Formal rationality,substantive justice,and discrimination

This study examines the extent to which a juvenile court uses legal, substantive, and discriminatory criteria in assessing dispositions. The indicators of legal criteria are the seriousness of offense and the extent of prior arrest record, of substantive criteria, the presence of family and school problems, and of discriminatory criteria, race and social class. An examination of the dispositions accorded to a sample of 464 fourteen and fifteen year old arrestees in one juvenile court shows that, while discrimination in sentencing is minimal, the court is more likely to use substantive than formal criteria of decisionmaking. These findings suggest that studies of the juvenile court should be reoriented away from their traditional focus on legal and extralegal determinants of decision making toward a focus on substantive criteria.This study was supported by Ford Foundation under grant no. 73-96. We are grateful to Jackson Toby, principal investigator, for his aid in all phases of this study. William Smith and Antonia Steegen provided invaluable research assistance. This is a thoroughly revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, November, 1977.     

Principles, Values, and Rules in Legal Decision-Making and the Dimensions of Legal Rationality

Abstract. The author singles out various conceptions of rationality used in practical legal discourse: formal and substantive rationality, instrumental goal- and means-rationality, communicative rationality. Practical rationality is expressed in decisions justified by epistemic and axiological premises according to the rules of justificatory reasoning. Five levels of analysis of this justification are identified. Rules, principles and evaluations are used as justifying arguments and their characteristics determine the dimensions of rationality of decision depending on the features of rules, various conceptions of principles, and kinds of relativisation of evaluations. The dimensions of legal rationality depend mainly on three singled out conceptions of rationality, i.e., formal rationality dealing with the deep structure of justification, instrumentally oriented rationality as content of justifiability, and communicative rationality linked with the pragmatics of human interaction. Legitimacy, according to the presented analysis, appears as a subclass of external justification dealing with axiological premisses in terms of instrumental rationality and/or communicative rationality.     

No Offense! On the Offense Principle and Some New Challenges

A central aim within criminal justice ethics is to give a plausible justification concerning which type of acts ought to be criminalized by the state. One of the principles of criminalization which has been presented and critically discussed in the philosophical literature is the Offense Principle. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that unless a rather special and implausible objective list theory of well-being is accepted, the Offense Principle should be subsumed in the Harm Principle.     

Fundamental Rights: Between Morals and Politics

Starting from the impossibility of understanding fundamental rights from the standpoint of natural law doctrine or positivism, the author tackles the issue of rights from a realistic point of view, that is to say from the perspective of law and politics on the one hand, and from the perspective of public morality, on the other. Thus the foundation of fundamental rights is the meeting point of conceptions of social morality that are current in the modern world and the political aspect of the conception of pluralist democracy. Moreover, fundamental rights are considered an instrument to enable the social and moral development of human beings.     

Equality and Constitutional Indeterminacy An Interpretative Perspective on the European Economic Constitution

It is claimed that European supranationalism represents an unprecedented mode of political association whose point is to maintain what is good about nationality and the nation state by stripping the latter of its adverse effects. In this article, this claim is submitted to a test by examining how different ways of conceiving of anti‐discrimination in the context of intra‐Community trading law give rise to two different conceptions of the European economic constitution. While the first one is married to the ideal of behavioural anti‐discrimination–that is, of affording protection against discriminatory acts by Member States–whose application would seemingly leave the nation state in its place, the other one takes a system of nation states as something that in and of itself engenders systematically discriminatory effects on international trade. According to the latter, effective anti‐discrimination presupposes overcoming such a system altogether. Both conceptions of the economic constitution are manifest in Community law, and at first glance it appears as if adherence to the first one would be consonant with supranationality as a special mode of political association. However, owing to internal predicaments arising from the application of the equality principle (understood as a principle protecting against discrimination), the difference between both conceptions cannot be upheld in practice. Since the first conception is constantly undermined by the second in the course of its application, it remains uncertain, at least in this context, whether or not the European nation state is left in place by the European Economic Constitution.     

