‘This gun is our food’: Disarming the White Army militias of South Sudan

The continued presence of ‘other armed groups’ poses a significant challenge to furthering peace and stability in post-conflict environments. A good example of this was ‘White Army’ militias, which maintained an armed presence after the signing of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. This article presents an empirical mapping of the White Army militias as well as a detailed analysis of the disarmament strategies that were implemented for them during the course of 2006. The article concludes with an analysis of the successes in achieving disarmament of White Army militias as well as the continuing challenges faced by Sudanese authorities and the international community alike in building sustainable conditions for peace.     

Making Disarmament Work: The Implementation of the International Disarmament Provisions In the League of Nations Covenant, 1919–1925

This article argues that, despite the eventual failure of the League to deliver the international disarmament that may believed would create peace, the early inter-war years showed signs of great promise. The League's early, often modest, efforts to establish the foundations of international disarmament, deserve greater credit than they are usually afforded because they have been overshadowed by the collapse of the World Disarmament Conference in 1934.     

Gender Mainstreaming Unraveled: The Case of DDRR in Liberia

In the past women have been excluded from peace initiatives. However, with the advent of UNSCR 1325 (2000) women's agency in the process has been heightened through a new framework for involvement. UNSCR 1325 is a policy document that acknowledges the link between women, peace, and security and uses gender mainstreaming as a mechanism to implement its objectives. Yet in spite of its policy advancements, over a decade later women still do not participate equally in peace and security initiatives that impact on the sustainability of peace. This article aims to explore the context of this framework through considerations of the gender mainstreaming provision in the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) process in Liberia. Using interviews with women associated with fighting forces (WAFFs)/ex-combatants the article argues that although there was a specific targeted focus showing some gender responsive design and coordination, WAFFs’/ex-combatants’ unique needs, especially those of a social and psychological nature, were poorly addressed. In addition, the commentary shows that the focus did not attend to structural inequality issues such as sexual and gender based violence (SGBV).     

Group identity—a neglected asset: Determinants of social and political participation among female ex-fighters in Guatemala

Many of the armed conflicts after World War II have had female fighters, such as El Salvador, Eritrea, Guatemala, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. In the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process that followed the signing of the Guatemalan peace accord in 1996, altogether 766 women were demobilised. This article seeks to explain why some of these women became politically and socially active in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase, whereas others did not. Contrary to the negative experiences of female ex-fighters from Sierra Leone and West Africa, the article points out that the Guatemalan female ex-fighters preserved a positive group identity developed during the war. In particular, the war experiences represented an asset for social and political participation to those of the female ex-fighters that reintegrated collectively—together with their male ex-combatants. The article concludes that future DDR programming should take into account the importance of group identity and the needs and the own wishes of female ex-fighters from different war contexts.     

Italy and the community after thirty years of experience

Convincing the Pakistani military to focus its attention on the Afghan Taliban and associated groups has so far proved unsuccessful. The Obama administration's reliance on economic incentives and regional peace initiatives, such as a dialogue with India on Kashmir, has failed to deliver tangible results. Instead, India's footprint within Afghanistan has expanded, leaving Pakistani elites ever more anxious. Balancing Indian and Pakistani interests in South Asia remains a top priority for Western governments, and most importantly the US. In the current milieu this will require shifting Western bureaucratic focus from the age old and seemingly intractable Kashmir dispute to maintaining the peace within Afghanistan. This article outlines why this shift should be considered, and how the India--Pakistan trust deficit might be bridged.     

Former combatant reintegration and fragmentation in contemporary Afghanistan

The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process in Afghanistan, widely acknowledged as flawed, has contributed to fragmentation and insecurity within Afghanistan. Based upon discussions with more than 500 DDR programme beneficiaries, the article describes the manner in which the reintegration process increased former combatants' and commanders' vulnerability to remobilisation in support of or in opposition to the Taliban-led insurgency by weakening cohesion between combatants and their former commanders and by fostering ineffective and culturally inappropriate livelihoods. The author argues that the DDR process and other international and Afghan government interventions have, furthermore, contributed to the fragmentation of the country and the straining of internal, regional tensions. The Taliban, as well as those fighting under its banner, has been the primary beneficiary of this fragmentation and has consolidated a highly diverse coalition of fighters. The opposing trends of a fragmented social, economic and political context—in relation to both individual former combatants and the country as a whole—and an increasingly cohesive insurgency will continue to contribute to greater insecurity and the potential for intra-state conflict.     

