American neo-colonialism in the Philippines

Abstract

This is one of those rare books that are small in size but heavy in substance and should be read and studied widely. It presents a well-documented indictment of American neocolonialist imperialism in the Philippines since its independence in 1946. Several earlier works have described in detail the classical form of American imperialism in the Philippines through military conquest and direct colonial rule and have helped suggest a close parallel between the conduct of the Philippine-American war and the American-Vietnamese war. However, America's continuing, pervasive domination of Philippine national life since 1946 has not been well appreciated except by a few perceptive and persistent observers of the Philippine scene. The neocolonial status of the Philippines in relation to the United States has generally remained concealed behind the facade of Philippine “independence” and “sovereignty.” Filipino presidents and other members of the Philippine establishment have helped hide the truth by proclaiming pro-Americanism as the cornerstone of their policy. President Manuel Roxas in 1946 not only vindicated American rule over the Philippines by expressing gratitude for Dewey's victory over the Spanish forces in 1898, but also affirmed close alignment with the United States in foreign affairs. This has meant that not only did the Philippines refuse to affirm Afro-Asian solidarity but, worse, it often took a simulated “initiative” in putting forth proposals designed to subserve American cold war interests. One example was the proposed Pacific Pact of 1950, calculated to stem Chinese communist “expansion.” Close alignment with the United States discredited the Philippines as odd-man-out in Asia. In the Philippines itself, the perpetuation of American dominance had tragic effects for the Filipino people and the Philippine nation-state. Foreign observers, especially from non-aligned countries, were puzzled and angered by the pro-Americanism of Philippine foreign policy. Filipinos themselves vented their frustration and fury in an intellectual, nationalist outburst against the lingering “colonial mentality.”     

What History Cannot Write: Bei Dao and Recent Chinese Poetry

An examination of the dictates and implications of contemporary counter-terrorism in the United States, this article analyzes the rhetorical tropes, historical precursors, and political valences of the “war on terrorism” as they pertain to the nature of sovereignty, the status of law, and the formation of political subjectivity. Building from a consideration of the demonological discourse on terrorism and the history of counterterrorism during the cold war, the article turns to the contingent sovereignty conferred to other states in the Bush administration's NationalSecurity Strategy and as borne out by its recent foreign policy and military actions. It notes a parallel development within domestic politics since September 11, as the administration seeks to consolidate sovereign authority against the other branches of government, evidenced most clearly in contests with the judiciary over the legitimacy of military tribunals and the legal status of “unlawful” and “enemy combatants.” Pursuing its thesis that counterterrorism as promulgated by the Bush administration needs to be registered as an emergent political rationality, the article draws from the thought of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault for its concluding analysis of the effects of counterterrorist surveillance and other forms of social regulation on political subjectivity and the enactment of democratic freedom.     

Reviews

Adopting a comparative historical approach informed by Marxist theory of imperialism, this study demonstrates the tendencies toward conflict between past and present rising and declining imperial powers. In the present context the study compares and contrasts two types of imperialism: a highly militarised US empire based on wars and territorial occupations and a market-driven Chinese empire driven by an alliance of state, foreign and national capital. Both imperial systems are influenced by “overseas” diasporas. In the case of the USA, an internal Zionist power configuration loyal to Israel subordinates Washington's Middle East policies to the economically prejudicial interests of a militarist state (Israel), while in the case of China the overseas diaspora facilitates and promotes investments and trade enhancing China's dynamic economic expansion. The emerging contradictions between and within the two conflicting styles of empire building, point to the need for a social transformation, enhancing the power and position of labour against the Zionised state and speculative economy in the USA and the new plutocrats in China.     

Reunification deadlocked: The United States,China and Taiwan

Abstract

Since the New China News Agency's release on March 15, 1949, of an editorial entitled “The Chinese People Are Determined to Liberate Taiwan,” that theme has been a cardinal principle of Peking's national policy. To appreciate fully the Chinese position, one must recognize not only Peking's claim that Taiwan is legally, ethnically, and historically an integral part of China, but also modern China's yeaming for national reunification and territorial integrity. On the ethnic question, China points to the fact that except for an extremely small number of aborigines, the inhabitants on the island today, including the so-called “native Taiwanese,” are of Chinese ancestry. They speak southeastern Chinese dialects and share with their compatriots on the mainland all the other basic Chinese cultural traits. Historically, as a Chinese spokesman once put it, “long before Christopher Columbus discovered America, the Chinese people were already in Taiwan. Long before the United States achieved its own independence, Taiwan had already become an inseparable part of the territory of China.” Although imperialist Japan occupied the island from 1895 to 1945, the island was returned to China in 1945 after Japan's surrender at the end of the Pacific War.     

