Whither Mr Abe's Japan?

This article reviews Japan's strategic options and policy initiatives under Prime Minister Abe, taking into consideration strategic changes in the region; chiefly a rising China and a United States approaching geopolitical retreat, and the policy implications of these developments. Mr Abe's announced goal is to restore Japan to its once great power status, and thus far success is proving elusive.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Hurdles in Mr Abe's path include the differing perceptions between Japan and its neighbours regarding Japan's history, and the deeply entrenched nature of these differences pose a significant barrier. A related aspect is the territorial disputes. A second task is to be a “normal” nation, that is exercising greater independence in security matters and matters of economic policy, and here differences arise with Japan's main ally, the United States. Furthermore Mr Abe also needs to convince the Japanese public as well as Japan's prospective allies about his views regarding Japan's security role in the region. A third task is to increase Japan's economic weight by turning around the Japanese economy from its existing stasis to sustained, robust growth.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Mr Abe is making urgent policy efforts in all directions and the rather uneven outcome experienced thus far has not deterred him, thus creating uncertainty for Japan, and enhancing the feeling of insecurity in the region. The ostensible policy choice facing Mr Abe now is to either persist with his existing policies, hence entrenching the increasing tensions in the region, or to accept a rapidly rising China and formulate policies more accommodative of that development.     

Seeking a New Role: Japan’s Middle East Policy under Shinzo Abe

With his frequent travels to the Middle East, more than all other Japanese leaders in the past, Shinzo Abe had been destined to ineluctably play a distinctive role in redefining his country’s foreign policy approach toward the region. Essentially, when Abe returned to power for a second time in late 2012, he succeeded to subsequently establish a relatively stable and long-term government which strived to critically reappraise some highly contentious elements of Japan’s internal and external policies. Reassessing Japan’s conventional low-profile orientation to the Middle East was particularly a major objective of the Abe government because the region had turned out to be closely and dubiously connected to some pivotal political and security reforms which Abe had long pursued to achieve domestically. By primarily doubling down Japan’s political engagement in different parts of the Middle East, therefore, Abe took advantage of what his country had capitalized in the region in more recent times to especially accelerate the accomplishment of some other political and security he favored ardently.     

Nuclear Policy and Regulation in Japan after Fukushima: Navigating the Crisis

The aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl, has seen a public debate emerge over the future desirability of nuclear power in Japan. While Japanese citizens’ suspicion of nuclear power has grown, the nuclear industry and electricity utilities have called on the central government to recommission the country’s reactors amid warnings of devastation for the Japanese economy. This article analyses nuclear policy-making in Japan in the aftermath of Fukushima, with the aim to identify key theoretical, institutional and organisational drivers and constraints to future change in Japan’s nuclear energy policy. Despite the growing anti-nuclear sentiment and concerns about the environmental risks of nuclear power, we contend that the continuing power of vested interests will make it difficult for Japan to completely abandon nuclear power during the course of the next decade. However, given the independence of the newly established nuclear regulator and the fact that an effective veto power is held by local government officials, some of whom are opposed to the recommissioning of nuclear plants in their prefectures, we argue that the nuclear policy and regulatory landscape in Japan will undergo moderate change.     

A “Proactive Contribution to Peace” and the Right of Collective Self-Defense: The Development of Security Policy in the Abe Administration

Since the inauguration of the second Abe cabinet in December 2012, there have been many important developments in the area of security policy. This article examines each new policy and how it fits in to the National Security Strategy principles of a “proactive contribution to peace” and international cooperation. It concludes with a comparison of the new policies with those of other major world powers and a discussion of the main source of opposition to Japan's security policy.     

Nationalism,Domestic Politics,and the Japan Economic Rejuvenation

This article explores the role of nationalism in domestic politics in Japan since 2005 by contrasting the Koizumi and the Abe administration of 2012/2013. It argues that the Koizumi and Abe administrations have exploited nationalism as a means to consolidate political power, move away from faction-based politics toward populism-based politics to weaken factions within the political system with entrenched interests that are counter to or prevent bolder, necessary economic reforms to propel Japan out of 20 years of economic stagnation. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that while each politician has used nationalism to mobilize popular support for their respective administrations, Koizumi’s use of nationalism was to achieve an economic agenda while Abe’s use of nationalism has been used to achieve his political agenda which includes constitutional reform.     

