MEDIA,IDENTITY, AND STRUGGLE IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CHINA

Abstract

Hayashi Kyoko was born in Nagasaki in 1930, but as a child she lived in Shanghai where her father was working. Except for her father, her family returned to Nagasaki in the spring of 1945 as the Pacific War drew to a close. On 9 August, three days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Nagasaki was also the target of an atomic bomb. When the bomb fell Hayashi and fellow students who had been mobilized for the war effort were working in a factory located close to the hypocenter, an area where tens of thousands died instantly.     

Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's China,by David E. Apter and Tony Saich

Abstract

As early as Edgar Snow's pioneering Red Star over China (1937), Yan'an was seen as the “defining moment” of the Chinese Communists' rise to power. Beginning in 1935, Mao Zedong set his personal imprint on the party as he successfully guided it from the disaster of the Long March to the “Congress of Victors” in 1945. This set the stage for the final showdown with Chiang Kai-shek and the hapless Nationalists in the civil war of 1946-49. With the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, the experiences of Yan'an became the blueprint for the reconstruction of China along the lines first laid out in that remote and impoverished town in the northeast.     

The politics of China's peasant revolution

Abstract

Efforts to explain the success of the Chinese Communist revolution have preoccupied more than a few American historians and political scientists in recent years. Most of these scholars, following the trail blazed by George Taylor's The Struggle for North China, have focused attention on the War of Resistance period (1937–1945) in search of the factors responsible for the phenomenal growth in Communist power. Chalmers Johnson, with his famous thesis of “peasant nationalism,” emphasizes the importance of the Japanese invasion for rural mobilization in China. Mark Selden, by contrast, identifies the Communist Party's positive wartime policies—the “Yenan Way”—as the key to revolutionary victory. Carl Dorris, while agreeing with much of Selden's explanation, locates the source of these successful wartime policies not in the capital of Yenan, but in the guerrilla bases of North China, especially Jin-Cha-Ji.     

Festival and revolution in the highlands of Vietnam: A Vietnamese artist shows how the revolution came to a mountain people in Central Vietnam

Abstract

Spring Festival on the High Plateaus (figure 1) is the name given by Vietnamese artist Tran Huu Chat to an engraved, painted, and lacquered wooden panel executed in 1962 and acquired by the Museum of Fine Arts in Hanoi. As so often in Vietnamese art of recent decades, this large (120 × 96 cm), elaborate, and richly populated composition is socially and politically charged, but it is also of exceptional ethnographic significance. The theme of solidarity in revolutionary struggle between ethnic minorities and the Vietnamese majority is that of much Vietnamese art of the U.S. war period, especially poster art. Moreover, this homage to Vietnamese “primitives” is in the spirit of President Ho Chi Minh's own repudiation of racism; his 1945 Declaration of Independence avoids any equivalent of the term “merciless Indian savages” contained in its model, the U.S. Declaration of Independence.     

K. A. Wittfogel's Marxist studies on China (1926–1939)

Abstract

K. A. Wittfogel is one of the most controversial figures in the field of modern Chinese studies. In the early 1950s he established himself as the leading figure in the academic section of the Cold War. Highlights of his “fight for the Free World” were the publication of “Oriental Despotism” in 1958 and the controversy with Benjamin Schwartz over the “Legend of Maoism” in the opening issue of China Quarterly in 1960. Wittfogel was a renegade, given to apocalyptic battle-cries against real or supposed “communist” studies and theories. He claimed to be the only one in his field who by personal experience knew the communist strategies and tactics and their subversive intentions.     

Reunification deadlocked: The United States,China and Taiwan

Abstract

Since the New China News Agency's release on March 15, 1949, of an editorial entitled “The Chinese People Are Determined to Liberate Taiwan,” that theme has been a cardinal principle of Peking's national policy. To appreciate fully the Chinese position, one must recognize not only Peking's claim that Taiwan is legally, ethnically, and historically an integral part of China, but also modern China's yeaming for national reunification and territorial integrity. On the ethnic question, China points to the fact that except for an extremely small number of aborigines, the inhabitants on the island today, including the so-called “native Taiwanese,” are of Chinese ancestry. They speak southeastern Chinese dialects and share with their compatriots on the mainland all the other basic Chinese cultural traits. Historically, as a Chinese spokesman once put it, “long before Christopher Columbus discovered America, the Chinese people were already in Taiwan. Long before the United States achieved its own independence, Taiwan had already become an inseparable part of the territory of China.” Although imperialist Japan occupied the island from 1895 to 1945, the island was returned to China in 1945 after Japan's surrender at the end of the Pacific War.     

