Understanding Dworkin through art: object-based learning and law

This article explores object-based learning (OBL), a burgeoning pedagogical approach in higher education. Object-based learning engages students’ pre-existing visual and conceptual literacy as a gateway to work through difficult threshold concepts. The article advocates this exciting learning model in law by articulating what it is, explaining how it can be applied through the example of teaching Dworkin in a jurisprudence module. The article introduces OBL approaches, details how it is relevant to jurisprudential teaching as well as its scope for application across legal teaching. It explains how such an approach moves away from transmission modes of teaching into transformational ones, accessing students’ abstract web of comprehension in conjunction with text-based learning to produce more imaginative and creative critical thinking skills.     

When Trumps Clash: Dworkin and the Doctrine of Proportionality

If there is one point on which defenders and critics of the doctrine of proportionality agree, it is that Dworkin's rights as trumps model stands as a radical alternative to the doctrine. Those who are sympathetic to proportionality reject the rights as trumps model for failing to acknowledge that there are conditions under which a right may be justifiably infringed. In turn, those who regard rights as trumps reject the doctrine of proportionality for failing to take rights seriously. This paper argues that each of these views is mistaken. On the one hand, Dworkin's rights as trumps model elides with a prominent version of the proportionality doctrine. On the other, this version takes rights seriously.     

Protestant Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law: Gadamer and Dworkin

Abstract. The rule of law demands that the state's coercive power be used only according to settled general laws, applied impersonally. But an individualist theory of legal inter pretation cannot provide the shared understanding required. Gadamer appeals to the practical wisdom of judges and lawyers, who will agree on how to apply law to new cases. But this account is adequate only for very cohesive societies. Dworkin's account rests on propositional knowledge of a supposed best interpretation of an entire legal system. But even if such a best interpretation is possible in theory, this possibility does not provide shared understandings in the social world.     

Objectivity,Interpretation, and Rights: A Critique of Dworkin

Law and Philosophy -     

Elmer's case: A legal positivist replies to Dworkin

Conclusion I have argued that Legal Positivism can accommodate the existence oftheoretical disagreements in law and that Ronald Dworkin is wrongto claim otherwise. As far as Legal Positivists are concerned, evenjudges who differ over both the truth of propositions of law and thegrounds or sources of law can have a legal duty to resolve their dis-agreements on the basis of legal arguments. The duty exists whenconventional legal practice creates it. Moreover, all Anglo-Americanlegal systems impose the duty on judges because all such systemscontain legal practices of the right sort: practices creating expectationsthat cases will be decided on the law even when they raise doubtsabout the content or proper formulation of a rule of recognition.Thus, Elmer's Case poses no threat to Legal Positivism. To the con-trary, it reveals the richness of that theory as few other cases can.Only if Elmer's Case is detached from the context of Anglo-American adjudication can it be said to undermine Legal Positivism.But then no theory of positive law could withstand its challenge.A draft of this essay was presented at a political theory workshop at the University of Chicago. I am grateful for comments received from Russell Hardin, Leo Katz, Steven Fletcher and Thomas Christiano on that occasion. I also thank Steven Walt and Jules Coleman, two of the better dressed philosophers I know.