What’s Inside and Outside the Law?

In this article I take up a conceptual question: What is the distinction between ‘the law’ and the behavior the law regulates, or, as I formulate it, the distinction between what is ‘inside’ the law and what is ‘outside’ it? That conceptual question is in play in (at least) three different doctrinal domains: the constitutional law doctrines regarding the limits on the delegation of legislative powers; the criminal law doctrines regarding mistakes of law; and the constitutional rights doctrines that turn on the distinction between state action and the acts of non-state actors. I argue that legal doctrines should turn solely on normative considerations and should not turn on answers to conceptual questions. However, the doctrines I discuss appear to turn on the conceptual question regarding what is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the law. I show how each of these doctrinal areas appears to raise this conceptual issue, and I explain how the doctrines might or might not escape being held hostage to conceptual controversy.     

The Nature of Legal Philosophy

Abstract. Philosophy is general and systematic reflection about what there is, what ought to be done or is good, and how knowledge about both is possible. Legal philosophy raises these questions with respect to the law. In so doing, legal philosophy is engaged in reasoning about the nature of law. The arguments addressed to the question of the nature of law revolve around three problems. The first problem addresses the question: In what kinds of entities does the law consist, and how are these entities connected such that they form the overarching entity we call “law”? The answer is that law consists of norms as meaning contents which form a normative system. The second problem addresses the question of how norms as meaning contents are connected with the real world. This connection can be grasped by means of the concepts of authoritative issuance and social efficacy. The latter includes the concept of coercion or force. The third problem addresses the correctness or legitimacy of law, and, by this, the relationship between law and morality. To ask about the nature of law is to ask about necessary relations between the concepts of normative meaning, authoritative issuance as well as social efficacy, and correctness of content.     

Regulatory Threats to the Law Degree: The Solicitors Qualifying Examination and the Purpose of Law Schools

Two major regulatory changes are affecting the provision of undergraduate legal education in England and Wales. On the one hand, the Qualifying Law Degree is being deregulated, meaning law schools are free to make significant changes to how and what they teach. On the other hand, higher education in England has seen a significant overhaul through the creation of the Office for Students, which treats students as consumers. Now more than ever, law schools need to ask themselves existential questions which will not only test their continued relevance or indeed viability within the ‘market’ for higher education, but also the status of the discipline of law as a whole. The regulatory landscape may indeed present a significant threat, but it is also an opportunity to reflect on what law schools are for, and consequently what changes could result from the academic freedom that comes with deregulation. Whilst different law schools will interpret their mission differently, they should caution against either generalised inertia or succumbing to an outcomes-oriented provision that simply prepares students for the new Solicitors Qualifying Examination. Instead, law schools will find their proper purpose in critical reflection and academic self-grounding, providing undergraduate students with a ‘question everything’ mentality, and showing them that law is something to be experienced and not merely learnt.

     

Processes of Criminalization in Domestic and International Law: Considering Sexual Violence

This article explores some conceptual issues regarding criminalization at the domestic and international levels. It attempts to explain what it means to say that a particular kind of conduct has been criminalized, and considers how the processes of criminalization differ in domestic and international law. In unpacking these issues, the article takes the examples of rape and sex trafficking in domestic and international legal systems, explores whether these offenses are criminalized more broadly in international criminal law as compared to domestic criminal law, and briefly outlines possible explanations for this disparity.     

Finding the Balance: Intoxication and Consent

Sexual offences in England and Wales have had a dramatic reimagining in the last 15 years, with the Sexual Offences Act 2003 establishing not only the boundaries of the most heinous of offences such as rape, but also defining one of the most important elements; consent. This article seeks to explore the problems that surround establishing if legally valid consent has been given, with particular regard for cases where voluntary intoxication takes centre stage. The problem that often arises is the question on whether or not an intoxicated victim had the capacity to consent, or establishing if she did consent when memory of the event is hazy, possibly from both parties. Using comparative analysis with other jurisdictions and their take on the offence of rape, the author seeks to discover if the current rules are sufficient to fit within twenty-first century western culture. The victim will be referred to as ‘she’, although the law here and all situations discussed are equally applicable to male rape.

