On the incentives to establish and play political rent-seeking games

Legislators will enact programs that encourage rent-seeking only if they can thereby increase their chances of winning election, or of receiving contributions themselves. The paper shows rent-seeking to be electorally robust — both voters and contributors will often avoid a candidate who proposes to eliminate rent-seeking. Important exceptions arise, however, if contributions are more likely to help challengers than incumbents, and if legislators prefer that some firm rather than another receive governmental contracts.I thank an anonymous referee, members of the Public Choice Study Group at UC Irvine, and Stergios Skaperdas for their comments.     

腐败新时尚“:性贿赂”问题研究

":性贿赂"已成为破坏经济秩序,腐化国家工作人员的祸害之一,但现行刑法对其无能为力。"性贿赂"具有社会危害性、普遍性和多发性,但仅靠道德规范来调整"性贿赂"已显得软弱无力,这就需要归结出对"性贿赂"立法的现实法律依据,探索出对"性贿赂"进行定罪量刑的具有可操作性的立法建议。     

The competitive incentives of vertically integrated local exchange carriers: An economic and policy analysis

The U.S. Congress passed sweeping telecommunications reform legislation in 1996 that will enable the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) to enter the interLATA long-distance market once certain conditions are met. This legislation empowers the state public service commissions, the Federal Communications Commission and the Justice Department to determine collectively when RBOC entry into interLATA long-distance markets satisfies the public interest. This article reveals that as long as RBOC long-distance market shares remain below certain critical levels, the RBOCs do not have the incentives (despite having the opportunity) to discriminate against their downstream competitors. These findings suggest that a public policy focused exclusively on eliminating the opportunity to discriminate may needlessly delay RBOC entry into interLATA markets and thereby deprive consumers of the benefits of enhanced competition.     

Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators

Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.     

试论执政能力与行政能力建设的关系

执政能力的提高是增强行政目的性的根本途径,是增强行政有效性的原生动力。政府行政是执政的直接载体,党执政的有效性最终通过政府行政的有效性来体现。加强执政能力建设,促进行政能力的提高要理性定位执政和行政的功能、转变执政党的执政方式和内部管理方式。行政能力建设要求确立有限政府、责任政府、效能政府三大目标,紧紧抓住公务员能力建设、行政伦理建设、行政法制建设三大支柱,把执政能力建设落到实处。     

Incentives for separation and incentives for public good provision

In this paper, I examine how the incentives of regions to unite and to separate are related to the incentives to provide public goods. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods. From a social welfare perspective, there are excessive incentives for separation and for the provision of public goods. When incentives for public good provision are not taken into account, however, these incentives can be misinterpreted as incentives for separation.     

On economic values in policy analysis

Analyses of public policy are rooted in the economic theory of the private sector. How relevant is this approach to the public sector? Specifically, where the organization is generally viewed as a controlled variable it often exhibits the characteristics of an independent variable working to constrain the feasible solution space. An illustration of this phenomenon is discussed, using a state rehabilitation agency as the case in point. Conclusions of an analysis based mainly on maximizing the economic value of return on investment conflicted with the agency professional values of individualized client service. This external/internal value conflict led to the apparent inability of the agency to implement the study conclusions in the near term. The substance of this conflict is seen as the main problem facing many public administrators. Recognition of economic values as but one element of public agency analysis is suggested as an approach superior to sole concentration on maximization of the return on public investment. By taking a broader view, the analyst may be able to encourage more rapid implementation of his recommendations.     

论经济自由与政府调控的关系——由美国经济危机引发的思考

美国次贷危机引发了如何正确处理经济自由与政府调控的关系的深入讨论.相当长一个时期以来,大多数西方学者和政要过分地夸大市场这只.看不见的手在经济生活中的作用,抑或说强调极端的经济自由.19世纪中叶以后,由于西方国家过分推崇强调经济自由,完全依赖市场这只看不见的手的弊端开始暴露.20世纪初的凯恩斯主义和罗斯福新政引导西方资本主义国家度过了经济危机,为资本主义的重新发展奠定了基础.在现代市场经济中,金融及其衍生工具是刺激经济发展的重要因素之一,但是,证券、期货等金融衍生工具本身就带有强烈的投机性和风险性,如果缺乏必要的监管,任凭其随心所欲地自由泛滥,就不可避免地出现问题.西方资本主义制度建立以来的历史证明,什么时候把自由规范在一个合理的限度内,经济和社会发展就健康有序,什么时候自由离开了必要的限制,就会引发灾难.     