Communications: Exchange on the Philippines

Abstract

In the December 1973 issue you printed an article by Ms. Luzviminda Francisco in which she attempted to sketch in the “nature of America's policy of aggression, the depth of popular mass resistance to the American forces and the duration of the struggle….” (p. 3) in order to move against “Filipino false consciousness” (p. 2) of the American connection in the history of the Philippines. It is a brief survey and rather well done, although one may quibble about the relationship of excesses (what a tame word compared to the record she presents!) of war and the nature of imperialism as well as implying that there was a “nation,” a “Philippine society,” or a “national struggle” (p. 3) before the late 19th century, at the earliest.     

State vs Federal Government in the “Barmaids” Case: Regulating Australia's Second World War Home Front

Australia's National Security Act of 1939 authorised the federal government to make emergency regulations “for securing the public safety and defence of the Commonwealth [of Australia]”. Further, it instructed the government to decide for itself what might be “necessary or convenient” for the “more effectual prosecution of the present war”. 1 This article examines the authorisation of the civilian leadership through one set of emergency regulations, the National Security (Women's Employment) Regulations, and analyses their functioning through one operational decision, the decision to permit women to serve in South Australian hotel bars with the intention of releasing male bar workers for essential industrial or military employment. Managing the home front proved complex. Sectional interests continued to jockey for positions of influence, even in war conditions. In this case, the state of South Australia sought to protect its “rights” against federal control of employment: a contest fuelled by an ideological squabble about what were then known as “barmaids”. I argue that Australia's centrally‐determined national war goals were undermined by its federal sovereignty‐distribution mechanism, which allowed sub‐national elements such as South Australia to impede national policy, and conclude that even with extensive defence powers to draw on, the federal government's war goals were obstructed by non‐war interests.     

The Initiation of the Sino-Indian rivalry

ABSTRACT

Sino-Indian interactions after the mid-19th century had a causal influence on Chinese and Indian elite perceptions. Modern China encountered modern India as an agent of British imperialism. China perceived India as an “imperial” power in the late 1940s by resorting to the availability heuristic while doubting India’s intentions in Tibet/Southeast Asia. By contrast, India viewed China as a fellow victim of colonialism that had sought India’s help during World War II. Consequently, India perceived China as a “partner” in postwar/postcolonial Asia. This interpretation was based on confirmation bias after 1947, despite contradictory Chinese signals. India’s image of China changed only after the 1950–51 invasion/annexation of Tibet. India then ascribed the image of an “expansionist/hegemonic” power to China based on historical analogy. Nevertheless, they carefully calibrated their strategies towards each other in consonance with these images until the 1959 Lhasa Uprising, thereby preventing their relationship from descending into militarized hostilities.     

DIALOGUE WITH THE WEST

Abstract

This portrayal of China by one of the most respected intellectuals ever to emerge from the shadowy labyrinth of the American diplomatic establishment mirrors twenty years of concentrated work by American China scholars. Not every China expert would accept all of Kennan's assumptions or express them in such strident form. Yet over the last two decades the China profession has evolved a style of thought, a mode of asking questions, which has largely substantiated such views in both the public and scholarly worlds. The majority of China watchers have pleaded for “tolerance” and “patience” towards the People's Republic as she gradually learns, aided by a flexible American containment policy, to “adjust” to the “international community of nations” and the “rationalizing” qualities implicit in the “modernization” process. While protesting against certain aspects of America's foreign policy toward China, however, their thought and work has reinforced, at times deepened, the ideological justifications that support America's role in Asia and her attitudes towards China.     

Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy

Ten years after unification, Germany still maintains its post-Second World War foreign policy course based on transatlantic multilateralism and European integration despite changes in Germany's international and domestic contexts. This study argues that neither realist nor institutionalist explanations can explain the post-unification pattern of German foreign policy. Instead, continuity and change in this policy can be understood best through a role-theoretical approach based on the civilian power idealtype. Two causal pathways are developed which account for continuity in foreign policy orientation (goals) and strategies while explaining change in the choice of foreign policy instruments. First, the apparent success of Germany's traditional foreign policy role concept during and after unification helped to reify a broad foreign policy consensus around the goals and strategies of an ideal-type civilian power. Second, major foreign policy crises, such as the Yugoslavian wars, stirred the long held hierarchy between the core values of reticence vis-à-vis the use of force (never again German militarism) and the special German responsibility to prevent genocide (never again Auschwitz). The interaction between domestic and foreign expectations provides a promising source for explaining change and continuity in Germany's foreign policy role concept and behaviour.     

