Politics of justice and reconciliation in post-Suharto Indonesia

This article examines the politics of justice and reconciliation in post-Suharto Indonesia with particular focus on the unprecedented pressures on the government to deal with past human rights abuses. Present Indonesian experience illustrates the complexity of dealing with past abuses and needs to be examined in the context of the constraints and possibilities negotiated by new democracies when dealing with past abuses. In a comparative sense the Indonesian case is not new in the sense that other new democracies have also faced this kind of situation. The case study of the Tanjung Priok killings in 1984 that will be presented here demonstrates the need to develop a strategy which combines the elements of prosecution and reconciliation in post-Suharto Indonesia.     

Resources on East Timor

Abstract

Until recently information in the United States on East Timor and the Indonesian occupation was scarce and usually outdated; more English-language material has been available in Australia and Britain. The wide international distribution of the videotape of the Indonesian Army's massacre of more than 270 innocent Timorese civilians in the Santa Cruz Cemetery (12 November 1991) contributed greatly to increasing international awareness of East Timor's plight. More importantly, the publicity surrounding the massacre revitalized solidarity groups around the world. As the groups expanded, so did the literature on East Timor. It is noteworthy that, aside from a few scholarly works, almost all of the available literature on East Timor has been written by activists of one sort or another.     

The East Timor Conflict and Western response

Abstract

East Timor is a former Portuguese colony that was invaded and occupied by its neighbor Indonesia in December 1975. Since then the native population has been fighting the occupation under the leadership of Fretilin, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, and to this day the struggle continues.     

荆棘与鲜血之路通向何方?

本文首先回顾了东帝汶问题形成的历史,其次将１９９８ 年６ 月以来东帝汶问题的发展分为三个阶段,即讨论自治问题阶段、讨论独立问题阶段和实现投票公决阶段,并从东帝汶本地区的形势、印尼国内状况、国际社会影响三方面分析了印尼政府改变对东帝汶政策的原因。文章的第三部分着重分析了影响东帝汶独立问题的主要因素,指出印尼国内政治对于东帝汶问题的解决发挥着重要作用     

独立前夕东帝汶的政治与经济

东帝汶的革命还未结束 ,新的考验就已经出现 :外国投资不足、官员以权谋私、政治意见分歧等等。这些问题解决得如何将对东帝汶的未来有着重要影响。     

The state of East Timor studies after 1999

Taking stock of the state of knowledge on East Timor since the UN intervention of 1999, this article traces the rise of a hegemonic discourse especially around development issues notably as promoted by the World Bank. In turn, the World Bank discourse of lean government, market-oriented economic policies, and export-oriented agriculture is reflected in a number of publications. As a formidable patronage machine in East Timor, it would not be surprising if arriving international staff along with East Timorese returnees would emerge as Bank collaborators or even employees. The thriving NGO community which emerged in East Timor as the underbelly of the UN mission also found common cause with human rights discourse and, especially, sustainable development discourse from within the UN mission. Meanwhile, a number of foreign anthropologists embedded themselves within and without the UN mission producing a major corpus of writings. Amidst this “clash of paradigms” East Timor muddled along, dependent on donor support, but prey to vagaries of seasons, international markets, and predatory outsiders. To a large extent, the international agency, NGO, and academic literature tracked these vagaries but, outside of linguistic studies, we await a critical mass of autonomous writings by East Timorese about East Timor.     

东帝汶的语言问题及其对教育的影响

东帝汶尽管还很年轻,是个新生的国家,但却有着漫长的历史和独特的文化.作为一个多语言、多民族的国家,东帝汶目前至少有16种本土语言.自2002年独立之后,东帝汶开始建设自己的国家,其中,语言问题不容忽视.本文研究了东帝汶的语言历史和现状,以及语言对其教育的影响.     

Truth,justice, and education: towards reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia

Key to the success of peacebuilding and social reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia are the attitudes of these young people. Our goal in this paper is to explore young people’s attitudes about the prospects of reconciliation vis-a-vis those with whom their nations were formerly at war. In particular, we examine three sets of factors. First, we contend that the level of contact among people engendered by the segregated educational systems affects the attitudes of the young about the possibility of reconciliation. We suggest that those who are able to interact more frequently with fellow students from other ethnic groups will be more likely to believe in the possibility of reconciliation. Second, we contend that attitudes of young people about which ethnic groups were responsible for the violence in the former Yugoslavia and the efforts of the international community to bring truth and justice will strongly influence attitudes. Finally, we examine other factors such as education and the influence of gender on reconciliation.     

浅析东帝汶阿尔卡蒂里政府的合法性问题

2006年的东帝汶骚乱凸现了阿尔卡蒂里政府的合法性危机,政府也因此而垮台.合法性包括规范要素、程序要素、绩效以及同意四个要素,如果其中一个要素缺乏,就会引发合法性危机.阿尔卡蒂里政府是随着东帝汶的独立而成立的,得到了国际和国内社会的同意,并且是由选民依宪法选举而产生的.然而,作为东帝汶的首届政府,它并未能有效解决民众最为需要的民生问题,特别是经济绩效低下,最终引起民众认同危机而导致垮台.     

