American Grand Strategy after Iraq

To the extent that a grand strategy can be discerned in the first year of the Obama Administration, its defining features are not a break from the past but continuity. As the President himself has analogized since taking office, crafting grand strategy is like parallel parking. He has only been able to make changes to grand strategy around the margins since a number of existing commitments limit his freedom of action. This article first identifies the structural determinants of grand strategy, pointing to the international distribution of power, American bureaucracy, and public as the key sources of strategic constraint and opportunity. It then shows how shifts in these factors—comparatively less U.S. power, an overstretched military organized around counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an American public weary from an aggressive grand strategy—produced a shift in grand strategy that predated the 2008 election and that remains consistent with the current strategic setting. It is for these reasons that the 2008 “change” election has produced considerable continuity in American grand strategy.     

New Structures of American Foreign Strategy Since 9/11--Seeking Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Countries

When George W. Bush entered the White House in early 2001,American foreign policy was based on unilateral principles and favored disengagement from global conflict resolution. The United States declared it's decision to withdraw from the Kyoto protocol, refused to negotiate with North Korea, and, in particular, it's pursuit of a national ballstic missile defense system,in face of global opposition, further reinforced the position of its unilateralism.The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 came as a shock to the world. The United States suffered not only physical casualties, but felt a psychological blow as well. For the first time since the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had been attacked at home. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the attacks on September 11 targeted civilians and the cornerstones of the American way of life- their financial and government centers. The terrorist attacks forced the Bush administration to re-examine it approach to foreign policy Seeking cooperation with other powers will be the new choice for American foreign strategy.     

The American far right and 9/11

On 11 September 2001, over 3000 Americans were killed in terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But the attacks do not only shed light on radical Islam. Far-right groupings in America reacted to 11 September in very different ways, and an exploration of their responses can offer fresh insights into a constellation of groupings which stretch from the militias to the neo-Nazi National Alliance.     

American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk

If there is no single long-standing American grand strategy, one nonetheless sees through the course of U.S. history the tracks of a grand strategy. It started with the idea of a U.S. monopoly in the Western Hemisphere, along with balances of power in the chief theaters of the world; with belief in the primacy of sea and air power and the need for an economic system to support these; and the objective of transforming international politics. Since 9/11, even if the strategic hierarchy, intensity, and political basis have changed, the Bush administration has largely been continuing in this same project, with a sensible strategy but poorly considered tactics.     

勾勒新时代美国之“大战略”——《美国时代的终结》介评

冷战结束以来 ,美国内理论界对美国优势地位的探讨从未停止过。乐观派———不管是信奉“历史终结论”还是“民主和平论” ,“全球民主化”还是“霸权稳定论” ,都认为美国的优势地位是绝对的 ,且会在相当长的时间内继续保持 ;悲观派则认为不论是源于“文明间的冲突” ,还是“大国政治悲剧” ,对抗是国际政治的永恒与必然 ,美国的单极地位正在或必将受到挑战。在此形势下 ,美国阿尔福雷德·克诺普夫出版社 2 0 0 2年出版了探讨美国国际地位的又一本力作 :《美国时代的终结 :美国外交政策与 2 1世纪的地缘政治》①。该书作者查尔斯·库普钱是…     

伊拉克战争与美国的大战略失误

美国发动对伊战争有着长远的战略考虑,但伊拉克战争本身在目标和手段上都无助于实现或推进美国在“9.11”事件后所确立的大战略目标。美国在伊拉克战争期间的大战略失误,突出地表现为大战略目标与单个军事行动目标之间的模糊和抵触,大战略目标与手段之间严重失衡。长远地看,如果美国偏重于单边主义和军事力量,其巩固“单极”世界的图谋会遇到更大的国际障碍。     

冷战后美国大战略的理论思辨

冷战结束之后,美国思想界掀起了一场关于美国未来国家大战略的理论辩论.对于冷战后美国大战略的利益与目标、威胁与挑战、手段与途径等问题,不同学派根据各自对国际政治现实的理解提出了纷繁复杂的理论模式.关于大战略的辩论在很大程度上也就是关于国际关系理论的辩论,因此,本文从现实主义与自由主义、孤立主义与国际主义、单边主义与多边主义三个主要视角对各种大战略模式及其论证思路进行了比较分析和逻辑疏理.     

Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism,and the War in Iraq

This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.     

China's Grand Strategy Seen from the Report to the CPC 18th National Congress

Clash of Opinions
Opinions vary over the question： ＂Does Beijing have a strategy. Both affirmative and negative answers have been heard. Witness the arguments for and against. The pros point to Mao Zedong＇s Ping-Pong diplomacy that shook the world by moving a big ball with a small one; Deng Xiaoping＇s Theory on reform and opening up, as well as his Three-Stage Development Strategy; and China＇s adherence to the path of peaceful development. Any one of these can be regarded as a grand strategy. On the con side, however, comes this sarcastic retort.＇ Just look at how the Middle Kingdom is kept constantly on the run responding to emergencies in foreign affairs without any internal coordination to speak of or any systemic approach to turn to. Is this not an eloquent testimony to the lack of a grand strategy？ Echoing this view, the former Australian prime minister, Kevin Rudd, in his recent article,     

The United Nations' Response to 9/11

ABSTRACT

The United Nations has been at the forefront of the global campaign against terrorism after the events of September 11, 2001, giving the campaign legitimacy and universality. The Security Council acted with remarkable speed with its Resolution 1373 and set up the Counter Terrorism Committee with extensive powers. Its UK Chairman provided able leadership but reservations over human rights issues, lack of funding for assistance, and the danger of duplicating the work of other UN bodies with specific mandates have been revealed as deficiencies. The General assembly condemned the events of 9/11 and held debates on the subject later. The Secretariat's views were expressed by several eloquent statements of the Secretary-General and in a policy working group report that advocated a tripartite strategy of “discussion–denial–cooperation” and made 31 recommendations. Counter terrorism is only one tool in tackling terrorism. Human rights concerns must be addressed. A separate, functional commission under the Economic and Social Council is recommended to provide the international community with a universal forum for a focused discussion on terrorism.     

Leveraging Strength: The Pillars of American Grand Strategy in World War II

This article argues that U.S. leaders navigated their way through World War II challenges in several important ways. These included: sustaining a functional civil-military relationship; mobilizing inside a democratic, capitalist paradigm; leveraging the moral high ground ceded to them by their enemies; cultivating their ongoing relationship with the British, and embracing a kind of adaptability and resiliency that facilitated their ability to learn from mistakes and take advantage of their enemies’ mistakes.     

“美利坚帝国”论与美国的大战略

“美利坚帝国”论是在新的历史条件下 ,以较过去更直言不讳、更不加掩饰的形式出现的美国支配全球论。它是当今世界力量对比状况的一种突出的反映。 2 1世纪初的美国 ,正在形成新的大战略。不管以何名之 ,也不管其制定者是否使用了“帝国”一词 ,这一战略的宗旨正在于支配世界和改造世界 ,造就和保证一个君临天下式的“美利坚帝国” ,使 2 1世纪成为又一个“美国世纪”。     

Grand Strategy after the Vietnam War

The perceived history of the Vietnam War profoundly influenced American discussions on grand strategy during the postwar period. The two largest schools of thought, one favoring confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other favoring engagement, drew lessons from the war based upon differing historical interpretations and used those lessons as support beams in constructing grand strategy. Compelling world events during the Carter presidency caused only a few individuals to shift positions in the debate, but one of those individuals was Jimmy Carter himself. Subsequent discoveries by historians indicate that the confrontation school understood the war's history and the postwar world better than did the engagement school and consequently crafted a superior grand strategy. The post-Vietnam debate contains numerous parallels to present-day discussions of grand strategy and offers a variety of lessons salient to contemporary strategic formulation.     

Attaching Importance to Post-9/11 Environmental Changes

Security environment is both an objective reality and a subjective consciousness. Here so-called "objective reality" mainly refers to the inherent law of the changes in international security situation. To a great extent, the subjective consciousness of the objective reality depends on the position and strategic choices of a nation in the international security     

Grand Strategy for the Next Administration

With the current administration's attention, resources and reputation so tied to Iraq, the prospect for significant changes in American foreign policy are limited in George W. Bush's remaining months in office. A new administration coming into power in January 2009, however, gives the United States a chance to revisit the changes to American foreign policy implemented after 9/11, as well as to consider any needed course corrections. The opportunity such changes in administration offers is a major strength of the American political system. Clearly, now is the time to start thinking about such issues.