Is Japan Really Back? The “Abe Doctrine” and Global Governance

Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has emerged as the “comeback kid” of Japanese politics and in his second term of office is now widely regarded as a rare example of strong leadership as he seeks to arrest and reverse his country’s perceived decline. The strategy to achieve these objectives has come to be known as the “Abe Doctrine,” which represents a radical but risky shift in foreign policy. This article outlines the tenets of the evolving Abe Doctrine and then applies them to the Abe administration’s behaviour in the mechanisms of global governance, a highly pertinent but overlooked example. It argues that although a more strategic and coherent approach to global governance has emerged under Abe than had been previously evident, this has been at the expense of the norm of internationalism that has traditionally shaped Japan’s role.     

Advancing the Role of Social Mechanisms,Mediators, and Moderators in Securitization Theory: Explaining Security Policy Change in Japan

ABSTRACT

In this article, I further develop the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory in a causal direction, by emphasizing the explanatory family of mechanisms, mediators and moderators. In the first half of this article, I present two models for conceptualizing the causal maps that securitization is part of. Next, I define five epistemological and methodological dimensions that are important for modelling securitization with causal power. The proposed approach is then put into practice by two most-similar case studies in the second half of the article: securitization attempts in Japan in 2006-07 and in 2012-15. By comparing his securitization efforts in 2006 and in 2012-15 respectively, I identify why PM Abe was successful in his securitization attempt in the latter period. Furthermore, I propose an explanatory set that together with securitization enabled certain effects to take place in Japan, namely the introduction of collective self-defense in 2014/15.     

The Abe Administration: Beyond 100 Days

The second Abe administration, inaugurated on December 26, 2012, has been called a repudiation of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rather than a strong endorsement of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). However, in the intervening months, public support has risen. Going forward, the Abe administration faces three serious challenges, namely the economy, security and foreign policy, and a strategy to win in the Upper House elections expected in July 2013. This article analyzes each of these challenges and explores possible courses that the administration could take.     

Explaining Japan's Fragile Premierships in the Post-Koizumi Era

After Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's highly successful rule, Japan saw the five short-lived premierships ?C Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, Taro Aso, Yukio Hatoyama, and Naoto Kan ?C over the period of five years (2006-11). This article aims to identify the causes of this unusually high frequency of Japan's leadership changes in recent times. Specifically, it finds that all post-Koizumi prime ministers lost power after a short tenure by following the same pattern of demise that was characterized by a rapid fall of approval rate in the media's polls. It argues that they fell into this pattern of failure for the same three reasons: their failure in economic policy; their poor leadership ability derived from the vanishing of the traditional career path to premiership; their unstable intraparty foothold caused by the transition from candidate-centered election to party-centered election. It argues that the politics under the Koizumi and post-Koizumi cabinets share important undercurrents despite their apparent differences.     

Abe Isoo and Kawakami Hajime in Interwar Japan — Economic Reform or Revolution?

This article explores the views of two eminent professors of economics, Abe Isoo (1865-1949) and Kawakami Hajime (1879-1946), regarding their socialist economic theories for easing poverty in Japan during the interwar years (1918-1939). Prior to this period, Abe believed the cure to capitalism’s ills lay in a combination of socialist economic reforms (sangyô demokurashii) and individual spiritual refinement. Kawakami, at that time a bourgeois economist, prioritised the spiritual revolution of the rich over any socialist-type economic reform. Thus, although convinced of the need for a different approach to eradicating poverty, they nevertheless agreed in the need for gradual change rather than radical reform (Gavin East Asia An International Quarterly 24:1, 30). The year 1928 marked a significant turning point both for Japanese social movements and in the lives of Abe and Kawakami. That year heralded Japan’s first national election under the new Universal Male Suffrage Law, and saw the police exercise their extended authority as they undertook a nationwide round-up of students and intellectuals suspected of left-wing tendencies (the March 15 Incident). Also in that year, Abe and Kawakami resigned from academic posts to dedicate themselves to alleviating the privations of the working class. Abe, by then well known as the father of Japanese socialism and as a Christian pacifist, became a symbolic figure for Japan’s working class parties, although he later came to support the government during WWII. Kawakami, who was forced to resign from his post during the round-up, “washed his hands of bourgeois economics”, became a prominent spokesman for Marxism in Japan ([28], xi, pp. 76, 169). This article will reveal that both Abe and Kawakami’s social and economic theories changed during the interwar period, so that Abe came to see imperial sovereignty as crucial to socialist economic reform, while Kawakami came to see it as a minion of the capitalists and advocated institutional and political revolution.     

