When States Prefer Non-Citizens Over Citizens: Conflict Over Illegal Immigration into Malaysia

Why would a state encourage illegal immigration over the opposition of its citizens? According to the theories of immigration and citizenship, we should expect exactly the opposite: that states will monitor, control, and restrict illegal immigrants' access to citizenship on behalf of its citizens, as has been the experience of most countries. I use my research on Filipino immigration to Sabah, Malaysia to show how Malaysia utilizes census practices and documentation to incorporate an illegal immigrant population from the Philippines. Illegal immigrants play an electoral role in Sabah because of the loosely institutionalized nature of citizenship, a feature common to many other developing countries. Our examination of Malaysia reveals several elements of illegal immigration and citizenship that are common to migratory flows in other developing countries. I conclude by showing how this case is generalizable and what it tells us about illegal immigrant participation in the international system.     

Why do some Arab citizens see democracy as unsuitable for their country?

Why do some Arab citizens regard democracy favourably but see it as unsuitable for their country? Modernization theory contends that economic development creates modern citizens who demand democracy. Cultural theories see Islam and democracy as incompatible. Government performance theories argue that citizens who perceive the current authoritarian government as acting in a transparent manner will demand greater democracy. I argue that attitudes toward democracy are shaped by beliefs about its political, economic, and religious consequences, including those related to sectarianism. I test this consequence-based theory using Arab Barometer data from six nations. Sixty percent hold favourable views of democracy generally and for their country, while 7% reject democracy. Twenty-seven percent support democracy generally but see it as unsuitable for their country. Beliefs that democracy will have negative consequences and perceptions of poor government performance are the most important predictors of democracy's unsuitability. Modernization theory receives support, but Islamic identity and beliefs do not consistently predict attitudes in the expected direction. These findings offer a more nuanced understanding of Arab public opinion and suggest that concerns about the consequences of free elections affect support for democracy as much as assessments of the political and economic performance of the current authoritarian regime.     

The Affect and Effect of Images of War on Individual Opinion and Emotions

We explore the conditions under which individuals are attentive to positive and negative battlefield information when forming beliefs about a conflict’s success or failure. We use three experiments to explore the impact of visual and textual battlefield cues on individuals’ emotional states and attitudes toward the war in Afghanistan. We find that both visual and textual information convey information about failure that influences public attitudes and emotions toward war. In keeping with rational expectations theory, but contrary to widespread beliefs within the journalistic and policymaking communities, textual cues and images of battlefield failure have similar effects on emotions and attitudes. The consistency of multiple war cues, however, greatly affects peoples’ reactions. Simply put, in war the content of information matters, not its delivery style.     

The Influence of Religion and Ethnonationalism on Public Attitudes towards Amnesty: Northern Ireland as a Case Study

The granting of amnesties has now become a cornerstone of peacebuilding efforts in societies emerging from conflict. Yet, the impact of the role of religion and ethnicity in determining attitudes towards such arrangements has not been empirically assessed. Mindful of this omission, this article investigates the relationship between a range of religious measures — religious practices and beliefs in and about God — and ethnonationalist identity on public attitudes toward amnesty in Northern Ireland. Based on nationally representative survey data, the results suggest that, although Protestants are significantly more opposed to such an initiative than Catholics, both religious beliefs and ethnonational identity are significant, albeit divergent, net predictors with respect to their differing views.     

论日本对中国东北地区的移民侵略──日本军国主义侵略本质的新视角

伪满14年期间,日本策划并实施了对中国东北的移民侵略,其政策是通过“移民计划大纲”、派遣“试验移民”及“百万户移民计划”来进行的。日本移民政策的形成过程、各种类型的移民活动及通过国家与民间的管理机构对进入中国东北移民的管理,是为了把日本移民组织成武装集团,监视和镇压当地人民,以达到其长期侵占中国东北的目的。     

Regional International Organizations and Individual Immigration Attitudes: Results from Finite Mixture Models

