Re-Evaluating ‘Best Interests’ in the Wake of Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust & Anors

In Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust, the latest of a number of cases concerning whether a child can travel abroad for treatment that doctors in the UK do not consider to be in their best interests, the High Court held that the hospital had acted unlawfully by failing to consider the child's rights under EU law when refusing to allow her to travel. Although this derogation could be justified on public policy grounds, as such treatment was, on the facts, in her best interests, no further interference with her rights was justified. In making this finding, the court recognised the ‘stress’ that such a case placed on the best interests test, lending weight to the argument for moving instead to a risk of significant harm threshold for judicial intervention in parental decisions, which better accounts for legitimate differences of value and strikes a better balance under Article 8 ECHR.     

Unjust Enrichment in the ‘Fairchild Enclave’ International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance plc

In International Energy Group v Zurich Insurance, the Supreme Court considered the implications of the special rule in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd for insurers’ for employers’ liability. The question for the Court was whether, in the light of its earlier decision in Durham v BAI (Run off) Ltd, insurers could be held liable for employees’ mesothelioma claims, even if the employer was not insured throughout the period of employment. The seven Justices unanimously held that insurers’ liability was proportionate to the period of insurance. In reaching that result, the majority recognised that the insurers were entitled to ‘equitable recoupment’ from insured‐employers in respect of periods during which they were uninsured. This note critiques the recoupment right with an unjust enrichment lens.     

Dryden v Johnson Matthey: The Boundaries of Actionable Damage

In Dryden v Johnson Matthey, the claimants sought to recover in tort for becoming sensitised to platinum salts by the defendant's negligence. The Supreme Court found, unanimously, that merely becoming sensitised, as opposed to developing an allergic reaction, sufficed as actionable damage. However, the court only provided two ‘indicative factors’ for when damage was ‘actionable’: whether there had been some impairment, and whether the effect of that impairment was ‘more than negligible’. This approach is unclear, in tension with other parts of the judgment, and produces undesirable broader consequences. It misses an opportunity for the Court to provide guidance on developments in tort like preventive damages, claimant‐specific loss, and the broader raison d'être of tort. A narrow and constrained adjustment to the law to permit recovery in negligence of pure economic loss for preventive damage could have achieved the same result without relying on somewhat convoluted mental gymnastics.     

Abandoning the common law: medical negligence, genetic tests and wrongful life in the Australian High Court

The Australian High Court recently found that the common law could allow parents to claim tortious damages when medical negligence was proven to have led to the birth of an unplanned, but healthy, baby (Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1). In Harriton v Stephens (2006) 80 ALJR 791; [2006] HCA 15 and Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan (2006) 80 ALJR 846; [2006] HCA 16 the High Court in a six-to-one decision (Kirby J dissenting) decided that no such claim could be made by a child when medical negligence in failing to order an in utero genetic test caused the child severe disability. In an era when almost all pregnancies will soon require patented fetal genetic tests as part of the professional standard of care, the High Court, by barring so-called "wrongful life" (better termed "wrongful suffering") claims, may have created a partial immunity from suit for their corporate manufacturers and the doctors who administer them. What lessons can be learnt from this case about how the Australian High Court is, or should be, approaching medical negligence cases and its role as guardian of the Australian common law?     

Assessing the best interests of the child in cases of cross-border surrogacy: inconsistency in the Strasbourg approach?

This article examines the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to assessing the best interests of the child in three recent cases of cross-border surrogacy, namely Mennesson v France, Labassee v France and Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy. It is argued that these cases reveal inconsistency in the ECtHR’s assessment of the best interests of the child. In Mennesson and Labassee, the ECtHR found that the national authorities’ refusal to legally recognise the relationships between the children and the intended parents amounted to a violation of Article 8 ECHR, whereas no violation was found in Paradiso. A notable distinguishing feature of Paradiso was that there was no genetic relationship between the child and the intended parents, and it is this point that seemingly led the Court to assess the best interests of that child differently to the others.     

