A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems

Abstract. With the recent acceleration of the integration process of the European Union there has been a rise in political parties expressing either scepticism or outright criticism of the nature of the integration process. Using a four–fold differentiation between single issue, protest, established parties and factions within parties, the first part of the article presents an overview of Euroscepticism within EU member states and Norway. This reveals the diversity of sources of Euroscepticism both in ideology and in the types of parties that are Eurosceptical but with a preponderance of protest parties taking Eurosceptical positions. The second part of the article is an attempt to map Euroscepticism in West European party systems through a consideration of ideology and party position in the party system. The conclusions are that Euroscepticism is mainly limited to parties on the periphery of their party system and is often there used as an issue that differentiates those parties from the more established parties which are only likely to express Euroscepticism through factions. Party based Euroscepticism is therefore both largely dependent on domestic contextual factors and a useful issue to map emergent domestic political constellations.     

How Europe Shapes the Nature of the Belgian Federation: Differentiated EU Impact Triggers Both Co-operation and Decentralization

This paper disentangles the impact of various dimensions of European integration on different aspects of the Belgian federal polity. We discern two opposite trends. While the institutional embeddedness of Belgium as an EU member state results in domestic centralizing tendencies and co-operative political practices, economic integration stimulates political pressures for regional autonomy, contributing to further divergence and hollowing out of the federal level. We conclude by arguing that the EU clearly affects territorial politics in Belgium, but, as the European causes are multidimensional, that also the effects, albeit substantial, will be diverse.     

The EU Fundamental Rights Policy as a Source of Euroscepticism

This article analyzes how the development of the European Union (EU) fundamental rights policy feeds Euroscepticism—and notably political Euroscepticism—within segments of national political elites in EU Member States. More specifically, it argues that this relatively new policy also gives rise to a new form of political Euroscepticism, which has been defined as “value-based Euroscepticism,” e.g., the perception that the EU via its fundamental rights policy, unduly interferes in matters where value systems and core domestic preferences on ethical issues are at stake. This happens in a context where the EU is resented, by some segments of political elites, for allegedly empowering diverse groups (such as ethnic minorities, immigrants' associations, judges, and so on) at the expense of popular sovereignty. This resentment is exacerbated by the fact that national governments are increasingly submitted to the critical assessment of EU-level actors (e.g., the European Parliament or the European Commission) in terms of democratic credentials.     

How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.     

The European Union Blowback? Euroscepticism and its Consequences in the Western Balkans

While there exists a large body of literature investigating the European Union’s intervention in the western Balkans, and in particular the influence of so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’, rarely is the western Balkans’ own fatigue towards the EU given serious consideration. This paper examines domestic views about Europe, arguing that aspiring new EU member states have been experiencing various forms of Euroscepticism due to a number of socio-economic, cultural and political factors. The growth of Euroscepticism has helped Russia to play a more assertive and influential role in the region. However, as this paper argues, Euroscepticism is not a rejection of the European perspective and the search for alternatives, but rather a critique of the actual methods, timing and impact of the integration process.     

Undermining,defusing or defending European integration? Assessing public communication of European executives in times of EU politicisation

How do mainstream political executives cue their politicised constituencies on European integration? Moving beyond static expectations that EU politicisation induces executives to either undermine, defuse or defend integration, this article theorises executives’ incentives under different configurations of public and partisan Euroscepticism in their home countries. Expectations are tested on the sentiment and complexity that executives attach to European integration in almost 9,000 public speeches delivered throughout the Euro Crisis. It is found that national leaders faced with sceptical public opinion and low levels of partisan Euroscepticism rhetorically undermine integration, whereas European Commissioners faced with similar conditions are prone to defend it. These responses intensify disproportionally with growing public Euroscepticism, but are moderated by Eurosceptic party strength in surprising ways. When such challenger parties come closer to absorbing the Eurosceptic potential in public opinion, executive communication turns more positive again but also involves less clear rhetorical signals. These findings move beyond existing uniform expectations on mainstream responses to Eurosceptic challenges and highlight the relevance of different domestic configurations of EU politicisation.     