Unanswered Questions about Japan-Russia Relations in 2017

Divergent views of Japan-Russia relations in 2017 result from leaving questions unanswered. This article seeks to answer the following queries. What is the sales pitch in Japan for Abe's wooing of Putin? Why is this rationale misleading? Why is Abe keen on pursuing Putin? What motivates Putin to encourage Abe yet hold back? When did talks hit a snag? Why was 2016 different from 2001? Is the US to blame for no breakthrough? What are the cause and effect of scapegoating for no summit success? Which Japanese criticisms—by the left or the right—of the summit make a better case? Do Abe and Putin have much freedom to maneuver? Where are Japan-Russia relations now headed? Through responses to these questions, we gain an understanding of the misleading coverage of the December 15–16 Putin visit to Japan and the difficulties ahead for Abe to achieve a breakthrough in Japan-Russia relations.     

Obama’s Pivot to Asia and Its Failed Japan-South Korea Historical Reconciliation

Since the 1980s, Japan’s war memory has strained its relations with South Korea and China, to a less degree, the USA. Two of the thorniest issues are the comfort women and the US atomic bombing of Japan. Before the Obama administration announced its policy pivot to Asia in 2011, both Japanese and American leaders were reluctant to make amends for the past acts of their countries. However, in 2015, the Japanese conservative Prime Minister Abe reached an agreement with South Korea that “finally and irreversibly” resolved the comfort women issue, thus achieving a historic reconciliation between the two countries. In 2016, then President Obama visited Hiroshima to commemorate the atomic bomb victims. Then, in December 2016, the comfort women issue resurfaced in Japan and South Korea relations, indicating a failure of the reconciliation. Why did the USA change its policy on historical issues involving Japan? Why did Abe and the South Korean President Park Geun-hye settle the comfort women issue? Why did Obama visit Hiroshima? Why did the reconciliation fail? In this article, I propose a rational choice theory to answer these questions. Applying the proposed theory and relying on available evidence, I argue that the settlement of the comfort women issue and Obama’s visit to Hiroshima are important components of Obama’s pivot to Asia to balance China’s rise. The reconciliation failed mainly because it did not resolve the historical justice issue promoted by the human rights norms. I discuss some implications for reconciliation in Northeast Asia.     

FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy

The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) is the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe Administration. One of the most important questions is whether this vision aims to contain a rapidly rising China. Along with the amelioration of the relationship between Japan and China, this diplomatic strategy has been evolved from the quadrilateral security cooperation among leading democracies in this region, namely the US, Japan, Australia, and India, to a more comprehensive regional cooperation. This article regards the latter diplomatic strategic as the “FOIP 2.0” and that there emerges a possible harmony between Japan’s FOIP and China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).     

A US-Japan Foreign Policy Alliance for Myanmar

Rarely before has such a large and potentially consequential country tried to reform itself politically and economically as Myanmar is now attempting, following an extended period of extreme isolation and amid unprecedented international and digital connectedness that exists today. This is a challenge not only for Myanmar, but also for the United States and Japan as they try to facilitate this transformation in productive ways, in a coordinated fashion, and consistent with their own foreign policy and commercial interests. A pertinent question, therefore, is whether or not Washington and Tokyo are inclined and prepared to address Myanmar's transition as an alliance issue, and if they are, then what is an efficient and effective way to go about this task.

The answer is mixed, for despite their pursuit of many common interests, the policy priorities and policy making environments in the United States and Japan differ significantly. In simple terms, the United States has a “democracy first” agenda in Myanmar that sometimes limits its options, while Japan takes a more flexible approach in order to maximize engagement and business opportunity. Still, President Obama and Prime Minister Abe provided a mandate in April 2014 to strengthen alliance cooperation in Southeast Asia (and in Myanmar in particular), and the two countries have complementary strengths and local networks that can be leveraged more effectively for the benefit of all.

Despite US concerns about stalled political liberalization and human rights abuses in Myanmar, Washington should take a longer-term horizon for evaluating reforms and consider enhancing its leverage with Myanmar through more effective policy coordination with Japan (which is a major player in the country), rather than the maintenance or reapplication of sanctions.     

Should South Korea go Nuclear?

