Rational Choice and Politics

The rational-choice approach brings scientific deductive methods to bear on politics. Appropriate methods are derived from physics, when actors interact probabilistically but non-rationally, and from game theory when they interact rationally. Collective action problems occur in the provision of public goods. As policies are themselves public goods, this leads to the game-theoretic analysis of voting, bureaucracy and lobbies. It is inconsistent to believe that economic actors are basically self-interested but that political actors are not. Rather, one should treat people as equally (not necessarily wholly) self-interested in each sphere. The paradoxes of social choice are then shown to have important implications for political science.     

Electoral Choice

ABSTRACT

The study examines the electoral psychology of voters, focusing on voters' locus of control, perceived risk, voter decision involvement and electoral control and positive affect as determinants of political satisfaction and voting stability in elections. The results indicated that locus of control influences voters' perceived risk and feelings of electoral control in elections. Further, locus of control and perceived risk influence voter decision involvement, which in turn influences perceived electoral control. Also, voter decision involvement and positive affect influence satisfaction. These, in turn, influence the propensity to vote for the same candidate or party over time (stability of voting behavior).     

Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice

The paper contrasts the liberal conception of democracy as the aggregation of individual preferences with the deliberative conception of democracy as a process of open discussion leading to an agreed judgement on policy. Social choice theory has identified problems - the arbitrariness of decision rules, vulnerability to strategic voting - which are often held to undermine democratic ideals. Contrary to common opinion, I argue that deliberative democracy is less vulnerable to these difficulties than liberal democracy. The process of discussion tends to produce sets of policy preferences that are 'single peaked'; and within a deliberative setting it may be possible to vary the decision rule according to the nature of the issue to be decided.     

Choice, Responsibility and Equality

Should responsibility for disadvantage constitute a matter of fundamental concern for egalitarians? An important strand of contemporary egalitarian thought – a strand that Elizabeth Anderson calls 'luck equality'– argues that responsibility for disadvantage should constitute a decisive concern for any acceptable egalitarian theory. Luck equality therefore requires a defensible account of responsibility; and disagreements regarding the nature and extent of responsibility for disadvantage have become central in the egalitarian literature. Anderson argues that luck equality's focus on responsibility reflects a misunderstanding of the point of equality. If persuasive, her argument would establish that egalitarian thought may do without a defensible account of responsibility. Although she fails to establish this claim, she does argue persuasively that luck equality employs the notion of responsibility overly strenuously. Her critique suggests that egalitarians must qualify their acceptance of the precept that 'genuine choice excuses otherwise unacceptable inequalities'.     

Rational Choice and Dysfunctional Institutions

As stated elsewhere in this issue, we cannot claim to explain an institution's origin just by the functions it serves. In part thismay be because of the cognitive limitations of those actors who are instrumental in institutional formation and institutional change. But even more clearly, it is the case that rational instrumental choice does not imply functional institutions. Just as rational choice in a prisoner's dilemma may result in inefficient policies, rational choice by actors with conflicting preferencesfor institutions may result in institutions that are suboptimal. Examples of rational choice explanations of dysfunctional institutions are provided in the area of bureaucracy, regulation, healthcare, and budgeting. I argue that the paradoxes and impossibility results of rational choice theory offer the best insights currently available into the persistent inefficiencies of the world ofpolitics.     

Gordon Tullock and Public Choice

Gordon Tullock is one of the founders of the field of public choice, of the Public Choice Society, and of the Public Choice Center. He is a coauthor with James M. Buchanan of one of the true classics in the public choice field—The Calculus of Consent. He has been one of the field’s most prolific scholars, with his research spanning virtually all dimensions of the public choice field. This article surveys his major contributions.     

Consideration and Choice: Analyzing Party Choice in the Swedish European Election 2014

For a long time the question of to what extent party choice in the European Parliament (EP) elections is primarily dependent on voters’ orientations towards the European Union (EU) or just a mere reflection of orientations towards issues and actors in national politics has been debated. By combining insights from individual‐level models of party choice in second‐order elections with theories of sequential decision making this article investigates if, how and at what stages in the decision process attitudes to European integration matters for party choice. In line with previous work on first and second decision rule criteria in EP elections, this article develops and tests hypotheses about how voters’ orientations work at different stages of the voter decision process. The findings, based on Swedish data from a probability‐based three‐wave Internet campaign panel, indicate that many voters are in fact considering more than one party to vote for in the beginning of the election campaign. As expected, left‐right orientations function as a main decision rule with respect to which parties voters even consider voting for, while proximity on the European integration dimension mainly matters as a second decision rule in the final stage of the decision process. Using a sequential model with consideration and choice stages, the article reveals a much larger complimentary effect of EU proximity on party choice than has generally been found in previous research. This serves as a distinct contribution to the emerging research field of individual party choice in second‐order elections.     

