Public sector performance and decentralization of decision rights

In recent years, governments have introduced several reforms, often adopting management mechanisms traditionally associated with the private sector. This article looks specifically at the impact of decision‐rights decentralization, along with accountability mechanisms, on performance. Twenty public sector organizations, experiencing a shift from rule‐based to outcome‐based control mechanisms and benefiting from different levels of autonomy and decision margins, were studied. Results show a link between the degree of power delegation and increased organizational performance. The units benefiting from greater freedom with respect to financial and human resources decisions experienced the greatest margin of performance increase. These findings underline the importance of considering the level at which measures are defined and the elements included in the measurement mechanisms (outcomes or rules).     

Health system performance reporting in Canada: Bridging theory and practice at pan‐Canadian level

Public reporting is increasingly used to enhance accountability and transparency and stimulate performance improvement in the public sector. In Canada performance reporting in the health sector is still in development, and involves a large number of actors. This article reports on the results of a recent intervention by the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) to develop a platform for pan‐Canadian performance reporting ( http://www.yourhealthsystem.cihi.ca ). It describes approaches taken to: develop a conceptual framework; engage the public in the definition of performance reporting priorities; and select indicators for public reporting. This article also discusses conceptual, methodological and operational challenges as well as a proposed evaluation strategy.     

Joining public accountability and performance management: A case study of Lethbridge,Alberta

Abstract: This article presents an in‐depth assessment of how performance measurement, public reporting, and internal performance management have been merged in Lethbridge, Alberta. Business‐unit managers and council members both share the view that performance measurement and reporting are useful and that performance information is credible. This finding contrasts with the more general view that performance information is not used much, despite widespread commitments to collecting it. In Lethbridge, a balance has been struck between performance measurement for management uses and council uses. The current system is driven by managers who share the view that performance measurement and reporting are useful for improving programs and providing information that can be a part of public accountability. If performance measurement is to add value in public‐sector organizations, it needs to have the continued support of managers – they are key to developing the measures, collecting the information and using it, and sustaining such systems. Changes that undermine the trust that is critical to a workable compromise for performance measurement, public reporting and performance management ultimately undermine the integrity of these systems.     

论我国地方政府问责制之建构：问题与对策

我国地方政府问责制之建构和运行正在推进,亟待深化研究加大其力度.审视其现实情境可以看到,在"谁来问责"、"如何问责"、"如何定责"与"何以为制"等问题上认识、规制和运作层面还存在诸多问题.这些制约因素对地方政府问责制的完善和运行效度的实现极为不利.因此,提出促进建构与完善我国地方政府问责制,以优化问责资源配置的基本构想与路径选择.     

Bringing accountability up to date with the realities of public sector management in the 21st century

This article identifies basic shortcomings of traditional approaches to accountability and considers some of the reasons for the persistence of an approach that is known to: provide an inaccurate and distorted view of actual performance; inhibits rather than facilitates improved performance; and contributes to less rather than more confidence in government. The article then presents a vision of accountability more in keeping with the realities of public sector management in the twenty‐first century.     

Comparing accountability relationships between governments and non‐state actors in Canadian and European international development policy

This article examines the alignment of different governance arrangements and alternative accountability mechanisms in international development policy making in Canada and the European Union (EU), with a particular focus on relationships between governments and non‐governmental organizations. The Canadian case illustrates an entrepreneurial mode of governance that aligns with fiscal auditing and performance management mechanisms, while the networked governance model of the EU relies more heavily on accountability instruments of public reporting and deliberation. The article concludes that the European accountability regime likely provides policy makers with more opportunities for social policy learning but would be difficult to implement in Canada given the underlying action logic of the federal government.     

Co‐producing accountability? Drawing conclusions from non‐profit child care services in Manitoba

This article uses a case study of non‐profit child care in Manitoba to explore whether accountability is co‐produced. Co‐production is not a new concept, but is gaining attention particularly in Europe. Co‐production involves citizens directly in the development or delivery of public goods alongside government. Through key informant interviews with parents, non‐profit organizations and government officials, this article argues that accountability is not co‐produced because citizen co‐producers are overly burdened with a disproportionate share of risk and responsibility compared to government co‐producers with minimal support.     

