A War on ‘Risk’? British Government and the National Security Strategy

This article explores the United Kingdom's National Security Strategy (NSS) since 2008, considering what the NSS discloses about how contemporary Whitehall conceptualises ‘risks’ to Britain. It contends that rather than being a strategy in the Clausewitzian sense, the NSS represents a political exercise in risk management. In addressing a range of quite different problems, the NSS suggests that those in Whitehall now conceive their role as being to shield the citizen from any conceivable threat to their safety, wellbeing, and even emotional security. Yet this constitutes a highly expansive vision, and elevates the state's provision of public goods to a potentially unmanageable level.     

The Big Society in Australia: A Case of ‘Non’‐Policy Transfer?

The Big Society was a flagship policy initiative launched by the UK Conservative party, under the leadership of David Cameron, to win office in 2010. Closely associated with the ideas of Phillip Blond, the Big Society agenda seeks to introduce new forms of civic activism and revive wider civil society. There has been speculation that the Big Society agenda might take hold in Australia, and Blond has been active in promoting it in Australia. Using Dolowitz and Marsh's policy transfer heuristic, this article examines the likelihood of the Big Society being adopted by the Abbott Liberal Coalition. The article outlines a number of potential variants of the Big Society, and concludes that for a variety of reasons it is unlikely to be adopted by the Liberal federal government in Australia. The case also highlights both strengths and limitations in the Dolowitz and Marsh framework, arguing that it can be used in an innovative way to speculate on potential transfers, but is limited in accounting for why transfer may or may not take place.     

Breaking the Mould? Roy Jenkins’ ‘Radical Centre’ and British Social Democracy in the ‘New Hard Times’

Social democratic politics in Britain requires compelling answers to three animating questions that Roy Jenkins posed in his landmark 1979 Dimbleby lecture. Firstly, how can the British system of democracy be reformed to develop a culture of political participation and pluralism that leads to more equitable economic and social policies? Secondly, how can the centre‐left and left unite to forestall long periods of Tory dominance in electoral politics, thereby avoiding calamities such as the 2016 referendum on EU membership? And, thirdly, how can a flourishing intellectual ecosystem be cultivated on the progressive left that generates radical ideas for economic and social reform, recognising the importance of concerted dialogue between political traditions? This article revisits Jenkins’ 1979 lecture by considering the prospects for ‘breaking the mould’ of British politics in the ‘new hard times’ of Brexit and ‘permanent austerity’.     

A ‘Property‐Owning Democracy’ or ‘Generation Rent’?

‘A property owning democracy’ has been at the centre of Conservative Party social policy since Noel Skelton coined the phrase in 1924. The idea has been underpinned by contrasting the independent, hygienic, suburban homeowner with the urban, managed, flat‐dwelling, high‐density council tenant. No Conservative‐led government has left office with a homeownership rate lower than when it came to power and the right to buy has enabled this growth to be maintained. However, in 2005, homeownership started to decline and this drop has continued into the Coalition government's term of office with more households now exiting owner‐occupation into the private landlord sector than entering owner‐occupation from private renting. The ‘reinvigorating’ the right to buy is an attempt put a ‘property owning democracy’ back on track but, should it fail, the Conservative Party may turn to more radical policies such as sale on vacant possession of ‘high value’ local authority and housing association houses.     

Officially Compulsory Advice — A New Policy Option?

This paper presents a new concept in how some aspects of government policy can be delivered and the author is unaware of it having been utilised anywhere before. The author, whose field of competence is building regulation, has named it ‘Officially Compulsory Advice’ and he sees building legislation as a first possible arena for its use. This paper also explores the factors that may make it attractive in two other possible arenas and, therefore, Officially Compulsory Advice may be a useful technique in extending the efficacy of policy implementation. Specialists in other arenas may well discover further possible uses for the concept. Is Officially Compulsory Advice a tautology? Yes, no and maybe. The concept combines elements from these three words: Advice is something that the recipient is free to accept or reject; Compulsory means that the recipient is obliged to receive the advice; and Officially means that legislation has required certain defined classes of people to receive certain advice. This paper also demonstrates how these apparently disparate elements are combined to create a concept that is cohesive, viable, practical and potentially useful in the real world.     

