国际贸易谈判的政治经济分析：一个初步的框架

加入WTO将给中国的改革开放进程带来深远的影响,也将会对中国的经济管理体制改革和政府管理体制改革带来巨大的挑战.对国际政治经济学有关贸易与国内政治的研究、国际贸易理论关于贸易政策之形成的研究、国际关系理论和博弈论关于国际谈判的研究进行了评述,并从国际政治经济学的角度提出分析国际贸易谈判的一个初步的分析框架.通过强调国内政治、策略行为和国际规则的重要性,并从公民政策偏好的形成、利益集团集体行动、两国贸易谈判之间的双层博弈、国际规则的制约因素等多方面讨论了如何分析贸易谈判.     

国际贸易谈判的政治经济分析:一个初步的框架(6)

加入WTO将给中国的改革开放进程带来深远的影响,也将会对中国的经济管理体制改革和政府管理体制改革带来巨大的挑战。对国际政治经济学有关贸易与国内政治的研究、国际贸易理论关于贸易政策之形成的研究、国际关系理论和博弈论关于国际谈判的研究进行了评述,并从国际政治经济学的角度提出分析国际贸易谈判的一个初步的分析框架。通过强调国内政治、策略行为和国际规则的重要性,并从公民政策偏好的形成、利益集团集体行动、两国贸易谈判之间的双层博弈、国际规则的制约因素等多方面讨论了如何分析贸易谈判。     

State Sales Tax Policy in a Changing Economy: Balancing Political and Economic Logic Against Revenue Needs

Soon after implementation in the 1930s, the general sales taxes emerged as the largest state tax source. In 1990, income taxes produced nearly as much state revenue as did sales taxes. Although income tax revenue have increased significantly, the sales tax is not in jeopardy of being replaced in the immediate future. The sales tax still remains a vital state fiscal concern, particularly to those states without a broad individual income tax.     

On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy

In the past there was hardly any use of economic instrumentsin environmental policy, mainly command and control measureswere used. More recently, ecological taxes as well as tradablepermits became more popular and voluntary agreements have beenimplemented. Using the Public Choice approach we ask for thereasons of this wider acceptance of economic instruments. Weconclude that the use of market based instruments inenvironmental policy has not increased very much and theirimpact on the actual situation is still rather low, but thereis hope of a at least some increase in the future.     

论我国外贸政策调整的方向

本世纪以来,我国货物贸易进出口总额占GDP的比例始终保持在60％左右,远高于世界平均水平。这说明我国对外贸易依存度很高,由此形成的贸易顺差和美元储备也很大。但这种情况是难以持续的,后果也是十分严重的,包括贸易摩擦增多、通货膨胀压力增大、美元储备蒙受损失等。因此,我国必须对现行的外贸政策及时做出调整。调整的基本方向是：扩大国内消费,实施“走出去”的发展战略,大力发展服务贸易和推进人民币国际化进程。与之相关的政策措施本文也做了具体阐述。     

Towards a New Political Economy of Behavioral Public Policy

The dominant normative framework in behavioral public policy postulates paternalistic intervention to increase individual utility, epitomized by the so‐called nudge approach. In this article, an alternative political economy of behavioral public policy is proposed that sits within, or at least closely aside, the liberal economic tradition. In short, rather than impose utility maximization as the normative ideal, this framework proposes that policy makers provide an environment that is conducive to each person's own conception of a flourishing life, while at the same time regulating against behaviorally informed harms and for behaviorally induced, otherwise forgone, benefits.     

How Trust Matters: The Changing Political Relevance of Political Trust

Americans most often think about government in terms of its ability to grapple with issues of redistribution and race. However, the September 11 terrorist attacks led to a massive increase in media attention to foreign affairs, which caused people to think about the government in terms of defense and foreign policy. We demonstrate that such changes in issue salience alter the policy preferences that political trust shapes. Specifically, we show that trust did not affect attitudes about the race‐targeted programs in 2004 as it usually does, but instead affected a range of foreign policy and national defense preferences. By merging survey data gathered from 1980 through 2004 with data from media content analyses, we show that, more generally, trust's effects on defense and racial policy preferences, respectively, increase as the media focus more attention in these areas and decrease when that attention ebbs.     

