Typologies in Comparative Criminal Justice Research

This article focuses on typology construction as a focal technique in the analysis of crime and crime control systems from a world perspective. The relationship between theories and typologies is discussed. The author stresses the structure of theory when the world is defined as a system which includes sub-systems. Theoretical schemes depend on the existence of world sub-system typologies. Crime typologies and legal system typologies are needed because the formulation of a world law will be affected by the existence of typologies which clarify the similarities and dissimilarities of world legal systems.     

价值体系的混乱与整合:当前我国法律文化建设的困境与出路

法律文化由法律观念和法律价值体系组成,缺少法律文化就意味着缺少精神和灵魂,法律制度就很难发挥出应有的作用.法律文化建设具有为法治建设奠定基础、维护国家的长治久安、提升我国综合国力以及将中国建设为文化大国等功能.当前,我国法律文化建设的困境是法律价值体系的混乱.走出困境的出路则是:整合现有价值体系,提出获得人们广泛认可的、包容性强的法律价值体系；形成支撑现代强国的法律观念；约束政府权力,形成良好的政治体制.     

Legal System and Practical Reason. On the Structure of a Normative Theory of Law*

Abstract
It will be argued, firstly, that there is a link between the legal validity of a norm and the rational justifiability of a requirement that judges should apply this norm, based on a normative conception of legal validity and the postulate that judges should act as rational persons; secondly, that rational justifiability of legal norms requires the construction of a legal system in a model of principles that differs from theories, e.g., of Kelsen, Hart, Dworkin and Alexy, which are not fully adequate for a normative conception of law.     

论法律概念的特征

法律概念是法律的基本构成要素,没有法律概念,我们就不能正确地理解法律问题。与哲学、政治学等学科相比,我国的法学对法律概念的研究却显得相对薄弱。然而,在司法实践中,要正确运用法律推理,必须首先研究法律概念。本文从研究概念入手,阐明了法律概念的涵义以及法律概念与一般概念的不同点。从立法、司法的角度,分析了法律概念的特征。     

论类推适用的概念——以两大法系类推适用之比较为基础

由于在类推适用的定位、适用前提、援引对象等方面的认识存在差异,学者们对类推适用的概念界定不一.其原因在于未能认识到大陆法系和英美法系在类推适用的地位、适用范围、援引对象上的差异.对类推适用的认识及其概念的准确界定必须建立在对两大法系类推适用的比较分析之上,并区分对两大法系共同适用之类推适用的一般概念与仅适用于具体法律背景之特殊概念.     

Conceptions Of Liberty Deprivation

This article adopts a theoretical and comparative perspective on the prisoner's legal status in England and Wales. Applying the principles of human rights, legality and proportionality, it argues that the prisoner's legal status must rest on a divisible conception of liberty. Such a conception must distinguish clearly between the liberty lost, and the rights restricted, by the imposition of the custodial sentence as opposed to the administration of prisons (the key distinction). In order for this to be achieved, the conception of the prisoner's legal status must also establish the purpose or purposes of the custodial sanction as distinct from the purpose of prison administration. Through comparison with Germany, the article demonstrates that the common law concept of the prisoner's legal status is unstable. Vacillating between a divisible and indivisible conception of the prisoner's liberty, the English conception of the prisoner's legal status lacks a foundation firm enough to satisfy the principles of human rights, legality and proportionality.     

Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

On Law and Logic

Abstract. The main purpose of this paper is to explore the role played by logic in the legal domain. In the traditional conception which underlies the movement of codification, judges are able to find in the legal system (the Master System) a unique answer for every legal problem. This entails its completeness, consistency and the possibility of deriving from it the contents of all judicial decisions. Although the ideal model of this conception is supported by important theoretical and political ideals, it has significant shortcomings. The elements of normative systems (Master Systems) are "norms" and not mere "norm-formulations." A "norm" is the meaning attributed to normative linguistic expressions. The set of all normative expressions, such as statutes, codes, etc. forms what is called the Master Book. One of the main problems for the ideal model is the identification of a normative system behind the Master Book. Interpretative arguments are the tools designed to solve these problems. Although the requirements of the model are not totally fulfilled in actual practice, it remains as an effective ideal rational goal behind legal activities linked to adjudication and most theoretical approaches to law.     