Principle,Proceduralism, and Precaution in a Community of Rights

Abstract. This paper presents a sketch of the way in which an ideal‐typical community of rights, Gewirthia, responds to the so‐called “internal problem of authority.” Notwithstanding the deep moral consensus in Gewirthia, where citizens are fully committed to the Principle of Generic Consistency (requiring that agents respect one another’s freedom and basic well‐being), Gewirthians make no claim to “know all the answers.” In consequence, public governance in Gewirthia needs a strategy for dealing with the many kinds of disputes—disputes that relate to matters of both principle and practice—that require authoritative settlement. In this context, having outlined the nature of (and justification for) the procedural strategy that Gewirthia adopts in order to resolve such disputes, we discuss the range of regulatory questions that are potentially moot in Gewirthia, and focus on three hard cases in which the State might argue for a precautionary licence—namely, where there is a dispute about indirect and speculative harm to rights‐holders, about harm to arguable rights‐holders, and about the possible corrosion of the conditions that are essential for the sustainability of a moral community.     

How Is Criminal Justice Related to the Rest of Justice?

Are principles of criminal justice derived from a broader conception of justice, or does criminal justice involve some of its own distinctive principles such that it is not—for example—an aspect of distributive justice? Examining considerations regarding luck and desert provides an illuminating approach to this issue. The notion of desert has largely been excised from a great deal of recent political theorizing, and in particular, it has been eliminated from many influential conceptions of distributive justice. It is widely held that the pervasiveness of luck renders desert inappropriate to contexts of distributive justice, and incompatible with the freedom and equality of persons in a just political community. Should considerations of desert also have a minimal role in criminal justice—where they seem to still be important? Are considerations of desert in the context of criminal justice consistent with persons being free and equal participants in a just political community? How are principles of criminal justice related to principles of distributive justice and political justice in an overall just society? Many scholars agree that criminal justice presupposes an adequately just society. Still, that leaves open just how criminal justice relates to justice overall. That is the present topic.     

The fact of reason: Kant's prajna-perception of freedom

Conclusion I have been experimental in my comparative approach, using the instrument of Hua-yen Buddhism to investigate Kant's fact or reason. What has been demonstrated? Certainly, the hypothesis that comparative study is flexible enough to illuminate strands of our own philosophical tradition is both interesting and compelling. But for Kant, does the study of practicability with reference to the buddhi-mind end in the perception of the dharmadhatu? I have marshalled some evidence to support this theory, implicit throughout the Second Critique. At the end of the Grundlagen, Kant offers one further note suggesting this conception must have been a continuing influence on his later moral thinking. Referring to the idea of a purely intelligible world, he says it serves to produce in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the splendid ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves (rational beings), to which we can belong as members only if we are scrupulous to live in accordance with maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature.⁴¹     

Why a Charter of Fundamental Human Rights in the EU?

Abstract. It has been argued that human rights politics is detrimental to social integration. But human rights are not merely abstract principles which, when positivated, secure negative freedom. When they are constitutionalised and turned into fundamental rights they contain a guarantee for equal freedom to all citizens. A charter of fundamental rights is a means to enhance the legal certainty of the citizens, reduce arbitrariness and moral imperialism and to institutionalise the right to justification. However, as the principle of popular sovereignty points to a particular society, and human rights point to an ideal republic, only with a cosmopolitan order can the problem of human rights politics be resolved.     

What is the Harm Principle For?

