试论当代中国的宪政文化建设

有宪法未必有宪政,作为西方泊来品的宪政文化是宪政得以实现的深层次原因。文章在探讨西方宪政文化的主要内容及回顾百年中国立宪教训的基础上,对当代中国的宪政文化建设提出了具体的建议。     

论政府管制改革的价值取向:有效管制

政府有效管制是我国政府管制改革的理念。当前 ,有关政府管制改革的理论有很多 ,有人主张放松管制 ,有人主张加强管制。而政府有效管制强调 ,政府管制改革不是要放松管制也不是要加强管制 ,最终目标是要提高政府管制质量、实现政府对经济社会发展的有效控制。政府有效管制的核心原则是有效性 ,它包括 :结果有效性和执行有效性、公共利益性、可行性、必要性     

论我国宪政建设的文化推动力

宪政建设的推动力有许多,政府和国民无疑是重要的因素,但我们不能忽视宪政建设的内在推动力———文化的重要作用。目前我国宪政建设应注重先进文化的推动力,进而树立健全的宪政意识,培养健全的宪政精神。     

A general constitutional possibility theorem

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem shows that there exist no transitive social preferences in nonoligarchic societies for all possible profiles of individual preference orderings. Similarly, a generalization of Sen's Theorem of the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal implies under the same conditions that non-Pareto-optimal outcomes may be present in the resulting cyclical preference relations. This essay changes the customary perspective. It demonstrates that, for any profile of individual preferences, we can always find a nonoligarchic assignment of rights to different subsets of society, to decide between pairs of outcomes, together with adequate decision rules, which escapes these problems. This assignment of rights can be a purely liberal one even for each profile, but not one in which everybody participates in all decisions and which uses simple or qualified-majority voting (Total Direct Democracy). The adequate purely liberal constitution, on the other hand, may imply an oligarchy if too few outcomes are present.     

A constitutional view of legislative pay

The distinction between constitutional rules and post-constitutional laws is often a fine line. However, this analysis suggests that, in the case of state legislative pay, constitutional rules are much more binding than post-constitutional restrictions. Further research in the area of constitutions from an economic point of view may yield fruitful results. As Tullock (1988: 140) has stated, The real importance of such an evaluation could be as a first step toward developing improved constitutional rules. Evaluating other areas of policy from a constitutional point of view might shed light on the path towards the development of optimal rules in a democratic process.Thanks go to Randy Holcombe for helpful comments and suggestions.     

A constitutional interpretation of the firm

When members of a firm make firm-specific investments they will earn rents. Potential rent-seeking on the part of the owner of the firm and other employees reduces the value of an employee's firm-specific investment and, as a result, reduces the level of those investments. In this context the firm can be thought of as a set of interdependent relationships where the actions of any one individual can affect the rents of all others. The owner of the firm will desire to set up an institutional arrangement to protect the individual's property rights in specific investments as part of his effort to maximize profit. Establishing this institutional arrangement is similar to the establishment of a constitution by the state or other organization. This constitution protects the property rights of the members of the firm and as a result encourages the creation of property, that is, the firm-specific investments. The constitution of a firm consists of a set of interdependent explicit and implicit contracts between the firm and its various members, as well as mechanisms for enforcing and monitoring these contracts. As a practical matter, it is obvious that workers normally do not enjoy costless or near-costless mobility, and thus an ordinary “at will” employment contract may no longer be sufficient to induce workers to join a firm. If, in order to function productively within an enterprise, individuals have to accumulate, and pay for, firm-specific capital assets, the simple neoclasical logic fails (Furubotn, 1988: 167).     

Positive constitutional economics: A survey

The author distinguishes between normative and positive constitutional economics. Taking the observation that the normative branch of the new discipline is much better developed than its positive counterpart as a starting point, the available positive literature is surveyed nevertheless. The available evidence is arranged into four categories: (1) Constitutional rules and the procedures bringing them about, (2) constitutional rules as the result of preferences and restrictions, (3) constitutional rules channeling constitutional change, and (4) the economic effects of constitutional rules. Additionally, various concepts of the constitution are presented, the tools suited for a positive theory of constitutional economics discussed, and precursors as well as related research programs shortly described.     

