From Rogers to Rivers: the rights of the mentally ill to refuse medication

Many individuals with mental illness wish to avoid psychotropic drugs, a type of treatment that may relieve their symptoms only at the risk of unpleasant, even permanent, side effects. In marked contrast to the widely-held view that most patients may refuse any treatment and that even patients with mental illness may reject other psychoactive interventions such as electroconvulsive therapy and psychosurgery, the courts and legislatures have been slow to recognize any right to refuse psychotropic drugs. This Article demonstrates that many of the justifications offered for forcing patients to take unwanted medications are inadequate and that unless treatment refusals are reviewed outside mental institutions, patients' rights will rarely receive appropriate deference. The author analyzes the federal and state litigation to determine whether the courts have fashioned meaningful relief for the mentally ill. The Article concludes that two recent United States Supreme Court decisions have made it impossible for the federal courts to provide adequate protection. By contrast, several state courts have responded to the needs and rights of patients with mental illness.     

The influence of the right to refuse treatment on precommitment patients

The unplanned extension of the right to refuse treatment to the precommitment period is described in this paper. This extension of the right to refuse treatment has important public policy implications for the civil commitment process. These implications, as well as the pros and cons of the extension of the right to refuse treatment, are discussed.     

The right to refuse treatment and the movement for mental health reform

The right to refuse treatment is the most controversial of the rights of mental patients, and usually polarizes the movement for mental health reform between providers of care and external activist reformers. A broad alliance supported earlier struggles for recognition of patients' rights, but most professionals oppose recognizing this most extreme right of treatment refusal. Professional opposition to treatment refusal is not based on a wide extent of actual refusal; rather it derives from a defense against challenges to professional and institutional autonomy, an opposition to legal interference, and a belief that the community as well as the patient must be protected. These three reasons for opposition are examined by reviewing studies of attitudes toward patients' rights, knowledge about patients' rights, and implementation of patients' rights. Finally, the implications of these studies for future directions in the movement for patients' rights are examined.