The place of political science in public choice

This study examines the effects of alternative executive veto structures in a model of the budgetary process. For the model examined it is shown that the outcome of the budgetary process must be contained in the Pareto set if the executive has either no veto authority or the authority to exercise an all-or-nothing veto. When the executive has item veto authority, however, the outcome need not be contained in the Pareto set.     

Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)

While the Electoral College may not be good for the political system, it is very good for political science (and public choice). This essay documents many of the ways in which this assertion is true.     

Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective

George J. Stigler (Ed.), Chicago studies in political economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pages xviii + 641.     

The Calculus of Consent: a compass for my professional journey

This paper investigates empirically the influence of government ideology on social policy using German data. Examining the funding and the benefits of social security and public healthcare policy, my results suggest that policies implemented by governments dominated by left- and rightwing parties were similar over the 1951?C2007 period. Leftwing governments, however, spent more in the 1970s and rightwing governments did so after German Reunification in 1990. Since policy convergence encourages new parties to enter the political arena, and party platforms on social policy matters are likely to undergo further changes in light of demographic change, the observed pattern may thus be a transitory phenomenon.