Why wrongful birth actions are right

A wrongful birth action is a claim in negligence brought by parents of a child against a doctor who has "wrongfully" caused their child to be born. These claims can be divided into two categories: those where a doctor performs a failed sterilisation procedure that leads to a healthy child being born; and those where a doctor fails to provide sufficient information to allow parents to choose to abort a handicapped child. The recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 77 ALJR 1312 falls into the former category. The decision to allow the parents to receive damages for the costs of raising and maintaining their child has generated much public debate. Despite the endorsement of this "wrongful birth" action, there are indications that the legislature will overturn the decision. This article examines whether there is a sound doctrinal basis for recognising wrongful birth actions.     

A five-year gender equality score card for the Philippine Supreme Court under its first woman Chief Justice: opportunities seized and missed

ABSTRACT

On 24 August 2012, the Honourable Maria Lourdes Sereno was appointed Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, the first woman to hold such position since its establishment in 1901. Several cases involving important women’s issues decided during her term were reviewed in this work, inspired by the possibility that a young, brilliant and hardworking woman of humble beginnings sitting at the helm could make a difference. Indeed, the Chief Justice manifested commendable grit in registering meaningful dissent in Imbong v. Ochoa, where she championed women’s bodily autonomy, and when she wrote a provocative concurrence in Vinuya v. Romulo, where she gave hope to women who suffered wartime atrocities. However, she missed an opportunity to put the rape shield law into good use in deciding People v. Batuhan and Lacturan. Her concurrence was also disappointing in Garcia v. Drilon, where she favoured rational basis review over intermediate level of scrutiny for gender-based classification, in People v. Jumawan where a conviction for marital rape was based on romantic paternalism, in People v. Palotes where additional compensatory damages were not considered for a rape victim who bore a child, in People v. Tionloc where acquittal was based on rape myths, and in People v. Caoili where the Court refused to call rape by its ugly name.     

MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd: The Practical Benefit Doctrine Marches On

In MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd the Court of Appeal held that when an ongoing contract is varied so that one party's obligation to pay money is reduced, the variation is binding as long as the other party receives a practical benefit. In doing so, the Court of Appeal effectively confined the rule in Foakes v Beer to one‐off payments. This raises serious questions about the continued survival of Foakes v Beer. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal ensured that Foakes v Beer would not be killed off via equity by moving away from the suggestion in Collier v P & M J Wright (Holdings) Ltd that an agreed part‐payment of a debt by a debtor will always raise an estoppel preventing the creditor from demanding the remainder of the debt.     

Adoption,Homosexuality and the European Convention on Human Rights: Gas and Dubois v France

On 15 March 2012 the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) issued its first judgment addressing the differential treatment of same‐sex and opposite‐sex couples in respect of the adoption of a child. 1 The Court held that excluding same‐sex couples in civil partnerships, who have no legal right to marry, from adoption provisions available to married opposite‐sex couples does not violate rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). I argue that the Court's reasoning in Gas and Dubois v France is unpersuasive and unsustainable in light of its wider case law.     

Consent to Treatment for Transgender Youth: The Next Chapter – Bell & Anor v The Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust & Ors

In September 2021, the Court of Appeal reversed the controversial decision of Quincy Bell v Tavistock and Portman NHS Trust in a victory for transgender rights. At first instance, the Divisional Court had set a high legal threshold for transgender children to attain Gillick competence to consent to treatment with puberty blockers – effectively restricting access to treatment for many. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that children are capable in law of giving valid consent to treatment for gender dysphoria, and court authorisation would not be routinely required before children could access such treatment. This note considers the implications of the Court of Appeal decision for the law on minors and consent to medical treatment in the transgender health context.     

