Explaining Reforms of Parliamentary Minority Rights: A Theoretical Framework with Case Study Application

How can we explain institutional reforms that redistribute institutional power between the parliamentary majority and minority? This paper proposes an informal theoretical model to explain such reforms in European parliaments based on congressional literature and inductive explanations from case studies. The article argues that political parties as the relevant actors pursue institutional reforms based on their substantive goals, their current and expected future government status, transaction and audience costs of reforms, second-order institutions that regulate the relative influence of actors in changing parliamentary rules, and the institutional status quo. Hypotheses derived from this model are tested with a qualitative case study of all standing order reforms in the Austrian parliament from 1945 to 2014. The empirical analysis finds support for various hypotheses and their underlying causal mechanisms. As Austria constitutes a least-likely case, the evidence provides strong support for the theoretical model.     

Uneven institutional configurations and sectoral variation in China's socialist market economy: a comparative study of three pillar industries

By comparing three Chinese pillar industries, automobile, petroleum, and machinery, this paper analyzes how the development of uneven institutional configurations bred sectoral variation in transitional China. In 1994, at the dawn of the Chinese socialist market economy, the State Council issued guidelines for national industrial policy and proposed the enactment of similar growth-promoting policies for all pillar industries. The level of policy enactment and the resulting outcomes, however, vary significantly across the industries. Previous literature on China's rapid industrialization has sought to build a single model encompassing China as a whole, and has emphasized either the state's institutional capacity or China's unique governance mechanisms. This study investigates China's industrialization by taking account of the uneven development of institutional capacity amid macro institutional reforms. Every idea and institution evolved at a different pace in these reforms, and the incremental nature of the reforms further deepened the gaps between sectors. This paper argues that, due to this uneven development, the Chinese state was not strong enough to be considered a developmental state until at least the early 2000s.     

From central planning to market systems: Implications of economic reforms for the construction and building industries

Abstract

Housing market reforms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are having enormous impacts on the construction and building materials industries. This article describes the current structure and performance of the construction industry in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, identifies key technical and institutional problems posed by housing reforms, and outlines an agenda of research and technical assistance to help construction and building materials industries in transition economies cope with the impacts of housing market reforms.     

Income inequality and economic freedom in the U.S. states

This paper examines the impact of economic freedom on income inequality using cross-sectional data for U.S. states. While previous research has explored this relationship internationally, the results have been conflicting. In addition, while it seems obvious that the large institutional differences across countries will impact income inequality, it isn’t so obvious that the smaller variation in policies among U.S. states can have a measurable impact. Can improvements in income inequality be used as a justification for marginal pro-market policy reforms at the state level, or is this argument applicable only to national-level institutional reforms?     

‘Going institutional’ to overcome obstruction: Explaining the suppression of minority rights in Western European parliaments, 1945−2010

When and why do parliamentary majorities in Europe suppress parliamentary minority rights? This article argues that such reforms are driven by substantive policy conflict in interaction with existing minority rights. Government parties curb minority rights if they fear minority obstruction due to increased policy conflict and a minority-friendly institutional status quo. Empirical support is found for this claim using comparative data on all reforms in 13 Western European parliaments since 1945. A curbing of minority rights is significantly more likely under conditions of heightened policy conflict and these effects are stronger the more the institutional status quo favours opposition parties. Contrary to frequent claims of consensual rule changes from single-country studies in Europe, these findings demonstrate the importance of competitive strategies in explaining institutional reform in European parliaments. The conditional impact of the status quo provides interesting theoretical links to historical institutionalist arguments on path dependence.     

Federalism and Decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Five Patterns of Evolution

Abstract

The 1990s were marked by democratic reforms throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. This went in tandem with decentralization reforms which either created or strengthened subnational levels of government. More than twenty years later it seems everywhere to the south of the Sahara there is a gap between the institutional/constitutional blueprints introducing the reforms and the facts on the ground. Understanding and explaining this gap in the workings of federalism and decentralization is important to both theorists and practitioners. This article proposes five benchmarks in order to map out the evolutionary patterns of the last two decades: a) symmetrical recentralization; b) differentiated performance; c) legitimizing traditional authority structures and indigenous conflict resolution; d) politicization of local conflicts over land, water, and other natural resources; and e) federal extinction.     