International Socialization in Difficult Environments: The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Central Asia

This article explores the potential of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to be an agent of socialization in the five Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In drawing on both rationalist and constructivist approaches to international socialization it is argued that the organization's inability to provide tangible material and political incentives as well as Central Asia's indigenous culture and institutions impede successful socialization dynamics. Moreover, the power-oriented elites consider the bulk of the OSCE activities to be a threat to their grasp on power, not only making socialization almost impossible but also making OSCE–Central Asian cooperation increasingly difficult to sustain. Recommendations to increase the OSCE's influence in the region concentrate on a better understanding of the cost-benefit calculation of Central Asian governments as well as a more responsive attitude to traditional institutions in the OSCE's approach toward the region.     

The failure of a liberal peace: Sri Lanka's counter-insurgency in global perspective

The victory by the Sri Lankan government over the LTTE in 2009 apparently ended over 25 years of civil war. However, the ramifications of the government's counter-insurgency go far beyond Sri Lanka's domestic politics. The military campaign against the LTTE poses a significant challenge to many of the liberal norms that inform contemporary models of international peace-building—the so-called ‘liberal peace’. This article suggests that Sri Lanka's attempts to justify a shift from peaceful conflict resolution to counter-insurgency relied on three main factors: the flawed nature of the peace process, which highlighted wider concerns about the mechanisms and principles of international peace processes; the increased influence of ‘Rising Powers’, particularly China, in global governance mechanisms, and their impact on international norms related to conflict management; and the use by the government of a discourse of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency to limit international censure. The article concludes that the Sri Lankan case may suggest a growing contestation of international peace-building norms, and the emergence of a legitimated ‘illiberal peace’.     

Eisenhower's disarmament dilemma: From chance for peace to open skies proposal

President Eisenhower's image as a promoter of ‘peace and nuclear disarmament’ was established through speeches he made such as ‘Atoms for Peace’ (December 1953) and ‘Open Skies’ proposal (July 1955). However, Eisenhower's approach to the subject cannot be grasped without an understanding of his attitude towards the relationship between arms, war and disarmament. As he saw it, not only would the mere existence of nuclear weapons not trigger a war, they were actually the best guarantee against the eruption of a global conflagration. The real threat to world security was the repressive, closed, totalitarian and expansionist Soviet regime. War could be prevented only by a dramatic change in the competing ‐ and threatening ‐ ideology and social structure embedded in the Soviet system. Until then, the existence of nuclear weapons would ensure the free world's safety.     

Gangster,ideologue, martyr: the posthumous reinvention of Teungku Badruddin and the nature of the Free Aceh Movement

This paper, which is based upon the author's experiences in Aceh from 2006 to 2010, illustrates the dangers inherent in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) policies that allow for the transfer of reintegration assets through ex-insurgent command structures. The manipulation of such transfers in Aceh, Indonesia, led to the creation of a new insurgent group, the Pasukan Peudeung, from the ‘splintering’ corpus of the Free Aceh Movement. The author argues that Aceh's DDR process, while widely heralded as a success, was inherently flawed in its execution and contained within it numerous discrete, and violent, failures; the emergence of the Pasukan Peudeung was emblematic of this. GAM's conflict-era economic activities, encompassing illegal forms of extraction and other rent-seeking behaviours, did not end with the conflict: they simply evolved, as did Pasukan Peudeung. Further, GAM was and remains in its current iterations a criminal network; its members constantly reinterpret their ideologies to suit their actions and interests, usually in reaction to crimes committed by members.     

The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War

The belief that globalization enhances peace, a central tenet of liberal theory, enjoys substantial support in recent scholarship on trade and conflict. To conclude that liberalism is right, however, is premature and wrong. Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace. This article uses the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade to connect globalization's economic effects to increased constraints on military force and then explores how, in the nineteenth century, globalization affected European peace. As liberal theory predicts, globalization generated substantial constraints on military force in prewar Europe. Yet there are important flaws in liberalism's logic linking these constraints to strengthened international peace. Contrary to liberal theory, globalization did not strengthen prospects for peace in prewar Europe but was a major cause of the First World War.     

