布林肯对华战略演讲主要观点分析

<正>5月26日,美国国务卿布林肯在拜登政府对华战略的首次全面演讲中,就美国涉华涉台政策进行了详细阐述。布林肯称美国仍然坚持将“与台湾关系法”置于美中三个联合公报之前的“我们的一个中国政策”;反对任何一方改变现状,不支持“台湾独立”,与台湾保持“强劲的非官方关系”。演讲既有对美国政府既往两岸政策的总结,也隐含了以反对改变台海现状为借口对中国统一大业的阻挠。     

中央领导谈台湾问题

4月13、14日,胡锦涛、江泽民、温家宝、曾庆红等党和国家领导人分别会见了美国副总统切尼,并重申了中国政府在台湾问题上的原则立场。 胡锦涛指出,“台独”势力的分裂活动是台海地区和平与稳定的最大威胁。在台湾问题上,中国政府坚持“和平统一、一国两制”的基本方针,致力于台湾问题的和平解决,但我们绝不会容忍“台湾独立”。我们希望美方恪守对中方的承诺,坚持一个中国政策,切实遵守中美三个联合公报,反对“台独”,反对台湾领导人任何旨在改变台湾现状的言行,不向台湾当局发出任何错误信     

两岸互动中的美国因素

中美《上海公报》签署 30年来 ,“中美台”三边关系互动的曲折历程留给人们许多有待深入反思的问题。作者认为 :第一 ,不能盲目夸大美国因素对两岸关系互动的影响力 ,两岸中国人的意志才是两岸关系互动的决定性力量 ;第二 ,“中美台”三边关系受到结构性因素的制约 ,美台关系必须服从于中美关系及两岸关系的利益要求 ;第三 ,中美对抗不符合两国根本利益 ,随着中美共同利益的深化 ,中美之间在台湾问题上的歧见将趋于淡化 ;第四 ,“反对台湾独立 ,反对武力解决” ,维持台海地区的和平稳定是当前美国对台政策的“底线” ;第五 ,美国的一个中国政策只会加强不会削弱 ,寻求两岸中国人共同的政治基础是台湾民众利益之归宿。     

美国鼓吹对台军售的实质

日前美国参议员科宁发出信函，以两岸战斗机数量不平衡鼓吹对台军售先进战机。与此同时，一向积极推动对台军售的美国在台商会会长韩儒伯也扬言现在是台湾向美国提案采购F16C／D先进战机的最佳时机。在两岸关系和平发展的时刻，美国军火商人与政客却在全力鼓噪对台出售先进战机，台湾也窃喜，积极争取。台美此举不符合两岸关系和平发展的形势，不仅无法确保所谓的“台湾防卫能力”与“台湾安全”，反而只会加剧两岸军事竞赛，破坏台海和平，最终拖垮台湾。     

美国台海危机管理：结构模式与现实困境

长期以来，美国在处理台海问题的实践中逐渐形成了以其国内法律为框架、模糊战略和“维持现状”策略的台海危机管理结构模式。冷战结束后。台湾岛内政治生态的演变特别是“台独”分裂活动，不仅对台海局势造成了重大的战略险情，也给美国长期坚持的“维持现状”政策带来了冲击，使美国的台海危机管理面临着越来越严重的战略困境。当前，两岸关系和平发展的态势正在不断形成，这对美国的两岸政策及其台海危机管理模式都将带来重大挑战。美国长期坚持“以台制华”的冷战思维无疑是严重制约其台海危机管理效能充分发挥的瓶颈所在。     

马英九上台后美国对台政策调整的背景分析

马英九上台执政后,美国对台政策的着力点由反对单方面改变台海现状转向正面评价台湾当局调整大陆政策和两岸关系的改善。美国的上述调整虽然有其现实的国家利益需求,但决策环境的变化也在对美国传统的对台思维和战略产生深刻的影响。未来四年,美国会继续发展美台关系,保持对台海局势的影响力,但随着两岸对话的不断深入,美国对台海局势的关注度可能会有所降低,台湾问题对中美关系的负面影响也可能趋于弱化。     

坚定维护共同基础 交流合作再添“津”彩——第九届津台投资合作洽谈会暨2016天津台湾名品博览会综述

正"我们对台大政方针不会因台湾政局的变化而发生变化,维护两岸关系和平发展共同政治基础的立场也没有改变。坚持‘九二共识’是保持两岸关系和平发展和台海和平稳定的共同政治基础,希望台湾方面多做有利于促进两岸同胞亲情、有利于促进两岸同胞福祉的事情。"7月6日,中共中央台办、国务院台办主任张志军在第九届天津台湾投资合作洽谈会开幕式后接受采访时做出上述表态。     

新时期的美国涉台关系及其制约因素

中美关系与两岸关系的大格局,决定了美国涉台关系的变化趋势.在政治上,美国乐见国民党连续执政和两岸关系的和平发展,但对于台湾被迫走向统一,存有疑虑,希望及时把握两岸和谈的具体进程.美方对台湾在“国防”、“外交”等领域予以多方面支持的目的,从短期看是同步强化美台关系,维护美国在台海地区的既有利益;从长期看则是增加台湾在两岸谈判中的筹码,谋取美国在台湾问题最终解决方案上的主动权.     