Emotion and the Framing of Risky Choice

One of the most noted phenomena in social and political decision-making is the occurrence of a framing effect. For example, on problems involving risky choices, individuals tend to act risk-averse when the problem is framed in terms of gains (e.g., saving lives, making money) and risk-seeking when the same problem is instead framed in terms of losses (e.g., deaths, losing money). Scholars have begun to identify the processes underlying framing effects as well as the conditions under which framing effects occur. Yet, extant work focuses nearly exclusively on cognitive processes, despite growing recognition of the importance of emotion in general decision-making tasks. In this paper, we explore the impact of emotional states on risk attitudes and framing. We find that emotions significantly influence both individuals’ tendencies to take risks and the impact of a frame on risky choices (e.g., emotions amplify or depress a frame’s impact). The precise role of emotions depends on the problem domain (e.g., a life-death or a financial decision), and the specific type of emotion under study. Moreover, in contrast to much work in political science, we show that emotions need to be distinguished beyond their positive or negative valence, as different negative emotions exert opposite effects. Our results accentuate the importance of integrating emotions into research areas traditionally dominated by more cognitive perspectives.

Childcare Policies and the Politics of Choice

Governments have intervened in two basic ways on childcare: via the provision of leaves to care (usually taken by mothers) and the provision or (often only partial) financing of childcare services. These policy options reflect the fundamental debate on how young children should be cared for. Labour has developed both policy areas since 1997, but there is a question mark over how far mothers and fathers have a ‘real choice’ to work and/or to care. Parents' choice in this policy area is a sensitive political issue and, this article suggests, requires a careful balancing of policy instruments. Policy goals may conflict with preferences and there is also the difficult issue that parents' choices may prejudice their future welfare in a work/welfare system that is tending to assume that there will be increasing capacity for self‐provisioning.     

Unemployment and Party Choice in Norway

By the late 1980s, the absolute number of jobless in Norway had reached the same level as that during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Unemployment in the 1930s is known to have had an impact on party choice. Among those hit by unemployment in the 1980s, however, we no longer find a strong correlation between unemployment and party choice. This situation constitutes the point of departure for this article. The relationship between joblessness and party choice is investigated on the basis of four hypotheses: (i) The incumbency thesis , which suggests that the incumbent party receives support in accordance with fluctuations in economic conditions - i. e. it is punished in bad times and rewarded in prosperous times, (ii) The policy thesis , which predicts that voters concerned about unemployment prefer the Labour Party, (iii) The social composition thesis , which argues that the fluctuations between unemployment and party choice are simply due to changes in the social composition of the unemployed, (iv) The generation thesis , which underscores that the impact of unemployment on party choice varies according to historical generation. Confronted with empirical evidence, the social composition thesis is rejected. Likewise, support for the policy thesis has gradually vanished. Some empirical support is given to the incumbency thesis . In the end, however, the generation thesis appears to be the most relevant.     

Rational Choice and the Policy Sciences

This article discusses the possibility of applying deductively based rational choice theories as analytical tools for understanding complex policy problems. It surveys the basic assumptions, axioms and rules of interpretation on which the theory is constructed and some of its important findings. Two of its more interesting results, that of the "paradox of voting" and of the "prisoner's dilemma," are presented and applied herein.     

收入风险与个人职业选择——基于风险态度的研究

本文采用"北京市企事业单位职工就业状况调查"的数据,对北京市国有部门和私人部门职工的收入风险、风险态度与其职业选择之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现:越愿意冒风险的个体,越不会选择去国有部门工作,这反映了风险态度对个人职业选择的影响;个人选择在国有部门工作,主要是考虑到收入、工作压力、社会地位、工作稳定性这四个因素;就我们的调查样本而言,只有受过较高教育程度(硕士及以上)的个体选择私人部门工作才获得了收入风险补偿。据此,文章提出了完善劳动力市场的政策建议。     

Religion and Party Choice in Europe

This paper investigates religiosity in relation to party choice in European Parliament elections. Conventional wisdom tells us that as Europe has secularised, the effect of religion on party choice should also have diminished. Yet, this cross-national and cross-temporal study of religious voting in European elections from 1989 to 2004 paints a more nuanced picture. It shows that a) the effect of religion has been declining, but has increased in recent years, b) religion matters in particular for voting for Christian Democratic parties and Conservative parties, c) while generational replacement reduces the overall effect of religion on electoral decisions, the effect of religion has recently increased within each generation, and d) the impact of religion depends on the religious context in which citizens live so that religion plays a bigger role in fractionalised societies. These findings are discussed in the light of a revived importance of religion for European politics.     

Risk Attitudes and Independence Vote Choice

In this article, we examine the impact of risk attitudes on vote choice in the context of a salient referendum with high levels of uncertainty about the consequences of the ballot proposal. Using data from a pre- and post-referendum panel survey conducted in the context of the 2014 independence referendum in Scotland, and a specific battery to measure attitudes to risk, we determine how these attitudes operate in such political contexts. We reach two main conclusions. First, risk attitudes have a direct effect on vote choice, even after controlling for alternative explanations of vote choice such as party identification and leaders’ evaluations. In the aggregate, the effect of risk attitudes on the vote choice contributes to the status quo bias found in referendums. Second, we find that information moderates the effect of risk attitudes on vote choice. Voters who are politically knowledgeable have a greater capacity to predict the consequences of political outcomes and, therefore, they are less affected by their risk attitudes when making their ballot choices.