United against a common foe? The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens

In Western European democracies opposition to the European Union is commonly found at the ideological extremes. Yet, the Euroscepticism of radical left-wing and radical right-wing parties has been shown to have distinct roots and manifestations. The article investigates whether these differences are mirrored at the citizen level. Using data from the European Election Study (2009/2014) and the European Social Survey (2008/2012) in 15 West European countries, it is found that left-wing and right-wing citizens not only differ in the object of their Euroscepticism, but also in their motivations for being sceptical of the EU. Left-wing Eurosceptics are dissatisfied with the current functioning of the EU, but do not oppose further European integration per se, while right-wing Eurosceptics categorically reject European integration. Euroscepticism among left-wing citizens is motivated by economic and cultural concerns, whereas for right-wing citizens Euroscepticism is solely anchored in cultural attitudes. These results refine the common ‘horseshoe’ understanding of ideology and Euroscepticism.     

Religion and Euroscepticism: Direct,Indirect or No Effects?

Taking as starting points the (growing) political significance of religion and increasing scepticism towards European integration, this study sets out to investigate the impact of religious divides and religiosity on attitudes towards the EU, both on the micro and on the macro level. In addition to considering direct effects, it focuses on the mediated nature of relationships between religion and Euroscepticism through immigration attitudes and authoritarian value orientations. Drawing on data from the 2006 European Social Survey the authors find that individuals' religious attachments have only indirect relevance for explaining Euroscepticism when controlling for immigration attitudes and value orientations. Religious context, however, does contribute to explanatory models of Euroscepticism, with citizens of Protestant countries being more Eurosceptic than those in religiously mixed or in Catholic countries. The authors furthermore show that both authoritarianism and anti-immigration attitudes are to some degree influenced by individuals' denomination and level of religiosity and in turn predict Euroscepticism. Yet, even indirect effects of religion on Euroscepticism are small or appear to cancel each other out. The article concludes that religion on the micro level is largely irrelevant for explaining Euroscepticism, whereas it is an important macro-level explanatory variable.     

The Europeanisation of conflict: Reflections from a social movement perspective

If Europe is becoming a polity, then regular patterns of social and political conflict ‐ both institutional and non‐institutional ‐ will emerge between citizen groups and decision‐making authorities. Although we are beginning to have a substantial body of research on institutionalised interest group interaction at the European level, we know much less about non‐institutionalised forms of contentious collective action that have European policies as their targets. Using social movement theory, several varieties of such collective action can be identified. Based on the theory of political opportunity structure, it is shown why one of these forms ‐ actions intended to bring national states’ power to bear against European policies — appears to have a rich and turbulent future.     

The rise of post-imperial populism: The case of right-wing Euroscepticism in Britain

Abstract.  Recent approaches to contemporary Euroscepticism have explained it in terms of the politics of opposition and peripherality characteristic of competitive party systems. Euroscepticism becomes a central strategy by which non-mainstream parties or factions within mainstream parties attempt to gain political advantage. In the British case, there has been a focus on the influence Eurosceptic factionalism can have within a first-past-the-post parliamentary system. This article challenges explanations of British Euroscepticism in terms of the politics of opposition and the workings of the party system. Instead, it is proposed that a structural crisis of British party politics has allowed Euroscepticism to enter the political mainstream. The author conceives of Euroscepticism as a distinct and powerful national movement asserting conceptions of Britain's exceptional national identity. This is viewed as part of a post-imperial crisis that shifts parties, and factions within parties, towards populist forms of legitimation that have weakened possibilities for stable and coherent political leadership over European integration. Consequently, mainstream parties have struggled to protect themselves against the ideological influence of this populist Euroscepticism. This is particularly evident during periods of Eurosceptic mobilization, and is demonstrated in this article through the examination of the extensive role played by right-wing Eurosceptic forces during the attempt by the Major Government to ratify the Maastricht Treaty.     