Institutional design and the accountability paradox: A case study of three Aboriginal accountability regimes in Canada

While academic interest in accountability and transparency mechanisms in Aboriginal governance has risen over the past few years, very few studies have examined how these mechanisms operate in practice. One author, Shin Imai ( 2007 ), argues that Indigenous groups in Canada are faced with an accountability paradox that gives too much power to the federal government to intervene in band affairs, while giving too little power to band members to hold their local officials accountable for their actions. This paper examines the extent to which Aboriginal groups can avoid this paradox by reviewing three experiments in institutional design and self‐government in Aboriginal communities: the Sechelt Indian Band and the Westbank First Nation in British Columbia, and Nunatsiavut in Labrador. While considerable variation exists in terms of how well these communities overcome Imai's paradox, each community's accountability regime is an improvement over the one imposed by the Indian Act. The effectiveness of these regimes depends heavily on the institutional designs chosen by the Indigenous groups.     

Public safety in private hands revisited: The case of Ontario's Technical Standards and Safety Authority

Delegated Administrative Authorities (DAAs) are widely employed for delivering public safety and consumer protection regulatory functions at the provincial level in Canada. Although strongly supported by governments, the model has been subject to considerable criticism from legislative committees and officers, non‐governmental organizations, and the media. This paper examines Ontario's DAA experience through the case of the Technical Standards and Safety Authority (TSSA). It finds that, like other jurisdictions pursuing similar new public management (NPM) reforms, the Ontario government adopted legislation significantly strengthening its oversight and control, indicating substantial concerns about the structure and performance of the TSSA and by implication Ontario's other DAAs. Even with these changes, significant gaps are identified in the TSSA's governance and accountability structures.     

“互联网+政务服务”的绩效评估与问责体系构建

“互联网+政务服务”的深入推进,需要评估和问责体系为其提供制度支持。“互联网+政务服务”评估的价值标准是价值理性和工具理性的统一,内容构成兼具组织价值、经济价值和社会价值,评估指标选择应从政治支持、信息透明度、可量化程度、评估目的、评估的开放性以及制度化水平等六个方面综合考量。“互联网+政务服务”的问责机制包括公民参与的社会问责,基于政务运行管理的行政问责,面向项目评估的绩效问责等三个方面。“互联网+政务服务”的评估与问责密切联系、互为条件,从确立以公众满意度为中心的评估问责导向、加强评估与问责的主体和内容的整合、完善评估问责的制度化建设等三个方面着力,推动两者之间的制度协同,形成相互促进的互动态势。     

The state of Ontario's municipal performance reports: A critical analysis

Abstract: Focus on results and accountability in public performance management is now firmly entrenched. Governments around the world, at all levels, have invested significant time and resources into measuring and reporting performance, with very mixed results. In 2000, Ontario became the first state or province in North America to mandate a municipal performance measurement program for all municipalities. One measure of the system's effectiveness is the documentation produced to show citizens how their government is doing – in this case, an annual performance report. Although the legislation is clear in terms of measurements and some reporting standards, there are clear differences in the overall quality of the annual reports produced by each of the 445 municipalities. This article will focus on the reports as the primary communication tool between the municipalities and citizens. The primary question that frames this research is the current quality of municipal performance reports in Ontario.     

西方行政问责理念的发展与启示

行政问责的理念决定行政问责制度建设。西方国家行政的理念经历了从科层理念到民主理念，再到绩效理念的发展历程。西方国家的行政问责理念的演变对中国的行政问责制度建设有非常重要的启示意义。     

行政问责制度刍议

行政问责制就是一种特定的问责主体针对各级政府及其公务员承担的职责和义务的履行情况，要求其承担否定性后果的一种责任追究制度。其功能在于防止和阻止行政人员“滥用或误用公共权力”。行政问责制在中国已经初步建立并运行，但依然存在问责主体单一、职责不清、问责程序不明确及公开透明度不高等问题。在未来制度建设与完善方面，要完善行政问责制，就要从严格职责划分、问责的主体多元化和规范问责程序及推行“阳光问责”制度这些方面作出努力。     