后现代法学方法论的理论光谱

后现代法学方法论发展了哲学诠释学的相对主义观点,与科学主义法学形成了尖锐的对立,动摇了法治主义的认识论基础。在后现代法学方法论中,存在着反基础主义、解构主义、新实用主义等几种主要的法律思维形式,它们对法律知识的客观有效性持怀疑的态度,否认法律体系中存在着一以贯之的普遍性标准,也不承认法律可以从某些超越性的道德价值中推导出来,而将法律看作是政治权力角力后的结果,法律的阐释者正是政治权力的体现者。     

法律移植的界定

法律移植作为一种创造性的法律活动,其目的在于改变一国的法律,使其实现法制的现代化,那么,移植的内容无疑应当是外国的法律制度、法律观念、法律理论及法律体系的有机统一体。缺少上述任何一个要素,法律移植都不可能是完整的,其推进法治文明的使命也是难以完成的。     

论法制现代化范畴能力的改善空间与提升策略

法制现代化的范畴能力是指其反映现实、评价现实、规范现实与指引现实的能力。法制现代化具有较强的范畴能力,但是由于其不尽适当的时间维度、与西方中心主义的过分纠缠、与对立范畴的复杂关系以及宏大叙事的色彩,使这种能力有着一定的改善空间。提升法制现代化的范畴能力,应强调其内部的合理化这个要素,从宏观思辨转向微观论证,以个案的合理性分析来实现具体正义。     

A 'European' Conception of Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering Eugen Ehrlich

This paper discusses the present ‘legal consciousness’ literature and seeks to identify two different conceptions of legal consciousness. Most of this literature originated in the United States, but there has also been a growing interest in issues of legal consciousness in Europe. The use of the term ‘legal consciousness ’ in these European discussions is, however, remarkably different from its use in the United States literature. It is argued that the most commonly used ‘American ’ conception of legal consciousness reflects important ideas of Roscoe Pound and asks: how do people experience (official) law? By contrast, a European conception of legal consciousness, which was first introduced by the Austrian legal theorist Eugen Ehrlich, focuses on: what do people experience as ‘law ’? After both perspectives are applied in a case‐study of a run‐down neighbourhood in the Netherlands, it is concluded that future studies of legal consciousness may benefit from an integration of the two conceptions.     

On Legal Inferentialism. Toward a Pragmatics of Semantic Content in Legal Interpretation?

Abstract. In this paper we consider whether a pragmatics of semantic content can be a useful approach to legal interpretation. More broadly speaking, since a pragmatic conception of meaning is a component of inferential semantics, we consider whether an inferentialist approach to legal interpretation can be useful in dealing with some problems of this important aspect of law. In other words, we ask whether Legal Inferentialism is a suitable conception for legal interpretation. In Section 1 we briefly consider the semantics/pragmatics debate in contemporary philosophy of language and in relation to legal interpretation. In Section 2 we discuss the relations between a pragmatics of semantic content and an inferentialist conception of content. In Section 3 we consider how Inferentialism can be applied to legal interpretation. Finally, in Section 4 we consider some possible advantages and drawbacks of Inferentialism applied to legal interpretation and adjudication.     

Kelsen's Theory on International Law during His Exile in Geneva

Kelsen's monistic theory of international law was shaped during his exile in Geneva (1933–1940), but its deep roots are to be found in his Pure Theory of Law, centred on the neo‐Kantian notion of “system.” According to this conception, a legal system can only descend from a single principle. Consequently, Kelsen constructed a monistic theory of law, i.e., a legal system incorporating all norms into a pyramidal structure culminating in a single principle: the fundamental norm. This Kelsenian pyramid must also include international law, considering that if international law were a legal system different from national law (as the dualistic theory assumes), the theoretical construction would need two fundamental norms. This dualism is as incompatible with Kelsen's monistic vision as Schmitt's theory of “Great Spaces,” creating a hierarchical system of international relations. In the Kelsenian pyramid, international law occupies a position superior to national law: The consequences of this assumption are discussed in some documents recently published in German and French.     