     

Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Criminal Law? Explaining and Defending the Distinction

This article makes six points. First, under any plausible normative perspective, the distinction between mistake (and ignorance) of criminal law and mistake of fact must at least sometimes be drawn. Second, the fundamental distinction is between a mistake about the state’s authoritative statement of what is prohibited (“M Law”), and a mistake about whether that prohibitory norm is instantiated in a particular case (“M Fact”). Third, when an actor makes a mistake about an evaluative criterion whose content the fact-finder has discretion to elaborate, it is impossible both to allow this discretion and to faithfully realize a jurisdiction’s policy of treating M Fact and M Law differently. Fourth, the claim that every unreasonable M Fact is really a M Law elides important differences between the two kinds of mistake. Fifth, various borderline objections, such as the famous Mr. Fact/Mr. Law example, do not undermine the fundamental distinction, although in rare instances, they do constitute genuine counterexamples that do not effectuate the principles and policies that the distinction ordinarily serves; and even here, they are exceptions that prove (the rationale for) the rule. Sixth, specification or evolution of a criminal law norm, such as the criterion for nonconsent in rape law, can convert a legally relevant M Fact into a legally irrelevant M Law. This phenomenon does not undermine the fundamental distinction between these types of mistake; to the contrary, it reveals the significance of that distinction.     

From Consent to Responsibility, from Pity to Respect: Subtexts in Cases of Sexual Violence Involving Girls and Women with Developmental Disabilities

How might feminist law reform serve all women? The author explores this question within the context of sexual violence involving girls and women with developmental disabilities. She presents the difference impasse as a theoretical tool for understanding how women are positioned in law differently and unequally in relation to each other. She explores how, within the consent framework of a rape trail, competing social narratives or subtexts about race, class, gender, and disability circulate in the courtroom. She also explores the issue of pity in rape traiIs and argues that focusing on interlocking systems of domination and on our complicity in maintaining categories of women in law and law reform is a useful approach for feminist law reformers.     

The Common Law and the Forms of Reasoning

The purpose of this article is to examine how various forms of reasoning both can and should be used to decide cases in the common law tradition. I start by separating positive questions about what the law is from normative questions about what the law ought to be. Next, I present a Peircean account of three main forms of reasoning – deduction, induction and abduction – and examine how they can be used by judges to decide cases in the common law. Finally, I argue that the three forms of reasoning can be used to answer both kinds of questions, but in different ways. All three forms of reasoning can be used to answer questions of positive law, while questions of normative law present a special case that may require the use of aesthetic judgments of taste in the formation of a legal hypothesis.     

Varieties of vigilantism: conceptual discord,meaning and strategies

The practice of vigilantism raises a number of broader provocative questions regarding state–society relations. But before pursuing these questions, we must first ask a critical conceptual question: what is vigilantism? In this article, I offer a conceptual analysis of vigilantism to identify and analyse the points of conceptual discord that make vigilantism an essentially contested concept. To address these challenges, I establish the concept’s core definitional dimensions and range of attributes. I then develop a root concept of vigilantism as the collective use or threat of extra-legal violence in response to an alleged criminal act. The root concept better positions researchers to effectively utilise different strategies to amend the concept for varying theoretical and empirical ends, avoid analytical pitfalls that beset existing conceptualisations and pursue promising new research questions.     

Sex crime legislation: Proactive and anti-therapeutic effects

Therapeutic jurisprudence may have its major role within law practice, but analysis of the law from a therapeutic perspective is a task that should not be neglected; how a piece of legislation is designed and formulated certainly influences the therapeutic outcome of a legal process. This article uses sex legislation as an example to demonstrate how the old rape law based on coercion has anti-therapeutic effects on rape victims. If the law requires resistance, it implies that a woman is sexually available until she resists physically, resulting in an attitude that a woman reporting rape without injuries should be mistrusted. This mistrust of the victim and the victim's attendant feelings of self-blame aggravate the victim's trauma. On the other hand, a modern rape law based on lack of consent gives the signal that a woman is not available until she has given her consent, resulting in a different starting position for the investigation. Since the will of the victim must be respected, the victim herself must be respected in the legal process. Furthermore, being able to tell one's story in a respectful atmosphere can be more important for the well-being of the victim than the outcome of the reported case.     

The place of law in a business studies curriculum

Abstract

LEGAL ETHICS are the values that inform the practice of law. This article establishes what and how Australian law schools teach about legal ethics and suggests what and how Australian law schools should teach about legal ethics.

First, the article establishes that Australian law schools tend to teach legal ethics as if it were only concerned with the law of lawyering. It also establishes that Australian law schools tend to teach legal ethics discretely over the course of one subject out of the whole undergraduate curriculum.