困境与理路：网络问责的政府回应性分析

随着公民问责意识的逐渐增强，我国政府对网络问责的回应性不断提升，取得了良好的回应效果，但依旧面临诸多现实困境，如政府权威信息缺失、政府回应的思维方式滞后、回应方式失当、官员回应能力和素养不足以及政府回应的制度化水平较低等。要提高政府有效回应网络问责的基本理路，需推进政府及时发布权威信息，提升官员回应能力与素养，建立长效的网络民意收集与反馈机制，完善规范政府回应行为的法律法规，提升政府回应的主动性。     

Alternative service delivery in the natural resources sector: An examination of Ontario's forestry compliance self‐inspection system

Abstract: This paper examines the compliance self‐inspection system adopted by the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) in relation to the province's forest industry from 1998 onwards. The system is a prominent example of the experiments with alternative service delivery arrangements that took place in the context of the province's application of “new public management” principles to public administration following the 1995 election. Evaluative criteria related to governnance, accountability, and performance are used to assess the self‐inspection system and alternatives to it. The assessment identifies concerns regarding the legal basis for the self‐inspection arrangement, the conflicts of interest inherent in the system, the implications of MNR'S increased dependence on forest licence‐holders for operational functions, the ministry's ability to oversee the inspection system and the capacity of licence‐holders to carry out the functions assigned to them, the impacts on legislative officer and public oversight of forest management activities, differences in the performance of MNR and licence‐holder employed inspectors, and the overall cost‐effectiveness of the system. The restoration of the ministry's compliance inspection functions, or the establishement of an independent profession of forestry compliance inspectors, are identified as the preferred alternatives to the existing self‐inspection system. Sommaire: Le présent article examine le système d'auto‐contrale de la conformité adopté par le ministère des Richesses naturellcs (MRN) de I'Ontario en ce qui con‐cerne l'industrie forestière depuis 1998. Le système est un remarquable exemple d'experiences avec differents modes de prestation des services qui ont eu lieu avec I'application par la province des principes de la « nouvelle gestion publiquc » I'administration publique apres l'election de 1995. Des critères d'Évaluation concer‐nant la gouvernance, l'imputabilité et la performance sont utilisés pour évaluer Ie systeme d'auto‐contrôe et les autres options. L'évaluation fait ressortir des préoccupations concernant le fondement juridique du mode d'auto‐contrôle, les conflits d'intérêt inhérents au systeme, les implications de la dependance accrue du MRN a l'egard des titulaires de permis forestiers pour les fonctions d'exécution, l'aptitude du ministere a superviser le système de contrôle et la capacité des titulaires de permis à exécuter les fonctions qui leur sont assignées, les impacts de la surveillance des activités de gestion forestière sur les fonctionnaires et le public, les différences dans la performance du MRN et des contrôleurs titulaires de permis, et la rentabilité glo‐bale du systeme. Les alternatives préférés au systeme d'auto‐contrôe existant seraient la restauration des fonctions dé contrôle conformees au ministère ou bien l'établissement d'une profession indépendante de contrôleurs de la conformité forestière.     

The governance of children with disabilities and their families: Charting the public‐sector regime in Canada