When are individuals more likely to support immigration? We suggest here that regional international organizations (IOs; for example, the European Union) publicly release reports about the scale and benefits of immigration to member states in the region in which these IOs operate. We argue that unlike individuals who are uninformed about immigration, informed individuals who have more knowledge of the main regional IO in which their country participates will be more likely to employ immigration reports released by their regional IO to construct their immigration attitudes. They will also perceive that these reports are credible. The credibility of these reports helps individuals with more knowledge about their region’s main IO to view immigrants favorably, which translates to support for immigration. We test our prediction by developing a finite mixture model that statistically accounts for the econometric challenges that emerge when uninformed individuals “save face” by disproportionately opting for the middle “status quo” category in ordinal survey response variables of immigration support. Results from the finite mixture model corroborate our prediction and are more reliable than estimates from a standard ordered probit model.     

Labor migration numbers and rights: do they trade off or advance together?

This article reconsiders the argument that as labor immigration policy opens, it must also become more restrictive in terms of immigrant rights. After discussing this tradeoff logic, positing a negative relationship between external (numbers) and internal (rights) labor migration policy, it then extends the underlying political model to show that when accounting for the lobbying pressure of firms seeking high skill labor, a very different expectation emerges. This political accommodation argument predicts a positive relationship between external and internal migration policy, or that policy related to labor immigration openness and immigrant rights should advance together, although not necessarily quickly or at the same rate. It then tests these competing propositions using a new dataset that sorts labor migration policy changes among 38 advanced industrial democracies from 1995 to 2016 into these two dimensions, finding a significant positive relationship between them.     

Nativism or Economic Threat: Attitudes Toward Immigrants During the Great Recession

To better evaluate the weight of economic versus cultural factors in determining individual attitudes toward open borders, this article reports on a survey experiment conducted over the course of the Great Recession. Over the course of the recession, we measured changes in attitudes on both immigration and trade policies, controlling for economic circumstance. Based on the data provided by respondents on both their current salaries as well as a subjective assessment of their economic well-being, we illustrate how both objective and subjective perceptions of the economy interact with cultural factors and influence attitudes on open borders. The panel provides a unique picture of the “stickiness” of policy attitudes in hard economic times, and by extension, the level of commitment in the United States to globalization.     

The Longitudinal Effects of Chronic Mediated Exposure to Political Violence on Ideological Beliefs About Political Conflicts Among Youths

This study examines the effects of chronic (i.e., repeated and cumulative) mediated exposure to political violence on ideological beliefs regarding political conflict. It centers on these effects on young viewers, from preadolescents to adolescents. Ideological beliefs refers here to support of war, perception of threat to one’s nation, and normative beliefs concerning aggression toward the out-group. A longitudinal study was conducted on a sample of Israeli and Palestinian youths who experience the Israeli-Palestinian conflict firsthand (N = 1,207). Two alternative hypotheses were tested: that chronic exposure via the media increases support for war and aggression and elevates feeling of threat, or that chronic exposure via the media strengthens preexisting beliefs. Results demonstrated that higher levels of exposure were longitudinally related to stronger support for war. Regarding normative beliefs about aggression and threat to one’s nation, mediated exposure reinforced initial beliefs, rendering the youths more extreme in their attitudes. These results mostly support the conceptualization of the relation between media violence and behaviors as “reciprocally determined” or “reinforcing spirals.” The results are also discussed in light of the differences found between the effect of exposure to political violence firsthand and exposure via the media.     

Any Publicity or Good Publicity? A Competitive Test of Visibility- and Tonality-Based Media Effects on Voting Behavior

When examining media effects on voting intentions, scholars of political communication have either focused on visibility- or tonality-based effects. Our study compares these effect models, asking whether the explanations are complementary or competitive; it goes beyond previous studies by considering interactions between media cues and voters’ attitudes. We draw on panel survey data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) that is combined with content analysis data of the main evening news broadcast in Germany. Findings show that visibility- and tonality-based effects are similar in potency, but tone-based effects are more contingent on attitudes toward parties and candidates. Both types of cues can backfire: higher visibility and more positive tonality can have negative effects on some attitude groups, which is in part moderated by the expectations about government coalitions. We find that visibility and tonality are rather complementary cues that both influence voting behavior. Implications are discussed.     

