Influence without Confidence: Upper Chambers and Government Formation

In most parliamentary democracies, governments must maintain the confidence of a single legislative chamber only. But in bicameral parliaments, upper chambers can affect the fortunes of government policy proposals. Recent work shows that parliamentary governments that lack control over the upper house also tend to collapse sooner than those with upper‐house majorities. In this article, we show that coalition builders anticipate the importance of upper‐chamber status (majority or minority) in making their formation decisions. After controlling for a host of “usual suspect” variables concerning the institutional, ideological, and partisan context of coalition building, and examining 15,590 potential governments in 129 bargaining situations, we found that potential coalitions that control upper‐house majorities are significantly more likely to form than are those with upper‐house minorities. Our findings are important for students of bicameralism, government formation, institutions, and, perhaps most significantly, for those who study policymaking in parliamentary democracies.     

Executive–Legislative Relations in Poland, 1991–2005: Institutional Relations in Transition

This paper relates factors previously identified as significant for parliamentary governance to general developments in post-communist CEE and proceeds to assess their relevance to the development of executive–legislative relations in Poland. The Sejm was institutionally strong, while governments were inexperienced, internally divided, and unstable. Governments could not assume the support of their parliamentary parties. Tensions with coalition partners were rife, and only in the period 1993–97 did the coalition survive intact. Periods of ‘cohabitation’ with a relatively strong president complicated governance even after the new Constitution of 1997. These factors suggest weak government, amply borne out by the experience of the two minority governments of the first term. Yet governments gained greater control of the legislative agenda and, regardless of their type or extent of parliamentary support, they usually succeeded in enacting their legislation and proved highly successful in defending individual ministers from votes of no confidence. We explain this apparent contradiction by contrasting institutional weakness with an underlying consensus on broad outlines of both foreign and domestic policy. Despite a discourse of hostile confrontation between government and opposition, much legislation was passed with the broad endorsement of the legislature. Governments were receptive to modifications of policy. When needed, they could often rely on cross-party support or that of independent-minded deputies. Parliament thus remained a key legislative actor; it was never merely the pawn of majority governments. Governments also benefited from opposition disunity. The opposition proved incapable of defeating ministers, even of minority governments.     

Mandating – a likely scrutiny instrument for regional parliaments in EU affairs?

ABSTRACT

Scrutinising governments lies at the heart of parliamentary activities in EU affairs. This applies to national as well as to regional parliaments, most of which possess a toolbox of scrutiny instruments, including the power to mandate, allowing for the strongest form of scrutiny vis-à-vis governments. The article investigates the existence of mandating tools in the 70 regional parliaments equipped with legislative competences in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, whose role in EU affairs has been strengthened by stipulations in the Lisbon Treaty. It is argued that mandating tools are, first, not widely used; second, they are more commonly applied in cases where national parliaments act as ‘policy shapers’ – enabling policy transfer – and if meso-level factors involving territorial politics create further incentives. In sum, the regional parliaments in six member states are still trying to find a place in the maturing EU multi-level parliamentary system.     

Committee autonomy in parliamentary systems – coalition logic or congressional rationales?

Large-n comparative research on committee structures in legislatures is rare. This paper uses newly collected data to analyse committee structures across 30 legislatures of parliamentary systems which possess strong parliamentary party groups. It seeks to explain committee autonomy which reflects the degree to which committees are able to carry out their tasks independently. The variation in autonomy is accounted for by contrasting the ‘keeping tabs on coalition partners’ perspective with the congressional theories of legislative organisation (referred to as distributional, informational, and partisan theories). The results support the informational and the keeping tabs perspective. More autonomous committees tend to be found in legislatures with a relatively high workload and frequent coalition governments. For the ongoing discussion about the applicability of the congressional theories outside the US, this study provides support for the usefulness of the US theories in parliamentary systems of government.     

