Right-financing the future. Lessons for Asian and European peace processes

This paper outlines measures to strengthen the sustainment of peace processes through the ‘valued’ utilization of external financial assistance, in line with the proposed ‘right-financing’ framework (see Middlebrook, P (2006), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-financing). While the right-financing concept has relevance across the entire public and private investment spectrum, its application to the peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction agenda is equally relevant given concerns regarding rising costs; US$5.03 billion in 2006 alone, and more than US$36 billion since 1948. When additional costs for peace enforcement and post conflict reconstruction exercises are factored in, to be measured in untold billions of US dollars (Middlebrook and Miller, Lessons in post conflict reconstruction from the new Afghanistan compact, 2006), the cost represents an increasingly heavy drain on the tax payers whose demands for increased services at home may 1 day see the ‘end of aid’ as the world currently knows it, unless its effectiveness is substantially increased. In so doing, this paper proposes corrective measures to strengthen financing arrangements to enhance the effectiveness and efficient utilization of scarce international resources.

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Indonesia and Southeast Asian territorial peace processes

This article offers an Indonesian perspective to the analysis of peace processes. The Indonesian experiences from territorial peace processes in the South China Sea, Mindanao and Aceh can offer ideas and inspiration. But if there is an overarching conclusion that may be derived from the experience of Indonesia, it is that there are no hard and fast rules. The approaches will have to depend on the general situation, the disposition and perceptions of the parties in conflict, the external environment of that conflict, and the capabilities and credibility of the entity carrying out the preventive diplomacy initiative. Ambassador Sastrohandoyo Wiryono, Indonesian Governor in the ASEF Board and formerly Indonesia’s Chief Negotiator in Aceh Peace Talks (2002–2003), and mediator of conflicts in Mindanao.

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Negotiated peace versus victor's peace: the geopolitics of peace and conflict in Sri Lanka

In examining the failure of the 2002 peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), this essay argues for the need to go beyond the power dynamics of the local actors. The peace process was dismantled and military victory by the Sri Lankan government made possible not so much by the Sinhala nationalist discourse, which opposed administration of development aid by the LTTE, as by the global security discourse associated with geo-strategic interests. The EU-led development discourse, which was informed by the liberal internationalist ethos, could have facilitated resolution and transformation of the conflict. In its place a security-based, realist discourse was prioritized in South Asia by the UK and US governments, particularly after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This was the discourse which provided the material basis for the Sinhala nationalists to consolidate their power in pursuing a military victory. The post-war era is marked by geopoliticization of the human rights discourse, deepening the conflict. This essay explores the correlation between the liberal peace model, human rights, international relations and geopolitics.     

Negotiating peace in Kosovo

We systematically analyze and forecast key developments before and during the Kosovo Crisis. Prior to the air campaign, we anticipated the breakdown of negotiations at Rambouillet and the subsequent initiation of hostilities. Without Russia as a mediator, we predicted that Milosevic would engage in military activity and strengthen his domestic control. As the war was being waged, we took a second look at settlement opportunities. Russia was identified as the key mediator needed to reach a settlement We show that a European‐led settlement offered promising prospects for peace. Finally, we demonstrate that the settlement achieved after the air war was not much different than the settlement that could have been achieved at Rambouillet The settlement on Kosovo offers only short‐term stability. To gain long‐term stability, the Serbians must either agree to the existing ethnic makeup in Kosovo or allow it to be partitioned. Otherwise, conflict in this region will likely revive.     

Coordinating intermediary peace efforts

Multiple peace-making efforts by intermediaries can be a blessing or a curse, particularly in ethnic, religious, or other types of communal conflicts. The author outlines four general ways in which multiple interventions can hamper peacemaking, as well as the different types of intermediaries and de-escalating activities that can help efforts to achieve conflict resolution. Multiple intermediaries can work effectively either in sequence or contemporaneously; coordination of such activities is vital. Based on the analysis presented here, the author offers four different strategies to maximize the benefits of multiple intermediaries in peacemaking.He was the founding director of the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflict at Syracuse, has written extensively on international conflict resolution, and is completing the book,Toward Constructive Struggle.     

In the shadows of war and peace: making sense of violence after peace accords

This article addresses an urgent but largely sidelined issue in the study of peace processes: that high levels of violence—usually framed as ‘crime’—are often ubiquitous in societies experiencing peace processes, even after the signing of peace accords. From South Africa to El Salvador, Guatemala to Northern Ireland, rising interpersonal violence has come to characterise the ‘peace’. This violence often takes place in the context of ambitious post-conflict development efforts. The article argues that even the seemingly non-political violence after peace accords is intimately linked to war, as well as the peace process—in both the causes of violence and in the types of violence that perpetrators use. In order to conceptualise post-peace accord violence, the article presents a framework of violence based on the perpetrators of violence and the types of violence (social, economic or political) that occur. This unpacking of post-peace accord violence emphasises the interconnectedness of political and non-political violence, and stresses the importance of security for development.     

Iraq—managing the peace

In a little over three weeks in March and April 2003 American-led Coalition forces invaded Iraq, defeated the Iraqi Armed Forces, removed Saddam Hussein's regime and occupied a country the size of France. In terms of military power and political will, it was a display of extraordinary detemination and might. To have achieved it in such a short time, with almost negligible military casualties and with limited war damage to the country's infrastructure was a feat of almost unimaginable military precision and planning. To have further avoided the dire consequences of the much talked of 'Stalingrad scenario' in and around the built-up areas of Baghdad and Basra displayed maturity and wisdom in the senior military leadership. That conditions for success were set, irrespective of outside pressures to act, is both commendable and surprising in a time of instant news, instant reaction and demands for instant success.     

Peacebuilding does not build peace

The concept of peacebuilding is a buzzword of the development policy and practice mainstream. The recent introduction of managerial tools and the focus on measuring the ‘effectiveness’ of peacebuilding have marginalised and depoliticised critical questions about the causes of violent conflict, and have replaced them with comforting notions for donors that peace can be built and measured without challenging Western understanding of economy, governance, and social aspirations of people.     

Prospects of peace negotiation in Papua

The Papuan conflict resembles the conflict in Aceh. Also some of the models of conflict resolution can undoubtedly be imported for Papua from Aceh. However, the existence of large migrant groups, the lack of a coherent organization of the rebel side, and the more extreme nature of economic grievances in Papua than in Aceh, give the conflict problem in Papua its own characteristics. This article speculates about how much Papua could learn from its own past and how much lessons it could emulate from other areas to establish its own mechanisms of peace negotiation.     

Guidelines for a strategy of peace

The Nixon‐Brezhnev meetings in the summer of 1973 produced a series of statements, and some renewal of hope, that detente would improve the prospects for world peace.