A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict: Testing the Impact of Sampling Bias, 1919–1992

This article develops a new unified territorial explanation of conflict that accounts for the possibility of certain factors affecting the rise of a militarized dispute, as well as the probability that a dispute will escalate to war. In the past, research linking territorial disputes to a relatively high probability of war outbreak has been criticized for underestimating the potential problem of sampling bias in the militarized interstate dispute (MID) data. This study utilizes newly available data on territorial claims going back to 1919 to determine, using a two-stage estimation procedure, whether the presence of territorial claims in the dispute onset phase affects the relationship between territorial militarized disputes and war in the second stage. It is found that territorial claims increase the probability of a militarized dispute occurring and that territorial MIDs increase the probability of war, even while controlling for the effect of territorial claims on dispute onset. The effect of territory across the two stages is consistent with the new territorial explanation of conflict and war and shows no sampling bias with regard to territory in the MID data.     

Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine

How does manpower affect counterinsurgency? Important debates about counterinsurgency theory, military doctrine, force planning, and ongoing military operations revolve around assumptions about the role manpower plays in determining counterinsurgency outcomes. But these assumptions have not, by and large, been subjected to large-n analysis. This paper helps serve that role by examining new data on counterinsurgents’ deployments across 171 campaigns since World War I. These data provide insight into a range of important issues, such as how force size should be measured, whether it is related to counterinsurgent success, whether troop nationality matters, and whether the role of manpower varies across contexts. Of these findings, the most notable is that conventional rules of thumb for force sizing, including the recommendation put forth in official US military doctrine, receive no empirical support. These findings therefore challenge the prevailing wisdom, while laying the groundwork for a range of future scholarship.     

Trade Interdependence and the Use of Force: Do Issues Matter?

In this project, we investigate the relationship between the use of military force and trade interdependence, suggesting that the influence of trade on militarized conflict varies based on the issue under dispute. For some issues, trade is likely to attenuate the chances that states escalate a dispute to the use of military force, while for others trade can intensify disputes so that military conflict is more likely. Specifically, we hypothesize that greater trade interdependence decreases the probability of military conflict over realpolitik issues like territory. On the other hand, greater trade interdependence increases the probability that states use military force when the issue under dispute concerns the regime, policies, and conditions in the target. To test our hypotheses, we employ new data on dyadic uses of force from the International Military Intervention data set that records the initiator’s reason(s) for using force against the target. The statistical tests support our hypotheses; trade decreases the use of force against a target for territorial and military/diplomatic reasons, which is consistent with arguments from the liberal paradigm. However, trade interdependence increases the use of force for humanitarian and economic reasons as well as to affect the regime or policy of the target. Thus, our study improves upon current research about the relationship between economic interdependence and foreign policy by specifying a conditional relationship based on the issues under contention.     

“Opportunity” and “willingness’ as ordering concepts in the study of war

The peace through trade hypothesis receives extensive support from a large empirical literature. However, extant research does not isolate whether this relationship holds for states that have fought in the past, or whether its influence following armed disputes is dependent upon the ways in which states settle their conflicts. Additionally, although recent research finds that imposed settlements are more pacifying than other forms of political settlement, these studies tend not to isolate factors associated with variation in the stability of imposed settlements. In this article, we examine how settlements condition the influence of trade on conflict recurrence, both to overcome a limitation in extant studies of trade and conflict, which tend to ignore the way states settle prior disputes, and to further an understanding of how post-conflict state interaction varies by (and within) settlement type. Looking at dyadic trade and recurrent conflict from 1885 to 2000, we find that imposed settlements foster a pacifying effect of trade, while negotiated settlements and failures to reach settlement lead to relationships in which trade has crosscutting effects on the stability of peace, resulting in an overall null effect of trade on conflict recurrence.     

EU member state participation in military operations: a configurational comparative analysis

Contrary to what the EU’s image as a civilian power suggests, the EU member states have had 50,000–100,000 troops deployed outside their home countries for most of the post-Cold-War period. Although the vast majority of these troops were active in operations with a strong European presence, the member states’ patterns of military engagement differ significantly. This study provides a systematic analysis of the member states’ contributions to military operations. More specifically, it examines which (combinations of) conditions consistently led to participation in EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the air strikes against the Islamic State. Methodologically, it builds on most different similar outcome/most similar different outcome and qualitative comparative analysis. The results of the analysis show that four conditions account for the bulk of the member states’ patterns of military engagements: military resources, competing deployments, UN peacekeeping tradition and regional trade.     

