The deep error of political libertarianism: self-ownership,choice, and what’s really valuable in life

ABSTRACT

Contemporary versions of natural rights libertarianism trace their locus classicus to Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. But although there have been many criticisms of the version of political libertarianism put forward by Nozick, many of these objections fail to meet basic methodological desiderata. Thus, Nozick’s libertarianism deserves to be re-examined. In this paper I develop a new argument which meets these desiderata. Specifically, I argue that the libertarian conception of self-ownership, the view’s foundation, implies what I call the Asymmetrical Value Claim: a dubious claim about the importance of choice relative to other valuable capacities. I argue that this misunderstands what is really valuable in life, and show how it causes libertarianism to generate counterintuitive public policy recommendations.     

Liberal Nationalism and Cultural Rights

Liberal nationalists such as Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka have argued for an extravagant range of cultural rights based on respect for individual autonomy. I present an alternative account of the moral import of liberal autonomy for the status of cultural minorities. The article examines three pivotal aspects of Tamir's argument for cultural rights and argues that, in each case, Tamir's position fails to honour the value of individual autonomy, and in ways parallel to Kymlicka's argument. These shared difficulties point to some basic ontological and moral properties of a genuine autonomy-based defence of cultural rights.     

A guide for the analysis of policy arguments

Based on what appears to be required for fully supporting a proposal for policy action, a series of interrelated propositional types is suggested as a tool for the design and critique of policy arguments. The kinds of criticisms to which different prepositional types are susceptible and the impacts of these on a policy argument are explored as are the uses persons in different roles might make of these criticisms. Finally, as an example, the typology is applied to a portion of the President's 1973 State of the Union Address.A draft of this paper was prepared while the author was Research Fellow in the Educational Policy Research Center at Syracuse. Suggestions on earlier drafts by Paul P. Van Riper, Warren A. Dixon, and Gerald C. Swanson at Texas A&M University are acknowledged with appreciation.     

Conceiving human rights without ontology

Conclusion In his book, World Poverty and Human Rights, Pogge sets out to articulate an approach to basic justice that is inversal and cosmopolitan. This notion of justice is to be articulated through the language of human rights. Pogge’s arguments about justice, moral universalism and cosmopolitanism are impressive and reward serious study. It is to be hoped. indeed, that many aspects of his argument might be adopted by the elite ruling classes of world politics; they have much to offer in the project of creating a world that is humane for all. The issues that I have raised in the foregoing argument however are central to the integrity of Pogge’s project. I have argued, in sum that it is not possible to advance a program for the expansion of justice and the implementation of human rights in world politics without making an appeal to a specific account of the nature of justice and of human rights. The account that informs Pogge’s argument is that of political liberalism, and this is an account that has much in its favor as a preferred vehicle for justice in world politics. However, this account makes itself vulnerable when it argues for universal principles without acknowledging their partisan and normative base. My argument has been that this issue is at the center of Pogge’s attempt to isolate the conception of human rights he explicates, which he wants to serve as the language for his global ethical universalism, from the ontological affirmations which make that conception of human rights possible, and which of necessity tie human rights to a specific conception of the nature of the good for human persons and groups. The attempt to establish a single, universal criterion of justice, and to express it in the language of human rights, is undermined from within for as long as it fails to engage with ontological concerns.     

New foundations of cost–benefit analysis

This article responds to the criticisms of New Foundations of Cost–Benefit Analysis that appeared in a review by Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar, and David M. Driesen. We argue that their criticisms are either based on misunderstandings of our approach or are too demanding, in the sense that no reasonable decision procedure would satisfy them. We illustrate this second argument by demonstrating that their preferred approach – feasibility analysis – has little to recommend it.     

The Legitimacy of Using the Harm Principle in Cases of Religious Freedom Within Education

John Stuart Mill’s famous “harm principle” has been popular in the limitation of freedoms within human rights jurisprudence. It has been used formally in court cases and also informally in legal argumentation and conversation. Shortly, it is described as a very simple principle that amounts to the notion that persons are at liberty to do what they want as long as their actions do not harm any other person or society in general. This article questions whether it is legitimate to use the harm principle in cases concerning the limitation of religious freedom within education. For example, can the exemption of a learner from sex education (based on religious objections) be denied based on the argument that such an exemption will cause harm? In order to answer this question, the meaning, origin and use of the harm principle are investigated. This article also discusses four main criticisms against the use of this principle in general and in cases of religious freedom of learners in education.     