A nuclear debate has arisen in South Korea following North Korea's nuclear tests and weapons program. Despite the US extended nuclear deterrence for its security, a sizable section of the people in South Korea have started debating if their country can revisit the nuclear option as a deterrent to North Korea's continued threats. Several law makers have started articulating such a view. Several opinion polls held recently also endorse such a view. However, the US is unlikely to allow South Korea to take the nuclear path as it would have serious consequences not only for the region but also the world. China would also not rejoice with the prospect of having another nuclear power in its neighborhood. If South Korea goes nuclear, Japan and Taiwan will find it difficult to resist having their own nuclear weapons. To stem such a trend, it becomes all the more necessary for the international community to address the issue of denuclearizing North Korea. The suspended Six-Party-Talks ought to restart soon and China has a great role in reigning in Pyongyang. Fortunately, the government in South Korea has not supported the view of the country going nuclear. But if the security situation deteriorates further, it might become irresistible for the government to have a rethink, with an inevitable domino effect in Japan and Taiwan soon.

This article makes an in-depth study of the prevailing trend in South Korea, the views of some influential law makers pleading for the country to go nuclear, various public opinions polls, possible US stance and implications that such a change in policy would have on the region's security situation and the author's assessment based on the critical examination of the above-mentioned factors. Many sources have been cited to analyze this issue before arriving at an objective assessment of the point raised in this essay.     

Twenty-Five Years of Japanese Peacekeeping Operations and the Self-Defense Forces’ Mission in South Sudan

Japanese participation in Peacekeeping Operations began in the balance between Constitutional and other legal constraints and demand for a larger international role in the post-Cold War era. The success of participation in the PKO in Cambodia and East Timor (UNTAC and UNTAET) created opportunities for further participation because of gradual acceptance of the participation of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in UN PKOs. However, these successes did not change the fundamental constraints of the conditions for participation, namely the Five Principles on PKO participation. The arrival of the second Abe Administration, whose policy objective is to proactively contribute to peace, increased the expectation of Japan taking a much larger role in the UN PKOs, but the SDF participation South Sudan (UNMISS), which faced difficulties due to the lack of a firm ceasefire agreement and sudden breakout of civil war, raised questions of whether Abe’s policy was too aggressive. With the establishment of Peace and Security legislation, more proactive missions can be taken, but the necessity of national debate for building consensus about participating in PKOs still remains.     

Getting It Right: Japan and Trans-Pacific Partnership

This paper explores the opportunities presented by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to Japan to revitalize its trade policy, bolster economic growth, and increase participation in regional multilateral fora for the 21^st century. Despite its strengths, Japan has continued to face problems caused by its economic, political, and strategic policies. The Japanese economy has been stagnant for the last several decades, and Japan needs to take bold steps to ameliorate this situation. Politically, domestic political paralysis has had a negative impact on Japan's alliances and partnerships and eroded Tokyo's ability to act as a major player in the increasing vital and important Indo-Pacific region. Connected to this, it is imperative for Japan to engage itself deeply in Asia in ways that increase strategic trust. This paper will also highlight the necessary reforms Japan must undertake to take full advantage of the benefits of the TPP, as well as what the TPP might mean for its relationship with both the US and other regional partners.     

日本外交的“钟摆”现象

日本民主党上台执政以来，在对美、对华政策上发生了一些明显变化，概括起来说，这些变化其实都是小泉下台以后的历任内阁对日本外交战略调整的继续。关于小泉以后至管内阁以前日本外交战略调整的过程，具体可以分3个阶段来考察：第1阶段是安倍、麻生的价值观外交所体现的“疏美防华”倾向；第2阶段是以“新福田主义”为特点的“亲美返亚”倾向；第3阶段是以鸠山的“友爱外交”为中心内容所表现出的“脱美入亚”倾向。其中，安倍的“疏美防华”仍然未消除冷战思维的阴影；鸠山的“脱关入亚”略带理想主义色彩；只有福田的“亲美入亚”具有现实性，预示着日本21世纪对美、对华外交战略的发展方向，也是菅内阁外交政策的方向标。     

从永久中立到依附美国——简析战后初期日本政府的国家安全构想

战后初期的日本政府从非武装化的现状出发,积极需求维护国家安全之路。概而言之,其国家安全构想经历了一个从永久中立国到依靠联合国,再到依附美国的演变过程。日本政府决策层最终选择依附美国,是在美苏对立的国际环境下,在被美国占领这一最大现实中,以"追随强者"的结盟心态做出的重大战略决择。在依附美国构想的基础上形成的战后日本国家安全政策目前正处于重要转型期,安倍内阁的国家安全政策走向特别值得关注。