Exemplary Damages in Equity: A Law and Economics Perspective

In Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298, the NewSouth Wales Court of Appeal held that exemplary (or punitive)damages are not available for breach of fiduciary duty or otherequitable obligation. The decision runs counter to authoritiesin Canada, New Zealand and some U.S. states. Punitive (exemplary)damages is a hotly debated topic in the United States and ithas attracted considerable interest among law and economicsscholars, particularly in the tort litigation context. Thisarticle analyzes the Digital Pulse case from a law and economicsperspective. Polinsky and Shavell (among others) argue thatthe function of punitive damages is to achieve optimal deterrencein cases where the probability that the plaintiff will discoverand successfully litigate the defendant’s wrongdoing isless than 1. Given the high costs of monitoring fiduciary behaviour,it might be tempting to conclude that exemplary damages shouldbe routinely awarded for breach of fiduciary obligation. Thearticle explains why this view is wrong. On the other hand,given the availability of gains-based remedies (the accountof profits and the like) for breach of fiduciary obligation,it might be tempting to conclude that exemplary damages arenever justified in fiduciary cases. The article explains whythis view is wrong too. The main conclusions are that: (1) exemplarydamages should be available for breach of fiduciary duty andthe like, but not as a matter of course; and (2) exemplary damageswere probably not warranted in Digital Pulse itself.     

Remedies for Breach of Trust

The decision of the Supreme Court in AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co confirms the approach taken by Lord Browne‐Wilkinson in Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns: where a trustee misapplies trust assets, a beneficiary is limited to a claim for equitable compensation for losses caused by the trustee's breach of duty. This seems to be a departure from traditional equitable doctrine, which held that the beneficiary could falsify the trustee's unauthorised disbursement and bring a claim for an ‘equitable debt’. This note considers the impact of the decision of the Supreme Court, and how the law regarding ‘equitable compensation’ might continue to develop.     

Attribution and the Illegality Defence

In Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) all seven judges of the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal by holding that the illegality defence could not be raised as a defence against the claim made by the company because the wrongdoing of the directors and shareholder cannot be attributed to the company. Although all the judges unanimously agreed on the outcome of the case, their reasoning concerning the approach to attribution and the different circumstances under which attribution should or should not take place differed. Further, the Supreme Court was divided on the issue of the correct approach to the illegality defence.     

Michael H. v. Gerald D.

The author attempts to apply semiotic analysis to a question of family law. By examining the language used by the Supreme Court in the title case, Michael H. v. Gerald D., along with the case briefs, lower court opinions, other Supreme Court cases and prior legal scholarship, the author attempts to determine the requisite relationships between father–child and father–mother in order for a legal tie to exist between a father and his biological child. The author tries to not only determine the necessary circumstances but also the political ideology that distinguishes these familial ties. The author further attempts to analyze the goals of these underlying political ideologies.     

The Hermeneutics of the Concept of Misrepresentation: Addressing the Quagmire of Damages and Compensation in Cases of Misrepresentation in Formation of a Contract Under Indian and English Law

In England, fraudulent misrepresentation is governed by English common law and damages are provided under the Tort of Deceit whereas negligent and innocent misrepresentation is governed by the Misrepresentation Act, 1967. In India, fraud is governed by s 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (ICA) and misrepresentation by s 18 of the ICA. Notably, unlike in England where the remedies for fraud and misrepresentation are provided at separate avenues, in India, the relief to the innocent party in both cases is provided under s 19 of the ICA. This article discusses fraudulent misrepresentation & negligent/innocent misrepresentation and the quantification of damages thereof in contracts under the two legal regimes mentioned above. To that extent, the authors attempt to illustrate certain nuanced differences between the two legal regimes while also highlighting the similarities between English law and Indian law. For the purposes of this article, the authors refer to the Misrepresentation Act, 1967 and the seminal judgments of Derry v Peek, Doyle v Olby, East v Maurer and Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v Scrimgeour Vickers and discuss the “date of transaction rule” as enunciated by Lord Steyn while juxtaposing it with the judgments of the High Court of Delhi, and the Supreme Court of India. In the Indian context, the authors highlight the position of law as is apparent from two recent judgments of the Delhi High Court in NHAI v Pune Sholapur Road Development and Daiichi Sankyo v Malvinder Mohan Singh and Ors and also focus on the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Avitel Post Stuidoz v HSBC Holdings (Mauritius).

