The politics of recognition of Crimean Tatar collective rights in the post-Soviet period: With special attention to the Russian annexation of Crimea

This paper examines the process of how Crimean Tatars strived to attain group-differentiated rights since they have returned to their homeland in the early 1990s. Whereas the politics of minority rights were viewed through security lens in earlier literature, we emphasize the significance of cultural constructs in influencing the minority policies, based on qualitative content analysis of “speech acts” of elites, and movement and policy documents. Focusing on the interaction of the framing processes of Crimean Tatars with the Crimean regional government, Ukraine, and Russia, we argue that the “neo-Stalinist frame” has played a major role in denying the rights of Crimean Tatars for self-determination and preservation of their ethnic identity in both pre and post annexation Crimea. The Crimean Tatars counter-framed against neo-Stalinist frame both in the pre and post-annexation period by demanding their rights as “indigenous people”. Ukraine experienced a frame transformation after the Euromaidan protests, by shifting from a neo-Stalinist frame into a “multiculturalist frame”, which became evident in recognition of the Crimean Tatar status as indigenous people of Crimea.     

Nationalism,identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution

This article is the first to study the positive correlation between nationalism and democratic revolutions using Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution as a case study. The Orange Revolution mobilized the largest number of participants of any democratic revolution and lasted the longest, 17 days. But, the Orange Revolution was also the most regionally divided of democratic revolutions with western and central Ukrainians dominating the protestors and eastern Ukrainians opposing the protests. The civic nationalism that underpinned the Orange Revolution is rooted in Ukraine’s path dependence that has made civil society stronger in western Ukraine where Austro-Hungarian rule permitted the emergence of a Ukrainian national identity that was stymied in eastern Ukraine by the Tsarist empire.     

Ukraine twenty years after independence: Concept models of the society

This paper attempts to create an overview of the Ukraine twenty years after independence by presenting prevailing conceptual narrative models of Ukraine employed by Ukrainian and foreign experts. Based on the analysis of 58 interviews of Ukrainian political and intellectual elites and foreign experts, the study revealed several categories of conceptual narrative models employed by respondents: (1) a state without a national idea and a common identity; (2) a country in an unfinished transition and degradation; (3) a divided society; and (4) Ukraine as a colony or “wild capitalism”. The analysis of these categories helps to assess conflict potential in Ukraine and discuss some ideas for conflict prevention and resolution.     

Attitudes towards gypsies in Ukraine (1989)

The national movements of sub-state national societies are divided into two or three competing political orientations (independentists, autonomists, and federalists), which vary over time. This article compares the process that led to the founding of the ADQ (autonomism) in Quebec, with the process that culminated in the transformation and de facto re-founding of ERC (independentism) in Catalonia during the period 1976–2005. Using the cases of two nationalist parties in two different national movements that have successfully established new political orientations, I analyze the political origins of this form of temporal variation. My outcome variable is the “tipping point” at which these nationalist political parties get established. This “tipping point” was reached through a temporal sequence that evolved in four phases. In each of these phases, a key variable was involved: the existence of a preexistent ideology, the occurrence of a central state constitutional moment, an impulse from the sphere of sociological nationalism, and the consolidation of a new leadership nucleus.     

Economic crisis and the crisis of national identity in Slovenia: toward a new notion of social order

This paper addresses the influence of the economic crisis on national identity in Slovenia. It first analyzes the creation of the contemporary national identity following independence in 1991 that was established in relation to a negatively perceived Balkan identity, which represented “the Other,” and in relation to a “superior” European identity that Slovenia aspired to. With the economic crisis, the dark corners of Slovenia’s “successful” post-socialist transition to democracy came to light. Massive layoffs of workers and the bankruptcies of once-solid companies engendered disdain for the political elites and sympathy for marginalized groups. The public blamed the elites for the country’s social and economic backsliding, and massive public protests arose in 2012. The aftermath of the protests was a growing need among the people for a new social paradigm toward solidarity. We show that in Slovenia the times of crisis were not times of growing nationalism and exclusion as social theory presupposes but, quite the contrary, they were times of growing solidarity among citizens and with the “Balkan Other.”     

