The Damage Done: Cocaine Methods in Detroit

The pro-competitive antitrust doctrine has originated in the free-market economies of Western capitalist countries but with economic transformations in Eastern Europe the doctrine ceased to be an exclusive Western concept. Using the example of the Polish law on combating Trust in the National Economy of 1987, the author demonstrates the spread of the antitrust doctrine from capitalism to socialism. Apart from these changes, the doctrine has been spreading on the international level because increasingly it has found application not only within particular countries but also with regard to trade and commerce between and among countries. The multidimensional nature of the antitrust doctrine has important implications for combating both domestic and international antitrust crime. The efficiency of efforts to combat abuse of a dominant market position, limiting access to the market or other forms of restraining competition will depend increasingly on the degree to which organs responsible for fighting antitrust crimes are willing to benefit from the multi-dimensional nature of the antitrust doctrine.     

相关市场的界定——判断垄断力存在与否的核心

政府反垄断部门提起反垄断诉讼的一个重要依据是相对方拥有巨大的市场份额,而“市场份额”是一个极为复杂且难以精确的概念,其计算需要对竞争性的“市场”进行深入的分析,以确定竞争的区域;本文将市场按产品市场与地理市场进行了界定,确定了竞争的范围。同时考察了潜在竞争对市场优势者行为选择的关键性意义。     

Certificate-of-need in an antitrust context

Recent cases such as National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City have found that certificate-of-need (CON) legislation did not intend to remove antitrust considerations. This note discusses the exemptions from antitrust provided by the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown as well as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, both of which appear to protect provider input into the CON process. Providing information that assists decision-making must be carefully distinguished from providing data that serve the interests of physicians and hospitals.     

The state action doctrine and the Local Government Antitrust Act: the restructured public hospital model

This Article analyzes the development and complexities of the antitrust state action doctrine and the Local Government Antitrust Act as these doctrines apply to both "municipalities" and private entities. The restructuring of a public hospital is used as a model to facilitate the antitrust analysis. The restructuring model, which typically involves the leasing of a hospital facility by a public entity to a private nonprofit corporation, offers the unique opportunity to compare the different standards employed under the state action doctrine and the Local Government Antitrust Act. As a practical matter, the Article provides a framework for a public hospital to evaluate the impact of corporate restructuring on its antitrust liability exposure and to develop strategies to minimize antitrust risks.     

Applying antitrust law to nonprofit healthcare entities: arguments for a greater attention to detail

This Article begins with an antitrust primer, then analyzes the appropriate application of antitrust principles to nonprofit healthcare providers. In light of the inherent charitable character of nonprofit healthcare providers, the author contends that the government and the courts should accord some deference to nonprofit hospitals when they are seeking approval of mergers. To date, this has not generally been the case, although a few recent court decisions have rested their approval of mergers, in part, upon the nonprofit character of the merging entities. The author, in particular, believes the paradigmatic local nonprofit hospital with a community board is less likely than a for-profit hospital to abuse any market power that it may obtain through a merger; consequently, any such merger should not be analyzed solely under the traditional presumptions of antitrust jurisprudence. Rather, the premerger analysis should involve meaningful consideration of the hospital's charitable character.     

论班轮公会反垄断豁免法

对世界上主要航运国家相关立法及国际公约的规定进行了比较研究,详细分析了班轮公会哪些行动和相关协议享有反垄断法豁免权以及其附加义务,最后对中国正在制定的《航运法》提出了相关立法建议。     

论中国反垄断执法机构的设置

以维护自由公平竞争秩序为己任的反垄断法是现代市场经济的基本法律之一,而其功能的有效发挥离不开一个权威、独立的执法机构。反垄断执法机构的科学设置及其职责的合理确定是中国反垄断法制建设中的重要一环,也是行政管理学和行政法学中的一个重要问题。本文首先分析国外反垄断执法机关的设置及其职能,作为我国反垄断执法机关的设计参考。在确定中国反垄断执法机构的设置时要考虑到反垄断法本身的特点、现有相关机构的设置情况以及外国经验的比较借鉴等因素,通过中西方政府职能的发展比较,对我国反垄断执行机构的地位作出合理的定位。最后,我国反垄断执法机关的设置,要遵循权威独立、依法设置、精干效能等原则。据此,不宜在现有机构中指定反垄断执法机构,而应该单独创设专门的执法机构,其可以称为"国家反垄断委员会"或"国家公平交易委员会",并只在中央和省两级设立。这是由于反垄断法更注重维护宏观经济秩序、防止市场竞争不足从而具有政策性、灵活性和行政主导性的特点决定的。这样的机构应拥有调查检查权、审核批准权、行政处罚权、行政强制措施权和行政裁决权,并应拥有对地方各级政府及其部门和国务院各部门的限制竞争行为(行政垄断行为)直接进行处理的权力。     

