A short review

Abstract

As the title indicates, Zhou En-lai is the link which joins together the two distinct parts of this brief work. The first section by Davison and Selden is a short interpretive history of the Chinese revolution from the Opium War to 1975, highlighting Zhou's participation in and contributions to it. The second section contains reprints from New China Magazine of Zhou's 1971 talks with Americans on selected topics including class struggle in the socialist period, slogans, the Cultural Revolution, and U.S.-China relations.     

CHALLENGING THE ATOMIZATION OF DISCONTENT

Stimulated by his participation in two recent museum exhibitions concerning the Cultural Revolution the author of this article offers his contrarian views on the history and lasting significance of China's ten-year-long Cultural Revolution. Acknowledging that there was indeed senseless and brutal acts of violence from 1966 to 1976, the author asks whether the violence ever rose to the level of a “holocaust,” as commentators inside and outside China have charged. He next explores the charge that the Cultural Revolution resulted in the deliberate destruction of Chinese culture and tradition. The picture the author paints of this turbulent period in China's history is one not often aired in academic circles or in public discourse. He closes by putting the violence of the Cultural Revolution in the broader context of violence that was happening elsewhere during that period, e.g., in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.     

China's new order and past disorders: A Dialogue Starting from Wang Hui's analysis

Abstract

This dialogue develops a series of reflections on contemporary Chinese politics starting from Wang Hui's analysis of the role that the repression of the spring 1989 movement played in the acceleration of China's neoliberalist economic policies, and more in general about the peculiar forms of intervention of the party-state in the implementation of capitalist forms of economy. Four major issues are discussed: some probings of the political value of the Tiananmen movement; the suppression of the agricultural people's communes; the parallel transformation of the industrial danwei system; and the rise of Deng Xiaoping's strategy as a form of reactive subjectivity toward the political experiments of the late sixties and early seventies. The authors argue that the major consistency in the Chinese state today is the process of harsh depoliticization of subjectivities deployed during the Cultural Revolution, and retrospectively throughout the entire twentieth century in China. On the other hand, this process of depoliticization shows a weakness in consistency, since it basically depends on a “radical negation” and, in the end, lacks autonomous subjective strength.     

Analyzing China's socialist revolution

Abstract

Recent trends in “China scholarship” include two dominant sets of goals and foci in examining China's socialist revolution. Exponents of the more traditional view, represented here by Lucian Pye's Mao Tse-tung, seek to explain it away as a pathological deviation from “normality” in social development. The extremism of Pye's book makes it almost a caricature of the worst in the first trend. By the same token this extremism makes the prejudices and assumptions on which this trend is based easier to perceive than would be the case with other more subtle works. The less traditional and less frequently published view, represented here by Nee and Peck's China's Uninterrupted Revolution attempts to comprehend the Chinese Revolution, historically and philosophically, as a meaningful process directed at increasing human liberation.     

Extremists are extremely extreme

Abstract

China's foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution is usually treated as a non-event. Melvin Gurtov in his careful and extremely useful chronological account of China's foreign policy at this time (RAND, RM-5934-PR) still deems it “an aberrant episode” (VII, 83). He describes it as the manifestation of a power struggle between extreme young zealots and implacable older powerholders. “Substantive policy views” are almost beside the point (76). Far Eastern Economic Review (1968 Year Book) also characterizes Cultural Revolution foreign policy as one of “excesses” and “‘extreme’ behavior,” giving anti-foreignism as its content. Anti-foreignism is seen as a deeply felt belief that an attempt to borrow from foreigners has resulted in “manipulation and exploitation” by foreigners. Yung Ho, writing for the Union Research Institue's (URI) Communist China 1967, finds the essence of Mao's thought to be opposition to “anything foreign,” and China's attempt at “propagating Mao-Tse-tung's thought abroad” to be an aggressive policy “even worse than Hitler's rule,” one which inevitably produced setbacks which further isolate China (326–327).     