SPECTACULAR COMPASSION

ABSTRACT

China's “Olympic Year” (2007–2008) was a watershed moment for the country and its ruling Chinese Communist Party. In this article, the author draws on her fieldwork experience as one of the few foreigners living in rural Tibetan regions during the Tibetan unrest in spring 2008 to consider the implications of the Olympic year from the margins of the state. Taking inspiration from recent anthropological debates about the nature of humanitarianism and sovereignty in neo-liberal and post-socialist states, the author considers the Tibetan unrest and the Sichuan earthquake that occurred just three weeks later on 12 May as particularly emblematic disastrous events linked by a new biopolitics of “charity” or “compassion” (Ch. aixin) in the context of state-led disaster relief. To get at the contested nature of morality and sovereignty in practice, the author focuses on nationally televised post-quake death rituals in which statist abstract compassion for lost Chinese citizens confronted the universalized compassion of embattled Tibetan Buddhist monastic communities.     

“Making the Crooked Straight”: China's Grand Strategy of “Peaceful Rise” and its Central Asian Dimension

Abstract

This article argues that China's foreign policy since 1991 has been guided by the evolution of a grand strategy of “peaceful rise” that seeks to ensure China's smooth transition to great power status. Moreover, it suggests that a strategic preoccupation with Central Asia has become an important expression of this grand strategy. Framing these arguments is a third overarching one that postulates that China's foreign policy in Central Asia is not only intimately related to the strategy of “peaceful rise” but also to a particular, historically and geopolitically informed narrative of China's “Inner Asian” power.     

“Rediscovery”, “Reinvigoration” and “Redefinition” in Perpetuity: Australian Engagement with India 1983–2011

For the past twenty‐five years Australia's bilateral relationship with India has been typified by an ongoing process of “rediscovery”, irrespective of whether Labor or Liberal administrations have steered foreign policy. This article explores the reasons why this might be the case by analysing Australia's foreign policy approaches to India spanning the period 1983 to 2011. It interrogates various Labor and Liberal strategies that have been mobilised to “reinvigorate” the relationship and searches for reasons why they have only been partially successful in strengthening Australia's rapport with India. The authors draw upon discussions with strategic affairs editors of India's major daily newspapers and current affairs journals to gain insights into Indian impressions of Australia from a political and foreign policy perspective.     

Geopolitics and Soft Power: Japan's Cultural Policy and Cultural Diplomacy in Asia

Japan's cultural policy and cultural diplomacy in Asia has changed dramatically over the past one hundred years, from actively introducing and imposing Japanese culture during its empire-building period, to essentially avoiding the promotion of Japanese culture in Asia for most of the postwar period due to fears of being seen once again as engaged in cultural imperialism, and more recently, to supporting and encouraging the export of Japanese contemporary culture and lifestyle in order to attain “soft power.” Looking at the fluctuations in Japan's cultural policy over these three periods allows us to understand how Japan has used cultural policy to further its geopolitical goals and more basically how it has viewed the role of “culture” in the context of its relations with Asian neighbors. In a broader sense, the Japanese experience shows that cultural policy, even when inward-looking, is not isolated from a country's geopolitical position and its ambitions in the world, regardless of the political system under which it operates.     

The Rise and Fall of Missile Diplomacy? President Clinton and the “Revolution in Military Affairs” in Retrospect

During the 1990s the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA), which produced “smart” weapons like cruise missiles, came of age. This apparently transformed how America viewed the relationship between force and international relations. It looked like technology was framing foreign policy. In particular, smart weapons enabled President Clinton to combine risk minimization with an expanded security agenda. However, we should be wary of ascribing technological determinism to the conflicts of the 1990s dominated by Washington's flexing of its strategic superiority, such as its bombing of Belgrade. As shown by comparison with post‐“9–11” US strategy, Washington's stance in the 1990s was shaped by linkages between technology and specific political circumstances. As these circumstances changed, so did the RMA's place in US efforts to shape world order.     

