EU citizenship and (fundamental) rights: Empirical,normative, and conceptual problems

There is a close connection between EU citizenship and rights, both in the law and literature. This article claims that EU lawyers' understanding of EU citizenship and rights suffers from empirical, normative, and conceptual shortcomings. I will point out that there has been insufficient awareness for the boundedness of EU citizenship, the political structure of the EU and the constraints this (realistically) imposes on the ‘meaningfulness’ of EU citizenship. EU citizenship must not be understood as requiring an elaborate set of equal rights for all Union citizens throuzghout the EU, but valued for its ability to allow its status holders to enjoy (almost) full membership in the Member States of which they do not possess nationality.     

Rules for Rights: European Law,Health Care and Social Citizenship

Social citizenship is about equality. The obvious problem for European social citizenship in a very diverse Union is that Member States will not be able or willing to bear the cost of establishing equal rights to health care and similar aspects of social citizenship. Health care is a particularly good case of this tension between EU citizenship and Member State diversity. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) strengthened the right to health care in other Member States, but this cannot create an equal right to health care when Member States are so different. In its efforts to balance a European right, the Court has formulated ‘rules for rights’—not so much European social citizenship rights, as a set of legal principles by which it judges the decisions of the Member States.     

Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union at a Crossroads: A Promising Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison?

The reinforcement of the protection of fundamental rights at the European level and the emergence of the status of Union citizenship are two closely connected phenomena. European citizenship has been and continues to be one of the central arguments in favour of the extension of the scope of EU fundamental rights. This argument arises out of a sentiment that vindicates equality at the core of the citizenship of the Union as a fundamental status. Against this background, this paper examines the different possibilities of interconnection between the traditional doctrine of EU fundamental rights and the jurisprudential construction of the citizenship of the Union. Particularly, it will be discussed whether fundamental rights should be placed at the core of the formula that protects the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of the rights conferred by EU citizenship, inaugurated by Ruiz Zambrano, already latent in Rottmann and substantially refined in an ever‐growing case‐law (McCarthy, Dereci, O. and S., Ymaraga and Alokpa). It will be argued that this formula carries the very valuable potential to reinforce citizenship of the Union as an independent source of rights able to overcome problems such as reverse discrimination. For these purposes, this formula could be considered to encompass not only the absolute deprivation of the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights’, but also the existence of serious obstacles thereto.     

Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

Citizenship of the European Union—A Legal Analysis

Abstract:  The aim of this article is to present a legal analysis of the concept of citizenship of the EU. This concept was considered by some to be embryonic in the original Community Treaties, but was first expressly incorporated into the Treaties by the Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992. In the case-law of the European Court of Justice, which has given citizenship a content going beyond the express Treaty provisions, the concept is closely related to other basic concepts, including free movement of persons, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality and the protection of fundamental rights. This article seeks to review the case-law, to disentangle citizenship from other related concepts, and to determine what added value citizenship has brought to the Treaties and what the potential and the proper limits of the concept might be.     

EU citizens: Challenging the notion of German National Political Community, 1990–2005

This article assesses the extent to which Germany's adaptation of European Union legal norms through altering the criteria for access to territory and rights has challenged the judicial and conceptual boundaries of its notion of national political community. It compares the policies that directly affected EU citizens’ and other immigrant groups’ access to German territory, citizenship and social integration programs. It may be seen that, in enjoying a unique and privileged position between Germans and the other foreigners, this group not only challenges and undermines the justification for this very distinction, but also transforms the concept of ‘otherness’.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems

Citizenship is the cornerstone of a democratic polity. It has three dimensions: legal, civic and affiliative. Citizens constitute the polity's demos, which often coincides with a nation. European Union (EU) citizenship was introduced to enhance ‘European identity’ (Europeans’ sense of belonging to their political community). Yet such citizenship faces at least two problems. First: Is there a European demos? If so, what is the status of peoples (nations, demoi) in the Member States? The original European project aimed at ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’ Second: Citizens are members of a political community; to what kind of polity do EU citizens belong? Does the EU substitute Member States, assume them or coexist alongside them? After an analytical exposition of the demos and telos problems, I will argue for a normative self‐understanding of the EU polity and citizenship, neither in national nor in federal but in analogical terms.     

Union Citizenship—Metaphor or Source of Rights?