Federalism and the European Union: A constitutional perspective

Constitutional questions have resurfaced in the last few years with regard to the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty is a kind of constitutional reform. The rejection of this treaty by Denmark in its first referendum, and the subsequent debate of the treaty that has taken place, raise questions about both the nature of the European Union, and the process by which its rules (constitution) get revised and approved. Similar questions surround the entry of Austria and the three, additional Scandinavian countries into the Union. Perhaps, no event called the European Union's constitution, or lack thereof, into question more that way in which a new President of the Commission was chosen during the summer of 1994. This paper will reexamine the European Union's structure and procedures from a constitutional perspective. Drawing upon the author's recently completed book, Constitutional Democracy, the paper will review the purpose for the Union's existence, the implications of this purpose for the structure of the Union (federalism versus confederation), the rules for making collective decisions in the Union, citizenship, and in particular, the procedures by which the European Union's “Constitution” is written and revised. The constitutional perspective adopted is taken from public choice. The political institutions of the European Union are examined relative to those rational, self-interested individuals would choose to advance their interests.     

Subsidiarity and ecologically based taxation: A european constitutional perspective

The principle of subsidiarity through its re-affirmation in the Treaty of Maastricht became an integral and central part of European constitutional law. Its relationship to ecological issues, however, has so far not been explored. Subsidiarity is a general principle of organization. It can apply to all areas of policy: financial, agricultural, technological, education, defense, economic development and, e.g. environmental policy. The principle of subsidiarity is silent about the specific purpose, direction or content of a particular policy. Whatever be the purpose of any such policy, the principle of subsidiarity requires that it be carried out within that context which is the smallest viable one in which the objective can successfully be attained. When a task is too complicated for a small unit such as an office or a firm to be successfully performed, that unit has to be augmanted to the point where the task can be effectively performed. Likewise, if an organization is too large to successfully handle particular problems as its procedure may be too cumbersome or as it lacks sufficient detailed information or experience repeated recurrences of problems it has tried to settle, then a different organizational form must be found, preferably an existing one, which is closer to the problem at hand and able to carry out the policy. With the shift in responsibility will also travel the access to resources with which to carry out the task. Since ecological units rarely co-incide with political units, the principle of subsidiarity poses a specific challenge to politicians and administrators who have to decide on assignments of tasks and responsibilities as well as funding within the different echelons and among the different Member States of the European Union. This essay explores those tasks and, in particular, advances the notion of establishing ecological tax units.     

Political morality and constitutional settlements

This paper presents a way of thinking about how to respond to the pluralism of modern societies that avoids any commitment to contractualist norms of political justification. The argument developed appeals to the notion of a constitutional settlement. Constitutional settlements are complex on-going social practices that both express certain values to which political societies are committed and establish procedures for resolving disputes among members of these societies. As such, they are a product of both moral commitment and the balance of power. The paper shows how constitutional settlements relate to issues of stability and non-subjugation in politics, and explains how they can ground a distinction between justice and legitimacy.     

Social order through constitutional choice: A contractarian proposal

The present paper consists of two closely related parts: one which outlines a normative criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional change and one which specifies a particular proposal of a constitution. The criterion used stems directly from the "pragmatic" brand of contractarianism developed by Buchanan, where an approximate rule of unanimity is utilized. The proposal aims at the highest possible freedom of choice for individuals when it comes to defining the political system of their liking: a core (dealing with public goods and rights) is common for all, but everything else can vary between different sub-constitutions between which individuals choose.     

大学生社会主义核心价值观教育领导机制构建

以习近平同志为总书记的党中央对社会主义核心价值观的性质及其在改革开放和社会主义现代化建设中的主导地位、重大意义做了明确的定位和表述。但目前国内大部分高校对践行社会主义核心价值观的自觉性、积极性、主动性不强,根本原因在于对社会主义核心价值观性质及其在高校思想政治教育以及学生世界观、人生观、价值观培养过程中的主导地位、重大意义缺乏认知认同。要进一步加强和改进大学生社会主义核心价值观教育,切实把大学生思想政治教育工作提高到一个新的水平,就必须认真紧紧抓住大学生社会主义核心价值观教育组织领导机制建设这个重要环节,通过明确工作分工,建立健全工作责任机制,搞好协调指导,建立动态预警和目标管理机制,做好督查考核,建立综合评价制度等等来保证工作不断推进的有效机制。