Ending in Failure? The Performance of ‘Takeover’ Prime Ministers 1916–2016

When Theresa May became Prime Minister in July 2016, she joined a list of eleven previous UK takeover leaders in the past 100 years. While the popular image is of Prime Ministers arriving in power after a general election victory, more than half of the Prime Ministers who governed since 1916 have acceded as ‘takeover leaders’ through an internal party process. This article analyses how such takeover leaders perform, concluding that May is likely to face greater obstacles and enjoy fewer advantages than if she had been popularly elected. Takeover leaders have less time in power and less chance of winning subsequent elections, and are generally rated as worse‐performing.     

‘Genre Blurring’ and Public Administration: What Can We Learn from Ethnography?

This article seeks to broaden the craft of public administration by ‘blurring genres’. First, I explain the phrase ‘blurring genres’. Second, I provide some examples of early work in administrative ethnography. Third, I compare this early, modernist‐empiricist ethnography with interpretive ethnography, suggesting researchers confront three choices: naturalism vs. anti‐naturalism; intensive vs. hit‐and‐run fieldwork; and generalisation vs. local knowledge. After this general discussion, and fourth, I discuss the more prosaic issues that confront anyone seeking to use ethnography to study public administration and look at fieldwork roles, relevance, time, evidence and fieldwork relationships. Fifth, I describe and illustrate the several tools students of public administration can use as well as observation and interviews; namely, focus groups, para‐ethnography, visual ethnography, and storytelling. Finally, I conclude that ethnographic fieldwork provides texture, depth and nuance, and lets interviewees explain the meaning of their actions. It is an indispensable tool and a graphic example of how to enrich public administration by drawing on the theories and methods of the humanities.     

The Contemporary Relationship of ‘New Left’ and ‘New Right’ Parties with Interest Groups: Exceptional or Mainstream? The Case of Norway's Socialist Left and Progress Party

Allegedly, the new green and left parties that were established in Western Europe during or after the 1960s tend to be characterized by informal but significant links with social movement organizations. In contrast, weak links or virtual lack of such connections is often seen as one of the enduring characteristics of the new populist (radical) right parties. However, there are both empirical and theoretical reasons for examining these conventional wisdom(s) more closely. To date, only limited evidence is available on this aspect of new European parties in general. Examining Norway's successful new left and populist right party, and based on rich original data, this case study adds to our knowledge in several ways. The analysis reveals that the socialist left has even closer and more wide‐ranging relationships with interest groups than traditionally suggested and that the Progress Party enjoys organized contact with various interest groups. Since these parties are only two, and not necessarily quintessential examples of the party families in question, the results cannot overturn the conventional wisdom, but they nonetheless question and supplement it by throwing light on the conditions favouring the development of stronger, and more varied, links to interest groups. Together with other presumably ‘atypical’ party examples mentioned in scholarly literature, the case of Norway calls for further empirical investigation. Finally, with an eye to future comparative research, the possible explanations for these findings are briefly discussed.     

‘Come together?’ Citizens and civil servants dialogue and trust

Trust is a key element in the co‐creation of solution for public problems. Working together is a gradual learning exercise that helps to shape emotions and attitudes and to create the foundations of trust. However, little is known about how institutions can promote trust. With the intention of going deeper into the subject, this paper focuses on a local experience in Spain: Madrid Escucha, a City Council initiative aimed at stimulating dialogue between officials and citizens around projects to improve city life. Three are our questions: who participate in these spaces, how the interactions are, and what advances are achieved. Based on qualitative research, empirical findings confirm a biased participation in this kind of scenarios as well as the presence of prejudices on both sides, an interaction characterised by initial idealism followed by discouragement and a possible readjustment, and a final satisfaction with the process even when results are not successful.     

