浅析行贿受贿行为

本文以理性经济人假设为立论前提,运用博弈模型、决策树和心理分析的方法对行贿受贿行为进行了动机分析,试图回答下列问题:人们为什么要行贿?公务员为什么会受贿?低薪为什么易导致"腐败"?怎样抑制行贿受贿现象的蔓延?并在此基础上提出"高薪养廉"、"健全法治"、"强化惩处"的政策主张.     

Localization,Formalism, and Passivity: Symbols Shaping Bribe Offers in Azerbaijan

The article analyses a neglected side of corruption – citizen-initiated bribe offers in Azerbaijan. The main rationale for taking a citizen focus on corruption is to identify whether citizen choices support state-led anti-corruption initiatives. Drawing on a survey of 1002 respondents, the research shows that ‘tolerance of corruption’ is high among the population in Azerbaijan. Logistic regression results show that bribe offers among citizens are associated with localization and formal value orientations. This means that the respondents pro-actively use bribes and readily bend laws to their own local interests. Thus, bribe offers constitute around half of the entire variation in corruption in Azerbaijan. Therefore, a successful fight against corruption cannot be confined to the eradication of only bureaucratic bribe demand, but needs to take into account corruption choices of the population too.     

Monopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam,a Survey Experiment

Prevailing work argues that foreign investment reduces corruption, either by competing down monopoly rents or diffusing best practices of corporate governance. We argue that the mechanisms generating this relationship are not clear because the extant empirical work is too heavily drawn from aggregations of total foreign investment entering an economy. Alternatively, we suggest that openness to foreign investment has differential effects on corruption even within the same country and under the same domestic institutions over time. We argue that foreign firms use bribes to enter protected industries in search of rents, and therefore we expect variation in bribe propensity across sectors according to expected profitability. We test this effect using a list experiment embedded in three waves of a nationally representative survey of 20,000 foreign and domestic businesses in Vietnam, finding that the effect of economic openness on the probability to engage in bribes is conditional on policies that restrict investment.     

Bribery and public procurement: an experimental study

A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer) who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider. Procurement is thus a multi-dimensional bidding contest with one-dimensional type space (the privately known cost). The optimal price and bribe bid is derived based on an iid private cost assumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed to capture that society is better off if bribes are rare or low. Although bid prices are lower than predicted, behavior is qualitatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction. When bribes generate a negative externality, there is a significant increase in the variability of the data.     

公职人员经济犯罪影响因素分析——基于受贿视角的实证研究

利用行为学理论分析公职人员经济犯罪行为的产生机理,得出影响公职人员经济犯罪的因素有宏观、中观和微观三个层次。在对三个层次的影响因素进行理论分析和总结的基础上,以受贿犯罪类型为视角,选取实地调研的373个公职人员经济犯罪案例,对其中6个可观测变量进行逻辑回归分析。结论表明:影响不法公职人员受贿的因素有成长环境、受教育程度、年龄、级别以及公职人员类型,这些因素都与不法公职人员采取受贿犯罪类型呈正相关关系,影响力由大到小依次为:级别、受教育程度、成长环境、年龄和公职人员类型。     

商业贿赂犯罪的动态特征与发展趋势

近年来，随着我国市场经济不断发展，发生在商品流通和服务行业等领域的商业贿赂行为并未得到切实有效地根治，作为一种具有动态意义的新型经济犯罪活动，其触角逐步伸入其他行业和领域，并呈现出一系列新的特点和发展态势。其动态变化特征主要有：犯罪形式多样，犯罪手段隐蔽，侦查难度加大；行业特点明显，发案部门集中，窝案串案突出；案件数目上升，涉案金额加大，大要案比例高；职务犯罪突出，主体特征明显，顶风作案严重。其发展趋势表现为：犯罪领域扩展，防控精度下降；作案手法翻新，查处难度加大；组织程度提高，期货特征明显；社会影响恶劣，危害程度加剧。各地应根据本地商贿犯罪现实情形与发展态势，建立健全惩防商贿犯罪的长效机制。     

Corruption: Governance challenge towards reducing unemployment in Nigeria

The study examines the possibility of having a very low rate of unemployment in Nigeria, if there is a reduced rate of corruption in the long-term. While using cointegration regressions and Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) over the period 1996–2020, it is affirmed that corruption could increase unemployment rate in the long run. The two corruption indicators employed (control of corruption and corruption index) are found to have a substantial effect on unemployment rate. Further evidence confirms that corruption and unemployment are cyclically interdependent. Findings indeed stress that a high level of corruption is harmful to employment growth. On the other hand, in the absence of sufficient job opportunities, rent-seeking government officials would be more interested in collecting bribes from job seekers, which results in sustained unlawful practices among the public officials. Thus, adopting effective corruption-control measures is critical. It is therefore suggested that to effectively tackle corruption incidents, there should be incentives for citizens or public officials to report bribery and the process of reporting corruption incidents should be further simplified. Strengthening anti-corruption agencies and developing a sound legal framework that promotes a culture of lawfulness and impeccable practices in the public sector are central.     