Foreign affairs in the Italian party congresses; the PCI

Incentives are capable of creating favourable environments in which peace processes can make progress. This is especially true for mega incentives, which can assist in overcoming political and socio-psychological barriers to peace. In Israeli–Arab peacemaking, incentives have not yet proven efficient. To date, they have been used in a limited and inefficient manner. In 2010, the US offered Israel incentives in return for an extension of Israel's settlement freeze. This move failed due to unfavourable political conditions and scepticism regarding its ability to bring about a major breakthrough. Nevertheless, it signaled that incentives are now an integral tool in US diplomacy and could serve as a step towards crafting a multi-national mega incentive package for Middle East peace.     

The OSCE and ethnic conflicts in Estonia,Georgia, and Tajikstan: A search for sustainable peace and its limits

This article analyzes some of the experiences of the OSCE in Estonia, Georgia, and Tajikistan. Conflicts in these three countries followed the demise of the Soviet Union and had basic aspects in common: actual and potential border claims; the presence of a large number of national minorities whose ethnicity is shared with neighbouring kin‐ethnic states; as well as conflicting claims of national self‐determination and territorial integrity. By comparing and contrasting these cases, this article discusses the implications of the OSCE's approach and its limits in the context of the former Soviet Union, and offers some policy recommendations for the future OSCE's activities in this region. The central arguments are as follows: the OSCE has played a significant role in building a sustainable peace in the former Soviet Union where few European institutions have attempted to intervene; and that while being heavily influenced by Russian policies, the OSCE's activities in the CIS were not simple reflections of Russian interests.     

‘Unlawful Combatants’: The West's Treatment of Irregular Fighters in the ‘War on Terror’

The West's treatment of irregular fighters in the “war on terror” was highly problematic. This article contends that we must look beyond the assumption that political and strategic considerations compromised the law and led to the “invention” of the category of the “unlawful combatant.” Rather, the law of armed conflict itself includes strong exclusionary mechanisms towards irregular fighters. These exclusionary strands in the law came to dominate the West's strategic decision-making on the treatment of irregular fighters. Moreover, the fact that irregular fighters became such a vital issue post-9/11 was not a result of the war on terror being a new kind of war, as has often been argued. Rather, this article suggests that it reflects an identity crisis of the West's regular armed forces at the start of the twenty-first century.     

What Makes Negative Frames Resonant? Hamas and the Appeal of Opposition to the Peace Process

Increasingly, scholars are applying Social Movement Theory to explore how radical Islamist groups strategically employ framing to legitimize the use of violence. What has not been explicitly examined, however, is under what conditions radical frames are more resonant with the public than more moderate alternatives. This article argues that the strength of a particular frame depends on the credibility of the competing claim-makers. Drawing on public opinion polls from the Palestinian Territories, the article shows that the resonance of Hamas’ frames vis-à-vis the peace process between 1993 and 2006 depended on the ability of the Palestinian leadership to maintain its legitimacy. Since the Gaza take-over and Hamas’ shift to a position of leadership rather than opposition party, the organization's inability to deliver in the economic realm or to even feign any progress regarding the peace process damaged its credibility and reputation. Accordingly, its frames vis-à-vis the peace process also started losing their resonance with the public. An understanding of the dynamics of credibility can also help explain the continued moves towards national reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.     

The political economy of stalemate: organised crime,corruption and economic deformation in post-Dayton Bosnia

‘The biggest security threat to this country is not nationalism; it’s criminality, corruption and unemployment'2 More than seven years after the end of the Bosnian war and despite some $5 billion in international reconstruction assistance, Bosnia's economy remains stagnant and dysfunctional, while the country is rapidly gaining a reputation not as an emerging market economy but as a lawless and ungovernable state dominated by organised crime and corruption. This paper assesses Bosnia's post-Dayton political economy, arguing that the nexus between organised crime and corruption, on the one hand, and nationalist political forces, on the other, represents the most significant obstacle to the development of a market economy in Bosnia and poses a growing threat to the country's peace process. This situation is the product of Bosnia's particular post-war and post-socialist environment, which has created a powerful class of elites with an interest in perpetuating the status quo of a largely unreformed economy. In this context, international efforts to impose economic reforms from above, and to encourage local authorities to embrace a reformist marketisation and rule of law agenda, have met with little success. The paper concludes by suggesting that international peace building efforts need to pay greater attention to the ‘enforcement gap’ that has en abled crime and corruption to flourish in Bosnia.     