从经济本位到以人为本——论民族自治地方政策理念的创新

在某种程度上,经济本位的政策理念是民族自治地方政府面对其经济发展水平的无奈选择.这种政策理念导致了民族自治地方社会各方面的发展之间、经济发展与人的全面发展之间出现关系紧张和恶化的局面.因而,必须以人本政策理念为目标来创新民族自治地方的政策理念,通过深化对经济发展的工具性价值的认识、改变政绩考核指标的价值导向、重设政府职能结构、展开具体的以人本政策理念为指导的政策过程等多方面的努力,使以人为本的政策理念沉淀于政府的文化中,以推动社会各方面的协调、均衡发展,进而促进人的全面发展.     

经济体制与政治稳定形态的关系探析

马克思主义认为,经济基础决定上层建筑,有什么样的经济基础,就会出现什么样的维护这一经济基础的上层建筑.计划经济产生静态的政治稳定,市场经济要求动态的政治稳定.静态政治稳定南于其封闭性和停滞性,与当前中国丰十会发展的方向和目标相背离.动态的政治稳定是新时期中国惟一可以选择的政治稳定形态.     

Financial incentives and welfare reform in the United States

This paper uses a microsimulation model to ask whether welfare recipients in the United States would work full‐time if offered an earnings supplement that was conditioned on full‐time employment. The simulations suggest that the earnings supplement would increase full‐time employment, with little additional cash transfer cost to the government. In contrast, financial incentives currently being used by many of the states are increasing employment and income, but are encouraging primarily part‐time employment. Encouraging full‐time employment is particularly important in light of new time limits on welfare receipt. Faced with a loss of welfare benefits, many recipients may find that part‐time earnings do not allow them to be economically self‐sufficient. © 2001 by the Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

经济全球化下的我国政府效率探析

我国的发展已进入实现崛起的新阶段。在经济全球化背景下,更加激烈的国际竞争对我国政府提出了新要求。增强国际竞争力不仅是中国未来发展的决定性因素,也是政府的重要经济职能。提高政府效率,积极发挥政府作用,已成为提升我国国际竞争力并为我国发展赢得先机的关键“内生变量”。     

On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes

Numerous empirical studies have investigated the direction of causality between democracy and economic growth (as well as the level of income per capita), but this empirical work has been paralleled by relatively few theoretical models that endogenize the institutional structure of the regime. Moreover, the different types of autocratic regimes have received relatively little attention. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes facing a revolt or an insurgency. In this model, there are three players: the regime, the rebels, and the masses. There are three stages in the game. In the first stage, the regime determines the level of infrastructure and the tax rate. In the second stage, the masses allocate their time between production and helping the rebels. In the third stage, the regime and the rebels simultaneously choose their fighting effort levels in a contest, in which the probability of survival of the regime is determined. It is found that autocratic regimes facing a revolt endogenously sort themselves into “tinpot” regimes that maximize their consumption at the cost of their survival, and (weak and strong) “totalitarian” regimes that maximize their probability of survival at the expense of their consumption. Empirical implications of the model are derived, and the relevance of the model to public policy is discussed.     

Policy incentives and the extension of mortgage credit: Increasing market discipline for subprime lending

The lax underwriting in non‐prime mortgage markets is widely perceived as one cause of the recent difficulties in the housing market. Policymakers are currently considering moves such as enforcing more careful underwriting to provide additional discipline to mortgage markets. This research explores the possibility of another approach to supplement or replace some of these efforts, namely the use of policy to create incentives for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (together, the GSEs) to help “check” behavior in non‐prime markets. The hypothesis is that the GSE Act affordable housing goals have increased GSE focus on targeted loan purchases, which in turn has led prime market lenders to compete more aggressively for borrowers on the margin between prime and subprime credit quality. As a consequence, these marginal borrowers will be more inclined to take prime mortgages rather than higher‐cost subprime loans. We test this hypothesis and find empirical support for it. We observe a negative relationship between the growth in GSE market share and the growth in subprime market share over time, and find that the impact of the GSEs on subprime lending tends to be stronger in high‐minority neighborhoods, where subprime lending has been concentrated and growing the fastest. Simulations show that a 10 percent increase in GSE market share (for example, from 20 to 22 percent) can cause 45,000 borrowers using prime instead of subprime loans a cost savings of about $1.7 billion. These results suggest that the GSEs, regardless of their postconservatorship form, should continue to devote attention to serving underserved populations and suggest that significant welfare benefits will accrue. © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Public policy,perverse incentives,and the homeless problem

Is homelessness a housing problem per se? In this paper we employ a HUD study from 1984 and Census data from 1990 within the context of simultaneous empirical models to examine this and other issues relating to homelessness in the United States. Our central conclusion is that homelessness does not appear to be a national housing problem as such and that, given untoward incentives among actual and potential homeless populations, policies addressing homelessness should be directed at other instruments of change (such as mental health funding and expenditures to treat substance abuse).