After nearly ten years of introducing Union Citizenship as a concept into Community law it seems time to draw a preliminary evaluation of its importance in reshaping the legal and social positions of citizens living in the EU, more precisely in its Member States. The balance sheet is however mixed: On the one hand, the prevalent position in legal doctrine seems to be that Union citizenship is merely a derived condition of nationality, while on the other side certain fundamental rights are based on criteria other than citizenship/nationality alone. The European Charter on Fundamental Rights will not overcome this dilemma. This can be shown in conflictual areas which are in the centre of discusion in the paper, namely the (limited!) use of the concept of citizenship to extend existing free movement rights in the new case law of the Court of Justice, the resistance towards granting 'quasi-citizenship' rights to third country nationals lawfully resident in the Union for a longer period of time, and the yet unsolved problem of imposing 'implied duties' based on a doctrine of ' abus de droit ' upon citizens paralleling the rights granted to them. As a conclusion the author is of the opinion that the question asked for in the title can be answered in the positive only to a limited extent. Citizenship appears to be a sleeping fairy princess still be be kissed awake by the direct effect of Community law.     

EU Citizenship without Duties

Many believe that duties should be at the essence of citizenship. This paper dismisses this view, using EU law as the main context of analysis, by making five interrelated claims. (1) There are no empirically observable duties of EU citizenship; (2) such duties would lack any legal‐theoretical foundation, if the contrary were true; (3) legal‐theoretical foundations of the duties of citizenship are lacking also at the Member State level; (4) EU law plays an important role in undermining the ability of the Member States where residual duties remain to enforce them; (5) this development is part of a greater EU input into the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the Member States and reflects a general trend of de‐dutification of citizenship around the democratic world. If these conclusions are correct, it is time to stop categorising EU citizenship duties among the desiderata of EU law.     

Another type of ‘Other’ in EU Law? AB (2) MVC v Home Office and Rahman v Secretary of State for the Home Office

EU citizenship law has to date paid little attention to the extended family members of Union citizens, a group mentioned just once in Citizenship Directive 2004/38. This note suggests that the current EU legal framework gives too much discretion to the member states, providing scope for the rights of EU migrant workers to be breached with impunity. It also questions whether the new mechanisms for addressing misapplication of EU law are robust enough to hold national authorities to account for their treatment of other family members.     

The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification

This paper provides a brief critical overview of the recent EU citizenship case‐law of the Court of Justice including Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci. While these cases open a number of new avenues of fundamental importance for the development of EU law, they also undermine legal certainty and send contradictory signals as to the essence of the EU citizenship status and the role it ought to play in the system of EU law. Most importantly, the Court's reluctance to specify what is meant by the ‘essence of rights’ of EU citizenship potentially has disastrous consequences following its own determination that such rights play a crucial role in moving particular factual constellations within the material scope of EU law. The substance and meaning of such rights is however left in suspense to harmful effects. An urgent clarification is needed.     

‘Caminante,no hay camino,se hace camino al andar’1: EU Citizenship,Direct Democracy and Treaty Ratification

Abstract: This article argues that obligatory, simultaneous, and simple Treaty ratification by referenda is the next step in the consolidation of the political core of European citizenship. In the first part, general remarks about the special nature of EU citizenship highlight the relevance of referenda on EU Treaties for EU citizenship. In the second part, the normative and empirical case in favour of direct democracy is put forward. It is followed by the assessment of direct democracy in European integration as we have known it so far. The practice is irreversible and gaining in momentum. But it is in need of substantial reform due to procedural dysfunctions and discriminatory consequences for the citizens. Section V relates this result to a legal analysis of EU citizenship. The suppression of the discriminatory consequences of the Treaty ratification procedure is necessary from a legal point of view, but it cannot be expected from the ‘judicial incrementalism’ that has characterised the development of EU citizenship regarding free movement and residence. In section VI , the conclusions of the previous sections are drawn into the final proposal of obligatory, simultaneous and simple Treaty reform by referenda in all Member States. At the end, five counter‐arguments to the proposal are discussed.     

EU Climate Change Litigation,the Role of the European Courts,and the Importance of Legal Culture

The purpose of this article is to show it is only in light of legal culture that climate change jurisprudence in the European Union can be explained. Examining the case law concerning the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, this article demonstrates that climate change proceedings in the European Union raise questions that stand at the heart of the EU legal order; that is, they demand that the boundaries of the EU's regulatory competences are drawn. In effect, the EU courts focus on ensuring that EU climate change laws are in accord with the rule of law or, in the context of EU law, the borders of the EU's environmental regulatory powers. As such, this article shows that attention needs to be given to the interaction between climate change laws and the constitutional role of the EU judiciary. These interactions are considered here together with the contingency of EU climate change litigation on EU legal culture.     