The role of intermediaries in corruption

The aim of the article is to examine a briber initiated corrupt transaction and the role of intermediaries in such a transaction, using a game theoretical model. Clients applying the intermediaries do so to be able to get rid of high red tape applied by the officers. They prefer using intermediary instead of offering a bribe to the officers directly since they do not know which officers are corrupt (accepts a bribe offer) and how much bribe should be given to the corrupt officers. In our model, the client wants to offer a bribe to get rid of red tape, however, she hesitates due to the possibility of offering a bribe to an honest public officer and as a result getting a penalty. Client also hesitates due to the possibility of offering an amount of bribe lower than the reservation price of the corrupt officer; thus being rejected. Intermediaries, knowing which officers are corrupt and the reservation prices of those corrupt officers, decrease the risk of offering a bribe. Two cases; one with intermediary, the other without, in such a scenario is examined and the results of the two are compared.     

Criminal Deterrence: Evidence from an Individual-Level Analysis of 24/7 Sobriety

Decisionmakers continue to search for new ways to deter criminal behavior that do not rely on increasing the severity of punishment. This paper evaluates South Dakota's 24/7 Sobriety Program—a novel, large-scale intervention requiring those arrested for or convicted of an alcohol-related offense to abstain from alcohol and submit to alcohol tests multiple times daily. Those testing positive or missing a test receive a swift,certain, and moderate sanction; typically, a night or two in jail. To estimate the causal effect of the 24/7 program on the probability of rearrest or probation revocation for those arrested for a second or third driving under the influence (DUI) offense, we instrument an individual's 24/7 participation with program availability in the county of arrest. We estimate that the individual-level probability of rearrest or probation revocation is 13.7 percentage points (49 percent; p = 0.002) lower for 24/7 participants than non-participants 12 months after their DUI arrest. We detect substantive decreases at 24 and 36 months, but the precision of those estimates depends on model specification. These findings provide empricial support for applying “swift-certain-fair” sanctions to deter noncompliance in community supervision settings. This paper also provides policymakers with evidence for a new approach to reduce criminal activity among those whose alcohol use leads them to repeatedly threaten public health and safety.     

论我国刑种结构设置的调整——从行政犯罪角度展开的思考

行政犯罪已经发展成为我国当前的一种重要犯罪形态。而我国现行刑罚结构与刑种设置更加契合传统刑事犯罪的特质，因此，以提高刑罚实效为目标，以处遇行政犯罪为突破口，有针对性地对现行刑种设置进行适当调整是本文主要的论证主旨。     

Forecast dispersion,dissenting votes,and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects

Using data from 1992 to 2001, we study the impact of members’ economic forecasts on the probability of casting dissenting votes in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Employing standard ordered probit techniques, we find that higher individual inflation and real GDP growth forecasts (relative to the committee’s median) significantly increase the probability of dissenting in favor of tighter monetary policy, whereas higher individual unemployment rate forecasts significantly decrease it. Using interaction models, we find that FOMC members with longer careers in government, industry, academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or on the staff of the Board of Governors are more focused on output stabilization, while FOMC members with longer careers in the financial sector or on the staffs of regional Federal Reserve Banks are more focused on inflation stabilization. We also find evidence that politics matters, with Republican appointees being much more focused on inflation stabilization than Democratic appointees. Moreover, during the entire Clinton administration ‘natural’ monetary policy preferences of Bank presidents and Board members for inflation and output stabilization were more pronounced than under periods covering the administrations of both George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, respectively.     

Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators

Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.     

Confessions: a Model of Officials' Perspectives on Accepting Gifts from Clients in Post-communist Europe

There is widespread criticism of the behaviour of junior officials in post-communist Europe where they are often accused of treating citizens unfairly and soliciting presents or bribes to solve citizens' problems. To get the perspective of officials themselves we interviewed 1307 junior officials and state employees in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. This paper focuses on their willingness to accept gifts from clients, their confessions to having done so, and the factors that lead some officials to accept gifts while others do not – factors such as occupational bargaining power and the (related) frequency of offers from clients, economic pressures, national and institutional cultures, fear of punishment, and moral perspectives on charging clients for favours. Economic pressures make officials more inclined to feel that they 'could not afford to refuse' gifts, but this motivation is only weakly related to actual behaviour. Occupational bargaining power and the frequency of offers from clients make them more likely to 'welcome' gifts or accept them 'out of politeness'– and these less excusable motivations are more strongly related to actual gift-taking.     

Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest

We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant makes his appearance. In the first stage each other player can contribute to bribe this new player to commit not to enter the contest. In the second stage we have the actual contest either with or without the new player. We present the conditions such that there exist equilibria in which the new player is being bribed.     

文化视野下中国社会中的礼物与贿赂

在不同的社会文化背景下,对什么是腐败行为有着不同的判断标准。特别是在中国社会中,个体行动者通过自我道德化表演的策略将不被法律认可的贿赂掩饰和转变为能够被社会规范所接受的礼物,以此来刻意模糊礼物和贿赂的界限。通过对中国社会中礼物的运作逻辑及其社会文化意义、以及法律在认定贿赂过程中局限性的考察,可以看出礼物和贿赂的辨析方向:礼物交换运行在私人生活领域,双方以同质性的形式依据交换物的象征性价值进行交换,并在这一过程中构建起交换主体之间的关系;贿赂运行在公共领域,双方以异质性的形式依据交换物的经济性价值进行交换,更强调交换物本身数量的关系。     

The choice of insurance in the labor market

Employment protection and unemployment benefits are considered the most prominent insurance devices for workers to protect themselves against the risk of unemployment. It occurs that societies either choose a high level of employment protection relative to unemployment benefits or vice versa. This paper explains where countries locate on this trade-off. It is argued that higher coverage of voters out-of-the labor force with intra household transfers yields a politico-economic equilibrium with relatively high employment protection and relatively low unemployment benefits. Cross country data and survey data on voters’ preferences are presented that corroborate the outcomes of the model.     

“经济贫困”还是“心理贫困”:幸福感悖论新解

家庭经济和外显自尊、自我接纳、被接纳感及其交互作用对大学生幸福感的影响同时存在;外显自尊与自我接纳是家庭经济与幸福感的中介变量;在农村与贫困生样本模型中,家庭经济、外显自尊、自我接纳的主效应显著;在城市与非贫困生样本模型中,家庭经济与外显自尊的交互效应显著。幸福感悖论之所以存在就是因为只考虑了经济与幸福感的关系而忽略了心理因素在其中的作用,心理贫困与经济贫困都会影响幸福感。     

Contextual Effects on Retrospective Economic Evaluations The Impact of the State and Local Economy

The theoretical premise of this study is that individual retrospective evaluations of the national economy, which have a clear impact on voting behavior in national elections, are influenced not only by the national economy but also by the state and local economic context. This hypothesis is tested by analyzing the effect that the unemployment rate in the individual's state and community has on the individual's retrospective evaluation of the national unemployment situation in 1992, using data from the 1992 American National Election Study survey, supplemented with data on the unemployment rate during the third quarter of 1992 for the respondent's community and state. The findings show that the state unemployment rate has a clear effect on retrospective evaluations of national economic conditions. This effect occurs apart from any effect on fear of unemployment, which is unaffected by the state unemployment rate. The community unemployment rate has little or no effect on retrospective economic evaluations, except for a small impact on personal unemployment experience. The contextual effect that we observe therefore is primarily sociotropic, not personal pocketbook, in nature. We suggest that the contextual patterning of information, perhaps especially through media reporting of economic conditions, is responsible for producing this effect.     

商业贿赂的性质、成因及治理策略

商业贿赂本质上是一种腐败。商业贿赂行为的产生,不仅与政治、经济、社会、文化等外部因素有关,而且与商业贿赂行为人的心理状态、价值取向、文化观念及政治意识等内在因素有关。治理商业贿赂是一项复杂的系统工程,既涉及经济、政治、文化等领域,又涉及利益表达、利益综合、利益转换等环节。利益协调是治理商业贿赂治理的政策核心,要通过建立相关机制,调节利益实现过程和利益关系,对合法利益手段给予支持,对非法利益手段予以打击,对受损利益给予必要补偿。     

Explaining the Consequences of Imprisonment for Union Formation and Dissolution in Denmark

Crime and subsequent imprisonment reduces men's chances on the marriage market and increases their divorce risk, but existing research, with a few notable exceptions, is silent about the underlying mechanisms driving these effects. This article studies the effect of home confinement under electronic monitoring as a noncustodial alternative to imprisonment on the risk of relationship dissolution and being single, thereby distinguishing between effects of incarceration and of committing crime. We study a policy that expanded the use of electronic monitoring to address nonrandom selection into electronic monitoring instead of in prison. Results from a sample of 4,522 men show that home confinement under electronic monitoring significantly and persistently lowers the risk both of being single and of becoming single during the first five years following conviction. The results show that one of the tools that could promote decarceration trends also secures better relationship outcomes of convicted men.