The historian's quest: Joseph R. Levenson

Abstract

Ever since Confucius remarked that he would not discuss the strange and supernatural, Chinese scholars have delighted in jotting down sensational and unusual events. This is such a favorite pastime that at least two books with the title Zibuyu (What the master refused to say) appeared in imperial times. The one by Yuan Mei (1916–97) has become a biji (jottings) classic. There are several editions published in recent years both in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China. This collection is full of ghost stories and strange tales, including records of “shrimp man,” “ape man,” and so on. Yuan Mei, while not particularly known for his moral rectitude, was nevertheless firmly rooted in the Confucian tradition.     

Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia, 1945-2002

Since the advent of Deng Xiaoping's policies of reform and opening in the late 1970s, most observers have agreed that China is likely to recover its rightful place in the world as a great power in the twenty-first century. Disagreements have arisen principally over whether China will join the world as a normal nation state or will instead seek to restore its traditional hegemony in East Asia and even attempt to extend that predominance to the entire world. This article challenges both of these positions by examining the uses of history –and the way in which the past uses those who use it – in several Chinese books published at the turn of the century and in a set of essays critiquing those books. The authors argue that China is likely to eschew both the national imperialism characteristic of Western superpowers and Japan and the over-expansion attempted by earlier Chinese states such as the Qin and the Yuan. Instead China is likely to pursue the minimal goal of avoiding political disunion and cultural crisis similar to its policies in earlier ages and the maximal goal of restoring political unity and cultural centrality associated with such earlier polities as the Zhou, Han, Tang, Ming, and Qing.     

Globalization's impact on the Malaysian workforce

This article provides a partial analysis of the socio-political impact of the so-called IMF reforms that were implemented by the South Korean government in response to the financial crisis of 1997–98. We find that at least in one key area — namely policies related to foreign investment — the IMF reforms fundamentally altered and reshaped Korea's development path. In fact, the policy changes affecting foreign investment produced what amounts to a paradigm shift in Korea's well-known model of developmental state. Alternatively put, these reforms led to the demise of the “Korea, Inc.,” the symbiotic relationship between government and businesses that was at the core of Korea's developmental state. As such, our analysis suggesting a paradigm shift in Korea's developmental state stands in contrast with previous (pre-crisis) arguments that proclaimed the demise of the developmental state.     

陆权与清代“海禁”政策

清代前期实行的海禁政策包括移民限制、物品出口限制、外商来华贸易规定以及民船建造规格等多项内容。这种海禁政策的性质并非惯常认定的"闭关锁国",而是中国传统陆权战略的一部分,其制定具有深刻的历史背景。清代海禁政策在当时的条件下,取得了重大成效,但鸦片战争之后,随着世界形势的剧变,这种战略尽显弊端。     

Extremists are extremely extreme

Abstract

China's foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution is usually treated as a non-event. Melvin Gurtov in his careful and extremely useful chronological account of China's foreign policy at this time (RAND, RM-5934-PR) still deems it “an aberrant episode” (VII, 83). He describes it as the manifestation of a power struggle between extreme young zealots and implacable older powerholders. “Substantive policy views” are almost beside the point (76). Far Eastern Economic Review (1968 Year Book) also characterizes Cultural Revolution foreign policy as one of “excesses” and “‘extreme’ behavior,” giving anti-foreignism as its content. Anti-foreignism is seen as a deeply felt belief that an attempt to borrow from foreigners has resulted in “manipulation and exploitation” by foreigners. Yung Ho, writing for the Union Research Institue's (URI) Communist China 1967, finds the essence of Mao's thought to be opposition to “anything foreign,” and China's attempt at “propagating Mao-Tse-tung's thought abroad” to be an aggressive policy “even worse than Hitler's rule,” one which inevitably produced setbacks which further isolate China (326–327).     

Profits and Cold War - Politically Motivated Export Finance in West Germany during the 1950s: Two Case Studies

The importance of exports in the process of West Germany's reintegration into the international community after the Second World War is well documented. In addition to political rehabilitation and the fundamental need for hard currency, there were also political reasons for the importance the federal government placed upon exports. In order to support American Cold War strategy, it was drawn into a risky credit programme to Yugoslavia, which at one stage was also used to further Adenauer's own agenda. Changes in West German political priorities, resulting partly from the Hallstein Doctrine, forced the government into still more politically motivated export finance and foreign aid. Without losing importance as the engine of German economic growth, export finance and economic aid became increasingly important to the country's foreign policy from the late 1950s onward.