The Europeanization of National Administrations: A Comparative Study of France and the Netherlands

Studies of the impact of European integration on the national administrations of the member states of the European Union (EU) have pointed towards an uneven process of "Europeanization." While there has unquestionably been a growing range and frequency of contacts between national administrations and the EU system, there is little evidence of an expected convergence towards a common institutional model. This uneven Europeanization is presently explained with reference to a neo-institutionalist framework, drawing primarily on the work of March and Olsen. It is argued that the politico-administrative systems of the member states differentially adapt to the pressures of European integration in a manner which reflects the preexisting balance of domestic institutionnal structures, as well as th broader matrices of values which define the nature of appropriate political forms in the case of each national polity. Distinctive national patterns of institutional adjustment, rather than appearing anomalous, emerge as corresponding to a basic logic of differentiation indissociable from the integration process itself. The general argument is illustrated by an extended comparative study of France and the Netherlands, examining both the making and the implementation of European policy in the two countries.     

The Contingent Diffusion of Parliamentary Oversight Institutions in the European Union

What explains the variation in institutional adaptation of national parliaments to European integration? Whereas the existing literature has mainly focused on domestic conditions, this article explains institutional adaptation to integration by focusing on inter‐parliamentary diffusion. The argument draws on ‘learning’ mechanisms of diffusion on the demand side and on ‘emulation’ mechanisms on the supply side. Parliamentary demand for external inspiration is related to uncertainty about functional oversight institutions, and the selection of sources to perceptions of similarity and success. Demand arises in new European Union member parliaments and young democracies that then turn towards culturally alike countries and old democracies. Using spatial econometrics, support is demonstrated for the argument in the article while ruling out alternative diffusion mechanisms such as spatial proximity and learning from Scandinavian frontrunners once links along cultural similarity and democratic experience are controlled for. The results underline the limits of the ‘isolated polity’ approach in the comparative study of institutions in Europe's closely integrated political system, while also showing that, even in this favourable environment, diffusion pathways are contingent on the mechanisms generating demand among policy makers and shaping their selection of sources for external information.     

Right-wing Euroscepticism and populism: investigating the concept of ‘the people’

ABSTRACT

Right-wing Eurosceptic political groups gained ground in the elections for the European Parliament in May 2014. The electoral victory of right-wing Euroscepticism was accompanied by a concern that populism is (once again) spreading in Europe. Associating right-wing Eurosceptics with populism raises the question of whether critiques of populism can be directly extended to right-wing Euroscepticism. By reconstructing the right-wing Eurosceptic concept of ‘the people,’ this article demonstrates that the Eurosceptic concept of the people has a dual meaning that encompasses both a transnational and a national concept of the people. The article concludes that while Euroscepticism shares ideological features with populism, it is problematic, due to the internal structure of the promoted concept of the people and the European political environment, directly to extend recent critiques of populism to right-wing Euroscepticism.     

How political parties frame European integration

This article analyses how political parties frame European integration, and gauges the consistency of their argumentation. Over the course of investigation, one can see how actors' positions are justified, and how the European Union is perceived (i.e., what forces give rise to Euroscepticism and Europeanism). It is argued here that the parties' framing of issues depends on the interests they traditionally defend at the national level, their general positions on European integration, and whether or not they belong to the established political actors in their respective countries. The coding approach enables the relation of frames to actors and positions, moving beyond the techniques employed by existing studies that analyse the media presentation of European integration. Sophisticated frame categorisations are provided to capture the complex structure of argumentation, going beyond a simple dichotomy of economic and cultural frames. Relying on a large and original media dataset covering the period 2004–2006, six Western European countries are investigated.     

The EU's fledgling society: From deafening silence to critical voice in European constitution-making

Abstract

The European Union is presently at a major crossroads. The Laeken process which launched the EU onto an explicit constitution-making process, has ground to a halt after the negative referendum results in France and the Netherlands. The European Council at its June 16–17, 2005 meeting decided to postpone the ratification process (by then 10 states had ratified and 2 had rejected) and instead issue a period of reflection. These events represent a significant re-politicization of the European integration process. From a research perspective they underline the need to study the dynamic interrelation between the emerging European polity and its social constituency. In this article we present a research framework for analysing EU-constitutionalization in terms of polity building and social constituency building. In empirical terms, this implies looking at the structured processes of intermediation that link institutional performance back to popular concerns and expectations. Going beyond the contentious politics approach we propose that the character of the emerging EU social constituency and its pervading effects on the EU-constitution-making process should be understood not only in terms of public voice (i.e., as ‘organized civil society’) but also in terms of public silence.     