和谐社会构建中的法理念转换

中国走向和谐社会的进程在法律领域的展开表现为建立新型的宪政,而建立宪政的理论前提就是重构法的理念。实现法的根本理念的转换应当从对过去一个时期奉行的阶级专政的法律理念的反思和批判开始。应当在这种批判的基础上,重新思考和定位人的法律角色、法的逻辑构造方式、法的正义观念等。     

法律意识形态的变迁——以我国民事诉讼中的"调解"为样本

考察中国民事诉讼中的"调解",可以发现,自上世纪80年代以来,中国主流法律意识形态一直试图脱离政治意识形态话语而独立存在,这个过程可以分成"走出特定政治意识形态的法律意识形态"和"走出总体政治意识形态的法律意识形态"两个阶段,主流法律意识形态的这种变迁导致了政治意识形态对法律意识形态的影响幕后化,政治意识形态和法律意识形态之间的关系因而显得模糊不清,但在可以预见的将来,法律意识形态并没有可能因此而成为独立于政治意识形态的"法律观念体系".     

概念外延的变动及其法律适用——以反垄断法中致害人和受害人为中心

各国反垄断法概括法律关系主体(致害人和受害人)的用语不尽一致,并存在概念外延变动的共性。致害人概念的外延多被扩大,受害人概念的外延多被缩小。正确理解这些概念有利于准确适用法律。反垄断法的实施建立在由"三层防护网"构成的机制基础上。我国反垄断法中受害人被表述为"他人"。"他人"和"民事责任"之间的关系不协调,使防护机制存在一定的漏洞,有必要对之进行完善。     

The Theory of Legal Dynamics Reconsidered*

Abstract. The author criticizes Kelsen's distinction between static and dynamic systems of norms and his theory of legal dynamics. The author moreover presents the institutionalist conception of legal dynamics. Kelsen's concept of static systems is incompatible with normological scepticism: The deduction of rules from a basic principle depends on additional premises; even in static systems there is a kind of dynamics produced by actual facts. Kelsen's conception of legal dynamics is also incompatible with normological scepticism and with Kelsen's demand of purity of jurisprudence. In the institutionalist conception Iegal dynamics is rather conceived as an interplay of legal norms and facts. Empowering relations, the principle of co-validity, temporal limits of norms, derogation, legal validity and the basic norm are analysed accordingly. Appendices deal with Paulson's empowering theory of legal norm and Lippold's double-faced reconstruction of the legal order.     

法律推理的客观性及其实现条件

20世纪西方法理学经历了从法律确定性向法律不确定性的转向，以“唯一正确答案”为核心的法律确定性难以成立。然而，这并不会影响法律确定性所追求的限制权力这一政治目标的实现，恰当阐释的法律客观性观念可以作为法治的基石。共同的社会文化背景、适当的法律推理思维方法、成熟的法律职业共同体三者的共同作用将为法律推理的客观性的实现提供保障。     

法治文化的几个理论问题

党的十七届六中全会强调文化建设,将推进法律文化、法治文化的研究。法治文化是指包含民主、人权、平等、自由、正义、公平等价值在内的人类优秀法律文化类型;法治文化由表层结构和深层结构组成,前者包括法律规范、法律制度、法律组织机构、法律设施等,后者包括法律心理、法律意识、法律思想体系。法治文化就是法律的意识形态和与其相适应的社会制度和组织机构。一般来说,观念支配行为,思想决定行动,而良好的制度和规范又影响和塑造着人们的思想观念体系。法治文化建设就是制度性文化建设与观念性文化建设的结合和互动。法治文化建设既应该高度重视法律制度的建设,也要高度重视对公民观念的塑造和提高。