Abstract: This article discusses governance and accountability structures that relate to the contemporary agenda of inclusion for children with disabilities in Canada. Who are the major public‐sector actors in policies for children with disabilities and their families? What governance roles does the sector perform? What are the defining trends that characterize the sector in the present age? The scope of the analysis is a broad scan of structures and roles rather than a detailed inventory of programs. Three clusters of governing activities are addressed: policy planning, consultation and coordination; creating structures, allocating resources and delivering services; and accountability roles and processes. Each of the clusters is examined in relation to public‐sector organizations general to government and to organizations specific to child and family and to disability issues. The education, health‐care and social‐service sectors are profiled to identify important trends and issues in the governance of Canadian disability policy. A concern of the public sector's governance regime for children with disabilities and their families is the absence of clear, consistent and central accountability mechanisms. There is a déjà vu discourse on disability reform, a strong sense that we have been here before. Among other factors, this frustrating pace of reform is due to bureaucratic factors and weak accountability mechanisms. To overcome this déjà vu, the author calls for the adoption of a more inclusive and integrated governance regime for the disability policy domain. Sommaire: Le prdéjàsent article porte sur les structures de gouvernance et de reddition de comptes concernant le programme aduel d'inclusion des enfants handicapés au Canada. Qui sont les principaux acteurs du secteur public responsables des politiques pour les enfants handicapés et leurs familles ? Quels rôles de gouvemance estce que le secteur joue? Quelles sont les tendances spécifiques qui caractérisent ce secteur à I'heure actuelle? L'analyse porte sur un vaste ensemble de structures et de rôles, plutôt que sur un inventaire détaillé de programmes. Trois groupes d'activités gouvernementales sont étudiés:la planification, la consultation et la coordination de politiques; la création de structures, l'affectation de ressources et la prestation de services; et les rôles et processus de la responsabilisation. Chacun de ces groupes est examiné par rapport aux organismes du secteur public dépendant du gouvemement et aux organismes relatifs à l'enfance et à la famille et aux questions d'invalidité. Les secteurs de l'éducation, des soins de santé et des services sociaux sont présentés pour identifier les tendances et questions importantes dans la gouvemance de la politique canadienne sur l'invalidité. Une précupation du régime de gouvernance du secteur public concemant les enfants handicapés et leurs familles est I'absence de mécanismes centraux de responsabilisation qui soient clairs, consistants et centralisés. Ce discours sur la réforme de l'invalidité a déjàété tenu. La lenteur frustrante de cette réforme est attribuable entre autres à des facteurs bureaucratiques et à de faibles mécanismes de reddition de comptes. Pour aller au‐dellà de ce déjà vu, I'auteur sumère l'adoption d'un régime de gouvemance plus inclusif et plus intégré pour le domaine des politiques en matière d'invalidité.     

西方责任政府研究的主题、框架与学说动向

西方责任政府理论研究的主题动向表现在民主、官僚、法律、结果、伦理以及主体六个方面,其分析框架较有代表性的是责任的五维度、无缝隙国家责任、政治理论范式、360度绩效,而理论学说最有影响力的是新公共管理、新公共服务和公共责任理论的学说动向。     

控权论视角下政府绩效问责的有效治理路径

政府绩效问责作为一种执行工具和制度安排,它具有绩效激励与问责控制的双重功能。在控权论视角下,绩效与责任并重、控制与激励兼容以及科层体制的制度保障构成绩效问责的控权治理基础,事前目标设定、事中检查验收与事后激励奖惩则形成绩效问责的控权行动规程。政府绩效问责的有效治理取决于整体制度与行动系统的逻辑匹配、功能互补与流程衔接。政府绩效问责所面临的目标偏离、信息障碍、标准模糊等制度困境和责任厘定、行为监测与绩效反馈等执行难题,主要归因于科层体制下绩效激励与问责控制的非一致性与非协同性。对此,需要总体上审视绩效问责制度均衡条件与行动支持机制,通过分层设置绩效目标任务、实施清单式检查验收和分级对位奖惩,达成全域定责、全程督责和底线追责的有效控权和高效问责。     

Rethinking accountability in complex and horizontal network delivery systems

This paper revisits the conventional notion of accountability rooted in bureaucratic and hierarchical structures of government and advances an alternative conceptualization more useful for analyzing complex horizontal network delivery systems. Although such systems are increasingly prevalent, they often exacerbate the problem of accountability in the public sector. By examining regional economic development policy implementation in Manitoba, this article illustrates the prospects and challenges of adapting conventional constructs of accountability to horizontal network delivery systems.     

Searching for strategy: Value for Money (VFM) audit choice in the new public management era

Value for Money (VFM) audits are now critical aspects of accountability in Westminster systems, based on the assumption that ministries are systematically examined. This study explores the VFM inquiries of the Auditor General of Ontario (AGO) between 1997 and 2014 as a case study to uncover trends of consistency of approach under the flourishing “new public management” philosophy of cutting costs and raising efficiencies. It asks three broad questions: does the frequency and intensity of VFM audits correlate with the financial importance of the ministries? Do political controversies affect the choice of what will be subject to a VFM audit? Finally, do Auditors General make a personal difference in what ministries will be audited through a VFM framework? The findings demonstrate a pattern of over‐auditing of some ministries while important ministries are consistently under‐audited.