Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector

September 11, 2001, led to renewed emphasis on airport security in the United States. Before the tragedy, government policy led to a suboptimal level of security. The fundamental problem was not simply the use of private security firms, but rather the reliance on airline financing and poor Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight. After 9/11 a federalized security system was put in place. The current system of tightened security is substantially more costly and should be evaluated in terms of its cost-effectiveness compared to a public–private approach.     

Terrorism, democratization, and US foreign policy

Members of the American foreign policy establishment argue that the United States should combat transnational terrorism by encouraging democratization. Yet, empirical studies indicate that democratization may increase political violence, thereby raising the question: why would American policymakers favor democratization when the empirical record shows that this course of action is so dangerous? This study develops a game theoretic model to analyze the effect of democratization on terrorism. The model demonstrates that the United States uses the commitment problems created by democratization to solve the moral hazard problem created by supporting autocratic hosts. These empirical implications are tested using a combination of two datasets.     

National Security, Terrorism and Constitutional Balance

The 'war on terrorism' engages all the institutions of the state. A constitutional structure devoted to protection of liberty must place a paramount value on separation of powers, and a parliamentary democratic constitution should ensure that the ultimate locus of responsibility rests in the legislature, the only branch which has a direct connection to the citizens. However, in an ironic reversal of practice that prevailed before the coming of mass democracy, Parliament in the UK since the early twentieth century has largely accepted a supine role compared to the executive in matters of 'national security'. The judiciary, despite the enactment of legally enforceable human rights, has also manifestly failed to exercise its proper function of curbing abuses of state power. The result is an over-mighty executive, able to draw upon the deference of other branches of government in prosecuting the 'war on terrorism' on the battlefield and in the statute book, which has trampled on individual rights with virtually no check or counte-balance. Some principles by which the balance might be restored are suggested.     

Terrorism,Dynamic Commitment Problems,and Military Conflict

Since 9/11, several states have initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: Why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explanations. First, we argue that while terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic objectives, terrorists can accomplish tactical objectives and may transition to insurgencies by seizing control of pockets of territory. States may respond by initiating preventive wars to stop terrorists from consolidating control over their strategically valuable territories (e.g., resource‐rich areas). Second, rival states may opportunistically exploit terrorist violence by declaring that the government is a “weak state.” This allows rivals to seize portions of the government's territory under the cover of fighting terror. We test these hypotheses using post–Cold War African dyads from 1990 to 2006.     

The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization

Many terrorist factions care about the level of popular support they enjoy within a population they claim to represent. Empirically, this level of support can either rise or fall in the aftermath of a campaign of terrorist violence. Under what circumstances is the use of terror an effective tactic for mobilizing political support for an extremist group? This article models a scenario in which an extremist faction considers attacking a government in the hopes of provoking a counterterror response that will radicalize the population, increasing the extremists' support at the expense of a more moderate faction. In our scenario, such radicalization can result either from the economic damage caused by counterterror operations or by the way in which such operations change the population's assessment of the government's motivations. We demonstrate that such attempts at mobilizing public support can be, but need not be, successful, discuss factors that make both the initiation of a terror campaign and successful mobilization more or less likely, and relate our results to several empirical cases.     

Terrorism

Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, War Without End: The Terrorists ‐ an Intelligence Dossier (London: Harrap, 1986). Pp.279. £9.95.

James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986). Pp.293. £12.95.

Benjamin Netanyahu (ed.) Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986). Pp.254. $18.95.     

Terrorism,Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Lessons

More than a generation ago, in the wake of investigations by the US Congress into improprieties carried out by US intelligence agencies, the United States, in effect, raised the wall between intelligence and law enforcement in order to protect the liberties of Americans. For similar reasons, its Cold War institutions enshrined distinctions between foreign and domestic, and public and private. The CIA was and is, for instance, enjoined from law enforcement and domestic activity.

