Flying solo: Explaining single-party cabinets under minority presidentialism

In recent years, the comparative literature on presidential democracy has emphasised the role of coalitional politics in attenuating the ‘perils’ facing minority presidents. Yet since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratisation in 1974, a surprising number of minority presidents have eschewed cabinet coalitions (defined minimally as the awarding of at least one portfolio to a party other than the nominal party of the president). Unipartisan governments are observed just under half of the time. What explains the adoption of single-party cabinets by minority presidents? Cross-sectional time-series analysis is employed to address this question. Hypotheses are tested that relate to the size and distribution of the formateur (presidential) and largest non-formateur parties that make up the legislature; the nature of party linkages and ideological distance between the president and possible partisan allies; and the extent of reactive veto powers held by the president.     

Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals

We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge's compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge's elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge's ideological compatibility with the president, the judge's previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state "ownership" of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president's preferences.     

Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public Opinion Regarding National Security and War

Research has shown that messages of intra-party harmony tend to be ignored by the news media, while internal disputes, especially within the governing party, generally receive prominent coverage. We examine how messages of party conflict and cooperation affect public opinion regarding national security, as well as whether and how the reputations of media outlets matter. We develop a typology of partisan messages in the news, determining their likely effects based on the characteristics of the speaker, listener, news outlet, and message content. We hypothesize that criticism of a Republican president by his fellow partisan elites should be exceptionally damaging (especially on a conservative media outlet), while opposition party praise of the president should be the most helpful (especially on a liberal outlet). We test our hypotheses through an experiment and a national survey on attitudes regarding the Iraq War. The results show that credible communication (i.e., “costly” rhetoric harmful to a party) is more influential than “cheap talk” in moving public opinion. Ironically, news media outlets perceived as ideologically hostile can actually enhance the credibility of certain messages relative to “friendly” news sources.

Testing the Reciprocal Effects of Campaign Participation

Questions persist regarding the robustness of cross-sectional estimates of effects of variables that are themselves endogenous to the participation process. On one hand, the consequences of working on a campaign have interesting implications for democratic society. Less benign, however, is the possibility that failure to control for reciprocal processes leads to biased estimates of the causes of campaign participation. I use a panel of Democratic and Republican contributors interviewed following each of the past three presidential elections (1996, 2000, and 2004) to explore the relationships between campaign participation and three variables typically parameterized as predictors of participation: receiving a contact, ideological extremism, and strength of party identification. The effect of strength of party identification on campaign participation proves robust; however, I find that nearly all of the associations between contacts and participation and ideological extremism and participation appear to extend from, not into, participation and past participation.

Shattered expectations: Public responses to “out-of-character” presidential actions

Six alternative hypotheses about public responses to out-of-character presidential actions were tested in an experiment that manipulated both the president's preexisting policy position (a hawkish or a dovish stance in international affairs) and the nature of his action in an international crisis (hawkish versus dovish). In addition, subjects themselves were classified as hawks or doves. Approval of the president and of his response to the crisis was a complex function of the policy views of the subject and the consistency of the president's action with his past record. Doves supported presidents and actions that were compatible with their own dovish leanings but resented a dovish president who behaved hawkishly, generally confirming the view that similarity breeds attraction. By contrast, hawks were willing to tolerate dovish behavior if it was undertaken by a hawk, supporting the expectation that out-of-character actions are uniquely capable of disarming would-be opponents. For neither hawkish nor dovish presidents were these findings consistent with the waffling interpretation, which holds that inconsistency per se is downgraded. Compared to presidents whose actions were consistent with their previous beliefs, out-of-character presidents were preceived as more changeable, in both positive and negative senses; were believed to have disliked doing what they had done; and were judged to have been relatively uninfluenced by internal causes.     

The vice-presidential succession effect: Individual or situational basis?