Electoral Competition,the State,and Communal Violence: A Reply

In a review of my 2004 book Votes and Violence,Ashutosh Varshney and Joshua Gubler criticize various aspects of the book and its electoral incentives theory. The implication is that Varshney's own local civic engagement theory provides a superior explanation for communal violence. This article responds to the specific criticisms of my arguments about the role of electoral incentives and state action, or inaction, in leading to communal violence, showing why these are wrong or unimportant. I cite three important recent studies, by scholars working independently of me, who come to the same conclusions I do about the key role of electoral incentives and the importance of the state. I also cite the work of other scholars, based on careful fieldwork, who have questioned Varshney's characterization of the causes of conflict and peace in the cities he discusses in his own 2002 book Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life.     

Post-conflict elections and the process of demilitarizing politics: the role of electoral administration

Post-conflict elections are called upon to advance the distinct processes of both war termination and democratization. This article examines the patterns in seven cases where elections served as the final step to implement a peace agreement following a period of civil war. Such elections are shaped in part by the legacy of fear and insecurity that persists in the immediate aftermath of a protracted internal conflict. Comparative analysis suggests that interim regimes in general, and electoral administration in particular, based on joint problem solving and consultation may ‘demilitarize politics’ and help transform the institutions of war into institutions capable of sustaining peace and democratization. In Mozambique, El Salvador and, to an extent, Cambodia, processes to demilitarize politics prior to elections created a context that allowed the elections to advance both peace and democratization. In the other cases, politics remained highly militarized at the time of the vote, leading either to renewed conflict (Angola) or the electoral ratification of the militarized institutions of the civil war (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Tajikistan). Interim electoral commissions provide an important opportunity to demilitarize politics by building consultative mechanisms and norms that increase confidence in the peace process and the legitimacy of the post-conflict elections.     

Ashes of co-optation: from armed group fragmentation to the rebuilding of popular insurgency in Myanmar

This article argues that attempts to buy insurgency out of violence can achieve temporary stability but risk producing new conflict. While co-optation with economic incentives might work in parts of a movement, it can spark ripple effects in others. These unanticipated developments result from the interactions of differently situated elite and non-elite actors, which can create a momentum of their own in driving collective behaviour. This article develops this argument by analysing the re-escalation of armed conflict between the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and Myanmar's armed forces after a 17-year-long ceasefire broke down in 2011. After years of mutual enrichment and collaboration between rebel and state elites and near organisational collapse, the insurgency's new-found resolve and capacity is particularly puzzling. Based on extensive field research, this article explains why and how the state's attempt to co-opt rebel leaders with economic incentives resulted in group fragmentation, loss of leadership legitimacy, increased factional contestation, growing resentment among local communities and the movement's rank and file and ultimately the rebuilding of popular resistance from within.     

Why Do Peace Negotiations Succeed or Fail? Legal Commitment,Transparency, and Inclusion during Peace Negotiations in Colombia (2012–2016) and Turkey (2012–2015)

This article examines the ways in which the negotiation framework—i.e., the legal guarantees, information management mechanism, and degree of inclusivity in peace negotiations—shapes the likelihood of concluding a peace agreement. Codifying the peace negotiations in law, publicizing information about the content of negotiations, and including mediators and civil society actors in peace talks is likely to increase a government's short‐term costs. However, doing so alleviates the adversaries' information asymmetry and commitment problems, sets guidelines to insure the process against exogenous shocks, and increases the number of actors taking part in conflict management. Comparing the recent peace negotiations to end intrastate wars in Colombia and Turkey, this article argues that a legalized, public, and inclusive framework made a peace agreement possible in Colombia, while the lack of such a framework caused Turkey's peace talks to fail.