The SIS network in Norway, 1940–1945

Bjørn Rørholt (with the co‐operation of Bjarne W. Thorsen), Usynlige soldater: Nordmenn i Secret Service forteller (Oslo: Aschehaug, 1990). Pp.500, NP. ISBN 82–03–16046–8.     

The road to Bletchley Park: the British experience with signals intelligence, 1892–1945

This essay examines the evidence and the literature on British signals intelligence between 1892 and 1945. It assesses the relative significance of the documents on signals intelligence released since the Waldegrave Initiative. It criticizes many conventional assumptions in the literature and argues that signals intelligence has been a normal practice of the British government throughout the twentieth century. The text sketches an alternative history of British signals intelligence during 1892–1945 and analyses its value for the British state in various aspects of the two world wars and diplomacy during the inter-war period.     

British Intelligence and the Jewish Resistance Movement in the Palestine Mandate, 1945–46

At the end of the Second World War, British and Zionist interests came into conflict over the issue of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which raised the broader issue of what sort of National Home could exist within the British Mandate. As a result, in 1945–46, the three Jewish armed groups in the Mandate, the Haganah, Etzel and Lehi, started a loosely coordinated armed struggle against British rule. Even the moderates in the Jewish Agency rejected their former partner against Hitler, Britain, and used force against it in order to achieve their political goals. This article assesses British intelligence on these developments, and demonstrates that it failed to anticipate or even to understand the threat until the destruction of the King David Hotel. The article demonstrates that these mistakes occurred because British intelligence relied heavily on the intelligence organs of the Jewish Agency itself for intelligence about political threats within Palestine. The article assesses this intelligence failure, and its heavy costs. However, it denies that bad intelligence caused British failures in the Mandate. On the contrary, that failure stemmed from deeper problems of policy.     

Protecting secrets: British diplomatic cipher machines in the early Cold War, 1945–1970

This article examines how effectively Britain secured its diplomatic communications against hostile decryption during the early Cold War. It shows that between 1945 and 1970 the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office introduced and operated four advanced cipher machines, Typex, Rockex, Noreen and Alvis, which produced very strong ciphers. However, Britain did suffer physical compromises of Rockex through Soviet espionage and an attack on the British embassy in Beijing. Rockex was also vulnerable to technical surveillance of its acoustic and Tempest emissions, and the Soviets exploited this to read the encrypted communications of the British embassy in Moscow.     

The First China Watchers: British Intelligence Officers in China, 1878–1900

In 1878, Britain developed the first systematic intelligence collection and analysis of China by a Western nation. Undertaken in response to intelligence failure and military defeat, the British Army in India established an intelligence section in Beijing using small numbers of Chinese-speaking British military officers. Their reports reveal their struggles to understand a culture and government radically different than their own and express a strong respect for Chinese military capabilities. The intelligence reports produced are a unique window into British history, intelligence practices and Chinese strategic thinking.     

Bandwagon effects in British elections, 1885–1910

This article investigates possible bandwagons in actual elections rather than the usual opinion poll data. Until 1918, British general elections were staggered over a fortnight or more. We use the eight general elections between 1885 and 1910 to investigate whether there was a general bandwagon or underdog effect as the election progressed. We find that any bandwagon effect was in favor of the party which eventually won the election, not the party gaining seats compared with last time. We also find that a typical election featured an initial bandwagon effect which peaked about halfway through the election and then declined. Its decline appears to be due both to declining enthusiasm for the leading party and to later polls occurring in places where voters were less prone to get on a bandwagon in the first place. The weakening of the bandwagon was correlated to distance of the constituency from London, although it revived to some extent in Scotland.     

Building politics: The British Embassy Peking, 1949–1992

Abstract

Timor-Leste is among the youngest nations in the world. It began its independence under difficult circumstances: poverty is widespread, education is poor, the industrial sector is non-existent, and political turbulence is on the rise. On the positive side, future oil revenues are predicted to be substantial, which could potentially be a great help in Timor-Leste's struggle for development. This paper examines critically the possibility for Timor-Leste to use oil revenues to achieve economic development. It describes how difficult it is to estimate the future revenues because of volatile prices, territorial disputes, and insufficient seismological mapping. It continues with a discussion of the ‘resource curse’ – the difficulty of combining natural resources with economic development. Moreover, the particular challenges for Timor-Leste's development are dealt with at some length, as are possible ways to avoid the resource curse.     

British Intelligence in the Middle East, 1898–1906

This article examines British intelligence efforts in Turkish Arabia at the turn of the twentieth century. It argues that intelligence collection was really three separate efforts, carried out by the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Government of India, and it reflected concerns about British decline, the problems experienced during the Boer War, as well as an effort to penetrate the ‘information order’ of India's sub-empire. Although intelligence efforts suffered from bureaucratic disharmony in Whitehall, and between London and the Government of India, valuable contributions were nevertheless made to Britain's knowledge of Turkish Arabia.     

The control of visual representation: American art policy in occupied Germany, 1945–1949

The development of the fine arts in post-war West Germany was influenced by the Office of Military Government for Germany, US (OMGUS). In mid-1946, a small group of OMGUS officers proposed the development of a fine arts policy aimed at neutralizing the Soviet cultural offensive. They were also interested in overcoming the cultural isolationism inherited from the Third Reich, and in strengthening the link between Western Germany and the democratic West. In 1947 the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Branch (MFA&A) of OMGUS began to develop an active fine arts policy. Its officers organized art exhibitions, provided exhibition space, established art contests, invited international speakers to lecture on art, created art appreciation groups, purchased work by German artists, channeled funds to German artists, and connected German artists with American museums, universities, and art patrons. Formal and informal, overt and covert networks were established to develop German-American artistic relations in the context of a cultural policy emphasizing collaboration.