What Is Neutrality?

This paper reinvestigates the question of liberal neutrality. We contend that current liberal discussions have been dominated—if not hijacked—by one particular interpretation of what neutrality could imply: namely, exclusive neutrality, aiming to exclude religious and cultural expressions from the public sphere. We will argue that this is merely one among several relevant interpretations. To substantiate our claim, we will first elaborate upon inclusive neutrality by formulating two supplementary interpretations: proportional neutrality and compensatory neutrality. Second, we will argue that inclusive proportional neutrality is the most appropriate interpretation in many contexts. Our discussion highlights the fact that some political disputes should not be seen in terms of the antithesis between liberal neutrality and illiberal alternatives but, instead, as a clash between various valid but incompatible interpretations of what liberal neutrality may imply.     

What is Crime?

Since its emergence in the 19th century, orthodox criminology has suffered from the contradiction of claiming, on the one hand, to be a value-neutral, intellectual discipline, and on the other, operating as part of the ideological apparatus of the political state by taking state definitions of what is crime and who are its criminals as the starting points for criminological inquiry. This essay examines the ways in which criminology has suffered from this internal contradiction, with particular attention to how it has been constrained by political, economic, and professional forces to focus primarily on crimes whose collective harm to society falls well below the harms caused by the wrongful, but often legal acts of economic and political elites. It concludes with the recognition that the kind of critical inquiry emblematic of the work of Bill Chambliss is essential if criminology hopes to remain relevant to the challenges of the future.     

Legal Knowledge about What?

We assume—in contrast to many legal realists—that law is a part of reality. Law exists because people believe in law, but law is not identical with beliefs. Law supervenes on human beliefs, preferences, actions, dispositions and artefacts. Moreover, the morally binding personal interpretation of the law supervenes on two things together: on the individual's knowledge of legal institutions and on moral obligation. The first supervenes in its turn on mutual beliefs; the second supervenes on motivations and dispositions of the individual, provided that she is morally sensitive and rational. Personal interpretation of law converts into social law, if other persons on the basis of overriding reasons do not contest it. Morally binding social law supervenes on moral motivation that is triggered by institutions that supervene on mutual beliefs.     

What is Inhuman Treatment?

In this article, I propose and argue for a conception of inhuman treatment. In the human rights context, I claim, inhuman treatment is that which is grossly degrading. Relative to “cruel,” “inhumane,” and “degrading,” “inhuman” has received little attention from moral philosophers. My aim here is to analyze this concept in greater depth in order to determine what it brings to discussions about punishment and other kinds of treatment. I begin by drawing distinctions between “inhuman,” “inhumane,” and “degrading.” Then, I discuss analyses of “inhuman treatment” proposed by Jeremy Waldron and John Vorhaus. Although I find both conceptions problematic, discussing each helps me to set the stage for my proposal. After articulating and arguing for my own conception, I conclude by briefly explaining some of its implications.     

What Is Transnational Law?

Is it important to conceptualize transnational law and “map” it as a new legal field? This article suggests that to do so might help both juristic practice and sociolegal scholarship in organizing, linking, and comparing disparate but increasingly significant types of regulation. To explore the idea of transnational law is to raise basic questions about the nature of both “law” and “society” (taken as the realm law regulates). This involves radically rethinking relationships between the public and the private, between law and state, and between different sources of law and legal authority. Taking as its focus Von Daniels's The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective and Calliess and Zumbansen's Rough Consensus and Running Code (both 2010), the article considers what approaches may be most productive, and what key issues need to be addressed, to make sense of broad trends in law's extension beyond the boundaries of nation‐states.     

What is the Criminal Law for?

The traditional distinction between retributive and distributive justice misconstrues the place of the criminal law in modern regulatory states. In the context of the regulatory state, the criminal law is a coercive rule-enforcing institution – regardless of whether it also serves the ends of retributive justice. As a rule-enforcing institution, the criminal law is deeply implicated in stabilizing the institutions and legal rules by means of which a state creates and allocates social advantage. As a coercive institution, the criminal law requires justification as an instance of legitimate state authority. The operation of criminal justice institutions should therefore not be evaluated by reference to a distinct set of criteria, but should be evaluated by the same criteria that apply to coercive public institutions generally.     

What is the Harm Principle For?

In their excellent monograph, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch argue for an account of legitimate criminalisation based on wrongfulness, the Harm Principle and the Offence Principle, while they reject an independent anti-paternalism principle. To put it at its simplest my aim in the present paper is to examine the relationship between ‘the harms’ and ‘the wrongs’ of the authors’ title. I begin by comparing the authors’ version of the Harm and Offence Principle with some other influential accounts. After examining the (considerable) role wrongfulness plays in their work, I ask what there is left for their Harm and Offence Principles to do. In the light of the understanding and foundations of the Harm and Offence Principles proposed by the authors, I suggest that the answer is little or nothing. The wrongfulness constraint the authors place on their Offence Principle comes close to swallowing it up entirely. Furthermore the part of their Offence Principle that is not thus swallowed by wrongfulness leaves the account with a commitment that is probably best dropped. As far as their Harm Principle is concerned I suggest that the authors’ account of ‘harm’ is so broad that it lacks the resources to distinguish harm-based reasons from wrongfulness- or immorality-based reasons in any principled way. Among other things, I ask in this context, first, whether one can be harmed as one’s character deteriorates and, secondly, whether one is harmed by virtue of the serious wrong one does to another. What really drives the authors’ account of legitimate criminalisation, I believe, is wrongfulness together with an important, amorphous set of potential defeating conditions. They themselves accept such a picture so far as paternalism is concerned. I conclude that their account, which I think has considerable force, would lose little of any significance were their Harm and Offence Principles simply excised. More generally I suspect that a strong role for wrongfulness in an account of legitimate criminalisation is likely to put into serious question the plausibility of an independent principled role for harm and offence.     

What do we know about rate-setting?

State regulation of hospital revenue is one approach to cost containment on which there is voluminous evaluative data from the "laboratory of the states"; yet these data are sufficiently complex and ambiguous that they are claimed by both proponents and opponents of rate-setting as support for their respective cases. This paper summarizes the evidence, concluding that mandatory rate-setting has generally constrained hospital costs where it has been implemented. However, were rate-setting established in additional states, it is not clear that comparable results would be realized. It is still less clear that rate-setting would constrain health care costs more than would increased competition and selective contracting.     

What Is Forensic Psychology,Anyway?

The issue of how forensic psychology is defined has taken on a new urgency in the context of an application to have forensic psychology designated a specialty by the American Psychological Association. To provide a historical perspective, I briefly review early attempts to apply psychological concepts to legal issues, beginning with the McNaughten trial in England in 1843. I then review current conceptualizations of forensic psychology, which have either a broad focus on all psychology–law interactions or focus more narrowly on clinical applications to the legal system. Potential advantages and disadvantages of each conceptualization are briefly discussed. After touching upon the major differences in the cultures of psychology and of law, I discuss three law-related areas of contemporary controversy: use of clinically based evidence in the courtroom, recovered memories of child abuse, and the use of the criteria-based content analysis technique to evaluate children's claims of sexual abuse. Issues concerning the education and training of psychology–law scholars and practitioners are briefly surveyed. I conclude that a broad conceptualization of forensic psychology is important in terms of relevant ethical standards, but that a more narrow distinction that differentiates between clinicians and researchers or legal scholars also is useful.