It takes two: how Eurosceptic public opinion and party divisions influence party positions

Do parties respond to voters’ preferences on European integration in elections to the European Parliament (EP)? Following recent research that shows political party responsiveness to Eurosceptic attitudes during EP elections is conditioned by party characteristics, this article seeks to understand how party unity on European integration affects party responsiveness to Euroscepticism. It argues that when Eurosceptic attitudes among voters are high and the parties are divided in their position on European integration, parties will be more responsive to voters and take a more Eurosceptic position. To test the theoretical expectations, the study uses data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the Euromanifestos Project, and European Election Study for 1989–2009 for over 120 parties across 20 European Union member states. The findings have important implications for understanding the nature of democratic representation in the European Union.     

Media relations in the Council of the European Union: insights into the Council press officers' professional practices

Government communication plays a key role in democratic societies as it helps public understanding of government policies and raises awareness of the roles and actions of decision makers. Within the European Union (EU) polity, communication plays a crucial role for citizens' support for the European integration process. Despite the increasing relevance of communication about major activities of the EU, studies on the EU institutions' communications are scarce, and very little is currently known about the external communication of the Council of the EU. Focusing on the media relations activities of the Council, this paper investigates the communication practices and roles of press officers working in the Council's General Secretariat as perceived by these government communicators themselves. Qualitative interviews with the press officers, analysis of Council documents, participation in their work processes and observations of their professional behaviour were used to establish the empirical basis of the study. The findings highlight the apolitical and reactive nature of these European civil servants' communication activities and identify some of the institutional and political challenges that they face in the performance of their professional duties. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Religion and Euroscepticism: Cleavages,Religious Parties and Churches in EU Member States

Taking into account the attempts to render the European integration process a new cultural and value-based quality on the one hand, and the prevalence of sceptical positions on the other, the role of religion as a factor shaping the process of European integration and its accompanying features such as Euroscepticism deserves special attention. It may be argued that the entire EU is a project inaugurated and pushed along primarily by Christian Democratic forces and inspirations. However, the EU is currently characterised by an advanced state of secularisation in most of its member states and high levels of religious and cultural pluralisation. This article raises the question to what extent religious, in particular Christian, actors such as religious parties and the churches have strayed from this integrationist past and contributed to Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the second question is whether a confessional pattern of Euroscepticism can be identified. The paper addresses these questions by empirically and comparatively analysing the positions and influence of religious actors on Euroscepticism in a selected group of EU member states.     

Institutional Design and the Use of Direct Democracy: Evidence from the German Länder

Despite growing interest in direct democratic institutions, the empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional design and the actual use of popular rights remains rather sparse. The authors use a novel data set on institutional openness and test its link to the number of popular initiatives in the German Länder for the period of 1997–2005. Their empirical analysis reveals a strong and robust negative effect of higher institutional requirements on the number of popular initiatives in the 16 German Länder; whereas other factors appear to be of minor importance. They thus come to the conclusion that the comparatively high institutional hurdles in the Länder impose costs of initiation, thereby limiting the number of popular initiatives.     

Social movements and the changing structure of political opportunity in the European union 1

To the extent that European integration results in the decline in the importance of the nation‐state as the exclusive seat of formal political power, we can expect attendant changes in those forms of interest aggregation and articulation historically linked to the state. This article suggests that a polity characterised by multi‐level governance is emerging in Europe and that this poses a set of new constraints and opportunities for groups that wish to influence political decisions. We argue that group strategy in response to this is a function of: (1) the structure of political opportunities facing a group in the EU; and (2) inherited institutions and ideologies that constrain the capacity of a group to exploit those opportunities. We use this framework to analyse the effect of European integration on four groups: the labour movement, regional movements, the environmental movement and the anti‐nuclear movement.