Does nationalism promote democracy? Comparative analyses of Ukraine's ‘Maidan’ revolution and Poland's ‘Solidarity’ mass mobilisation

The increased number of ‘democratic revolutions’ around the globe has raised questions of how mass mobilisation contributes to democracy and of what role nationalism plays in this process. Mass mobilisation is viewed as the best option for breaking down communist regimes due to the rise of new political elites to positions of power within the state. On the other hand, the revolutionary character of mass mobilisation movements, together with the uncertainty of the link between democracy and nationalism, may lead such movements to impact negatively on democratisation. Ukraine's ‘Maidan’ revolution and Poland's ‘Solidarity’ movement allow for a comparison of two types of mass movements in terms of both causes and outcomes. This article claims that the mass protests in Ukraine, as opposed to those in Poland, did not lead to democratisation but rather to the opposite: the polarisation of both political elites and civil society. The role of nationalism, in this respect, was shaped and interpreted by political leaders.     

Protest Patterns in Provincial Russia: a Paired Comparison of Company Towns

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia implemented reforms aimed at transitioning to a market economy and devolving power to regional and municipal levels of government. Although it is well known that these reforms created significant uncertainty, economic crises, and protest, most existing studies do not explore the considerable variation in protest patterns across localities. This article asks why, despite similar pressures, some cities have experienced protests that are consistently larger and more intense than others. Focusing on the context of the many company towns that emerged during Soviet industrialization, I construct a paired comparison of two average-sized company towns using process tracing through interviews and archival documents. This article also employs an original protest database created through newspaper analysis that tracks not only the instances of protest but also protest size, demands, and targets. What emerges are two pathways that explain the divergent protest structures in the two company towns studied. In Cherepovets, a city that is less dependent on the central state, local elites pursued strategies of co-optation and suppression, limiting the opportunity structure for contentious politics to small-scale, local protests. In Komsomolsk-na-Amure, a city where the primary industry is in decline and dependent on support from the center, local elites converged with opposition groups to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the central government; this produced protests that were larger and more extreme and targeted the system as a whole.     

Transformation of political elite as regime changes in Pakistan

Burton and Higely [(2001). ‘The study of political elite transformations’, International review of sociology/Revue internationale de sociologie, 11(2): 181–199] argue that when elites of a society are not united this will lead to an unstable political regime. Consensual elite cohesion is only created through distinctive elite transformation. This essay attempts to elaborate their argument in Pakistan, by developing a link among a continuous regime shift from authoritarian to democratic governments and the political elites who keep transforming their structure accordingly. The technique followed for it is analysing the epochal events over time from pre-partition till date which became reason for regime transformations. The discussion focuses on the collusions and contestations of multiple power elites within given social context which are embedded under the international context. It concludes that political elites in Pakistan were always embraced by multiple other power elites who accordingly hold dual elite identity to control the command post in the political arena. Such complex elite structure makes it paradoxical to distinguish political elite of Pakistan from other power elites of Pakistan.     

Soviet conspiracy theories and political culture in Ukraine: Understanding Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions

Conspiracy theories in Ukraine draw on inherited Soviet political culture and political technology imported from Russia where such ideas had gained ascendancy under President Vladimir Putin. Eastern Ukrainian and Russian elites believed that the US was behind the 2000 Serbian Bulldozer, 2003 Georgian Rose and 2004 Orange democratic revolutions. The Kuchmagate crisis, impending succession crisis, 2004 presidential elections and Orange Revolution – all of which took up most of Leonid Kuchma’s second term in office – were the first significant domestic threats to Ukraine’s new, post-communist ruling elites and in response Ukraine’s elites revived Soviet style theories of conspiracies and ideological tirades against the US and Ukrainian nationalism. Opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko became the focal point against which the conspiracies and tirades were launched because his support base lay in ‘nationalist’ Western Ukraine and he has a Ukrainian-American spouse. The revival of Soviet style conspiracy theories has become important since Viktor Yanukovyc’s election as Ukrainian president in 2010 because this political culture permeates his administration, government and Party of Regions determining their worldview and influencing their domestic and foreign policies.     

Fighting for the Soviet Union 2.0: Digital nostalgia and national belonging in the context of the Ukrainian crisis

This paper focuses on the use of Soviet-era symbols, myths, and narratives within groups on VKontakte social media site over the initial stage of the Ukraine crisis (2014–2015). The study is based on qualitative content analysis of online discussions, visual materials, and entries by group administrators and commentators. It also applies link-analysis in order to see how groups on social media are interrelated and positioned online. It reveals that these online groups are driven primarily by neo-Soviet myths and hopes for a new version of the USSR to emerge. Over time, the main memory work in these groups shifted from Soviet nostalgia and “pragmatic” discourse to the use of re-constructed World War II memories in order to justify Russian aggression and to undermine national belonging in Ukraine. Reliance on the wartime mythology allowed for the labelling of Euromaidan supporters as “fascists” that should be eliminated “once again.” This powerful swirl of re-created Soviet memories allowed effective mobilization on the ground and further escalation of the conflict from street protests to the armed struggle.     

