Competitive intelligence and national intelligence estimates

National Intelligence Estimates are consensus-driven intelligence products. Yet there is considerable evidence supporting the use of competitive intelligence at every level of activity, including the presentation of finished products to consumers. We examine NIEs from two important periods in US foreign policy: the buildup in Vietnam and Gorbachev's reforms. We find in both cases alternate viewpoints were not presented in the US IC's premier intelligence product when such views could have made a difference. Consistent with contemporary findings in cognitive psychology, we argue the manner in which NIEs are structured and presented should be reformed to offer better decision support.     

Between Appeasement and Belligerent Moralism: The Evolution of Moral Conduct in International Politics

Public Choice - What are the conditions for ``moral'' conduct in internationalpolitics to be viable? This question is explored by modelingregional conflicts as a two-stage game in which...     

Spreading intelligence

ABSTRACT

Defining intelligence is not just a terminological but also a political question. Intelligence methods are spreading quickly in the contemporary security landscape, and defining intelligence gives us a clearer idea of what we are in fact spreading, and therefore also of the political and social consequences that this may entail. When using intelligence methods in, say, policing, public administration or immigration services, we import a specific adversarial logic and thereby transform the social relationships that these regulatory and administrative practices support and rest upon. In this paper, I shall propose a new definition of intelligence in order to analyse the social transformations that may be produced by the logical structure implicit in the concept of intelligence.     

Burma's intelligence apparatus

Since it regained its independence in 1948, Burma has developed a complex structure of intelligence and specialized security agencies. After General Ne Win's coup d'etat in 1962, and led by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), this apparatus was completely dominated by the armed forces, which used it not only to gather combat‐related intelligence but also to stamp out any challenges to continuing military rule. So powerful did the MIS become that, at times, it was seen as a threat to the Ne Win regime, and purged of key personnel. After the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988, the resources devoted to Burma's intelligence agencies greatly increased. Under the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence, more attention was given to purely military intelligence, but there was also closer surveillance of both the armed forces and the civilian population. Since late 1997, this policy has continued under the State Peace and Development Council. Several intelligence failures in recent years, however, have raised serious questions about the ability of even this expanded apparatus to meet all the demands being placed upon it.     

Counterterror intelligence operations and terror attacks

We present a formal model of an intelligence agency that must divide its resources between the collection and analysis of information pertaining to terror plots. The model highlights the negative consequences of queues which form when collection exceeds analytic capacity. We incorporate the response of a terrorist organization to the operating characteristics of the intelligence system it faces, and solve for equilibrium strategies for the intelligence system and terrorist organization. Our results demonstrate the importance of properly balancing resources between collection and analysis, and stand in contrast to the observed state of overcollection in US intelligence agencies.     

Trump and the US intelligence community

President Trump has publicly denigrated the value of the United States' intelligence community (IC), imperilling the morale and retention of intelligence officers. Unless he establishes a better working relationship with the IC, the White House not only risks hollowing out the IC but could also wind up politicising the intelligence process and misusing intelligence products.     

Signals intelligence in India

In May 1945, as France celebrated the end of the Second World War in Europe, its foremost overseas dependency, Algeria, erupted into rebellion. Revisiting the roles and responses of the colonial security forces to what came to be known as the Sétif uprising, this article suggests two things. One is that the intensity of repressive violence pursued becomes more explicable once we consider the part played by political intelligence gathering in the operation of French colonial government in Algeria. The other is that the decision to use the political intelligence amassed before, during, and after the rebellion to coerce the Algerian population at the rebellion's epicentre signified a fundamental shift in the nature of the French colonial state in Algeria. Intelligence-led security policing, much of it later adopted by police agencies in metropolitan France at the height of the Algerian War, became more repressive, less selective, and highly violent.     

Is social media intelligence private? Privacy in public and the nature of social media intelligence

ABSTRACT

SOCMINT (SOCial Media INTelligence) is increasingly considered relevant and cost efficient information, and the exploitation of social media information in the name of security and public safety is generally regarded as unproblematic. We will critically scrutinize this claim and argue that the exploitation of such information by Intelligence and Security Services raises new ethical concerns. Drawing on recent moral discussions about privacy, we will argue that individuals have an interest in privacy in public spaces, including online spaces. We will discuss the role of such public privacy interests and argue that the systematic surveillance of social media platforms by security authorities potentially entail a negative chilling effect.