The possibility of secular human rights: Alan gewirth and the principle of generic consistency

This article explores Alan Gewirth’s argument for a secular foundation for the idea 2 of human rights as a possible response to Michael J. Perry’s claim “that the idea of 3 human rights is…ineliminably religious.” I examine Gewirth’s reasoning for constructing 3 a theory, namely that existing theories are fundamentally flawed and leave the idea of human rights without a logically consistent foundation, before considering in detail his claims for the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). Having looked at his critique of numerous other theories, as well as at his own argument about human action grounding basic rights to freedom and well-being, I then offer a critique of Gewirth’s PGC. Ultimately my conclusion is that Gewrith's 3 theory relies too heavily on the notions, first that we have a meta-desire not to contradict ourselves and, second, that we are unable to find persuasive justifications for our behavior that might allow us to avoid self-contradiction. If one is not troubled by charges of self-contradiction or, as is more often the case, one does not recognize that one’s victim is as much a human being as oneself, Gewirth’s theory 5 V 3 will not seem particularly persuasive. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A28BB025 00003     

Kavanagh and Mckenzie on power

This article responds to an earlier analysis by Kavanagh which criticised the basic thesis of McKenzie's British Political Parties. The author of the present article believes that Kavanagh made some important criticisms of McKenzie, but it is still true that power in the Labour Party is similarly distributed to power in the Conservative Party ‐ broadly the parliamentary party is autonomous, and the Leader, especially in government, is in control of the party. Events since 1983 have served to underline this fact.     

On National Self-determination

This paper argues in favour of a conception of self-determination which involves the equal recognition of different national identities. It proceeds by, first, criticizing the dominant territorial (in contrast to national) conception of self-determination. It then addresses three main criticisms of a principle of national self-determination. These are (1) the argument from indeterminacy; (2) the argument from instability; (3) the problem of overlapping nationalities.     

Universal Human Rights and the Coloniality of Race in Sweden

This article makes an argument that using the term race and considering structural racial discrimination as such and the impacts on it of European colonialism are needed for Sweden’s observance of universal human rights. This argument is contrary to the view of the Swedish state and challenges an image of Sweden as a champion for universal human rights without any colonial history or racial problems of its own.     

On Sen's Liberal Paradox and its Reception within Political Theory and Welfare Economics

In this article, Amartya Sen's seminal proof of the impossibility of a Paretian liberal is briefly reviewed. I then discuss the reception of this alleged 'liberal paradox' within the fields of political theory and welfare economics. In particular, I examine the criticisms made by Brian Barry, and their wider implications for the field of social choice theory. It is argued that the various criticisms made on Sen's characterisation of liberty are fundamental, and that Sen's subsequent defence of his position is unconvincing. Moreover, there remain some wider doubts as to the usefulness of social choice theory's SWF approach to individual rights and freedoms.     

In Defence of Associative Political Obligations: Part One

Part One of this article seeks to defend the idea of associative political obligations against a number of criticisms that have been advanced opposing it. The purpose of this defence is not to demonstrate that the associative account is therefore the best explanation of political obligations, but only that the principal reasons which have been given for rejecting it are much less compelling than its critics maintain. The argument focuses in particular on the various criticisms advanced by A. John Simmons. Two general lines of defence figure especially prominently. First, it is shown how many of the criticisms in one way or another ultimately rest on the assumption that political obligations must be voluntarily acquired, when it is just this assumption that is contested by an associative account. Secondly, it rebuts the charge that the idea of associative obligations faces a particular problem because it entails the view that members must have obligations to associations or groups that are evil. While it is not claimed that the idea of associative political obligations is entirely without difficulties, it is contended that stories of its demise are greatly exaggerated, and in this respect the ground is laid for Part Two of the article, which sketches a particular account of associative political obligations.     