标准化与反垄断问题研究

本文首先通过对标准化市场效应的分析 ,表明标准化同样也应当进行反垄断的法律分析 ,然后作者以美国为例 ,详细阐述了美国在这方面的法律规制制度。在此基础上 ,作者对美国制度中的不足进行了评判 ,作为本文论旨之所在 ,本文最后提出了我国标准化反垄断的法律对策。     

The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute

The antitrust laws demand competition but, in general, no competitive outcome is possible in markets characterized by substantial fixed costs. Consequently, restrictions on competition may have an efficiency defense, and a prohibition of cartel agreements may entail costs as well as benefits. Giving examples, this essay illustrates the problem that fixed costs pose for competition, long recognized in economics, and discusses implications for real-world industries. The author addresses Wiley's recent criticism of theoretical and empirical work on the fixed cost problem and outlines an agenda for legal research that can help illuminate the underlying economic and antitrust policy issues posed by industries with high fixed costs.     

Defending hospital mergers after the FTC's unorthodox challenge to the Evanston Northwestern--Highland Park transaction

Examining the Federal Trade Commission's retrospective challenge of a hospital merger in Illinois, the author provides an insightful analysis of one of the agency's major antitrust enforcement initiatives in health care in the last several years. Because the case produced several departures from antitrust orthodoxy, these departures may affect the trials of future hospital mergers that are challenged. The author reviews the methodology and evidence of the case, and he identifies theories and best practices that are important for administrators and legal practitioners to implement in future mergers.     

Why don't courts treat hospitals like tanks for liquefied gases? Some reflections on health care antitrust enforcement

In this article, I use the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 2004 report Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition as an occasion to comment on two specific issues that have arisen in health care antitrust: the recent string of losses by the enforcement agencies in hospital merger cases and an antitrust exemption for physicians to bargain collectively with health insurers. One of the more salient facts about health care antitrust enforcement is the notable recent lack of success of the enforcement agencies in hospital merger cases. This may be due to judges and juries holding views of hospital markets as being different from markets for other goods and services. My conclusion is that hospitals are an industry with unique attributes, but nothing about the specifics of the health care industry suggests that the unregulated use of market power in this industry is socially beneficial. As a consequence, the antitrust laws should be enforced here as in any other industry. Countervailing power is an issue that has come to the fore in health care antitrust. Physicians have explicitly asked for legislative exemption from the antitrust laws in order to bargain collectively with insurance companies, as a means of counteracting insurers' monopsony power. It is not clear that health insurers possess significant monopsony power. Even if they do, bestowing monopoly power on physicians will not necessarily improve matters. Active antitrust enforcement in insurance markets is the correct response, not blanket exemptions for providers.     

Applied difficulties of conditions for bail pending trial and institutional solutions

In the domain of bail pending trial in China, there is a deep-cutting tension in bail pending trial between the practical conditions in judicial practice and the legal conditions established by legal authorities. Based on the data and information collected, this article investigates the conditions of bail pending trial in the aspects of rules and facts, and looks for an institutional solution to reconstruct the system of bail pending trial that can realize the interaction between the facts and rules. __________ Translated from Susongfa Lilun Yu Shijian 诉讼法理论与实践 (Theory and Practice of Procedure Law), 2005, (9): 374–382     

Estimating damages from price-fixing: the value of transaction data

We use a unique private data set of about 340,000 invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive.     

Blockchain governance: The missing piece in the competition puzzle

Antitrust law deals with economic matters as if they were all industrial processes, that is, processes through which companies transform inputs into outputs. In this sense, we could say that antitrust law is still a Nineteenth Century law, even when it comes to platforms that transform digital data into services.For this reason, when we look at blockchains through the lenses of antitrust law, they are either framed as the result of an industrial process (the blockchain as an output) or as a means that allows the development of an industrial process (the blockchain as a tool). However, these two pieces do not complete the puzzle: they do not say much about the competitive impact of blockchains. Studying the operating mechanisms of blockchains and, in particular, their governance, one realizes that the puzzle must acquire a new piece: the information on who controls the blockchain. This piece of information reveals that even dominant blockchains, which are still nowhere to be seen, could be harmless if truly devoid of any central authority and that even strategic exchanges of information via permissioned blockchains should not trigger any antitrust liability, if blockchains’ administrators managed to allow the exchange only among non-competing participants.     