The Political Economy: Political Attitudes and Economic Behavior

It has long been recognized that voters bring their political behaviors in line with economic assessments. Recent work, however, suggests that citizens also engage in economic behaviors that align with their confidence—or lack thereof—in the political system. This alignment can happen consciously or, as we suggest, unconsciously, in the same way that positivity carries over to other behaviors on a micro-level. Using monthly time series data from 1978 to 2008, we contribute further evidence of this relationship by demonstrating that political confidence affects consumer behavior at the aggregate level over time. Our analyses employ measures more closely tied to the theoretical concepts of interest while simultaneously accounting for the complex relationships between subjective and objective economic indicators, economic behavior, political attitudes, and the media. Our results suggest that approval of the president not only increases the electorate’s willingness to spend money, but also affects the volatility of this spending. These findings suggest that the economy is influenced by politics beyond elections, and gives the “Chief Economist” another avenue by which they can affect the behavior of the electorate.     

The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: An Experimental Study on the Strategic Use of Deficits

Field data on the strategic use of deficits to limit thebudgetary scope of future governments are inconclusive aboutthe effects of political polarization or a government'sre-election probability on fiscal policy. Therefore, wedesigned a controlled experiment to examine the strategic useof deficits. Using a within-subjects design, we find thatdeficits rise with a higher degree of polarization and a lowerreelection probability. However, in a between-subjects designneither polarization nor reelection probabilities have asystematic effect. We discuss the implications of ourexperimental results for empirical tests of the strategic useof deficits with field data.     

Jiwei Qian,The Political Economy of Making and Implementing Social Policy in China

Journal of Chinese Political Science -     

The Political Economy of Development

The approach focuses principally on economic linkages between developed and developing countries. It owes much to studies of Latin America and may be more difficult to apply to other parts of the third world where economic development is not necessarily seen as a primary objective of policy. Studies within the field have not generally succeeded at a global level. They have often been too deterministic to describe a world which is both complex and unpredictable. In any case it is more important to influence policy than to discuss the formation of historical structures. Dependency theory in particular has proved a poor guide to policy-makers. The New Right and public choice theory have been better tailored towards influencing policymakers, although this approach (like much dependency writing) divorces the content of public policy from the political system in which it is made. However, political economy of development studies have worked well at a lower level of abstraction and have contributed to a better understanding of public policy in some developing countries.     

The Political Economy of Acid Rain

Over the past decade, acid rain has been transformed from arelatively unnoticed area of scientific inquiry into a majorenvironmental issue of regional, national, and internationalconcern. What is acid rain, why has it acquired such relativelysudden political prominence, and what are the prospects forthe adoption of policies addressing this issue? These questionsillustrate how the regional cleavages inherent in transboundaryair pollution problems have fractured the political coalitionswhich supported earlier environmental legislation. Understandingthe basis for that transformation, which requires informationfrom the natural and physical sciences as well as insights intothe economics and politics of the acid rain issue, is centralto developing an appreciation of the constraints on policymakingfor air quality management in the United States.     

Explaining Capitalism: The Method of Marx's Political Economy

The central thesis of this article is that Marx's explanation of the significant phenomena of the capitalist economy draws upon a basic theoretical syntax of a determinist/latent functionalist type. This conclusion has three consequences. First, it extends the range of functionalist explanation in Marx beyond its traditional loci, namely the theory of history and the analysis of the role of the state and other institutions in stabilizing capitalism, into the very heart of Marx's project, his political economy. Secondly, it has a powerful, though indirect, impact on our understanding of what might loosely be called the normative component of Marx's writings in as much as it identifies a specific sort of unfreedom peculiar to capitalist society. Thirdly, it shows just how great a challenge is mounted against Marx's project by those who seek to recast its method of explanation along methodological individualist lines. For if the first two points are accurate, rational-choice Marxists are drawn into a critique of both the explanatory and normative core of Marxism.     

The Public Purpose of Political Economy

ABSTRACT

For too long the discipline of political science has ceded research on the dynamics of the national political economy to the field of economics. In this article, we explore the cost of this cession in the context of the public purpose. Following John Kenneth Galbraith, we define the public purpose in terms of its independence from the market economy and the planning system. Political scientists, and especially political theorists, are uniquely qualified to theorize power relations relative to a host of challenges that have emerged in today’s rapidly transforming national economies. Galbraith’s critique of mainstream economics, coupled with his understanding of power as an inescapable and perpetual dialectical process, provide guidance for theorizations that should attend to rather than deny the contested domain of the public interest and collective good.