     

Ideological Neutrality in the Workplace

This note assesses the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Achbita v G4S Secure Solutions NV and Bougnaoui v Micropole SA, the first cases dealing with religious discrimination under the Equal Treatment Directive 2000/43. Both cases concerned Muslim women wishing to express their religious beliefs by wearing an Islamic headscarf while working in a private undertaking. The Court held that the employees’ dismissal could not be justified by reference to clients’ prejudices against the headscarf. However, dismissal could be justified if pursued on the basis of a corporate policy of ideological neutrality which prohibited all visible religious, political and philosophical symbols. This note criticises the latter part of the Court's decision for, inter alia, placing too much weight on an employer's freedom to run its business in spite of the grave effects this has on employees’ fundamental right to manifest their beliefs at work.     

Peacekeepers Facilitating Human Rights Violations: The Liability of the Dutch State in the Mothers of Srebrenica Cases

This article provides a critical reading of the judgments of The Hague District Court and especially The Hague Court of Appeal in the case of Mothers of Srebrenica v. the State of the Netherlands, which concerned the liability in tort of the Dutch State for facilitating the massacre of Bosnian Muslims in 1995. It engages with the courts’ considerations regarding the attribution of conduct to the State in UN peacekeeping operations, the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, the State obligation to prevent genocide, and the State’s liability for damages. While not fully agreeing with the courts’ argumentation, the author concludes that the judgments contribute to the refinement of the law and practice of State responsibility in respect of wrongful acts committed in complex multinational peace operations.

     

Two Steps Forward,One Step Back: One Step (Support) LTD v Morris‐Garner and Another

One Step is an important decision that deals with the circumstances in which a claimant may recover damages in contract on the so‐called Wrotham Park basis, valued as the amount that would hypothetically have been negotiated between willing parties to release the defendant from his obligation. This note argues that, although the Supreme Court was right not to award damages on this basis in this case, the test laid down by their Lordships for when such damages are available is unclear and will be difficult to apply.     

Crawford v. Washington One Year Later: Its Practical Effects in Child Abuse and Domestic Violence Cases

A year after the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the maelstrom that many legal scholars anticipated has failed to materialize. Crawford's abrogation of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and its articulation of the new standard for determining when the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause applies to out‐of‐court statements, has had less effect than some predicted, regarding which statements are admissible and which are excluded. This article explores Crawford's practical effect as courts around the country have applied it, particularly in the context of child abuse and domestic violence cases.     

Factual causation in medical negligence

The conventional approach to causation in negligence is the "but for" test, decided on the balance of probabilities. Even when supplemented by the "material contribution" principle, satisfying the onus of proof of causation can be an insuperable obstacle for plaintiffs, particularly in medical cases. Yet, having found a breach of duty, a court's sympathies may gravitate toward the plaintiff at this point in the case. Accordingly, courts have sometimes accepted a relaxation of strict causation principles. The judicial devices are described: a special principle of causation in particular duties of care; a shifting burden of proof; "bridging the evidentiary gap" by drawing a robust inference of causation; treating a material increase in risk as sufficient proof of causation; and permitting causation to be established on the basis of the loss of a material chance of achieving a better outcome and discounting damages. In Accident Compensation Corp v Ambros [2007] NZCA 304 the New Zealand Court of Appeal recognised the need for a legal device to ameliorate the injustice sometimes caused by the strict rules of causation, and preferred the "inferential reasoning" approach favoured by the Canadian common law for use in the context of the accident compensation scheme. It is hoped that the New Zealand Supreme Court approves Ambros if the opportunity arises.