“和平”烟雾下的“台独”告白——简评陈水扁的“双十”讲话

10月10日,陈水扁发表所谓“双十讲话”,标榜“和平”“善意”,声称两岸“以九二香港会谈为基础”,“作为进步谈判的准备”,谋求“台海永久和平”。但“讲话”以“一边一国论”为基调,模糊、否定“九二共识”,恶毒攻击大陆,煽动两岸敌意,坚持军购,蓄意制造两岸对抗,实质是陈水扁当局加速“去中国化”,推行“台独”的告白,是对台海和平与稳定的又一次严重挑衅。在“双十讲话”中,陈水扁无处不在刻意宣扬“台湾主体性”与“台独认同”。他宣称“中华民国就是台湾,台湾就是中华民国”,“台湾是会能否复谈,关键在于台湾当局是否接受“一个中国”,…     

时讯快递

两岸上要闻美国就台海局势举行听证会 仍重申反对“台独” 美国国会授权成立的“美中经济暨安全检讨委员会”于2月6日举行有关台海军事的听证会,美国国防部主管亚太事务的副助理部长劳里斯和主管东亚事务的副助理国务卿薛瑞福出席并表示,“维护台湾海峡和平和稳定极为重要,美国支持加强台湾安全不等于赞同‘台独’”。     

两岸对“和平协议”的立场与前瞻

台海和平环境的建立,是两岸当局与人民自1949年内战之后一直的期待。两岸对和平远景的期待可以理解,但从理想走向实际却需要一段漫长而且曲折的过程。本文共分五个部分,包括前言、两岸创议“和平协议”的历史背景介绍、两岸终止敌对状态协议设计与推行、两岸对“和平协议”解读的相互冲突,以及两岸“和平协议”签署的展望,来解析两岸对此一问题的立场与要求,并整理出双方对此事件的不同解读,以及彼此尚无法“跨出门槛”的症结所在。     

台湾当局与尼克松政府关于中美大使级会谈的交涉

多年来,台湾当局始终反对中美大使级会谈。美国为了安抚台湾,每次大使级会谈后都向其通报内容。然而,尼克松当政时期,美方向台方的通报却隐瞒了最敏感的内容,即美方在＂台湾问题＂上的新表述和中美举行高级会谈的事宜。然由于美方的通报涉及与中方讨论＂台湾问题＂及签署支持＂和平共处五项原则＂的联合声明,台湾当局向美方提出了交涉与抗议。蒋介石本人也深受打击,不再信任尼克松。尽管尼克松勉力安抚蒋介石,不断重申美国将坚守对台承诺,但都不能减轻蒋的疑虑。台美关系也因此变得更为复杂而敏感。     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

The origins of conflict across the Taiwan Strait: The problem of differences in perceptions

In 1995 and 1996, the Taiwan Strait became an area of considerable tension. Relations between Beijing and Taipei deteriorated as a result of perceptions by leaders in the People's Republic of China that Taiwan was moving toward independence, especially after President Lee Teng‐hui made a widely publicized trip to the US in the summer of 1995. An assessment of the differences in perceptions by scholars, officials and the populations on the two sides, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, are instructive. The author looks at five areas where disparate views are noticeable and divisive: the history of Taiwan (especially its ties with the mainland), Taiwan's legal status, views of the ‘Taiwan issue’ espoused by Beijing and Taipei, current relations between Beijing and Taipei, and the stance of the international community and the nature and structure of international politics. Scenarios are presented regarding the future of the conflict.     

The politics of greater China's integration into the global Info Tech (IT) supply chain

The most notable feature of the public ‘dialogue of the deaf’ taking place across the Strait separating Taiwan and China is its zero‐sum logic. This logic of one‐upmanship in political and security matters dictates that whatever benefits Taipei is detrimental to Beijing and vice versa. Commercial interaction between Taiwan and China, particularly in the broadly defined sector of information technology (IT), is arguably the more powerful driver of cross‐Strait interaction today. Two characteristics of this accelerating dynamic of commercial interaction across the Taiwan Strait are paramount: (1) its tight integration into a global IT supply chain; and (2) the extent of symbiosis by which all participants in this global supply chain depend on the worldwide vitality of this economic ecosystem. In interpreting what cross‐Strait economic integration in IT portends, political logic may be leading Taipei and Beijing along opposite paths to the same end‐point: the presumption that economic integration is undermining, and destabilizing, the cross‐Strait economic and political status quo. As a dominant player in global IT, the US has its own stake in a clear understanding of this globalization dynamic and in astutely maintaining its interests as the global IT supply chain continues to extend across the political fault‐line of the Taiwan Strait. Non‐partisan analysis of the logic of globalization suggests a different outcome for the cross‐Strait commercial dynamic than either Taipei or Beijing has publicly credited: its potential to mutually enhance economic prosperity and contribute long‐term to stabilizing cross‐Strait political interaction.     

两岸关系和平发展新课题浅析

在领土主权意义上,“两岸一中”是现存状态,不需要追求,但需要维护。两岸关系和平发展的内涵包括两个方面：如何正式结束两个政权之间的敌对状态,达成有序分配内政和外交空间安排的共识;如何解决与两岸人民生活密切相关的经济、社会和文化发展的问题。“领土主权一体,政府差序并存;存量原则不变,增量拓展共商”的原则可以成为两岸关系和平发展的框架。两岸关系和平发展的重点是解决经济、社会和文化发展的问题。双方可以在合作的基础上提出两岸关系和平发展的共同沦述。     

台湾当局亚太经济战略的演变、动因及影响——基于“一个中国”框架视阈的分析

自上世纪90年代以来,台湾当局的亚太经济战略均以减缓两岸经贸关系发展、挑战＂一个中国＂框架为主轴。马英九上台后,以＂黄金十年＂愿景为蓝图,在＂壮大台湾、连接亚太、布局全球＂的总战略下＂通过大陆走向世界＂,以＂战略平衡＂、＂同步多轨＂、＂官民结合＂等方式推动对外签订双边经济合作协议（ECA）及加入TPP、RCEP等多边经济合作机制。这一战略虽给大陆维护＂一个中国＂框架带来新课题,但总体上保持两岸政经良性互动,稳住两岸关系和平发展大局,并对未来两岸关系发展产生深远影响。     

US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.