Preferences and the Democratic Peace

A debate exists over whether (and to what degree) the democratic peace is explained by joint democracy or by a lack of motives for conflict between states that happen to be democratic. Gartzke (1998) applies expected utility theory to the democratic peace and shows that an index of states' preference similarity based on United Nations General Assembly roll-call votes ( affinity ) accounts for much of the lack of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between democracies. Oneal and Russett (1997b, 1998, 1999) respond by arguing that UN voting is itself a function of regime type—that democracy 'causes' affinity . Oneal and Russett seek to demonstrate their thesis by regressing affinity on democracy and other variables from a standard model of the democratic peace. I replicate results reported by Oneal and Russett and then extend the analysis in several ways. I find that the residuals from Oneal and Russett's regression of affinity remain highly significant as a predictor of the absence of MIDs. Further, significance for democracy is shown to be fragile and subject to variable construction, model specification, and the choice of estimation procedure.     

High Hopes and Limited Prospects: Washington's Security and Nation-Building Aims in Afghanistan

Four years have passed since the United States and allied governments toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan and began security and nation-building operations. Despite the continuing deployment of thousands of Western troops and the expenditure of billions of dollars in foreign aid, current conditions in Afghanistan are perilous. Poverty is rampant, the drug trade has shown no sign of decline, warlords remain in power, and the Taliban continues to confront US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces. With the US preparing to reduce its troop presence in 2006 and NATO poised to deploy forces into Afghanistan's dangerous southern provinces, Western security and nation-building efforts are at risk of failure.     

Regions of Hierarchy and Security: US Troop Deployments,Spatial Relations,and Defense Burdens

Recent work has begun exploring the effects of foreign military deployments on host-state foreign policies. However, research mostly focuses on dyadic relationships between major powers and host-states, ignoring the broader regional security environment of host-states. We develop a theory of spatial hierarchies to understand how security relationships throughout the region surrounding the host-state affect host-state foreign policy. Using data on US military deployments from 1950–2005, we show that regional security considerations condition how host-states respond to the deployment of military forces to their territory. Consequently, regional analyses are fundamental in understanding monadic and dyadic decisions about security, alliance behavior, and conflict.     

Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy: the USA and the European Union in Somalia and Mali

The French intervention in Mali in early 2013 emphasizes that the decision-makers in Paris, Brussels, and Washington considered the establishment of the radical Islamist regime in Northern Mali a threat to their security interests. The widespread instability including the rise of radical Islamist groups in Somalia was perceived as a threat to western interests. It is the core argument of the paper if western powers decide to provide security in Africa, they will be inclined to use proxy instead of deploying own troops. Security provision by proxy in African means that African troops are doing the actual fighting and peacekeeping on the ground while western powers basically pay the costs, the logistics, and the training of local African troops. The paper concludes that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia and The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in Mali are proxies for the USA and the European Union.     

A Quality of Government Peace? Explaining the Onset of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1985–2001

That democracies do not wage wars against each other is one of the most widely accepted claims within the study of international relations, although challenged lately by the capitalist peace argument. In addition to confirming both the democratic and capitalist peace effects, this article finds that the impact of quality of government—that is, having an impartial, nonpoliticized, and noncorrupt bureaucracy—on the risk of interstate conflict is at least on par with the influence of democracy. This result draws on dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data in 1985–2001 and holds even under control for incomplete democratization and economic development, as well as for fatal MIDs, the Cold War era, and within politically relevant dyads. I argue that the causal mechanism underlying this finding is that quality of government reduces information uncertainty among potentially warring parties and improves their ability to credibly commit to keeping their promises. Both democratic and capitalist peace theory needs to be complemented by theories “bringing the state back in” to the study of interstate armed conflict.     

Regime Instability,Leader's Affiliation,and Organizational Culture: Why Are Military Dictatorships More Likely to Initiate Militarized Interstate Disputes? An Empirical Analysis, 1975–2006

Prior studies find that military dictatorships display a high propensity to initiate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Yet, there is little agreement on which feature of military regimes can best explain this behavior. This article distinguishes between three potential causes: coup risk, the dictator's affiliation with the military, and the military's influence on politics. Using recent data on authoritarian regimes, I find that, whereas coup risk is a strong predictor of conflict initiation, the dictator's affiliation does not affect his foreign policy. Furthermore, I find tentative evidence that the military's influence on domestic politics has a negative effect on MID initiation. These findings thus challenge the view that military regimes' foreign policy is due to the military's organizational culture: the relationship between military regimes and dispute initiation seems to be due to factors that simply happen to add up in military autocracies but are essentially unrelated to regime type.     