Capitalist and Maoist economic development

Abstract

While capitalist and Maoist processes of economic development have several elements in common, the differences between the two approaches are never theless many and profound. It is certainly not evident that one approach or the other is always superior, in regard either to means or to ends. What is evident, however, is that most studies by American economists of Chinese economic development are based on the assumption of capitalist superiority, and so China has been dealt with as though it were simply an underdeveloped United States — an economy that “should” develop along capitalist lines and that “should” forget all that damn foolishness about Marxism, Mao's thought, Great Leaps, and Cultural Revolutions and just get on with the job of investing the savings efficiently. This almost complete and unthinking acceptance by American economists of the view that there is no development like capitalist development has resulted in studies of China that lack insight and are generally unsatisfactory. Later on, I shall briefly examine some of these weaknesses and then suggest the types of economic studies that might be undertaken if China's development efforts are to be given serious intellectual consideration. The main portion of this paper, however, is a comparison of capitalist and Maoist development processes.     

Father,son, and holy ghost: Pye,Solomon, and the ‘spirit of Chinese politics’

Abstract

Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture structurally is two books. The first (parts I and II pp. 1-159) is a discussion of Chinese psychological characteristics based on the author's 1966 dissertation for MIT, The Chinese Revolution and the Politics of Dependency: The Struggle for Change in a Traditional Political Culture. The second (parts III and IV pp. 160-526) is a competent if somewhat narrow think-tank piece written in 1969 on the Hundred Flowers, the Great Leap, and the early phase of the Cultural Revolution.     

A Triptych in honour of the cultural revolution

Abstract

Here are three valuable books which sincerely try to understand the Cultural Revolution and make it understandable to Westerners. They avoid theoretical juggling as well as picturesqueness for its own sake. None of these books takes for granted what a certain rhetorical type of Chinese propaganda states with overflowing phraseology, nor do they indulge in the kind of trifling questions characteristic of many Western commentators, such as: Is Chou En-lai losing ground? Is there a rift between the Secretariat and the Politburo? A rebirth of regionalism? and so on. The authors' most obvious concession to Western “bourgeois-educated” readers is that they try to avoid jargonistic Marxism, and to explain even the doctrinal grounds of the Cultural Revolution with plain words; but maybe it could be argued. that they only apply Chairman Mao's teachings in opposition to the “eight-legged essay style.” As for the “socialist-educated” reader, I should add that the authors also escape flatulent psychoanalysis and sociology.     

Causes of the Collapse of the USSR

The paper studies Russia's Ukraine policy since the Orange Revolution. Russia's policy toward its western neighbor has evolved from unhappy relations with Victor Yushchenko to rapprochement with Victor Yanukovich and then confrontation over the revolutionary power change in Kiev in February 2014. The paper argues that Vladimir Putin's actions following February revolution in Kiev demonstrate both change and continuity in Russia's foreign policy. Although these actions constituted a major escalation, relative to Russia's previous behavior toward Ukraine, the escalation of relations with Kiev also reflected a broader policy pattern of Russia's assertive relations with the Western nations adopted by the Kremlin since the mid-2000s. What made Russia's conflict with Ukraine possible, even inevitable, was the West's lack of recognition for Russia's values and interests in Eurasia, on the one hand, and the critically important role that Ukraine played in the Kremlin's foreign policy calculations, on the other. The paper provides an empirically grounded interpretation of Russia's changing policy that emphasizes Russia–Ukraine–West interaction and a mutually reinforcing dynamics of their misunderstanding. It also addresses four alternative explanations of Russia's Ukraine policy and discusses several dangers and possible solutions to the crisis.     