Taking the Leap: Voting,Rhetoric, and the Determinants of Electoral Reform

The Second Reform Act ushered in the age of democratic politics in the United Kingdom by expanding the voting franchise and remedying legislative malapportionment. Analyzing parliamentary debates and divisions, we investigate why reform successfully passed the House of Commons in 1867. We consider why reform passed under a minority Conservative government yet failed under a majority Liberal government despite no election or change in membership. Though partisanship is most influential for parliamentary voting, it is an incomplete explanation given the absence of modern party institutions. Rather, we argue that the narrowed scope of debate under the Conservatives was crucial in passing reform.     

Personal Characteristics of MPs and Legislative Behavior in Moral Policymaking

Theoretical and empirical models of legislative decision making in parliamentary democracies typically neglect the policy preferences of individual MPs and instead focus on political parties and possible institutional constraints. We argue that MPs actually make judgments and decisions on the basis of their preferences, which are shaped by their personal characteristics. However, given the strength of parties in most parliamentary systems, the impact of personal characteristics on legislative behavior is rarely visible. Therefore, we examine a moral issue. Looking at cosponsorship, parliamentary speeches, and votes in the German Bundestag, we analyze the legislative procedure on the regulation of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) in Germany in 2011. We show that the legislative behavior of MPs does not only reflect partisan conflict but is also influenced by the preferences of the constituents and MPs’ own personal characteristics such as: religious denomination, gender, and parental status.     

Party system change and parliamentary scrutiny of the executive in Italy

Conventional wisdom suggests that internal institutionalisation of parliamentary procedures causes greater policy effects on executive decisions and secondary legislation. The role played by parliaments in policy-making depends on internal processes, but it also depends on other factors, such as the changing structure of the party system – the bipolarisation of which determines the legislative opposition's strategy and performance. The empirical research discussed in this paper shows that the Italian parliamentary process for approving and implementing secondary legislation changed considerably – from pervasive and substantive to formalistic and procedural – during the 1990s, as a result of the parliamentary opposition behaving differently in response to the accomplished alternation in government. Despite the greater institutionalisation of the Italian Parliament, parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation has in fact had a diminishing impact on policy. This paper evaluates the increasingly limited power of parliamentary committees to amend delegated legislation in draft against a comparative analysis of the law-making process and performance of the opposition. The effect on policy of parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation is found to be proportionately related to consociational practices during the legislative process. The scrutiny of parliaments is greater when the balance between the legislative majority and opposition is characterised by consociational practices.     

Coalition Prospects and Policy Change: An Application to the Environment

In most developed democracies, parties adjust their positions to polls and public opinion. Yet, in a coalition government, the policy that emerges is often the outcome of negotiations between governing parties. We argue that the credibility of exit threats by current coalition members and the importance of outside parties for the formation of potential alternative coalitions both matter for policy adoption. Building on a new data set measuring the expected coalition‐inclusion probabilities of parties in parliamentary democracies, we estimate the effect of coalition prospects on an important policy outcome—environmental policy stringency—in nine European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our findings demonstrate that only polling shifts that alter coalition probabilities affect outcomes. Changes in the coalition‐inclusion probability of green parties—regardless of whether they are in government—predict changes in the environmental policy stringency of sitting governments. Political polls, in contrast, do not.     

Legislative Bellwethers: The Role of Committee Membership in Parliamentary Debate

Political parties and legislators use legislative debates to establish their reputation, challenge rivals, and engage in coalition management, among many other tasks. Yet, existing theories on parliamentary debates have abstracted away from the need for information and expertise, which are costly to acquire. Drawing on the “informational” perspective on legislative organization, we address this problem by arguing that party leaders use committees as training arenas for their backbenchers. They task their assigned members with acquiring specific expertise and then rely heavily on those members during the corresponding debates. We turn to the Portuguese legislature, from 2000 to 2015, to discuss how saliency, government dynamics, and party size affect the use of experts. We test this theory using a novel approach to classify speeches that leverages the texts of legislation as training data for a supervised approach.     

Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs

Abstract:  The question of strengths and weaknesses of national parliaments in EU affairs, one of the most salient in the debate on the democratic legitimacy of the EU, is generally answered by assessing formal parliamentary powers which can influence their governments' EU policy. Such an evaluation, however, is flawed: Formal mandating rights are usually incompatible with the overall logic of parliamentary systems, which explains why most national parliaments make very little use of them. Even more importantly, it unduly reduces parliamentary functions to the legislative or policy-making function. Drawing on agency theory, it will instead be argued that the functions of public deliberation and of holding the government publicly to account are at least as important and therefore need to be included in a redefined concept of parliamentary strength. In particular, the article proposes a distinction between two different elements of accountability—monitoring and political scrutiny—which recognises parliamentary majority and opposition as two distinct agents of the electorate.     

Limiting Party Representation: Evidence from a Small Parliamentary Chamber

Parties are seen as vital for the maintenance of parliamentary government and as necessary intermediaries between voters and legislators; an elected parliamentary chamber not controlled by parties is highly anomalous. This study contrasts the party‐controlled Tasmanian lower house with its Independent‐dominated elected upper house and finds that the major source of constraints on party representation is not a clientelistic style of politics but the persistence of a distinctive institutional design and electoral rules based on fixed terms and annual staggered elections. The consequences of these rules are explored for their effects on voter choice and legislative behaviour.     

Throwing the rascals out? The electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals in Europe 1981–2011

Corrupt politicians have to a surprisingly great extent been found to go unpunished by the electorate. These findings are, however, drawn from case studies on a limited number of countries. This study, on the contrary, is based on a unique dataset from 215 parliamentary election campaigns in 32 European countries between 1981 and 2011, from which the electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals are analyzed. Information about the extent to which corruption allegations and scandals have occurred is gathered from election reports in several political science journals, and the electoral effects are measured in terms of the electoral performances—the difference in the share of votes between two elections—of all parties in government, as well as the main incumbent party, and the extent to which the governments survive the election. The control variables are GDP growth and unemployment rate the year preceding the election, the effective number of parliamentary and electoral parties, and the level of corruption. The results show that both corruption allegation and corruption scandals are significantly correlated with governmental performances on a bivariate basis; however, not with governmental change. When controlling for other factors, only corruption allegation has an independent effect on government performances. The study thus concludes—in line with previous research—that voters actually punish corrupt politicians, but to a quite limited extent.     

Multilingual Sentiment Analysis: A New Approach to Measuring Conflict in Legislative Speeches

Comparative scholars of legislative politics continue to face the challenge of measuring a key theoretical concept: conflict at the level of legislative bills. We address this challenge with a multilingual sentiment‐based approach and show that such a measure can effectively capture different types of parliamentary conflict. We also demonstrate that an automated translation of the dictionary yields valid results and therefore greatly facilitates comparative work on legislatures. Our applications show that a sentiment approach recovers government‐opposition dynamics in various settings. The use of a simple, translatable sentiment dictionary opens up the possibility of studying legislative conflict in bill debates across languages and countries.     

Politics of Constituency Representation and Legislative Ambition under the Glare of Camera Lights

The introduction of legislative television as a transparency initiative has been welcomed in an increasing number of democracies. The impact of television cameras on parliamentary behavior, however, has received scant attention in systems where personal vote-earning attributes are thought to be of little importance (e.g., closed-list proportional representation). Additionally, studies examining this relationship relied exclusively on over-time variation in legislative behavior (i.e., before and after the introduction of television into parliament), which arguably has important deficiencies in demonstrating the true effect of legislative television. Capitalizing on a unique quasi-experimental setting, the present study aims to close these gaps in the literature by analyzing parliamentary activities in Turkey, where the legislative television was restricted to 3 days per week (Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday) in 2011 after almost two decades of continuous 7-day operation. Results based on original data sets of parliamentary activities from the pre- and postreform periods (2009–11 and 2011–13) indicate that the varying presence of television cameras exacerbated the effect of electoral and reputation-building motivations on parliamentary behavior, encouraging electorally unsafe and junior MPs to shift their constituency focus to the televised proceedings. The results offer important implications for the study of legislative transparency and constituency representation in party-list proportional representation systems.     

