A Constructive Quality: The Press,The CIA,and Covert Intervention in the 1950s

This article examines the relationships between the CIA and the US domestic press during the 1950s through the lens of CIA covert interventions in Guatemala and Indonesia. It disputes interpretations of the press/CIA relationship that argue for significant control exercised by the CIA, and contends that there were several types of press/CIA relationship, ranging from cooperation to hostility. The most common relationship was one of friendly confluence, rooted in Cold War considerations; even well-disposed reporters, though, tended to be careful about preserving their independence. This article concludes that while the CIA/press relationships generally resulted in reporting favorable to the CIA, there were counter-trends in the 1950s that laid the groundwork for the later collapse of the CIA's public image.     

The CIA and congressional oversight: learning and forgetting lessons

Organizations both learn lessons and forget lessons. A lesson said to be learned by the CIA as a result of the negative reaction of congressional overseers to its interrogation program was the need to create opportunities to provide information and interact with them. The historical record shows that this was a lesson already learned. Why then the need to relearn it? It is suggested here that organizational forgetfulness may be triggered by the same factors which promote learning: perceived problems with organizational performance, opportunities to act, and people.     

Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq

The concept of ‘politicization’ of the US intelligence services, and in particular the CIA, has been debated by scholars for many years. However, it has also been easily dismissed by those investigating recent US foreign policy, as in the Robb-Silberman Commission's assurance over the 2003 Iraq War that ‘the Intelligence Community needs to be pushed’. This essay seeks an extension of the critique of politicization by considering the historical context since the formation of the CIA. It seeks an application of that critique by putting forth, when evaluating the policy and operations of the George W. Bush administration, the notion of an ‘alternative network’ within the government. The argument is that politicization must be linked to a conception of ‘Executive power’, both within the American bureaucracy and in the projection and rationalization of US aims overseas.     

Too Little,Too Late: The CIA and US Counteraction of the Soviet Initiative in the Six-Day War, 1967

The authors' previous research has established that the 1967 Arab–Israeli Six-Day War resulted from a deliberate Soviet plan to provoke Israel into a pre-emptive strike, which would legitimize and trigger a massive Soviet military intervention to aid an Egyptian–Syrian counteroffensive. However, US documents released until recently provided no evidence that the American intelligence community, and particularly the CIA, detected this threat or informed the political leadership about it – even though some indications were picked up at the field level. A newly declassified, retrospective report appears for the first time to show that there was awareness of major components of the Soviet operation (preparations for a naval landing and parachute drop). But closer scrutiny finds that this report reflects Soviet propaganda more than factual intelligence – thus further tarnishing what has hitherto been held as an outstanding achievement for the Agency and its chief.     

Getting CIA History Right: The Informal Partnership Between Agency Historians and Outside Scholars

The common task of all historians is to endeavour to present history as accurately and objectively as possible despite gaps in the record or a paucity of evidence. Intelligence historians face particular challenges in making sense of what too often is history deliberately shrouded. Staff historians of the Central Intelligence Agency operate mostly in the secret world and yet rely on the fine work of ‘outside’ historians. There is in effect a largely unstated, certainly informal, but absolutely crucial partnership between CIA historians on the ‘inside’ and dedicated scholars on the ‘outside’. It is not too much to say, in fact, that accurate and objective history about the CIA is possible only through this informal partnership.     

The CIA in Western Europe and the abuse of human rights

Covert action by the CIA and other intelligence services is designed to remain secret. Academics and the public at large therefore to this very day face great difficulties in answering two specific questions: What covert action has the CIA carried out in Europe during its almost 60 years of existence? Did CIA covert action violate human rights in Europe? Some operations, however, have become known and are now in the public research domain. Among them are the clandestine anti-communist stay-behind networks set up by the CIA in case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. As the details of the operation emerge only gradually some sources suggest that the stay-behind network was linked to terrorist groups, adding further interest to this largely unknown research subject at a time when the so called ‘war on terrorism’ has forced academics to examine present and historical terrorism data once again.     

Negotiating the review process: a CIA guide to intelligence analysis, 1970

The literature on intelligence analysis contains many references to the ‘review process’, the mechanism by which analysts’ drafts are converted into corporate products. Analysts whose drafts consistently navigate the process quickly and smoothly are regarded as star performers. Divining the practical meaning of organizational definitions of ‘good’ analysis and the personal preferences of specific senior reviewers is not easy, however. Analysts occasionally commit their understanding of reviewers’ stylistic preferences to paper, effectively providing style guides to help others. This essay presents and explains the development and implications of one such guide, which was designed to help analysts in CIA’s Office of Strategic Research in the early 1970s.