Imperialism and incorporation—the case of Chinese Silk

Abstract

In the last decade, studies of the silk industry and trade have been at the center of the continuing debate over China's development in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although silk, like the other case studies, has limitations for unveiling the overall picture of China's “underdevelopment,” the silk industry, as Lillian Li and other writers point out, provides a particularly valuable vantage point for exploring the debate because: (1) silk was China's most important export, accounting for one-third of total export value in the mid—nineteenth century and one-fifth in the early twentieth century; (2) China's silk industry was centered in the two regions around Canton and Shanghai that were the most important centers of imperialist penetration; (3) silk exports provide a case for comparison with Japan, since Japan and China were the two leading exporters of raw silk in the world market in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The most critical point, I sense, is the fact that Japan's silk industry was the major, indeed the only, competitor for China's silk industry. And Japan also happened to be the most important imperialist power that Chinese scholars have pointed to in explaining the failure of China's silk industry. Therefore I would stress their relations as well as comparisons of their performance.     

The political and organizational implications of China's new economic policies, 1976–1979

Abstract

Whatever one may say about China under Mao, it would be terribly difficult to argue that economic development had failed to take place. Of course, measured against some abstract standard of perfection, one could make a case for a disappointing or relatively imbalanced performance. China's performance did not live up to the more extravagant claims made by the Chinese media and by some foreigners. But viewed in historical context, and by comparison with any other third world economy, China under Mao could take credit for successfully overcoming some of the most crucial obstacles to development and for distributing its benefits in an unprecedentedly egalitarian way. Progress was at times uneven, but the unevenness should be attributed more to the serious objective constraints and bottlenecks caused by underdevelopment and poverty, and by the periodic political upheavals which paradoxically were necessary to achieve the very successes. Allegedly “fatal” irrationalities inherent in the Maoist approach to organization and planning or to economic development in general cannot, therefore, be held responsible for non-existent failure, though as will be seen, this approach was not without serious problems. Indeed, if the years during and after the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1975 are taken as a period of “Maoist” approaches to economic development and organization, the following figures tell the story.     

The Revolution and its Discontents: Grenadian Newspapers and Attempts to Shape Public Opinion during Political Transition

Abstract

What role did the newspaper play in attempting to influence public opinion in the early stages of the Grenada Revolution and what are the terms in which printed discourses on the revolution were conceptualised? The Grenada Revolution was a discursive political process where branding and narration were necessary elements in securing the revolution’s authority and legitimacy. This paper argues that Cuba functioned as a metonym through which the revolution was translated in Grenadian periodicals. Even before the coup of 13 March 1979 Grenadian media represented the New Jewel Movement—the revolutionary party—as Cuban-inspired and socialist. In order to examine how socialism in general, and the socialist character of the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) in particular, was narrated, a comparison is staged between two newspapers—the government-run Free West Indian and the privately owned The Torchlight. Competing discourses on Cuban communism are analysed for the ways in which they stood-in for the Grenadian people’s hopes, aspirations and anxieties in the midst of radical political change. Issues including race, gender equality, property ownership, freedom of religious practice and freedom of travel are examined in relation to capitalism and socialism, and the PRG’s efforts to maintain narrative authority of the revolution.     

Soviet Assessments of Economic Reforms in Other Socialist Countries

A prominent American economist pieces together and analyzes Soviet assessments of economic reforms in other socialist countries. Included in the author's analysis are studies of Soviet specialists investigating changes in the administrative organization of the state sector, planning, pricing, banking, labor, agriculture, nonstate activity, and foreign economic relations, within the framework of a socialist planned economy. Also covered are more recent Soviet studies focusing on privatization, marketization, and government regulation in the transition to a capitalist market economy—work that influenced decisions about economic reforms in the Soviet Union. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: P21, B20.     

Between Interest and Responsibility: Assessing China's Foreign Policy and Burgeoning Global Role

Abstract

This article is situated within the contemporary debates about the nature and purpose of China's growing power. It uses the concepts of “national interest” and “international responsibility” as a framework of analysis for Chinese foreign policy, and develops a three-dimensional typology to conceptualize their relationship (antagonistic; instrumental; mutually constitutive). This article adopts two main arguments. First, a stronger China is one gravitating toward greater notions of international responsibility, albeit instrumentally. Second, observable trends in China's evolving worldview indicate, however, that it is conceiving its national interests more broadly, embracing further socialization and greater normative commitments to international society. One may therefore view China's burgeoning global role as a great power with a degree of “cautious optimism.”     