Intimate yet dysfunctional? The relationship between governance and conflict resolution in India and the European Union

The rise of India and the EU as global actors has sparked growing interest in their peace-building approaches. This paper compares the objectives and effects of the EU's and India's engagement in different conflict contexts within and alongside their borders. It examines whether their practices of conflict resolution or peace-building strive for more than conflict management or ‘governmentality’. This article asks whether there is sufficient consistency across either actors' governance interventions to even speak of a distinct ‘strategy’ or ‘governance culture’. It illustrates the close relationship between governance and conflict response initiatives but finds that the relationship is often dysfunctional.     

Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion,Economic Interdependence,and Interstate Conflict

Many scholars argue that economic interdependence and more extensive economic ties between countries decreases the risk of violent conflict between them. However, despite considerable research on the “capitalist peace” at the macro or dyadic level, there has been less attention to its possible individual-level microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that public perceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of conflict should influence the expected constraints on the use of force for leaders. Actual high interdependence and potential economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on the use of force if people are unaware of the degree of interdependence or fail to understand the benefits of trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the linkages between individual perceptions about economic interdependence and their views on conflict and peace through a survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan about approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China and varying information about economic ties. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge and information about economic interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and increases support for peaceful solutions with China.     

Counting the development costs of the conflict in North-Eastern Nigeria: the economic impact of the Boko Haram-led insurgency

Nigeria presents an important case for examining the interaction between economic emergence and (in)security on account of the Boko Haram-led insurgency. This paper interrogates long-standing theoretical assumptions about the economic consequences of violent conflict in such a complex space. It analyses the cost of North-East Nigeria’s conflict on development by considering its impact on the economy at the national and subnational levels. Generalised assumptions about the ways through which conflict affects development appear to hold in some regards but not in others. Evidence suggests some disruption in fiscal adjustments at the macro level, trade and investment as well as agricultural production and commerce within the North-East but less so with regard to economic growth and foreign direct investment flows at the national level. The paper finds evidence of a dichotomy in terms of the impact of the conflict on the national and subnational economy. There is a high degree of containment of the repercussions of the conflict at the subnational level. However, there remains a degree of interconnectedness across these strata that are influenced by both domestic and international political economy dynamics.     

Bilateral Import, Export, and Conflict/Cooperation Simultaneity

A mathematical model of dyadic trade and the level of political conflict/cooperation is developed and empirically tested. The model extends the literature in three ways. First, the bilateral trade quantities and the level of conflict/cooperation are simultaneously determined. Second, the commonly used unitary state actor is replaced by a government, an exporter, and an importer in each country in a dyad. Third, action-reaction conflict/cooperation dynamics are incorporated into the model. The model predicts that the effect of bilateral trade quantity on conflict/cooperation and the effect of conflict/cooperation on the monetary value of trade may be positive or negative, whereas the effect of conflict on trade quantity will be negative. These predictions depend on certain conditions, heretofore unrecognized in the literature. The empirical test employs statistical methods, and the results generally support the model's predictions. Overall, this paper suggests that contemporary trade and conflict theories may miss important elements, pointing out the need for richer, more microfounded models.     

Progressive Era Diplomat: Lloyd C. Griscom and Trade Expansion

The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.     

Progressive Era Diplomat: Lloyd C. Griscom and Trade Expansion

The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.     

Trade and Democracy: A Factor-Based Approach

We study the relationship between trade openness and democracy using a data set with capital-labor ratios, trade flows, and regime type for 142 countries between 1960 and 2007. We are among the first to test a prediction that emerges from the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006): Relative factor endowments determine whether trade promotes democracy or not. The statistical results from two-stage least squares estimation indicate that trade is positively associated with democracy among labor-abundant countries but that trade has a negative effect on democracy in capital-abundant countries. The results are not robust, however, and thus we conclude that the evidence in support of their argument is relatively weak.     

Lost in Translation? Domesticating Global Policy on Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparing India and China

This article compares the way in which China and India, two leading developing countries in the global debate on biotechnology, have sought to translate policy commitments contained in international agreements on trade and biosafety into workable national policy. It is a complex story of selective interpretation, conflict over priorities and politicking at the highest levels of government. It connects the micro-politics of inter-bureaucratic turf wars with the diplomacy of inter-state negotiations and coalition building. Empirically, the article provides the first systematic comparison of patterns of implementation in the two countries based on extensive fieldwork, contributing to debates about biotechnology regulation and the extent to which developing countries can exercise policy autonomy in a global environment of high commercial interest and aggressive political lobbying. Conceptually, the article develops thinking about the interaction and non-linear relationship between “domestic” and “international” policy-making arenas and does so in a way which is sensitive to the key role of non-state actors in this field.