Besting Monarchy: The Anti-Classism Argument

Following the death of a monarch and the crowning of another, this article considers monarchy as a topic in political theory. It seeks to revitalise the topic, which has been given limited attention by political theorists in recent years. It identifies traditional objections to monarchy, alongside newer objections that attack it (particularly the British institution) for being racist and imperialist. However, those objections—though increasingly common—are not fatal to monarchy as an idea. This article develops an argument against monarchy based on the concept of classism: discrimination based on a person's class. Reframing familiar criticisms of monarchy for being elitist and snobbish, the anti-classism argument draws on discrimination theory to outline the best objection to monarchy at the conceptual level.     

NEW FEDERALISM, OLD REMEDIES, AND CORRECTIONS POLICYMAKING

Corrections litigation is changing, but new case law does not authorize a wholesale cutback of prisoner constitutional rights. Supreme Court cases urge a return to traditional compensatory damages as the remedy for unconstitutional acts and conditions. Monitoring of state correctional performance by federal courts is disfavored. The author believes that basic rights of prisoners will remain protected, but that systematic planning and exemplary programs will erode. Under the money damages model, legal reform should thus urge waiver of the state sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment.     

Human Rights, “Orientation,” and ASEAN

This article will first look at the recent promulgation by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of its ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). This development follows on from ASEAN's official attempts since the development of the 2007 ASEAN Charter to promote a “people-oriented” ASEAN. This article explores the various criticisms that have arrived of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, and, in particular, considers the criticisms concerned with or relevant to sexual orientation and gender identity rights. Second, the article uses the context of the arrival of the AHRD and, indeed, the arrival of its auspicing institution, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), to ask broader and deeper questions about the cultural politics of making rights claims and the manner in which these claims may contribute to the development of a more democratic politics.     

A neo-communitarian approach to international relations: Rights and the good

New communitarianism is important even to those who care little about academic disputes. A greatly altered communitarian position lays the foundation for an international legal framework that is more comprehensive than the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is more attentive to beliefs in the East, and enhances the ability of nations that adhere to different values to find common ground on policies ranging from humanitarian interventions to fighting terrorist groups. The article first examines criticisms leveled against communitarianism and then highlights the ways a neo-communitarian approach has overcome these criticisms. The question of under what circumstances one nation may interfere in the internal affairs of another, especially to advance human rights, using means as different as cross cultural moral judgments to armed humanitarian interventions, serves as a litmus test for distinguishing the new from the old communitarian approach.     

Antitrust actions and the budgeting process

The author expresses appreciation to Dan Benjamin, Charles Knoeber, C.M. Lindsay, M.T. Maloney, William Shughart II, and John Warner for comments and criticisms. The usual caveat applies.     

A critical legal conception of human dignity

In this article, I argue for adopting a specific conception of human dignity centered around the argument that human dignity flows from an individual's capacity for self-authorship as defined by the set of expressive capabilities they enjoy. I also develop a corollary argument for a specific model of fundamental rights which flows from adopting the conception of dignity presented here.     

Freedom,immigration, and adequate options

According to the freedom argument for open borders, immigration restrictions are generally unjust because these restrictions infringe on important freedoms, such as freedom of association and the economic liberties. Some authors have objected to the freedom argument by claiming that potential immigrants only have rights to sufficient options to live decent or autonomous lives and, consequently, states can permissibly prevent people from immigrating when potential immigrants have adequate options. This paper shows that this objection to the freedom argument for open borders is unsound and that restrictions on international freedom of movement can be morally impermissible even when potential immigrants have adequate options.     

Repress or Respect? Precarious Leadership,Poor Economy and Labor Protection

How should insecure leaders deal with labor rights in the face of an economic downturn? Economic theory suggests that suppressing labor rights boosts the economy and that economic growth also dampens violent political opposition. As a result, the suppression of labor rights should contribute to more job security for leaders. However, some other scholars maintain that more repression actually increases the probability of opposition. As a result, the policy implication of this argument is that leaders would be better off if they choose to improve the protection of labor rights. Our simple formal model demonstrates that the second argument is more likely to be the case. The probit analysis of 146 countries from 1984 to 2004 bears out this prediction. We also find that this relationship is stronger in non-democracies than in democracies. Our study appears to provide some support to Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2005) statement that policies that are good for political survival may not necessarily be good for the economy.