Democracy or autocracy on the march? The colored revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism

What impact have Eurasia's 2003–2005 “colored revolutions” had on the state of democracy and autocracy in the region? The logic of patronal presidentialism, a set of institutions common to post-Soviet countries, suggests that the revolutions are at root succession struggles more than democratic breakthroughs generated by civic activists and foreign democratizing activity. This helps explain why Georgia is experiencing a new retreat from ideal-type democracy while only Ukraine, whose revolution weakened the patronal presidency, has sustained high political contestation after its revolution. This means that autocratic leaders clamping down on non-governmental organizations, free media, and their foreign supporters may have learned the wrong lessons, perhaps making their countries more susceptible to violent revolution than they were before.     

“Soviet mentality?” The role of shared political culture in relations between the Armenian state and Russia's Armenian diaspora

Russia's Armenians have begun to form diaspora institutions and engage in philanthropy and community organization, much as the pre-Soviet “established” diaspora in the West has done for years. However, the Russian Armenian diaspora is seen by Armenian elites as being far less threatening due to a shared “mentality.” While rejecting the mentality argument, I suggest that the relationship hinges on their shared political culture and the use of symbols inherited from the Soviet Union in the crafting of new diaspora and diaspora-management institutions. Specifically, “Friendship of the Peoples” symbolism appears to be especially salient on both sides. However, the difference between old and new diasporas may be more apparent than real. The Russian Armenian diaspora now engages in many of the same activities as the Western diaspora, including the one most troublesome to Armenia's elites: involvement in politics.     

Ukrainianization,terror and famine: coverage in Lviv's Dilo and the nationalist press of the 1930s

This article looks at the press coverage of Ukrainianization, the Soviet terror, and the famine (Holodomor), particularly in the years 1932–33, focusing on the largest Ukrainian daily outside Soviet Ukraine, the Lviv Dilo. It compares this coverage to the reporting in the press of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). It argues that these two years were a turning point in political attitudes. Galician Ukrainians turned away from the Communist Party of Ukraine and support for the OUN began to grow. Ironically, the OUN had not led protests against the famine, but benefited from the lack of a strong response from European governments and international bodies. The article draws on a reading of the Ukrainian press of the 1930s, and on recent research by Polish and Ukrainian scholars.     

War of words: the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet

How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's “News of the Week” show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict – World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the “fascist” and anti-American frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a “television party” and an “Internet party” in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other.     

The gypsy as vanishing mediator in Russian television coverage of inter-ethnic tension

The article addresses the representation of gypsies in Russian television news bulletins and popular drama series over a 15-month period. It seeks first to explain the prominence of the media image of the gypsy relative to the size of the Roma population and second to account for the relationship between fictional and non-fictional modes of representation. Situating itself within the broader field of post-Soviet Russian identity studies and applying qualitative tools differentiated according to the arena of analysis, it looks at questions of lexicon, voice and viewpoint in relation to news and issues of characterization, fictional space and plot with respect to drama. The two apparatuses are linked through a shared emphasis on narrative, and in particular on its dual orientation toward the exceptional (what makes a story worth telling and capable of embracing “difference”) and the typical (what enables it to represent and project “identity”). In its central argument it maps this dual “identity/difference” dynamic onto the gypsy's liminal status as both “of the self” and “of the other”, and its mediatory function: the ability to serve as a proxy for ethno-cultural difference more generally, and to negotiate the tensions between the cultural and racial aspects of ethnicity.     

Pacts,Parties and Elite Struggle: Ukraine's Troubled Post-Orange Transition

This article resuscitates some of the theoretical arguments of transition studies to shed light on the complex institutional and political developments in post-Orange Ukraine (2004 – 2007). In December 2004, Ukraine's elite agreed to embark on a complex transition involving power-sharing between the Rada (parliament) and the government on one side, and the presidency on the other. The new electoral law was to be based on a fully proportional system. In the subsequent period of 2005 – 2007, two consecutive proportional elections have been held, Ukraine has had several governments, and the Rada was incapacitated for a longer period. Rival elites engaged in a zero-sum game over reforms, and attempts were made to resolve differences by several pacts. This article analyses the post-Orange transition in terms of three variables: the effectiveness of pacts, the need to abide by the transition scheme, and the effect of elections. It is argued that Ukraine has failed to deliver on pacts and timetables, but has delivered on elections. This means that its political system may be considered a minimalist and electoral based one.     