Delegation of Clinical Authority,Administrative Culture and Policy Adoption: A Comparative Analysis

Numerous countries have adopted reforms that allow medical personnel other than physicians to engage in tasks that traditionally were exclusively performed by physicians. This policy is controversial because it challenges the medical profession’s traditional boundaries. This study is an exercise in comparative policy research based on the experience of 18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. It evaluates the contribution of different structural factors – socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional – to policy adoption. Based on both quantitative analysis and an examination of how delegation unfolded in Israel, the role of administrative culture is highlighted: a category that combines cultural legacies and institutional properties in explaining policy adoption. It is argued that because, in entrepreneurial administrative cultures, administrators are more likely to possess a managerial mindset than in Rechtsstaat cultures, and also have more institutional leeway for action, delegation is more likely to be adopted in the former.     

Patrons against clients: Electoral uncertainty and bureaucratic tenure in politicized states

Why would incumbents undertake institutional reforms that constrain their discretion over state resources? Many studies point to electoral competition in response. They argue that incumbents who risk exit from office undertake reform to insure themselves against potentially hostile successors. This paper challenges this line of reasoning, arguing that it confounds two potential implications of electoral competition – potential and certain electoral losses – which yield contrary reform incentives. Certain exits from office may well incentivize reforms as insurance. Where elections are contested, however, incumbents face incentives to resist reforms that constrain discretion over state resources that provide incumbents with electoral advantage. This argument is developed and assessed with an institutional reform the literature has so far neglected: job stability protections (tenure) in politicized bureaucracies. A case analysis of the Dominican Republic and suggestive cross‐country data confirm theoretical predictions: electoral uncertainty dis‐incentivizes tenure reform. Electoral competition may thus be a double‐edged sword for institutional reform.     

Explaining the Reform of Banking Supervision in Europe: An Integrative Approach

National frameworks for banking and, more generally, financial supervision in various European countries have undergone significant changes in the last decade or so. What explains these supervisory reforms? This work addresses this question by examining the recent reforms in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, engaging in a structured, focused comparison, mainly using process tracing and adopting an analytical framework articulated across three levels of analysis. It is argued that while international and EU factors acted as antecedent variables, establishing the background for the reforms, they were mediated by national factors—to be precise, by two independent variables—that account for distinctive modes and outcomes of reforms. In addition, the institutional strength of the central bank—the intervening variable—can make a difference to the process of reform by either inhibiting or catalyzing change.     

Municipal debt in Switzerland: new empirical results

Switzerland has experienced extensive institutional reforms at the local level that could influence local debt. These reforms have included municipal mergers, greater inter-communal cooperation, reformed political decision-making mechanisms, and the introduction of new public management measures. Many of these reforms originated at the cantonal level. However, the institutional diversity among Swiss municipalities hardly has diminished. A cross-sectional analysis for the 137 largest Swiss cities and villages in 2004 shows that direct democratic rights and a high degree of fiscal autonomy lead to a lower level of local debt. There is no statistical support for the hypothesis that reforms following the new public management guidelines had an effect on debt levels.     

Similar Ends, Differing Means: Contractualism and Civil Service Reform in Denmark and New Zealand

State sector reform was an integral component of the radical economic and social policy changes enacted by New Zealand governments between 1984 and 1991. This reform replaced the traditional tenured public service with a contractual regime. Through a comparison with Denmark, it is shown that New Zealand's reforms were not unique. Similar reforms were enacted in Denmark. But contrary to what occurred in New Zealand, the Danish reforms had already begun in the 1960s, and have since been gradually expanded. The parallel contractual regimes introduced in the two countries are accounted for by an increasing demand among politicians to secure a civil service that is responsive to political executive demands. However, because of institutional differences and diverging regulatory regimes, the strategic approaches in the two countries have been different. Whereas the New Zealand approach was dominated by an appeal to a coherent and sophisticated body of theoretical knowledge, combined with strict formalization, the Danish strategy has been based on political bargaining with the civil service unions. In both cases the reforms rest on critical assumptions regarding their positive and negative implications.     

