Economics,politics, and the cycle of presidential popularity

Does the economy hold the key to the ups and downs of the popularity of American presidents? This study, which is based on quarterly data from 1961 to 1980, employs stochastic models for time series (Box-Jenkins). For inflation, though not for unemployment, the findings confirm a significant effect at a lag of one quarter. The worries of political leaders about the inflation side of macroeconomic performance appear to be justified. Nevertheless, the influence of noneconomic factors such as international events, the Vietnam War, and Watergate proves even more potent. Moreover, presidential popularity is subject to a cycle whereby each president begins his service with an unearned popularity bonus that subsequently erodes. Economic performance is not found to be responsible for this inauguration-erosion cycle, but neither are rallies, wars, or scandal.     

Labour's approach to planning: Economics v politics

Since 1964 the Labour Party has been closely associated with the development in government of a conception of planning which gives pride of place to economic rather than representative opinion. Although ofneo‐liberal inspiration, its adoption by Labour is by no means circumstantial but is historically embedded in social democratic ideology concerning economic organisation. This convergence with neo‐liberalism is especially notable for its tendency towards the denial and ultimate impoverishment of politics. Yet the theoretical basis exists for an approach to planning—ultimately more realistic politically—incorporating and developing rather than devaluing representative democracy.     

Context matters: Economics,politics and satisfaction with democracy

Economic and political considerations are important in determining citizens' level of satisfaction with their democratic system, but research analyzing which criteria prevail in which contexts is still limited. We examine under what conditions citizens chiefly rely on economic or political considerations in assessing their level of satisfaction with democracy. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems dataset covering 72 elections in 45 unique countries (1996–2016), we show that the relative weight of economic and political criteria in citizens' evaluation of their democratic regime is a function of their nation's affluence. On the one hand, citizens in poorer countries mostly rely on the economy to assess their level of satisfaction with democracy. On the other hand, political considerations are crucial in citizens' evaluations of richer societies. Our results entail strong implications to understand why citizens' recipes for satisfaction for democracy vary across time and space.     

Economics, politics, and foreigners: Populist party support in Denmark and Norway

This paper investigates the dynamics of vote intention for the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties. It shows that support patterns for these populist parties can be explained with similar independent variables. These include national economic conditions and political events. Empirical support for the usefulness of these variables is stronger in the case of the Danish Progress party. The analysis also suggests that increases in support for both parties during the 1980s was to a significant extent driven by the increase in the number of foreigners entering these countries.     

Introduction: Regulation and deregulation

Abstract. 'Deregulation' is best conceived as covering two separate sets of processes: changes to the structure of rules embodied in regulatory systems; and disturbances to the stability of those systems due to the inability of system 'governors' to function effectively. The most striking feature of deregulation is variety - in incidence, form and extent. This variety is a function of three broad sets of variables: place, notably national setting; time, notably the historical epoch and the stage in a regulatory cycle when deregulation happens; and arena, notably the economic arena and policy networks where deregulation takes place.     

Regulation, deregulation and public bureaucracy

Abstract. In 1982, a new Liberal-Conservative government launched a grand deregulatory campaign as part of its programme for restoring the Danish economy. After some initial success, the campaign lost momentum. The government gradually realised that it was difficult to mobilise both economic interests and public opinion for the cause of deregulation. Bureaucratic resistance and disinterest among economic interest organisations together with the erosion of political commitment to deregulation after a couple of years stopped the campaign. Still, some results were reached where least expected.     

西部大开发中小城镇建设的政府管理

小城镇建设是西部开发建设中基础设施的基础,是西部经济、社会发展的载体.西部地区发展落后于东部地区,其中一个重要原因就是城镇建设大大滞后.为了加速西部发展的步伐,必须加大小城镇建设和管理力度,小城镇的管理是政府的基本职能.政府只有加大对小城镇的科学管理,才能更好地发挥小城镇在西部开发中的作用.     

The limits of deregulation: Transnational interpenetration and policy change

Abstract. Deregulation became a major cross-national trend in the 1980s. Proponents of deregulation have included neoclassicists, pragmatists and certain analysts on the Left and Center-Left. Deregulation has a number of unintended or unforeseen consequences. A major issue is the development of new, market-oriented regulations and regulatory structures – the first category of 'reregulation'. Another is the cross-national knock-on effect of regulatory changes. And a third is the emergence of new forms of market stabilization and control, whether by the state or at the transnational level. A crucial feature of deregulation is the change in the wider pattern of state intervention from the 'welfare state' model to that of the 'competition state'. A number of competing explanations for deregulation can be identified – market explanations, institutional/technological explanations and political explanations – each of which has significant variants. These explanations can be seen to apply in the real world at four different levels: the 'global' level; that of various intermediary transnational political structures; the state level; and the level of 'self-regulation' of a neo-corporatist kind.     

Myth and American politics

Accumulating tensions call into question the sustainability of the American political system, which ultimately depends on public faith in the justifying myth. This article takes sustainability as a policy problem, and attempts to reconstruct the significance of recent, scattered events in American politics from the standpoint of central theory in the policy sciences. The resulting construct emphasizes the significance of intellectuals in the decision processes of modern society and the continuing task of the policy sciences.     

Coalition politics and accountability

The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a ‘unity government’) can not be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivate government performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy.     

Structural violence and politics

Abstract

In Red Tape, I do not use the term “arbitrary” in opposition to “systematic”, as is alleged by Harriss and Jeffrey. Arbitrariness accompanies systematic forms of discrimination, and is the result of both, the indifference to outcomes and to the chaotic style of functioning of Indian bureaucracies. Interpreting structural violence, or explaining injustice, requires understanding what the state means to different people. The chief argument that poverty is a form of violence, and represents the killing of the poor, underlines the injustice that results from treating poverty as a biopolitical fact. I employ a notion of politics that is not restricted to parties and mobilization, but which saturates all relations of inequality. Despite voicing dissatisfaction with the analysis presented in Red Tape, Harriss and Jeffrey fail to forward an adequate and coherent alternative.     

Evolutionary psychology and politics

Like its predecessor sociobiology, evolutionary psychology has distanced itself from political discourse. In so far as evolutionary psychology can contribute towards an understanding of politics, it claims to do so only as a potential explanation for political behaviour. However, I argue that evolutionary psychology - like sociobiology - is itself a political phenomenon. It proceeds from a conception of the political - drawn from the Hobbesian social contract tradition - which crucially informs its theoretical trajectory. A recognition of the political character of evolutionary psychology, in this respect, should be the starting point of its critique.     

Monopoly deregulation in the presence of Tullock activities

We give the condition for a welfare improving monopoly deregulation when the decision making process cannot be insulated from Tullock activities and players are risk neutral. The author is grateful to the Faculty Recruitment Program (FRP) of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations for financial support.