Simonton (1981) found that accidental presidents do not perform as well as duly elected chief executives. Though this vice-presidential succession effect may be due to individual factors, such as some deficiency in personality or political experience, it might be due instead to situational factors, most notably the failure to be perceived as having legitimate power by those already in power positions. Three studies investigated the relative plausibility of individual and situational explanations. Study 1 examined 49 president-vice-president teams to determine the criteria by which running mates are selected. Study 2 looked at 69 leaders who served as either president, vice-president, or both, in order to discover if accidental presidents can be differentiated on biographical and political background variables. Study 3 scrutinized 100 congressional units in a time-series design to gauge the impact of serving an unelected term as president. The results most support a situational interpretation based on the attribution of legitimate power.     

Reassessing ideological bias in campaign participation

Until 1964, ideological conservatives tended to participate in presidential campaign activities at higher rates than liberals. Since then, Beck and Jennings (1980, 1984) have shown the variable nature of the participation-ideology relationship, arguing that ideologically extreme candidates have successfully mobilized their followers in particular elections. In this paper, we explain the anomaly of the 1980 election in which strong liberals participated at higher rates despite a very strong conservative on the Republican side. Using data collected over time in 1980 by the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies (CPS/NES), we broaden the Beck-Jennings model to include participation during the primary season and hypothesize that mobilization of ideological groups may result from ideological candidatesand the competitiveness or closeness of a nomination contest. We find that the ideological candidate model explains general election participation to a significant degree, while competitiveness considerations are more important for mobilization during the primaries.     

Social determinism,rationality, and partisanship among college students

This study finds high rates of defection from parental partisanship among a sample of undergraduate students at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, despite relying on students' perceptions of their parents' party loyalties, which almost certainly exaggerate agreement between students and parents. There was a much higher rate of defection among students from Republican families than among students from Democratic families. The pattern of defections from parental partisanship was consistent with the rational reevaluation hypothesis: liberal-conservative self-placement was strongly related to party identification among students from Republican families and families without a party preference.     

The Changing Finnish Democracy: Stronger Parliamentary Accountability, Coalescing Political Parties and Weaker External Constraints

Examining constitutional and political developments since the Second World War, this article shows that Finland has moved from a system dominated by the president toward a normal parliamentary democracy. Government formation is now based on partisan negotiations and the president is almost completely excluded from the policy process in domestic matters. The chain of delegation from the voters to the civil servants is thus now simpler than before and subject to fewer external constraints. In fact, Finland is probably the only West European country where parliamentary democracy has become less constrained since the 1980s. Leadership by presidents has effectively been replaced with leadership by strong majority governments, which have ruled, without much effective opposition, since the early 1980s. The stronger role of parties in shaping public policy stands in contrast to the weakening of the parties among the electorate. The ability of political parties to effectively align preferences is increasingly in doubt, as indicated by the transforming cleavage structure, lower turnout and declining party membership.     

Character Weakness,Partisan Bias,and Presidential Evaluation: Modifications and Extensions

In a recent article Goren (American Journal of Political Science, 46, 627–641, 2002) draws upon theories of negativity bias, partisan bias, and motivated reasoning to posit that the more strongly people identify with the opposition party of a presidential candidate, the more heavily they will rely on character weakness impressions to construct global candidate evaluations. This paper modifies the theoretical framework by positing that (1) partisans will judge opposition nominees most critically on the traits owned by the former’s party and (2) partisan bias promotes negativity bias in the evaluation of incumbent presidents seeking reelection and incumbent vice presidents seeking the presidency. Analysis of data from the 2000 and 2004 NES surveys, along with a reconsideration of the results from the 1984 to 1996 period covered in the original piece, yields strong empirical support for these expectations.