Secondly, this article suggests the adoption of a new approach to legal ethics as the ability to exercise legal ethical judgment. It also suggests a pervasive method of instruction that integrates issues of legal ethics and the process of legal ethical judgment into every subject in the undergraduate curriculum in combination with discrete subjects on the context and substance of the law of lawyering.     

Digging Up, Dismantling, and Redesigning the Criminal Law

The criminal law raises wonderfully thorny foundational questions. Some of these questions are conceptual: What is a plausible conception of crime? What is a plausible conception of criminal law? Some of these questions are genealogical: What are the historical and genealogical roots of the criminal law in a particular jurisdiction? Other questions are evaluative: What are the political and moral values on which a given conception of criminal law depends? What kind of rational reconstruction, if any, could the criminal law be given? And, finally, still other questions are exploratory and normative: Should parts of existing criminal law be abandoned? What new topics in criminal law theory need to be addressed in our globalised, technologically savvy world? The contributors to Antony Duff and Stuart P. Green’s collection Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law tackle these questions with zeal and independent spirit. They disagree markedly with each other about what the foundational questions are. And, they disagree about how those questions should be handled. This article charts their disagreements by situating the contributors within two taxonomies. The first groups them according to their approaches to the foundational questions; the second groups them according to their modes of theorising. This double taxonomy provides a useful frame within which to analyse these competing takes on the philosophically foundational work of criminal law theory.     

Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework1

Abstract: It has been argued that the EU suffers from serious accountability deficits. But how can we establish the existence of accountability deficits? This article tries to get to grips with the appealing but elusive concept of accountability by asking three types of questions. First a conceptual one: what exactly is meant by accountability? In this article the concept of accountability is used in a rather narrow sense: a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences. The second question is analytical: what types of accountability are involved? A series of dimensions of accountability are discerned that can be used to describe the various accountability relations and arrangements that can be found in the different domains of European governance. The third question is evaluative: how should we assess these accountability arrangements? The article provides three evaluative perspectives: a democratic, a constitutional and a learning perspective. Each of these perspectives may produce different types of accountability deficits.     

Eating Peas with One’s Fingers: A Semiotic Approach to Law and Social Norms

This paper proposes a semiotic theory of norms—what I term normative semiotics. The paper’s central contention is that social norms are a language. Moreover, it is a language that we instinctively learn to speak. Normative behaviour is a mode of communication, the intelligibility of which allows us to establish cooperative relationships with others. Normative behaviour communicates an actor’s potential as a cooperative partner. Compliance with a norm is an act of communication: compliance signals cooperativeness; noncompliance signals uncooperativeness. An evolutionary model is proposed to explain how this comes about: evolution has generated an instinctual proficiency in working with these signals much like a language—a proficiency that manifests in an emotional context. We see these social rules as possessing a certain ‘rightness’ in normative terms. This adaptive trait is what we call internalization. Internalization enhances the individual’s ability to speak this code. Because these signals communicate who is and who is not a reliable co-operator, sending and receiving cooperation signals is crucial to individual survival. Individuals who internalized the entire process and thus became more adept at speaking the language were at an advantage. Law seeks to shape the language of norms by maintaining the collective standards of society; as such, understanding how and why this normative language emerges is critical to understanding a core function of law.     

Consent forms in genomics: the difference between law and practice

Consent forms are the principal method for obtaining informed consent from biomedical research participants. The significance of these forms is increasing as more secondary research is undertaken on existing research samples and information, and samples are deposited in biobanks accessible to many researchers. We reviewed a selection of consent forms used in European Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) and identified four common elements that were found in every consent form. Our analysis showed that only two of the four most commonly found elements in our sample of informed consent forms were required in UK law. This raises questions about what should be put in informed consent forms for research participants. These findings could be beneficial for the formulation of participant information and consent documentation in the future studies.     

Identifying Points of Contact and Engagement Between Legal and Environmental Education

This article explores the shaping and possibly reforming potential of ideas about sustainability in legal education by drawing up a scale of environmental education theories, arranged according to their propensity to transform radically university education. The article offers a critical analysis of current individualist strategies aimed at developing students' environmental skills, in particular that these hamper opportunities for universities to develop a broader and more creative agenda of social change. Applying ideas about how environmental education communities of practice develop, this article identifies some pockets of activity seeking to integrate ideas of sustainability into the law curriculum, including via environmental law and teaching Wild Law or Earth Jurisprudence. These issues form part of an on‐going debate about how well law students are being prepared for work in highly challenging social, environmental, and financial circumstances, against the backdrop of a broader question about ‘what are universities for?’     