Appendix: Lim Li-suat

Abstract

In his “Comments on Cham Population Figures,” Michael Vickery criticizes my 1988 article “Orphans of Genocide: The Cham Muslims of Kampuchea under Pol Pot.” “Kiernan has tinkered with the statistics in a tendentious manner in an attempt to prove the case for genocide,” he claims. Vickery accuses me of making “propaganda” and using “doctored evidence” to support it, of failing to make “honest use” of data, and of “fiddling with statistics to prove a particular political case, which cannot be made.”     

Social Darwinism as History and Reality: “Competition” and “The Weak” in Early Twentieth-Century Korea

ABSTRACT

By the time of Korea’s forced integration into the Japanese Empire in 1910, Social Darwinism was established as the main reference frame for the modernizing intellectual elite. The weak had only themselves to blame for their misfortune, and Korea, if it wished to succeed in collective survival in the modern world’s Darwinist jungles, had to strengthen itself. This mode of thinking was inherited by the right-wing nationalists in the 1920s–1930s; their programs of “national reconstruction” (minjok kaejo) aimed at remaking weak Korea into a “fitter” nation, thus preparing for the eventual independence from the Japanese. At the same time, in the 1920s and 1930s some nationalists appropriated the slogan of solidarity and protection of the weak, nationally and internationally, in the course of their competition against the Left. After liberation from Japanese colonialism in 1945, “competition” mostly referred to inter-state competition in South Korean right-wing discourse. However, the neo-liberal age after the 1997 Asian financial crisis witnessed a new discursive shift, competition-driven society being now the core of the mainstream agenda.     

The Japanese worker

Abstract

Robert Cole points out in his introduction to Japanese Blue Collar that there are two dominant but conflicting views of the social relations of production in the Japanese economy, views which Cole conveniently sums up under the rubrics of “uniqueness” and “convergence.”     

Amerasian children: Living legacy in the Philippines

Abstract

For nearly fifty years, the largest U.S. military bases outside U.S. territory were to be found in the Philippines. However, the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo led to the closing of Clark Air Base in 1991, and the rejection by the Philippine Senate in September 1991 of a new Bases Treaty led to the closure of Subic Naval Base in November 1992.     

“Never Again!” Women Hibakusha in Osaka

Abstract

In August 1945, the United States attacked the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the most catastrophic weapon in history: atomic bombs that caused more than 210,000 deaths by the end of 1945 (35 percent of the Hiroshima population and 25 percent in Nagasaki), and severe suffering for a large number of the more than 370,000 survivors.     

Post‐War Reconstruction and the New World Order: The Origins Of Gough Whitlam's Democratic Citizen*

Gough Whitlam's father was one of Australia's most significant public servants. Deputy Crown Solicitor and Crown Solicitor at a time of great constitutional and international change, Frederick Whitlam maintained an unusually advanced perspective on the use of international instruments to protect rights and to expand powers of nationhood. Gough Whitlam's war‐time experiences in the Air Force, in particular during the referendum campaign to expand Commonwealth Powers to aid post‐war reconstruction, cemented these aspects as central to his developing notions of democratic citizenship. In his 1973 Sir Robert Garran Memorial lecture, fourteen years after his father had delivered the inaugural oration, Gough Whitlam acknowledged the influence of his father as a “great public servant” committed to public service and the developing institutions of internationalism: “I am Australia's first Prime Minister with that particular background”. This paper explores “that particular background”. I have never wavered from my fundamental belief that until the national government became involved in great matters like schools and cities, this nation would never fulfil its real capabilities. ¹ 1 E.G. Whitlam, Sir Robert Garran Memorial Oration, “Australian Public Administration under a Labor Government”, Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration, 12 November 1973, < http://www.whitlam.org/collection/1973/ > accessed 31 October 2006.
     

The gap between the natural and social sciences sometimes leaves the public poorly informed

Abstract

In his book On Human Nature, sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson expresses many of the frustrations of natural scientists, complaining that the intellectual community has failed to recognize the importance of their contributions. He attributes this partly to the natural scientists' lack of literary ability and laments that even those who “step outside scientific materialism to participate in the [dominant] culture” have almost never been able “to close the gap between the two worlds of discourse.” But he directs his main criticism at those who work in the social sciences. He argues that they control the cultural establishment and that their reflections “are devoid of the idioms of chemistry and biology, as though humankind were still in some sense a numinous spectator of physical reality.”     