Review essay: Recent books on Indonesia's occupation of East Timor and the East Timorese struggle for self-determination

Abstract

East Timor is the site of one of the great genocides since World War II. Out of a population of about 700,000 at the time of East Timor's brief independence, about 200,000 people have died as a result of the Indonesian invasion and the ensuing war, politically created famine, and the ongoing occupation. From the time of the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975 until January 1989 Jakarta kept East Timor closed. Apart from official foreign delegations, some international aid workers, and a limited number of journalists, few were able to enter the territory. On 27 December 1988 the Indonesian authorities accorded East Timor open-territory status following a one-day visit in November to the territory by Indonesian president Suharto. Jakarta was keen on encouraging foreign and “domestic” (Indonesian) investment in its “twenty-seventh province” as well as presenting an image to the outside world of normalcy in East Timor. On both accounts, Jakarta has largely failed in its objectives. The ongoing resistance by the East Timorese people to Indonesian hegemony and the concomitant political instability in East Timor as well as the relative poverty and isolation of the territory have prevented the influx of private capital. In terms of international opinion, the “opening up” of East Timor has not helped to suppress the image of the brutal nature of Indonesia's illegal occupation of the territory.     

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Balancing Economy and Security

Abstract

Although the quest for oil has long been a central concern for resource-poor Japan, its foreign policy in the Middle East does not simply reflect a mercantilist interest in the region's resources. Its desire to remain close to the United States during the North Korea crisis and its nascent competition with China are also critical factors in Japan's Middle East policy. However, Japan lacks an integrated strategy toward the Middle East and as a result the various components of its policy are not always compatible. Hence, while Japan has firmly backed the Bush administration's Iraq policies, and begun discussing a possible free-trade agreement with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, it has also, until quite recently, simultaneously pursued closer relations with Iran. In lieu of coherent regional strategy, Japan instead possesses a clearly prioritized sense of its interests in the region.     

Hostages to History: The Use of Portuguese Prisoners of War in the Annexation of East Timor

On 26 August 1975 the colonial administration in Portuguese Timor abruptly removed itself from Dili to the island of Atauru, amidst escalating armed conflict among Timorese political parties. A puzzle that has remained is why did the Portuguese administration leave so precipitately, and why did it not return a few days later when the conflict was over? We have been left with the impression that Portugal simply deserted its responsibilities, abandoning the territory to Indonesian annexation. This paper pieces together a rivetting but little-known story, from contemporary Portuguese, Indonesian, US, Australian, Timorese and eyewitness accounts, about the humiliating capture and detention by Timorese and Indonesians of Portuguese military as prisoners of war, which helps to explain a previously unrecognized constraint on Portuguese policy in East Timor in 1975-1976. This paper also shows that Indonesia had taken some important lessons from history on how to manage Portugal, from India's annexation of Portuguese Goa in 1961.     

Australian Reporting from East Timor 1975–1999: Journalists as Agents of Change

This article examines Australian reporting in East Timor from 1975 to 1999, and the changing professional practice of Australian journalists who reported from the region during this time. Research conducted for this article includes testimony from the journalists, and a collating of 3,456 newspaper articles published in the mainstream Australian press on the East Timor situation between 1998 and 1999. It will show that in addition to new regulations over access to the region, new mobile media technologies pushed journalism in new directions, adding to the ability of the journalist to facilitate instantaneous delivery of news to Australia. These reports filed by Australian journalists from East Timor were crucial in fostering the Australian government's decision to send troops to the region.     

Secret Intelligence And Escape Clauses: Australia and the Indonesian Annexation of East Timor, 1963-76

In September 2000 the Australian government declassified thousands of pages of documents concerning the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975. Some 68,000 pages of documents were released. About 2,600 pages of diplomatic documents were withheld, along with Cabinet papers, intelligence materials, and Defence Department records. The documents cover only the period from early 1974 to mid-1976 and do not document the Indonesian war and its human costs. What they do document is the process whereby Australia acquiesced in the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. Above all, they show that secret briefings by the Indonesians kept the Australian government closely informed of Indonesian intentions and operations at every step. In the light of these secret briefings and related documents, it is clear that Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's claim that he wanted to see a “genuine act of self-determination” by the East Timorese is and always was hollow. This was a fig leaf covering his desire to see East Timor incorporated into Indonesia as West Papua had been in the 1960s. Its patina of moral responsibility and legal respectability were his alibi or, as Richard Woolcott put it in late 1974, “escape clause,” if and when Indonesian actions led to accusations of Australian complicity with Jakarta. Mr. Whitlam was complicit. The record is clear.