When Do Laws Matter? National Minimum‐Age‐of‐Marriage Laws,Child Rights,and Adolescent Fertility, 1989–2007

Using the case of adolescent fertility, we ask the questions of whether and when national laws have an effect on outcomes above and beyond the effects of international law and global organizing. To answer these questions, we utilize a fixed‐effect time‐series regression model to analyze the impact of minimum‐age‐of‐marriage laws in 115 poor‐ and middle‐income countries from 1989 to 2007. We find that countries with strict laws setting the minimum age of marriage at 18 experienced the most dramatic decline in rates of adolescent fertility. Trends in countries that set this age at 18 but allowed exceptions (for example, marriage with parental consent) were indistinguishable from countries that had no such minimum‐age‐of‐marriage law. Thus, policies that adhere strictly to global norms are more likely to elicit desired outcomes. The article concludes with a discussion of what national law means in a diffuse global system where multiple actors and institutions make the independent effect of law difficult to identify.     

Posner versus Kelsen: the challenges for scientific analysis of law

Law & economics scholars claim, among other things, to provide explanations of how law impacts behaviour. The aim of this article is to shed light on the conceptual and methodological difficulties related to analysis of the impact that law has on behaviour. The analysis advanced in the paper takes as its starting point a commentary on Richard Posner’s interpretation of Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law. The work of Kelsen is treated as a meta-theoretical analysis that reveals some of the presumptions of theoretical approaches to law that claim to be scientific and, in particular, that claim to scientifically analyse the law’s influence on behaviour. The article concludes with a methodological proposal on how to approach the identified methodological challenges and conceptual tensions that law & economics contends with.     

“How an Ordinary Jury Makes Sense of it is a Mystery”: Barristers’ Perspectives on Rape,Consent and the Sexual Offences Act 2003

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 introduced significant reforms to the offence of rape, amid concerns regarding the low reporting and conviction rates for rape. One of the key aims of the Act was to improve the law relating to consent, in order to assist a jury in their decision making process. In addition, disquiet had been expressed with regards to the subjective nature of the mens rea of rape. Consequently, the 2003 Act reformulated the law so as to introduce an objective test. This article discusses the findings of a qualitative research project undertaken with 14 Barristers in the North West of England, in order to investigate counsels’ opinions regarding the 2003 reforms. Drawing upon data collected from semi-structured interviews, the article examines barristers’ perspectives with regards to the definition of consent, the ‘consent presumptions’, and the reformulated mens rea. In conclusion, it will be argued that while the barristers were not overly optimistic about the reforms introduced by the 2003 Act, they were also opposed to further reform to the substantive law and increased jury directions. Barristers argued that the law relating to rape should remain as simple as possible.     

Interpretation of Unilateral Acts in International Law

The article explores the question of interpretation of unilateral acts in international law both from the perspective of ascertaining their binding force (law determination) and from the perspective of ascertaining their content (content determination). It argues that the objective intention of the author to be bound is what distinguishes binding commitments of unilateral origin from non-binding ones. In turn, this involves the interpretation of a unilateral act in accordance with its content and the circumstances surrounding its making. In practice, the use of clear and specific wording in conjunction with a set of contextual indicators are indicia of the intention to create a binding unilateral commitment. Against this backdrop, the article continues by addressing the question of interpretation of unilateral acts from the standpoint of ascertaining their content. It shows that the text of the act is the primary consideration in determining its content—and that its context as well as the circumstances surrounding its making are also interpretative elements that need to be taken into account. Due to the unilateral origin of these acts the interpretative rule applicable to international agreements can only be used as a point of reference when it comes to interpreting the content of these acts. In this light, the article concludes that more practice is needed in order to elucidate the exact role and weight that should be ascribed to non-textual elements in the context of interpreting unilateral acts. At the same time, the article argues in favour of adopting a broader approach to the concept of ‘interpretation’ in international law. Viewing interpretation not merely as content determination but also as law ascertainment allows us to better assess the persuasive value of arguments in favour or against certain interpretative rules when practice is scant—as is the case with unilateral acts.