Reconstructing the Role of the Working Class in Communist and Postcommunist Romania

This article examines the position of the industrial working class in Romania before 1989, its role in the overthrow of the communist regime during the December 1989 revolution, and its status during the postcommunist transition to democracy after 1989. The subordination of labor interests by both communist and postcommunist regimes to ideologies that underestimated the issue of class differentiation is emphasized throughout the paper. This analysis is undertaken at two levels, namely, the rewriting of the history of communism after 1989 and the obstacles encountered during the process of democratic transition. The later aspect refers to the problematic relationship between the intellectuals and the working class and labor's lack of involvement in shaping the post-1989 economic and political reforms. The argument that I pursue is that many of the setbacks experienced during the democratization process are partly rooted in the status of labor as an important absentee from the discourse and agenda of both incumbent governments and intellectual elites. It has been a significant factor in pushing the working class towards an illiberal right-wing politics and ideologies of a populist, xenophobic, and anti-intellectual nature.     

Civil society,youth and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions

Youth have played an important role in mobilizing support for democratic revolutions during elections that have facilitated regime change. In Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) youth led the way in organizing democratic coalitions among hitherto warring opposition parties that the authorities had successfully divided and ruled over. In the three countries used as case studies, youth dominated civil society and election monitoring NGOs. The article outlines a five fold framework and discusses the issues that help understand the role of youth in democratic revolutions as well as those essential conditions that lead to success. Regime change only proved successful during certain time period, in our case electoral revolutions when the authorities were at their weakest. Organization of youth groups led to the creation of Otpor (Serbia), Kmara (Georgia) and Pora (Ukraine) and provided the youth movements with structure and purpose. The training of these organized youth NGOs became a third important condition for success and often was undertaken with Western technical and financial assistance. The choice of strategies to be employed during elections was an important fourth feature. In the three country case studies, discussed in this article, the response of the authorities proved to be ineffective, weak and counter-productive.     

Manipulated Society: Paralyzing the Masses in Post-revolutionary Iran

Social riots, popular uprisings, and revolutions are among the threats that could have jeopardized the stability of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in its recent history. Since 1979, the clerical establishment has utilized a number of institutions and social groups and applied various strategies to control Iranian society and neutralize such threats, including policies used to silence the masses and force public allegiance to the Islamic Republic. One of Iran’s key strategies involve social manipulation, which includes the “engineering” of the minds, bodies, and emotions of its population. In addition to distributing massive amounts of propaganda and regulating and disciplining citizens’ bodies, the Islamic Republic has deliberately been depressing Iranian citizens through a policy which I call the “politics of sadness.” Through this strategy, the IRI has promoted despondency and hopelessness to the extent that citizens become paralyzed and incapable of challenging the political status quo. The result has simultaneously been satisfying the more conservative and religious parts of society while suppressing its more progressive social spheres. Through these policies, the Islamic Republic has been able to maintain power and has survived despite several social protests that have occurred in last two decades.     

Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians and why Novorossiya failed

This article discusses two inter-related issues. Firstly, the factors lying behind Russia's fervent belief that its Novorossiya (New Russia) project, aimed to bring back to Russia eight oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhhya, Odesa, Mykolayiv, and Kherson in eastern and southern Ukraine and launched during the 2014 “Russian Spring,” would be successful. Russian identity misunderstood, and continues to misunderstand, Ukraine and Ukrainians through stereotypes and myths of Ukraine as an “artificial state” and Ukraine's Russian speakers as “fraternal brothers” and Russians and Ukrainians as “one people” (odin narod). Secondly, why Ukrainian national identity was different than these Russian stereotypes and myths and how this led to the failure of the Novorossiya project. Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians came face to face with the reality of Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism and their low support for the Russkij Mir (Russian World). The article compares Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians with how Ukrainians see themselves to explain the roots of the 2014 crisis, “Russian Spring,” and failure of Russian President Vladimir Putin's Novorossiya project.