Openings in the wall: transnational migrants,labor unions,and U.S. immigration policy

"This article seeks to enhance our understanding of why the United States resisted restrictionist [immigration] legislation in the late twentieth century during times when one may have expected a movement toward closure, as occurred in the 1920s.... The article will supplement a state-centric approach with insights from the perspective of complex interdependence--the significance of transnational relations and the blurring of foreign and domestic politics. I will argue that the societal groups that influence the formation of U.S. immigration policy contain a transnational component, which contributes to the maintenance of relatively open legislation.... More specifically, I will argue that the transnationalization of the labor market...blurs the boundaries between foreign and domestic constituents for unions, causing unions to resist those restrictionist immigration measures that impede organization of foreign-born workers. Hence, the pressures for restrictionism are weaker than anticipated by the conventional wisdom that expects labor to lobby for closure."     

A Review Of: “Outfoxed: Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism”

The growth and dispersion of America’s immigrant population exposes increasing numbers of non-Hispanic Whites to Spanish. Yet the political impacts of that exposure depend on whether Democrats and Republicans respond in similar ways. To address that question, this article first presents survey experiments showing that exposure to Spanish increases restrictive immigration attitudes only among Republicans. To confirm the external validity of that result, the article then presents an analysis of California’s Proposition 227 indicating that support for ending bilingual education was higher in heavily White, Republican block groups with Spanish-language ballots. No such pattern appears in Democratic block groups. Together, these findings demonstrate that Spanish is a politicized symbol, provoking different responses among Whites depending on their partisanship. To the extent that other immigration-related cues produce similar effects, the salience of immigration seems likely to reinforce existing partisan divisions rather than undermining them.     

"Us" and "them": European and North American attitudes to immigration

This work compares attitudes toward immigration in Europe and North America. Europe has adopted and reinforced a restrictive immigration policy since the 1970s, but family reunification and asylum for refugees have replaced labor migration to maintain the flow of newcomers over the past two decades. Illegal immigration has increased in countries such as Italy and Spain where immigration is a recent phenomenon. Migratory pressure from the former Soviet block, violence against immigrants in Germany and elsewhere, the crisis of social protection systems, economic recession and increasing unemployment have pressured European governments to reinforce their closed door policy. In the US, restrictions against immigration have relaxed greatly since adoption of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986. Over 800,000 immigrants have been admitted annually to the US in recent years. The factors explaining the different immigration policies in North America and Europe are not economic or demographic, but stem rather from history, social structure, the functioning of the labor market and social mobility. North America, more than Europe, has a positive view of immigration as contributing to the vitality and renewal of the culture and promoting development by broadening experience and knowledge. Immigration is regarded in Europe as, at best, a necessity in times of labor shortage and economic expansion. European countries tend to perceive themselves as totally formed and not requiring further cultural contribution. Homogeneity in culture, language, and religion is valued. Social mobility is possible in North America through professional success, but in the older and more hierarchical societies of Europe, social status is determined by birth and family or other connections. Since the early 1990s, public opinion toward immigration has become less favorable on both sides of the Atlantic, with increasing proportions favoring limitation. The positive perception of immigration in America and the work of pressure groups have thus far blocked restrictionist measures. In Europe, restrictive policies are in perfect harmony with public opinion.     

Religious Affiliation and Individual International-Policy Preferences in the United States

Empirical examination of individual-level survey data on national identity, in general, reveals a significant relationship between religious affiliation and an individual's international-policy preferences and that this relationship varies across Protestant denominations. Specifically, we test attitudes toward import and immigration policies, the role of international institutions, and unilateral policy actions. The empirical results indicate that individuals affiliated with conservative Protestant denominations are more likely to support positions on international issues that can be regarded as consistent with the anti-globalist right. We also find evidence of a reinforcing regional effect among conservatives in the south, and differences in the preferences of Baptist and non-Baptist African Americans.     

Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda

Different theories about the impact of aid make distinct predictions about citizens’ attitudes toward foreign aid in recipient countries. We investigate their preferences toward aid and government projects in order to examine these different theories. Are citizens indifferent between development projects funded by their own government versus those funded by foreign aid donors, as aid capture theory suggests? To address this, in an experiment on a large, representative sample of Ugandan citizens, we randomly assigned the names of funding groups for actual forthcoming development projects and invited citizens to express support attitudinally and behaviorally. We find that citizens are significantly more willing to show behavioral support in favor of foreign aid projects compared to government programs, especially if they already perceive the government as corrupt or clientelist or if they are not supporters of the ruling party. They also trust donors more, think they are more effective, and do not consistently oppose aid conditionality. This experimental evidence is consistent with a theory that we call donor control which sees donors asbeing able to target and condition aid so that it is not fungible with government revenues and thus to be able to better direct it to meet citizens’ needs.     

Further Tests of the Women and Peace Hypothesis: Evidence from Cross-National Survey Research in the Middle East

This research report replicates, extends, and adds a longitudinal dimension to a recently published analysis focusing on the relationship between sex and attitudes toward international conflict, and specifically on the hypothesis that women are more peace-oriented than men. The study being replicated utilized public opinion data from Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait. The present report extends the analysis, employing one additional data set from Israel, two additional data sets from Palestine, and new data sets from Jordan and Lebanon. In contrast to findings from studies conducted in the United States and Europe, none of the nine Middle Eastern data sets yields a statistically significant relationship between sex and attitudes toward international conflict. The article considers possible reasons for the difference between findings from the Middle East and those based on research in the West. Emphasizing the notion of salience, it hypothesizes that characteristics of the conflict about which attitudes are held may be more important than country or regional attributes in determining the applicability of the women and peace hypothesis.     

Guilt by association: The link between states�� influence and the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations

Unfavorable views toward a particular state will result in skepticism about the legitimacy of IGOs in which that state possesses influence. The more extensive the avenues of influence, the stronger this “guilt by association.” The rationale is two-fold. First, a state that possesses institutionalized influence (e.g., a veto) within an intergovernmental organization faces substantial difficulties in credibly committing to non-interference with organizational activities. Second, even if a state somehow could commit to abstention from overt interference, it may exert covert ideational influence if it already has embedded its values into an IGO. Elites and laypeople alike recognize the avenues of influence that fuel guilt-by-association. With statistical analyses of public opinion data from 35,397 people in 23 countries, I provide the first systematic evidence that guilt-by-association exists: for the United States, Russia, Japan, and Pakistan, vis-à-vis the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. The evidence is robust to numerous alternative specifications. The findings contribute to international relations scholarship by enhancing our understanding of threats to IGO legitimacy and by providing concrete evidence for a mechanism by which antipathy toward powerful states matters in the international realm.     

The Return of Prejudice in Europe's Regions: The Moderated Relationship between Group Threat and Economic Vulnerability

Using data from 16 countries and employing multilevel analysis that encompasses the national, regional, and individual levels, we find that both economic and social factors trigger anti-immigrant attitudes among Europeans. Regional per capita GDP is positively correlated with tolerant attitudes while the regional unemployment rate drives prejudice. We find a moderating relationship between immigrant population size and per capita GDP, which suggests that, as the size of the immigrant population increases, prejudice rises but only in poorer regions. In more affluent regions, an increase in the immigrant population corresponds to increased tolerance.     

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

To account for variance in great powers responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.     

Why the “Sacred” Is a Better Resource Than “Religion” for Understanding Terrorism

The popular media and many in academia often overstate the role that religion, and its supposedly unique qualities, has played in recent acts of terror. In this article, I argue that the notion of religious violence is unhelpful and that there is a more useful concept that we can utilize to draw out the values and ideas that play a role in the move to violence in both religious and secular groups. From a series of case studies on religious and non-religious groups, I have drawn out an alternative framework for investigating and learning from the role that beliefs play in motivations and justifications for terrorism. This framework uses the concept of non-negotiable (or “sacred”) beliefs. It is as applicable to secular as it is to religious groups, and can show us much more about how such beliefs can contribute to violence.