Towards a ‘New English Regionalism’ in the North? The Case of Yorkshire First

Traditionally, the debate over English devolution has been framed by mainstream parties, favouring a top‐down approach. However, this scenario has recently started to change, particularly in the areas with stronger regional identities such as the North of England. In 2014, the first regionalist party (Yorkshire First) was created, followed by the North East Party and the Northern Party. Such actors overtly challenge the narratives of regionalisation that have prevailed so far, and endorse bottom‐up regionalism. This article offers the first analysis of these ‘new regional voices’ in the North, and seeks to assess emerging tensions between regionalisation and regionalism in the devolution debate. To achieve this, it concentrates on the case of Yorkshire First, drawing on documentary analysis and the results of a membership survey. It will be argued that, although still limited in its impact, the rise of Yorkshire First signals the presence of a political vacuum in the region which has been left open by mainstream politics, and that regional identity and territorial cleavages do matter in the current debate on devolution in the North of England.     

Influencing the Penal Agenda? The Justice Select Committee and ‘Transforming Justice’, 2010–15

This article assesses the policy influence of the House of Commons Justice Select Committee, established to oversee the work of the Ministry of Justice following its creation a decade ago. The committee has, from the outset, overseen many contentious policy and legislative developments in the penal field, although none so extensive as those introduced following the formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010. Despite the newsworthy nature of its business, the committee has, to some extent, operated in the shadows of its high‐profile sister, the Home Affairs Select Committee, and has received surprisingly limited attention from criminologists and political scientists alike. Forming part of a wider investigation into the work of the committee, this article examines the extent to which it was able to influence penal developments during the coalition years. This period is of particular interest given that it heralded the end of the New Labour administration and welcomed the ‘fresh thinking’ of a coalition leadership keen to emphasise its progressive attitude towards law and order. While the committee was able to influence the direction of penal policy on several occasions, this mostly occurred as a result of its proactive or niche inquiries. The committee had less impact when conducting inquiries that assessed the government's flagship policy agenda, however. Such findings brought into question the ability of the committee to influence the most significant justice transformations in this era of new penal governance.     

Britain's Wages Crisis—Is ‘Predistribution’ or ‘Redistribution’ the Way Forward?

Is ‘predistribution’ as championed by Ed Miliband, or old fashioned ‘redistribution’ as adopted, if stealthily, by Labour from 1997, the best way to create greater equality? Some critics have argued that a strategy of predistribution—aimed at closing the income gap before the application of taxes and benefits—would not work and that it will be necessary to rely mainly on redistribution. This article examines the potential impact of weak and more radical predistribution‐style measures on one of the key drivers of inequality—‘wage compression’. It examines the potential of a mix of policies for raising the wage floor. It argues that reliance on traditional redistribution would face its own set of constraints and that creating a more equal distribution of the cake, before taxes and benefits, is a necessary condition for lowering the risk of continuing economic crisis.     

England's New Scheme for Funding Higher Education through Student Fees: ‘Fair and Progressive’?

From September 2012 most home undergraduates at English universities are being charged fees of £9,000 per annum. These are funded by a government loan, which attracts interest from the moment they start their course; after three years their accumulated debt exceeds £30,000. They can also borrow to cover their living costs, on the same terms, so that those studying in London can graduate with a debt of more than £50,000—although those from low‐income families can obtain grants and universities are encouraged to provide bursaries and other support to students from underrepresented groups. Graduates start repaying their debts once their annual income exceeds £21,000—at a rate of 9% of the difference between their income and that figure: until the debt is fully repaid it continues to attract interest, by as much as three percentage points above the current inflation rate. Using data from a calculator on a government website, this paper shows that the highest‐paid graduates pay back less than those on middle incomes: the ‘squeezed middle’ pays back more not only than those on low incomes but also the better‐paid and those whose incomes increase more rapidly. This has differential effects according to occupation—and sex; and middle‐income groups also contribute more to the costs of widening participation programmes, which all universities charging more than £6,000 per annum are required to fund.