Contesting anticompetitive actions taken in the name of the state: state action immunity and health care markets

The so-called state action doctrine is a judicially created formula for resolving conflicts between federal antitrust policy and state policies that seem to authorize conduct that antitrust law would prohibit. Against the background of recent commentaries by the federal antitrust agencies, this article reviews the doctrine and discusses its application in the health care sector, focusing on the ability of states to immunize anticompetitive actions by state licensing and regulatory boards, hospital medical staffs, and public hospitals, as well as anticompetitive mergers and agreements. Although states are free, as sovereign governments, to restrict competition, the state action doctrine requires that "the state itself" make the decision to do so. Partly on the basis of problems in the political environment, the article criticizes courts for using a mere "foreseeability" test to decide whether a state legislature sufficiently authorized competitors to act in contravention of clear federal policy: "Few things are more foreseeable than that a trade or profession empowered to regulate itself will produce anticompetitive regulations."     

The Trouble with Boycotts: Can Fossil Fuel Divest Campaigns Be Prohibited?

Organizations like 350.org, Insure Our Future, and DivestInvest are leading campaigns to urge boycott and divestment from fossil fuels as a means to address climate change. Increasingly, they are finding success, from individual consumers to massive pension and sovereign wealth funds. However, as organized group boycotts, divest campaigns may be vulnerable to prosecution under antitrust law. This article explores the likelihood of success in such a case, considering the history of the legal treatment of organized boycotts, the scope and purpose of antitrust law, and the possible application of the First Amendment to the divestment context. The article finds that fossil fuel boycotts straddle a number of contradictory characteristics, making application of existing theories inadequate. In particular, existing precedent protects political boycotts, but not those with primarily economic objectives, and fails to definitively address whether a noncompetitive actor may undertake concerted action under antitrust law. In the context of climate change, where the political is economic, and political goals may seek significant economic changes (such as undermining an entire industry), existing theories may lead to a result that threatens both free expression and the health of the planet. The essential flexibility of the Sherman Act, however, provides room for protection of political activity, even where the ultimate objective is economic in nature.     

Antitrust Law and Distributive Politics in the American States

State enforcement by state attorneys general (AGs) has become a major component of American antitrust law. Much has been written about state antitrust enforcement, but existing accounts of AG incentives and behavior are incomplete. As elected officials in forty‐three states, AGs must represent their constituents and, therefore, will be drawn to cases that maximize the level of settlement reward—cases with large, wealthy defendants. I hypothesize and find that state AGs represent their constituents along ideological lines, but this relationship is conditioned by case characteristics that involve the potential settlement reward. Moreover, incentives to participate are likely to be higher when there are clear violations of the law, as in price‐fixing cases, rather than in merger cases, where no wrongdoing has necessarily been established. The study adds to our understanding of antitrust law but also has implications for how distributive politics shapes political responsiveness to the electorate.     

The economic analysis of antitrust consents

Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques.     

The institutional-evolutionary antitrust model

The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative antitrust model to the mainstream model that is used in competition policy. I call it the Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model. In order to construct an antitrust model one needs both empirical knowledge and considerations of how to adequately deal with norms. The analysis of competition as an evolutionary process that unfolds within legal rules provides the empirical foundation for the model. The development of the normative dimension involves the elaboration of a comparative approach. Building on those foundations the main features of the Institutional-Evolutionary Model are sketched out and it is shown that its use leads to systematically different outcomes and conclusions than the dominant antitrust ideals. JEL Classification B52. D83. K21     

共同诉讼抑或群体诉讼——评我国代表人诉讼的性质

我国《民事诉讼法》司法解释将该法第54条规定的代表人诉讼界定为共同诉讼是值得商榷的。如果按此推论,该法第55条确立的代表人诉讼又处于“休眠”状态的情况下,我国就基本上没有什么群体诉讼了,这显然不符合实际情况,也与法院每年处理几十万件群体诉讼案件的统计数字不符。从其产生所适应的条件、所借鉴的国外同类制度以及自身的特点和功能来看,我国《民事诉讼法》确立的两种代表人诉讼均已突破了共同诉讼的范畴,在性质上都应属于单一诉讼和共同诉讼之外的第三种诉讼形式——群体诉讼。