“Seoul will become a sea of fire…”

Abstract

Seoul, 19 March 1994: People watching the evening news are terrified. The network stations repeatedly show Park Yong Soo, the North Korean representative at the eighth working-level meeting between North and South Korea at Panmunjom, retorting angrily to Song Yong Dae, his South Korean counterpart. “Seoul is not far from here,” he declares, “If there is a war, it will become a sea of fire.” The next day disturbing headlines splash across the morning and evening newspapers: “Seoul will become a sea of fire.”     

Forays into Japanese cultural psychology

Abstract

The search for a theory of Japanese personality and culture has been an epic endeavor among foreign specialists, filled with all the mystery and fantasy of discovering Atlantis. The inquiry began nearly a century ago when the venerable William Griffis described the moral character of the “average Japanese” as being “frank, honest, kind, gentle, courteous, confiding, affectionate, filial, loyal.” Reviewing his own inventory of personality traits, Griffis felt obliged to conclude that the “Japanese are simply human, no better, no worse than mankind outside.”     

Thaksin's Achilles' Heel: The failure of Hawkish approaches in the Thai South

Abstract

Many scholars voice approval for the political strategies and approaches that businessman-turned-politician Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has borrowed from the business world. His CEO management style is regarded as a key political asset. Moreover, his populist policies such as the “one village–one tambon” village fund and the “bank for the poor” show him to be full of concern for grass-roots Thais. In this article I argue that Thaksin's handling of the South reveals another side of his character, his preference for the use of violence to tackle problems and his disdain for “softer” methods such as discussion and negotiations. Thaksin pays very little attention to peaceful solutions offered by academics, the National Human Right Commission, and even the government-appointed National Reconciliation Commission. Unfortunately, this hawkish approach has widened distrust and discrimination among Thais and non-Thais. Thaksin's draconian methods have had serious consequences both on himself and the country. The volatile conflict in Thailand's far South is Thaksin's Achilles' heel.     

Anti-Tamil Riots and the political crisis in Sri Lanka

Abstract

“Have a taste of Paradise” says the advertising blurb of Air Lanka, the national airline. But on July 24, 1983, the island paradise for tourists turned into a veritable hell for its Tamil-speaking inhabitants, with fire and smoke engulfing the capital city of Colombo. Within days, rioting spread throughout Sri Lanka in a wave of assaults against the Tamils in almost all the towns and plantation areas. For nearly a week, mob rule prevailed and lynching was the order of the day.     

The 1990 National Affairs Conference and the future of democracy in Taiwan

Abstract

In the last four decades Taiwan has made startling economic progress under the authoritarian rule of the Nationalist government, increasing its per capita Gross Domestic Product from about U.S. $50 in 1945 to about $8,000 in 1991. Politically, however, Taiwan has moved with great caution, reluctance, and conservativeness, maintaining martial law and ruthless militarist control until 1987. There was little real democratization although in those long years dissidents such as the tangwai (“outside the party” that is, outside the Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang [KMT]) opposition fought valiantly, suffered enormously, and achieved some breakthroughs and softening of the Nationalist authoritarian rule.     

Rejoinder

Abstract

Many of Mr. van Walt's criticisms are based solely on fabrications of his own making. For example, I am accused, twice, of referring to myself as a “scholar” and to my article as “scholarly.” I could find no trace of either. I am further accused of considering all Tibetan refugee accounts as “unreliable.” To be sure, I believe that one cannot base the study of historical events solely on refugee accounts, but that does not make all of these stories “unreliable.” After all, Dawa Norbu, a refugee himself, wrote in Red Star Over Tibet, “I never saw or heard of any case of misconduct by a Red soldier.” I would never argue that this statement was unreliable. We are further told that I refer to Tibetans as Chinese when in the second paragraph of my review I wrote, “… Tibetans [are] only one of 56 minority nationalities.” Chinese citizens yes, ethnic Hans no. A final example, although there are many more, is Mr. van Walt's attempt to attribute to me the opinion that

… the only importance to the Western academic world is that the situation in Tibet can teach us how to eliminate a “mystical religion” and that “it gives clues as to how Peking will integrate a capitalist Taiwan into a Communist China in the future”. (emphasis added)     

What happened in Korea? Rethinking Korean history 1945–1953

Abstract

The Pueblo incident was a stunning reminder of the hysteria and racism associated with the word Korea in the U.S. In spite of Vietnam and the great changes that have taken place within American society, the U.S. government and the military had little trouble in resuscitating the spectre of “brainwashing” and torture. The most diabolical cunning was attributed to the Koreans, who had legally captured the Pueblo and its crew. But as though at the touch of a switch, the American media and much of the nation again began to call for blood as they had done in the years 1950 to 1953. It would be a mistake to underestimate the success of America's campaign of vilification against the Korean people and the Korean revolutionary movement. At times the phobia reaches absurd proportions.