What Drives Reforms in International Organizations? External Pressure and Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs in the UN Response to AIDS

This article explores organizational dynamics that go with the design and implementation of public administration reforms within the United Nations (UN) system. It focuses on management reforms carried out in the UNAIDS Programme, which brings together 10 UN agencies to combat the worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic. The article suggests that understanding these reforms requires questioning the exposure of UN administrations to pressures emanating from their environment and at the same time, investigating the intentions of bureaucratic entrepreneurs who promote and drive reforms within the UN system. The empirical development demonstrates that the swift incorporation of the external pressure into a reform process in the mid‐2000s cannot be dissociated from the active support of some UN agencies who have had a common interest in shifting institutional arrangements inside UNAIDS to expand their bureaucratic authority. In conclusion, the article suggests analyzing reforms within international administrations as social processes driven by both coercion and opportunities.     

The Dynamics of Domestic Coordination of EU Policy in the New Member States: Impossible to Lock In?

This paper examines the evolution of coordination structures for EU policy-making in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The study maps the main features of the established EU coordination machineries, and traces the most important reforms of their organisational structures. It proposes an actor-centred, ‘politics of institutional choice’ approach to explain the rapid and far-reaching changes in EU coordination structures in all the new member states. By contrast, two alternative frameworks focusing on efficiency and historical-institutional arguments emphasising the impact of early institutional lock-in fail to explain the specific institutional forms adopted and the considerable degree of institutional dynamics.     

Defending the organisation,not the members: Unions and the reform of job security legislation in Western Europe

European labour markets are often described as rigid with comparatively high levels of job protection that do not allow for the flexible adjustment of employment to economic fluctuations. This interpretation overlooks important sources of flexibility, however. Research has shown that recent labour market policy reforms have allowed for the creation of two‐tier labour markets consisting of insiders in standard employment relationships and outsiders in non‐standard employment. This outcome has typically been explained by pointing to the representational interests of unions or social‐democratic parties. It has been argued that rather than protecting all labour market participants, unions and social‐democratic parties focus on the interests of their members and their core constituency, respectively, most of whom are in standard employment relationships. In contrast, it is argued here that unions' institutional power resources are the crucial variable explaining this outcome. In difficult economic times, when unions are asked to make concessions, they will assent to labour market reforms, but only to those that do not fundamentally threaten to undermine their organisational interests. In the context of job security legislation, this means that unions defend the protection of permanent contracts while they compromise on the regulation of temporary employment. This ‘second best solution’ allows them to protect their organisational interests, both by retaining their institutional role in the administration of dismissals and by living up to their institutional role as one of the organisations responsible for the direction of labour market policy reform. Using fsQCA this article shows that unions' institutional power resources are more apt to explain the observed two‐tier reform pattern than the unions' or the social‐democratic parties' representational interests.     

Political Competition and Policy Adoption: Market Reforms in Latin American Public Utilities

This article shows that political competition generates incentives that affect the pace of adoption of market reforms in the context of policy convergence. Previous work shows the effect of financial and technological pressures in promoting policy convergence and the impact of institutional constraints on shaping the pace of policymaking. Controlling for these effects, this article demonstrates the policy effects of political competition and ideological polarization even at a time when ideological policy differences seem to be fading due to policy convergence. This article studies policy adoption using duration analysis for the 18 countries of Latin America during the 1985–2000 period when most of the market reforms in public utilities were adopted.     