In their excellent monograph, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch argue for an account of legitimate criminalisation based on wrongfulness, the Harm Principle and the Offence Principle, while they reject an independent anti-paternalism principle. To put it at its simplest my aim in the present paper is to examine the relationship between ‘the harms’ and ‘the wrongs’ of the authors’ title. I begin by comparing the authors’ version of the Harm and Offence Principle with some other influential accounts. After examining the (considerable) role wrongfulness plays in their work, I ask what there is left for their Harm and Offence Principles to do. In the light of the understanding and foundations of the Harm and Offence Principles proposed by the authors, I suggest that the answer is little or nothing. The wrongfulness constraint the authors place on their Offence Principle comes close to swallowing it up entirely. Furthermore the part of their Offence Principle that is not thus swallowed by wrongfulness leaves the account with a commitment that is probably best dropped. As far as their Harm Principle is concerned I suggest that the authors’ account of ‘harm’ is so broad that it lacks the resources to distinguish harm-based reasons from wrongfulness- or immorality-based reasons in any principled way. Among other things, I ask in this context, first, whether one can be harmed as one’s character deteriorates and, secondly, whether one is harmed by virtue of the serious wrong one does to another. What really drives the authors’ account of legitimate criminalisation, I believe, is wrongfulness together with an important, amorphous set of potential defeating conditions. They themselves accept such a picture so far as paternalism is concerned. I conclude that their account, which I think has considerable force, would lose little of any significance were their Harm and Offence Principles simply excised. More generally I suspect that a strong role for wrongfulness in an account of legitimate criminalisation is likely to put into serious question the plausibility of an independent principled role for harm and offence.     

Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

协商民主能否成为可能——自由、平等与理性之于协商民主

20世纪最后20年,一种新型的民主理论——协商民主在西方政治学界开始兴起、发展,并成为人们讨论研究聚集的焦点。作为一种可能的新型民主,面临着许多挑战,何以成为可能或者说能否成为可能成为人们争论的焦点,这一问题值得我们认真思考。基于此,从一种自由、平等、理性分析的视角来看,协商民主能够化解自由与秩序的矛盾,维护社会的平等和正义,能够在公开的理性下实现政治的合法性,解决现有民主制度的困境与挑战,是确实能够实现的政治理想。     

Criminals or Patients? Towards a Tragic Conception of Moral and Legal Responsibility

There is a gap between, on the one hand, the tragic character of human action and, on the other hand, our moral and legal conceptions of responsibility that focus on individual agency and absolute guilt. Drawing on Kierkegaard’s understanding of tragic action and engaging with contemporary discourse on moral luck, poetic justice, and relational responsibility, this paper argues for a reform of our legal practices based on a less ‘harsh’ (Kierkegaard) conception of moral and legal responsibility and directed more at empathic understanding based on the emotional and imaginative appreciation of personal narratives. This may help our societies and communities to better cope with unacceptable deeds by individuals who are neither criminals nor patients, to make room for praise as well as blame and punishment, and to set up practices and institutions that do not rely on a conception of responsibility that is hard to bear for all of us.     

A Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason*

Abstract
Contemporary discussions about practical reason or practical rationality invoke four competing views which can be named as follows by reference to their historical models: Aristotelian, Hobbesian, Kantian and Nietzschean. The subject-matter of this article is a defence of the Kantian conception of practical rationality in the interpretation of discourse theory. At the heart, lies the justification and the application of the rules of discourse. An argument consisting of three parts is pre sented to justify the rules of discourse. The three parts are as follows: a transcen dental-pragmatic argument; an argument which takes account of the maximisation of individual utility and an empirical premise about an interest in correctness. Within the framework of the problem of application, the article outlines a justification of human rights and of the basic institutions of the democratic constitutional state on the basis of discourse theory.     