Party Polarization and Party Structuring of Policy Attitudes: A Comparison of Three NES Panel Studies

The conventional wisdom in the partisan change literature predicts that increasing party conflict on one issue agenda leads to a decline in party conflict on another agenda—a process called conflict displacement. We have argued that recent party politics in the United States has experienced conflict extension, with the Democratic and Republican parties in the electorate growing more polarized on cultural, racial, and social welfare issues, rather than conflict displacement. Here, we suggest that the failure of the literature to account for conflict extension results from incomplete assumptions about individual-level partisan change. The partisan change literature typically considers only issue-based change in party identification, which necessarily leads to the aggregate prediction of conflict displacement. This ignores the possibility of party-based change in issue attitudes. If party-based issue conversion does occur, the aggregate result can be conflict extension rather than conflict displacement. Our analysis uses data from the three-wave panel studies conducted by the National Election Studies in 1956, 1958, and 1960; in 1972, 1974, and 1976; and in 1992, 1994, and 1996 to assess our alternative account of individual-level partisan change. We show that when Democratic and Republican elites are polarized on an issue, and party identifiers are aware of those differences, some individuals respond by adjusting their party ties to conform to their issue positions, but others respond by adjusting their issue positions to conform to their party identification.     

The transformation of the new deal party system: Social groups,political ideology,and changing partisanship among northern whites, 1972–1988

This paper examines the partisanship of a neglected segment of the American electorate—white northerners. Like their southern counterparts, northern whites have moved toward the GOP (Grand Old Party) and away from the Democratic party during the last two decades. In fact, a substantial plurality of northern whites now identify with the Republican party. Moreover, Democratic losses and Republican gains have not been confined to particular categories of social groups but have cut across groups traditionally identified with the parties. However, political ideology is closely related to the changing partisanship of northern whites. Liberals have become more Democratic and conservatives have become substantially more Republican since 1972. Moreover, the relationship between ideology and changing partisanship occurs within most categories of social group membership, suggesting that ideological orientations now override social group ties in the formation of partisanship. The northern white electorate, in sum, is undergoing an ideological transformation that is reshaping the contours of American politics.     

Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South

Our focus is the regional political realignment that has occurred among whites over the past four decades. We hypothesize that the South's shift to the Republican party has been driven to a significant degree by racial conservatism in addition to a harmonizing of partisanship with general ideological conservatism. General Social Survey and National Election Studies data from the 1970s to the present indicate that whites residing in the old Confederacy continue to display more racial antagonism and ideological conservatism than non-Southern whites. Racial conservatism has become linked more closely to presidential voting and party identification over time in the white South, while its impact has remained constant elsewhere. This stronger association between racial antagonism and partisanship in the South compared to other regions cannot be explained by regional differences in nonracial ideology or nonracial policy preferences, or by the effects of those variables on partisanship.     

Parliamentary Election Turnout in Europe since 1990

This article examines the cross-national variations in turnout for parliamentary elections in Europe since 1990 – a continent with a vast range in turnout levels and some clear subregional patterns, especially that of low turnout in East-Central Europe. A full range of socio-economic, mobilizational, party system, institutional, and contextual factors are examined for bivariate relationships with turnout. A multivariate model then indicates that cross-national turnout is higher where there is strictly enforced compulsory voting, in polarized two-party systems and countries with a high level of party membership, and where there are no relevant elected presidents or strong regional governments. Variances on these and other key factors are what accounts for the subregional pattern of East-Central Europe and the highest turnout case of Malta; however, Switzerland is confirmed to be a significant national dummy variable.     

Gaining new insights by going local: determinants of coalition formation in mixed democratic polities

We develop a simple spatial model suggesting that Members of Parliament strive for the inclusion of the head of state’s party in coalitions formed in mixed democratic polities, and that parliamentary parties try to assemble coalitions that minimize the ideological distance to the head of state. We identify the German local level of government as functionally equivalent to a parliamentary setting, such that the directly elected mayor has competencies similar to a president in a mixed national polity. Our findings show that the party affiliation of the head of state is a key factor considered by party members in the legislature when forming coalitions: coalitions in the legislature are more likely to form if they include the party of the head of the executive branch. Furthermore, the policy preferences of the head of the executive branch matter for the legislators’ behavior in the coalition formation process: the smaller the ideological distance between the position of a coalition and the position of the head of state, the more likely a coalition is to be formed.     