Overestimating the Shift from Government to Governance: Evidence from Swiss Metropolitan Areas

There is an oft‐stated claim in political science research that public sector reforms in Western democracies are consistent with a shift from government to governance. This article challenges that claim. Based on a comparative analysis of governance reforms in Swiss metropolitan areas, the article reveals that what seems to be a shift to governance may turn out to be a path to government, however, including a change either from the local to the metropolitan level or from general‐purpose authorities to task‐specific jurisdictions. Further, the article analyzes the political dynamics behind governance reforms. It shows that exogenous pressures put existing governance schemes under strain. Its impact, however, is mediated by the initial institutional setting and the narratives responding to case‐specific political dilemmas.     

Three Decades of Policy Layering and Politically Sustainable Reform in the European Union's Agricultural Policy

The study of policy reform has tended to focus on single‐stage reforms taking place over a relatively short period. Recent research has drawn attention to gradual policy changes unfolding over extended periods. One strategy of gradual change is layering, in which new policy dimensions are introduced by adding new policy instruments or by redesigning existing ones to address new concerns. The limited research on single‐stage policy reforms highlights that these may not endure in the postenactment phase when circumstances change. We argue that gradual policy layering may create sustainability dynamics that can result in lasting reform trajectories. The European Union's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has changed substantially over the last three decades in response to emerging policy concerns by adding new layers. This succession of reforms proved durable and resilient to reversal in the lead‐up to the 2013 CAP reform when institutional and political circumstances changed.     

Cleaning up and invigorating the civil service

Reliable quantitative estimates are not available of: (1) the quality of civil service performance and changes therein as the result of development projects, or (2) the importance of civil service performance for various development outcomes. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence indicates that in some countries government performance has indeed collapsed, with calamitous effects on development. Although poor government performance is theoretically overdetermined—there are many possible causes, which we cannot disentangle in practice—a plausible story can be told based on institutional economics, using such concepts as information, incentives, and credible commitment. This version of both problems and solutions is supported by examples of successful reforms. The article argues that “institutional adjustment’ deserves more consideration as a basis for reforms. Two practical examples are discussed in some detail: improving incentives in the public sector and strategies to combat corruption. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Das parteipolitische Paradox des Finanzmarktkapitalismus. Aktionärsorientierte Reformen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und den USA

Addressing the debate over the political dynamics of different varieties of capitalism, this article tests the partisan hypothesis in the field of corporate governance. The state of research on distributional consequences of shareholder oriented corporate governance and on institutional complementarity between corporate governance and labor relations suggests that the center-left should oppose shareholder oriented reforms. In fact, our comparison of reforms during the last 15 years reveals the contrary. In Germany, France, Italy and the US, the center-left turned out the be the driving force behind the reforms, while the center-right parties tended to protect organized capitalism, state capitalism, family capitalism, and managerialism. The comparison allows specification of the impulses that made the center-left push for reforms while making the center-right protect traditional institutional arrangements. We present a conflict model that, beside class conflicts and insider/outsider-conflicts, includes conflicts over managerial control. The recent economic reforms cannot be understood without consideration of the significance of this conflict line.     

Defensive versus Offensive Approaches to Administrative Reform in France (1988–1997): The Leadership Dilemmas of French Prime Ministers

From 1988 to 1997, all French prime ministers launched administrative reform programs with numerous concerns for increasing efficiency, strengthening responsiveness, or redesigning political and administrative roles within the state. However, these initiatives have never led to radical and disruptive changes. The institutional legacy seems to have strongly constrained the politics of administration. What, then, is the meaning of launching administrative reforms within the French political power configuration, and how does it “fit” with the way leaders try to establish their political authority? This article provides two empirical studies of different prime ministers (Michel Rocard under the Mitterrand presidency and Alain Jupp under the Chirac presidency) that can explain the nature of the French governments' commitments to these issues. It argues that understanding administrative reforms requires a mixture of institutional and actor‐centered explanations, because these policies are really leadership challenges to the preexisting institutional order. As such, they are reflexively shaped or constrained by what they try to control and define. This paper shows that for a French prime minister to define the administration as a problem while building his own leadership can jeopardize the resources he will get from that same bureaucratic administrative system. This “power‐reform dilemma” may explain why administrative reforms have proven more politically effective as an instrument of order‐affirming impulses rather than as a disruptive strategy.