‘A Fair Day’s Wage for a Fair Day’s Work’? Exploring the connection between the parliamentary work of MPs and their electoral support

Electoral systems across Europe increasingly invite candidates to build up a personal reputation to earn votes. In this article, we investigate whether parliamentary work can be considered as a personal vote-earning attribute for incumbent MPs based on data of the 2014 elections in Belgium. The results show that when parliamentary work is operationalised in a narrow way (i.e. as the number of bills and the number of oral and written questions of an MP), this has no influence on the amount of preferential votes. When parliamentary work is defined in a broader way (i.e. also including other aspects of the legislative and control function of MPs), parliamentary work has a significant positive effect for MPs from opposition parties. This supports the claim that the number of legislative and control activities is not sufficient to measure the impact of parliamentary work on preferential votes, but that also other aspects of the work should be taken into account.     

The Time Path of Legislative Party Switching and the Dynamics of Political Competition: The Italian Case (1996–2011)

Political competition is more realistically described as a dynamic process rather than as a series of static stages in which parties compete over policy and government formation. This paper focuses on legislative party switching as the main manifestation of this endogenously evolving process, linking individual switching behaviour to policy and office incentives that are assumed to evolve throughout the life of the entire legislature. Using a new data set tracking the timing of MPs’ changes in party affiliations between 1996 and 2011 in Italy, it is found that switching is mainly motivated by policy reasons and that it is more likely during government formation periods and budget negotiations. These results are a consequence of the interplay between MPs’ ambition and the alternation of key phases in the legislative cycle.     

The hidden electoral connection: analysing parliamentary questions in the Chilean Congress

Legislators in presidential countries use a variety of mechanisms to advance their electoral careers and connect with relevant constituents. The most frequently studied activities are bill initiation, co-sponsoring, and legislative speeches. In this paper, the authors examine legislators’ information requests (i.e. parliamentary questions) to the government, which have been studied in some parliamentary countries but remain largely unscrutinised in presidential countries. The authors focus on the case of Chile – where strong and cohesive national parties coexist with electoral incentives that emphasise the personal vote – to examine the links between party responsiveness and legislators’ efforts to connect with their electoral constituencies. Making use of a new database of parliamentary questions and a comprehensive sample of geographical references, the authors examine how legislators use this mechanism to forge connections with voters, and find that targeted activities tend to increase as a function of electoral insecurity and progressive ambition.     

Wasting or saving time? How government and opposition parties use time during legislative debates. Evidence from the Italian case

The use of plenary time during legislative debates has consequences for the enhancement of party goals. Hence, parties have different preferences on how legislative time should be managed: while some parties would like time not to be ‘wasted’ on the floor, other parties may instead try to ‘consume’ as much time as possible. Speeches delivered in the plenary signal these preferences. Focusing on plenary debates on legislation, this paper proposes a theory for explaining party speech-making behaviour that takes into consideration parties’ preferences on the use of time and their incentives related to the divide between government and opposition. The theoretical argument also emphasises the role of issue salience and party cohesion, which interact with the incentives faced by government and opposition parties. Hypotheses are tested against data from over 21,000 speeches delivered in the Italian parliament. Results highlight the importance of considering the different incentives faced by government and opposition parties when analysing speech making in parliamentary settings, and suggest some interesting avenues for future enquiry.     

Lobbying Across Arenas: Interest Group Involvement in the Legislative Process in Denmark

Interest groups may approach political decision makers in two phases of the legislative process: the pre‐parliamentary, administrative phase, in which bills are prepared by bureaucrats; and the parliamentary phase, in which bills are discussed and possibly revised by parliamentary committees. The article investigates the factors that lead groups to engage in these phases based on group proceedings for 225 bills presented to the Danish parliament in the 2009/2010 session. We conclude that resourceful groups are clearly more active in both arenas, but the parliamentary arena is also a venue for voicing discontent and defending gains achieved in the administrative arena.