What price fairness when security is at stake? Police legitimacy in South Africa

The legitimacy of legal authorities – particularly the police – is central to the state's ability to function in a normatively justifiable and effective manner. Studies, mostly conducted in the US and UK, regularly find that procedural justice is the most important antecedent of police legitimacy, with judgments about other aspects of police behavior – notably, about effectiveness – appearing less relevant. But this idea has received only sporadic testing in less cohesive societies where social order is more tenuous, resources to sustain it scarcer, and the position of the police is less secure. This paper considers whether the link between process fairness and legitimacy holds in the challenging context of present day South Africa. In a high crime and socially divided society, do people still emphasize procedural fairness or are they more interested in instrumental effectiveness? How is the legitimacy of the police influenced by the wider problems faced by the South African state? We find procedural fairness judgments play a key role, but also that South Africans place greater emphasis on police effectiveness (and concerns about crime). Police legitimacy is, furthermore, associated with citizens' judgments about the wider success and trustworthiness of the state.     

What is bad about clientelism? Citizen perceptions in poor communities in South Africa and Tunisia

The literature regards clientelism as a negative practice because of its particularism, informality, inequality, and inefficiency. At present, we know little about whether citizens in communities where clientelism is prevalent share this assessment. However, their evaluations are the ones that are critical for the persistence of clientelism. We explore the attitudes of citizens towards clientelism with conjoint experiments administered with respondents from two poor communities in South Africa and Tunisia, and a sample of academics that we use as benchmark. On average, Tunisian and South African respondents evaluate clientelism more favorably than academics. All groups see particularism and inequality as negative features but only academics care about informality. Clients are evaluated much more positively than patrons in the exchange. Our findings suggest that clientelism persists not only because communities fail to coordinate around a programmatic candidate but because clientelism is considered as a legitimate strategy to access resources.     

Pushing the Boundary: are Reality TV Shows Ruffling Feathers in Africa?

The article addresses the viability of Reality TV shows in Africa. It weighs this against the continent’s much acclaimed conservatism. It identifies key differences within African philosophical traditions that could militate against the tenets of this genre. It concludes that the trend towards presenting TV formats where individuals and families are exposed to ridicule and contempt, berated for dysfunctional activities or where homosexuality, incest, infidelity, strange fetishes, or transvestism are discussed, has the tendency to collide directly or indirectly with competing African moral frameworks and could prove polarizing in the African setting.     

Prophesying War: How Convincing is The Power Elite?

Society - No sociological study of the exercise of American power has matched the provocative influence of The Power Elite (1956), which was published when radical criticism of foreign policy was...     

What Drives the Swing Voter in Africa?

What makes African voters “up for grabs”? Existing approaches to the swing voter have several liabilities. This article introduces a new measure enabling a more comprehensive assessment of swing voting, including the differentiation between clientelistic and collective goods motivations. The issue of swing voting is then brought to an environment where voters are rarely considered persuadable: Africa. Using a count‐model estimation technique and original survey data from Ghana's critical 2008 elections, the analysis challenges the near consensus in African politics on clientelism as the only electoral strategy. When voters perceive politicians as providing collective, developmental goods, the efficacy of clientelism as a tool to win over voters is reduced. Many persuadable voters can also be won over by both clientelistic and collective goods, thus contradicting the literature presenting these as mutually exclusive. Finally, the analysis shows that incumbents do better when they provide collective goods even in highly clientelistic environments.     

Intelligence in war: how important is it? How do we know?

The role of intelligence in determining outcomes of battles and wars has varied dramatically across conflicts and time, contributing to wide differences in judgments about the importance of intelligence in war. Some analysts minimize the importance of intelligence while others argue it is essential. Opposing perspectives often do not engage each other’s points and generalize from small samples of conflicts. The result is a disjointed discussion of the roles and importance of intelligence in armed conflicts. This article’s aim is to partially rectify this situation by deriving an analytic framework that links intelligence to military operations and strategic outcomes.     

How Bad is Bad?: Dispositional Negativity in Political Judgment

Political Behavior - When citizens approach political decision-making tasks, they carry with them differing values and preferences, yielding heterogeneity in their assessments. This study explores...     

How democratic is Japan?

The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and politics in a stateless nation, by Karel van Wolferen. Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1989. 496 pp. £16.95. ISBN 0–333–44321–7.     

Human-provided waters for desert wildlife: what is the problem?

Conflict persists in southwestern deserts of the United States over management of human-constructed devices to provide wildlife with water. We appraised decision processes in this case relative to the goal of human dignity and by the standards of civility and common interest outcomes. Our analysis suggested that conflict was scientized, rooted in worldviews, and aggravated by use of inflammatory symbols such as “wilderness” and “bighorn sheep.” Contested problem definitions, framed as matters of science, advanced factional interests largely by allocating the burden of proof and failing to disclose private concerns about well-being, affection, respect, skill and power. Decision processes were shaped by precepts of scientific management, and thus largely failed to foster civility, common ground, and a focus on common interests, and instead tended to exacerbate deprivations of dignity and respect. If the status quo continues, we foresee further erosion of human dignity because there are likely to be increases in system stressors, such as climate change and human population growth. The prognosis would be more hopeful if alternatives were adopted that entailed authoritative, equitable, and collaborative public decision-making processes that took into consideration national-level common interests such as the U.S. Endangered Species Act.     

Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of?elections in Sub-Saharan Africa

Post-Soviet African democratization has introduced elections into contexts that often lack restraints upon the behavior of candidates, resulting in the emergence of voter intimidation, vote-buying, and ballot fraud. We propose a model of electoral competition where, although some voters oppose violence, it is effective in intimidating swing voters. We show that in equilibrium a weak challenger will use violence, which corresponds to a terrorism strategy. Similarly, a nationally weak incumbent will use repression. However, a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud. We discuss the applicability of the model to several African elections.     

Analogical reasoning and policymaking: Where and when is it used?

A steadily growing literature has emerged in recent years on the role of analogical reasoning in policymaking contexts. However, there has so far been little attempt to anwer the question of where and when analogical reasoning tends to be used. Using Yaacov Vertzberger's situational-motivational nexus framework as starting point, the article examines the decision of the Kennedy administration to wait it out during the substantial stock market crash of 1962. Little evidence is uncovered that the Kennedy and his advisers relied on analogical reasoning to reach this decision, a finding which is surprising given the number of situational and motivational inducements present in the case. The article concludes that a high degree of perceived risk and uncertainty – noticeably absent from the stock market case – is the key situational inducement to analogizing, but suggests that the case tells us something important about the prevalence of rule- as opposed to case-based reasoning.