Those distinctions served the country tolerably well during the Cold War but set it up to fail on September 11. Now, a rethinking of them is underway, as the balance between security and liberty is re-struck. It is imperative, though, to learn the right lessons on September 11. That means thinking carefully and proceeding slowly as changes are made. It also means carefully evaluating the effects of proposed changes, especially to avoid ‘pain for no gain’ measures that do inconvenience people, or even affect their liberties, for little or no gain in the war on terrorism.     

Hollywood and the Spectacle of Terrorism

As terrorist actions, both state and non-state, have spread in both frequency and destructive power since the 1960s, the topic has become an enduring source of narratives, fantasies, and myths that have contributed to Hollywood filmmaking with its familiar emphasis on international intrigue, exotic settings, graphic violence, and the demonization of foreign threats. Images of political violence have a strong appeal in the US, where the gun culture, civic violence, crime sprees, and a thriving war economy permeate the landscape. The al Qaeda attacks of 9/11 heightened public fascination with terrorism, fueled by mounting fear and paranoia, and this was destined to inspire a new cycle of films in which on-screen terrorism dramatizes elements of real-life threats that now include possible weapons of mass destruction. The “war on terror,” driven as much by US strategy to reconfigure the Middle East as by the events of 9/11, serves as the perfect backdrop for film industry productions of violent high-tech spectacles, now a major staple of media culture. For cinema as for politics, the “Middle East” now exists as a mystical category largely outside of time and space, a ready source of dark fears and threats. At the same time, corporate-driven globalization, viewed as a cultural as well as economic and political process, feeds into modern terrorism as political violence (including militarism) sharpens its capacity to attack, disrupt, and surprise—the same features now so integral to the Hollywood film industry. We see jihadic terrorism as not only a virulent form of blowback against US imperial power but as possibly the darkest side of neo-liberal globalization.     

Terrorism,gender, and the 2016 U.S. presidential election

The 2016 U.S. election provides the opportunity to assess how gender, party, and experience shape candidate evaluations when terrorist threat is elevated. The presidential contest featured the first woman major party nominee (Hillary Clinton), a major party nominee without political experience (Donald Trump), and terrorism was salient. We argue that security threats dampen public confidence in Democratic women running for office, yet an experience advantage could countervail against those tendencies. We test expectations using the 2016 ANES and two experimental studies. We first affirm that individuals worried about terrorism held lower evaluations of Clinton and higher evaluations of Trump. We then test an active manipulation of the salience of national security experience and find that it mitigates Clinton's disadvantage, but only in the absence of a counter-message. The results underscore the difficulty that Democratic women face in overcoming the negative influence of party and gender stereotypes when running for office in times of terrorist threat.     

Risk Sensitivity and Terrorism

One enduring question about terrorism is why individuals choose to join terrorist groups. Past studies have shown that terrorists are not always poor, and they can in fact come from more privileged groups in society. Risk sensitivity and prospect theory are approaches that can help explain some of the anomalies. They suggest that two types of group are likely to supply members for terrorist organizations in disproportionate numbers. One group consists of those who face a loss of status or position due to ongoing changes in society. A second group consists of those who have an opportunity to gain a major advance in status or position. Both groups are thus more likely or more willing to take risks such as joining dissident terrorists – either to maintain their position or to improve it. An analysis of the situation of Palestinian nationalists, nationalists in Northern Ireland and the Tamils in Sri Lanka provides support for the idea that sensitivity to risk can be an important factor in explaining the willingness of individuals to join terrorist groups.     

Highway Security and Terrorism

This article presents an overview of highway transportation security before and after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the context of hazardous materials (hazmat) transportation. It is primarily focused on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulation of motor carrier transportation of hazmat and post-9/11 efforts to prevent acquisition by terrorists of certain classes of hazmat. In the context of homeland security, motor carrier transportation of hazmat is receiving heightened attention. It should be cautioned, the article highlights a limited number of activities at the federal level only to provide the reader with a sense of ongoing government and industry activities to improve transportation security.