Soft Post‐Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control

The Commission's soft post‐legislative rulemaking by way of communications, notices, codes and similar instruments has become an increasingly important tool for the adequate functioning of the system of shared administration in the EU. However, the development of its legal framework has not kept pace with this, as the Treaty on the EU nor the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) recognise this regulatory phenomenon. As a result, its current procedural control is of a very ad hoc nature. Given the risks this rulemaking involves for the legitimacy of the EU, its practical and legal importance for legal practice and the way in which the Treaty of Lisbon has sought to condition and control the behaviour of the Union institutions, it is argued that the time is ripe for a more stringent and consistent procedural control of soft post‐legislative rulemaking. Some options to realise this are presented for further research.     

Granting the Right to Vote for the European Parliament to Resident Third‐Country Nationals: Civic Citizenship Revisited

The EU grants rights to third‐country nationals (TCNs) and strives to approximate their rights to those of Union citizens. Up to now, the approximation has extended to social and economic matters. This article investigates whether political rights, notably voting rights for the European Parliament (EP), should also be approximated. To this end, the analysis applies Dahl's democratic principles of ‘coercion’ and ‘all affected interests’ as well as Bauböck's principle of ‘stakeholding’ to the position of TCNs in the EU. Against that background, it explores the relevance of arguments for and against granting TCNs the right to vote in European elections and submits that voting rights should be granted to long‐term resident TCNs. The author then proposes including TCN voting rights in the legal framework for EP elections and concludes by suggesting the use of the concept of civic citizenship to express political approximation of TCNs to EU citizens.     

Sincere Cooperation,Respect for Democracy and EU Citizenship: Sufficient to Guarantee Scotland's Future in the European Union?

The position of an independent Scotland within the European Union (EU) has recently been a subject of considerable debate. The European Commission has argued that any newly independent state formed from the territory of an existing Member State would require an Accession Treaty. This article critiques that official position and distinguishes between a set of claims that could be made on behalf of an independent Scottish state, and a set of claims that could be made on behalf of the citizens of an independent Scottish state vis‐à‐vis the EU. It argues that the general principles of the EU Treaties ought to govern how Scotland is treated, and that a new Accession Treaty is not necessary. Furthermore, notwithstanding the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the area of EU citizenship, we conclude that EU citizenship itself is not sufficient to guarantee or generate membership of the EU.     

Forward or Back: The Future of European Integration and the Impossibility of the Status Quo

This article considers how the legal and political order of the EU can cope if the ‘Ever Closer Union’ envisaged by the Treaties ceases to be inevitable. In particular, it focuses on what are the likely consequences if previously successful integration mechanisms such as integration through law (including adventurous pro‐integration interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)) and functional integration can no longer successfully push forward the integration process. It considers whether it is possible for the Union to ‘stand still’, that is, to maintain the current level of integration without either moving forward to more intensive integration or engaging in costly and disruptive disintegration. In order to substantiate this claim, the article looks at three areas, the law of citizenship, the Eurozone and the legislative structures of the Union, showing in each case that the neither the current degree of integration nor methods used in recent times to move the integration process forward provide a long term basis for policy.     

On the Technology of Collective Identity: Normative Reconstructions of the Concept of EU Citizenship

The unsatisfactory present of European Union Citizenship and the unclear integration telos have given rise to many questions regarding the future of the European Citizen and the possibility of a European demos. On what sort of foundation can such a demos be constructed, and what will its relationship with national demoi be? This article presents the theoretical approaches on the future of EU citizenship, varying from civic‐centered thesis to social models, with a view to exploring the potential and dynamics of a different European identity based, not on supposedly common history and culture, but on newly‐founded shared political values. The aim is to go beyond the classic federation–confederation dilemma and look deeper into the process of creating an actual European demos.     

Problems of a Concept of European Citizenship

Abstract: The article explores the possible content of the newly established institution of ‘Citizenship of the Union” as stipulated in Articles 8–8d of the EU Treaty. Within the broad scope of varying historical meanings which the concept of citizenship has undergone in the last two thousand years its main relevance must be found in its affiliation with the modern constitutional nation-state and its basic political feature, namely its anti-primordialism and its representative character. Although the European Community does not satisfy the conditions of democratic representation which are essential for the constitutional nation-state, the idea of citizenship can acquire a new meaning within the framework of the EU in that it is disconnected both from nationality and from national identity and opens the space for actions of which the significance is no longer defined by the territorial boundaries of the nation-state.