古代民事主体及其价值诉求探寻——以罗马和中世纪为视角的分析

民事主体制度作为私法制度运行的核心基础承载着人类的理性欲求,也蕴涵着深刻的价值意义。由罗马法而展开的古代民事主体,无论在现实层面还是在制度层面,整体上展现的是不自由与不平等。但如果细心探寻,仍然能够从中发现某种自由的潜在诉求与平等的事实蕴含。虽然这种自由与平等因人类理性的发展局限而未能升华为观念形态,但却为近代民事主体的观念自由与平等提供了必要的积淀与储备。     

Social justice in the modern regulatory state: duress,necessity and the consensual model in law

This paper examines the role of the consensual model in law and argues that if substantive justice is to be the goal of law, the use of individual choice as a legal criterion for distributive and retributive purposes must be curtailed and made subject to substantive considerations. Substantive justice arguably requires that human rights to life, well-being, and the commodities essential to life and well-being, be given priority whenever a societal decision is made. If substantive justice is a collective societal responsibility, the individual cannot be justly rewarded or punished for his or her choices with respect to life, well-being and essential commodities insofar as these choices are justified or excused by standards of substantive justice. Societal conditions and institutional arrangements should be recognized as grounds for justification and excuse because they may impose limits and constraints on the choices available to an individual that are as unavoidable and compelling as those imposed by chance or by another human being.     

Building the Union: The Nature of Sovereignty in the Political Architecture of Europe

The debate on the nature of the European Union hasbecome a test case of the kind of political andinstitutional arrangements appropriate in an age ofglobalization. This paper explores three views of theEU. The two main positions that have hithertoconfronted each other appeal to either cosmopolitan orcommunitarian values. Advocates of the former arguefor some form of federal structure in Europe and areconvinced that the sovereignty of the nation statebelongs to the past. Proponents of the latter make acase on both socio-political and normative grounds fora Europe of nations. However a third position,favoured by the authors, is gaining ground. This viewcombines cosmopolitan and communitarian conceptions.It emphasises the mixed nature of the European polityand conceives the constitutionalization process asopen-ended. The paper concludes that from this perspectivea bricoleur's Europe of bits and piecesmay not necessarily lack justification and legitimacy.     

经济法的实质正义观及其实现

形式正义和实质正义分别属于近代和现代法律分配权利和义务的价值观念。形式正义是按照绝对平等和自由的原则分配权利和义务,而实质正义则是根据主体身份特征进行倾斜式分配。实质正义不但促进了民法的社会化,而且催生了经济法和社会法的诞生。实质正义首先通过立法环节转化为具体的权利和义务规范及法律责任,其次通过行政和司法机关得以实现。     

Justice,Legitimacy and the Authority of Legislation within the European Union

What are we to make of the authority of legislation within the EU? EU lawyers have questioned the significance of legislative decision‐making within the EU. This article challenges these views and argues that the EU legislature must enjoy adequate freedom to shape EU law with the general interest in mind. Institutional accounts that seek to curtail the authority of legislation tend to rest upon ‘content‐dependent’ conceptions of political legitimacy, according to which the legitimacy of a decision depends on its moral qualities. Such conceptions overlook reasonable disagreements on justice and rest upon an overly optimistic (pessimistic) view of the Court (the legislature). The article argues for a content‐independent conception of legitimacy, following which the benefits of legislative decision‐making are more easily understood. The authority of legislation deserves wider recognition among EU lawyers for reasons of political legitimacy and because the EU legislature is better positioned to decide in the general interest.     

Toward a moral theory of negligence law

This paper explores how the widely acknowledged conception of tort law as corrective justice is to be applied to the law of negligence. Corrective justice is an ordering of transactions between two parties which restores them to an antecedent equality. It is thus incompatible with the comprehensive aggregation of utilitarianism, and it stands in easy harmony with Kantian moral notions. This conception of negligence law excludes both maximizing theories, such as Holmes' and Posner's, and Fried's risk pool, which combines Kantianism with distributive rather than corrective justice. Central to the Kantian approach is the impermissibility of self-preference. The two types of self-preference, self-preference in conception and self-preference in action can respectively account for the objective standard and the Learned Hand test, which are the two most characteristic features of negligence and which are generally (and wrongly) considered to be inescapably aggregative. This corrective justice conception of the negligence standard can then be compared to Epstein's corrective justice conception of strict liability, and arguments can be offered in favour of the superiority of the former.