China's 'Omnidirectional Diplomacy': Cooperation with all,Emphasis on Major Powers

In the first half of 2001, China's relationship with the two economic power houses, the US and Japan, was anything but smooth. Tomoyuki Kojima, professor of political science and dean of policy management at Keio University describes the principle of China's foreign policy as ''omnidirectional'' diplomacy. The strained relations with the US and Japan, however, were contradictory to this principle which emphasizes international cooperation with a focus on world powers. In the following article, he examines the main reasons for China's problems with both countries. At the time of writing, Shanghai is to host the 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in October, China is poised to enter the World Trade Organization and Beijing had also won the bid to host the 2008 Olympics. As China becomes more and more internationalized, Kojima argues that the emphasis on cooperation will be perceived as having been of vital importance.     

The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: China's Initiative in Regional Institutional Building

China's initiative in establishing and promoting the development of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) is an interesting case study of China's attempt at regional institution building. China's increasing interest in Central Asia coincided with its gradual acceptance and rising enthusiasm regarding participation in regional organisations. The “Shanghai Five” mechanism and the SCO were seen as appropriate mechanisms for pursuing China's multiple interests in the region; their development was also in line with the improvement in Sino-Russian relations. Chinese leaders have skilfully developed the SCO's institutional framework, and they seem intent on getting good value for the resources spent. The leaders have also demonstrated considerable patience when the SCO's development encountered setbacks.     

China's Discourse on Regionalism: What it Means for India

China's approach towards regionalism and multilateralism is essentially driven by realpolitik paradigm. More specifically, China's tilt towards regionalism has been propelled by three reasons: one its own rise, two its domestic concerns and three change in the world-order in the aftermath of the collapse of bipolarism and the resultant emergence of new threats and insecurities. Regionalism in Chinese discourse is rooted primarily in the quest for building a China-led regional order, supporting China's peripheral diplomacy and grand strategy, than on mere rationale of economic gains. Therefore, in Chinese conceptualization realpolitik issues hold primacy over normative and liberal notions of interdependence. The web of regional security architecture, thus, evolved serves essentially China's security needs and grand strategy.     

Review Essay

Abstract

So far in modern world history, social revolutions, though they have entailed elements of class conflict, have plainly not conformed to Marx's theoretical expectations or moral vision. They have occurred in agrarian countries caught behind foreign competitors, not in the most advanced capitalist industrial nations. And even those revolutions that have expropriated domestic capitalist classes in the name of socialist ideals have hardly resulted to date in the prosperous, democratic communist societies envisaged by Marx. (Skocpol, p. 292)     

Introduction

Abstract

The century-long debate scrutinizing China's cultural heritage and the road to wealth and power (modernization) reached a crescendo in 1988 with the publication of a best-selling book, performances of a six-part series on national television, and soul-searching discussion culminating in the banning of He shang (River elegy, or Deathsong of the river). Cutting to the heart of the emotional issues pertaining to assessment of Chinese tradition and the West, the debate provides insight into the cultural and political conflicts of the era and the democratic movement of 1989 that it helped shape.     

An “Assertive” China? Insights from Interviews

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a more assertive China. What happened to China's “peaceful rise” and “charm offensive”? What explains the changes in China's foreign policy? According to interviews with Beijing and Shanghai-based analysts, China's assertiveness between 2008 and 2010 can be divided into two waves, each triggered by a different cause. The first wave seems triggered by a sense in Beijing that Washington, DC was more differential to China's interests, and less committed to East Asia. The second wave seems best explained as China's response to what it perceived as a far more assertive and threatening United States. Both waves were amplified by two domestic challenges: Chinese leaders’ hypersensitivity to popular nationalism and poor bureaucratic coordination among an expanding number of foreign policy actors.