.     

‘The importance of being honest’: Switzerland,neutrality and the problems of intelligence collection and liaison

This paper seeks to contribute to a number of debates that have attracted scholarly attention over the last few years. Firstly, by examining the experiences of the Swiss foreign intelligence service, the paper takes issue with what one scholar has dubbed ‘intelligence history snobbery’; a process that has privileged the study of the major powers and overlooked the contribution made to the secret world by the intelligence agencies of small states. Secondly, the paper explores the extent to which a state's engagement in the secret world is affected by its preconceived ideas over its place and standing in the international community. It asks whether the behaviour of a neutral foreign intelligence service is likely to differ from that of any other ‘small’ state, and whether neutrals can be both honest brokers in international affairs, and earnest players in the field of secret intelligence. The final section of the paper looks at the impact of the end of the Cold War and the emerging ‘global war on terror’ on the shape of the Swiss intelligence community.     

Reproducing remoteness? States,internationals and the co-constitution of aid ‘bunkerization’ in the East African periphery

ABSTRACT

The physical and social retreat of international interveners behind the walls of ‘bunkered’ aid compounds in (putatively) more remote and dangerous regions of the South has been the focus of growing critical attention in recent years. An increasingly remote and fearful culture of risk aversion and differentiation among Western states and organizations has been largely identified as the driving force behind this set of practices. This article presents a different perspective on the bunkerization phenomenon through focusing on the agency of Southern states in the process. Exploring bunkerization across eastern/central Africa—and in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali region in particular—the study emphasizes not only how African states have been key promoters of modern bunkerization, but also how bunkerization behaviour and mentalities have historically characterized how many African borderlands—and contemporary sites of international intervention—have been incorporated into the global state system.     

‘Extremely valuable work’: British intelligence and the interrogation of refugees in London, 1941–45

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the compulsory questioning of over 30,000 refugees who escaped to Britain during the Second World War and who were detained in London’s Royal (Victoria) Patriotic School. It answers three questions: how did intelligence come to see non-British civilians as sources; what characteristics did refugees possess and how did these influence the information they shared; and who was interested in their accounts? It argues that, while this site was set up as an MI5 vetting camp for the identification of Axis agents, it quickly evolved into an intelligence-gathering centre, serving the interests of multiple departments and organisations.     

The ‘Arab Spring’ in the historical perspectives of Middle East politics

Abstract

The events of the ‘Arab Spring’ appeared to be animated by slogans and objectives of universalist orientations to liberty, dignity and social justice, a departure from the ethno-religious nationalisms that dominated the politics of the region. They raised questions regarding the ‘exceptionalism’ of Arabs and Muslims, whom many observers and commentators considered to be tied to sentiments and solidarities of patrimonialism, tribe and religion. Yet, the forces that seemed to benefit from the transformations in Egypt and elsewhere were not those that made the ‘revolution’ but precisely religious and patriarchal parties which benefited from popular constituencies in elections. A consideration of the political history of the main countries concerned can throw some light on these transformations. The nationalist, often military, regimes which emerged from the independence struggles of mid-twentieth century headed ideological, populist, nationalist and ‘socialist’ movements and parties and authoritarian regimes which eliminated oppositional politics and social autonomies in favour of a corporatist welfare state. These regimes, facing economic and geo-political contingencies of the later decades were transformed into dynastic oligarchies and crony capitalism which broke the compact of welfare and subsidies leading to intensified impoverishment and repression of their populations. Popular strata were driven ever more into reliance on ‘survival units’ of kin and community, reinforcing communal and religious attachments at the expense of civic and associational life. These ties and sentiments come to the fore when the ruling dynasties are displaced, as in Iraq after the 2003 invasion or Egypt after the removal of Mubarak. The ideological and universalist politics of the revolutionaries appear to be swamped by those conservative affiliations.     

‘Words are cheaper than bullets’: Britain’s psychological warfare in the Middle East, 1945–60

Psychological warfare, the use of propaganda to aid military operations, acquired prominence in British strategy in the early Cold War Middle East. This article argues planning made limited progress until the 1956 Suez crisis. Suez produced optimism about propaganda’s ability to address threats from Egypt, the USSR and the Yemen. In Oman, Aden and Cyprus, psychological warfare was practiced to demoralise enemies, bolster allies and counter smears about British conduct. Only mixed results ensued though, and doubts about the military’s involvement in propaganda lingered. Psychological warfare endured because it was a cheap option that might sometimes work, and could induce opponents to surrender rather than fight on.