Political Parties and Intergovernmental Relations in 1984: The Consequences of Party Renewal for Territorial Constituencies

Democratic and Republican efforts at party renewal have differedin approach, but both can be recognized as intergovernmentalphenomena having significant implications for American federalism.The Democratic Party's national charter and delegate selectionrules, for instance, have federalized the governing structureof the party. The national Republican Party organization hasdeveloped such a large base of financial resources andcampaignservices that state Republican parties and candidate committeeshave begun to accept national party authority along with itsmoney. Moreover, as national, state, and local parties and candidatesincreasingly coordinate their delegate selection, finance, andother campaigh activities, they may transform the decentralizedparty system that has been a protector of state and local influencewithin the federal government. National ideological constituencieswithin both party organizations may rival territorial and functionalconstituencies for the attention of federal elected officials.     

Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the Transformation of American Conservatism

Most recent Republican presidents have proposed signature federalisminitiatives intended to devolve power or sort out federal andstate functions. The Bush administration has not propoundedan explicit federalism policy of this sort, but its approachto federalism can be gleaned from analyzing presidential advocacyof legislation and constitutional amendments, fiscal policies,administrative actions, and judicial policies. What emergesfrom this analysis is an administration that has been surprisinglydismissive of federalism concerns and frequently an agent ofcentralization. In one sense, Bush is merely the latest in astring of presidents who have sacrificed federalism considerationsto specific policy goals when the two have come in conflict.However, the administration's behavior is somewhat surprising,given the president's background as a governor and the factthat he has been the first Republican president to enjoy Republicancontrol of Congress since 1954. Our explanation for the Bushapproach begins with the president's lack of any philosophicalcommitment to federalism and explores the changing status offederalism concerns within conservative ideology. Any explanationfor the Bush approach should account for this shifting politicaldynamic, which has seen Republicans in recent years become increasinglysupportive of exerting federal authority on behalf of theireconomic and social objectives, encouraging Democrats at timesto become more supportive of state authority.     

The New President Makes a Budget: From Eisenhower to Bush

Beginning with Eisenhower in 1953, newly elected presidents have proposed revisions to the budgets their predecessors submitted just before leaving office. Only Eisenhower and Reagan enjoyed substantial success in these efforts; the other four soon found that Congress has become increasingly determined to work its own will in budgetary matters. While we have only six cases of new presidents who tried to revise their predecessors' budgets, it seems clear that the two most significant determinants of success have been the personal popularity of the president and a favorable ideological (not partisan) balance in Congress.     

Institutions and the stabilization of party systems in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe

Most explanations of party system stability focus on the strength of mass-elite linkages. We highlight the role of institutions, focusing on how electoral rules and elected institutions, especially the presidency, impact elites' incentives to coordinate on a stable set of parties or to form new parties, thus affecting electoral volatility. Using Central and Eastern European elections data, we find that directly elected presidents increase volatility and that presidential power magnifies this effect. Absent a directly elected president, high district magnitude is associated with increased volatility, but district magnitude dampens the impact of an elected president on volatility; hence, our findings underscore the interactive impact of institutions on party systems. We also find evidence that bicameralism and concurrence of presidential and parliamentary elections decrease electoral volatility. Our model not only explains persistently high electoral volatility in Eastern Europe, but the extreme stability of Western European party systems.     

Presidents,Supreme Court justices,and racial equality cases: 1954–1984

This research assesses the policy success of presidents since Eisenhower in their appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court in racial equality cases from 1954–1984. The research examines presidential preferences in a much more detailed and sensitive manner than previous research. While past research has used presidential party as a measure of the policy preferences of presidents, we examine policy preferences in a very direct manner. Specifically, the preferences of presidents on racial equality issues are gauged by their public policy statements. These statements serve to tap the degree of liberalness, the level of attention, and the level of concern with judicial actions in racial equality matters. The results demonstrate that presidents have been much more successful in appointing like-minded justices than is suggested by the existing literature. In addition, it is shown that prior judicial experience is not related to presidential success. This is discussed in terms of the perennial debate over the political control of the Supreme Court and the congruence of Court policy making with majoritarian values.